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This Doctoral thesis entitled the Constitutionality of Employers' Investigative 
Procedures and Disciplinary Hearing Processes with Specific Reference to 
Dismissal of Employees on the Basis of Criminal Misconducts in South 
Africa, focusses on individual labour law principles of fair labour practices 
entrenched in section 23(1) of the Constitution. The thesis deals with 
fairness in situation where an employee who is suspected of committing a 
criminal act is investigated and subsequently goes through a disciplinary 
hearing for dismissal. It determines the extent to which an employee’s 
criminal guilt is decided before dismissal. As such, the thesis is based upon 
South African judicial interpretation of the right to fair dismissal. In the 
process the thesis examines the application of principles informing the 
employer’s duty to provide fair reason concerning the dismissal of 
employees criminal suspects. In examining if employers observe 
constitutional transformative objective when conducting criminal 
investigations and disciplinary hearings - the thesis reviews the extent to 
which the employer respects constitutional rationales of equity based on the 
principles of natural justice. These natural justice principles are the basis 
upon which section 23(1) fairness is founded. Section 23 (1) is implemented 
through the LRA provisions. The thesis then concludes that, only one 
principle of natural justice - audi alteram partem is respected within 
employer flexibility-based fairness while the other principle - nemo judex in 
propria sua causa is ignored. It is this denial that causes serious procedural 
challenges in the quest for equity intended in section 23(1) fair labour 
practices. It is upon these foundational equity concerns that this thesis 
opposes the flexibility in employer’s criminal investigations and disciplinary 
hearing processes entrenched in item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 of the LRA fair 
procedure for dismissal of employees suspected of criminal acts. The thesis 
interlinks labour law and criminal law to advocate for the missing 
constitutionally justiciable fairness for employees who have committed 
criminal misconducts. It argues that the current judicial interpretation of 
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labour law fairness is based upon the principle of flexibility underlying 
dismissals, asserting that fairness based on flexibility breeds informal 
procedural processes which exempt employers from observing crucial 
constitutional fairness principles expressed through proportionality-based 
prescripts. The thesis concludes that the practice of including the right 
against self-incrimination in employment law, done in other common law 
countries be introduced into the South African labour law through section 
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Criminal misconducts: - The term criminal misconducts is a term devised in 
this thesis to refer to criminal acts of dishonesty committed by employees 
within or without the employer premises and in turn having negative impacts 
on their employment relationship with their employer. 
 
South African Parliamentary Supremacy: - Parliamentary sovereignty (also 
called parliamentary supremacy or legislative supremacy) is a concept in 
the constitutional law of some parliamentary democracies. In South Africa 
during Common law era (before the Constitution of South Africa, 1996,) 
there was no rule of law, the legislative body which is the parliament had 
absolute sovereignty and it was supreme over all other government 
institutions, including executive or judicial bodies. The parliament repealed 
the common law through its legislative injunctions and insisted on 
positivisim to safegruard its laws against the common law judicial 
interpretation. The Judiciary due to its inferiority was prevented from 
rationalising the law or insisting on justiciability of the law. South African 
Parliamentary System was therefore an established legal order within the 
common law system. Hence its reference to as the common law era or order 
as opposed to the constitutional law era. 
 
Constitutional transformative principles: - is the term implying 
entrenchments of the constitution as a transformative tool and aimed at a 
transformative interpretation. Such an interpretation is a human rights-
based interpretation. 
 
Wide constitutional transformative fairness perspective: - is a concept of 
fairness which aligns with the human rights based constitutional objective 
of the South African Constitution. It implies fairness that observes all 
constitutional fairness prescripts (sections). All legislation that was passed 
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to operationalise constitutional entrenchments (sections) is thus referred to 
as constitutional transformative legislation. In effect all legislation in South 






I would like to thank all special persons who granted me support in 
undertaking this research, which was not an easy task. My heartfelt thanks 
go to: 
- My Promoter, Prof Mpfariseni Budeli-Nemakonde who patiently 
accommodated me and made sense of my proposal;  
- My mentor and mother, Justice Yvonne Mokgoro who never ceased to 
believe in my intellectual capabilities and made intellectual efforts to restore 
my confidence, despite negative forces. 
- My brother, Thabiso Monyakane, who would listen to me and read my 
work, marvel, critique and correct. That superb grasp on English and widely 
read mind of yours played a trick. 
- I appreciate the UNISA postgraduate grant which paid my tuition fees. 
I cannot forget the encouragement and emotional support of all my friends. 
I thank my family, especially my sister ’Maseutloali Monyakane for playing 
a mother’s role to my daughter Mpasie, while I was busy finding my feet in 
the challenging academic environment.  My Mother, sisters, brothers and 
my son, Lesedi are remembered for their courageous words. 
- I dedicate this work to Bonang Phakela (and other people who are gifted 
and yet discouraged in their efforts): maybe one day you will write down the 
recipes and publish your cook book for the brain food you used to cook for 
me while I was busy writing this work. 
-To my paternal great grandparents; 
 Thank you for enduring the sacrifices of your historical times. As San 
people, you were subjected to unbearable inhuman treatments and 
indignities from various spheres, to the extent that to some of us, it became 
shameful and dangerous to refer to ourselves as your direct blood. Although 
it’s been ages since you departed this earth, I still respect and honour your 
strong presence and determination from which you bore a fruit- “me”. You 
are therefore the sources of my direction and independence in many ways. 
x 
 
I am your true receptacle and I am proud of it. It is through your sacrifices 
that we came to realise the need for human rights in South Africa. We 
became ashamed of our faults and aspired to reform.  As your receptacle, I 
carry your aspirations for respect and dignity. I love and respect you, 
(Stemmer / Stammel; Schreiner; Koos/Kose; Gouws/Ak’hosi; April, Ralinku, 
Molisana, Sehlabo, Monyakane, Apraal, Conrad and those I never heard of 
their life stories. Forgive me if at any moment I am ashamed of you. 
-To my maternal great grandparents; 
For I would miss a part of my brain if I was not borne by you, “Ncholu wa 
Mare, Tshwane le Mampuru; Mare – a – Ntsikwe– a – rarela – Phole.”  
-To my immediate parents: - Ntate Sehlabo Lazarus Monyakane and 
’Me ’Makoos (’Makose) Monyakane who regardless of hardships, 
raised me, educated and shaped my intellectual capabilities.   
For you sacrificed your time and limited finances to raise me while 
remaining determined to fight against the apartheid environment in which I 
could not have been able to determine my destiny as a human being, I thank 
you for paving my way. I am aware that now, it’s in my hands to reach the 
heights and to solve the challenges of the present times for the present day 
and future generations. It is through your resilience in the face of unbearable 
challenges that I AM. 
-I acknowledge my adoptive Nations—the Basotho of Lesotho AND South 
Africans. “The challenges you endured me shaped the positive me.” I have 
become a better and understanding person. I can be in an indigent’s shoes 
because I have been there.  





Table of Contents 
 
Title page…………………………………………………………………………0  
Declaration………………………………………………………………………. i 
Key terms describing the topic of a thesis……………………………….….. ii 
Abstract.……………………………………………………………………... iii-iv 
List of Selected Acronyms…………………………………………………...v-vi 
Selected Concepts ………………………………………………………...vii-viii 
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………..... ix-x 
Table of Contents…………………………………………………….…....ix-xviii 
 
Chapter One:    General introduction 
1 Introduction……………………………………………………………1-9 
1 1 Background to the study……………………………………………9-32 
1 2  Statement of the problem…….………………………………….32-39 
1 3 Item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 Code of Good Practice: 
     Dismissal……………………………………...............................39-41 
1 3 1  The relationship between section 23(1) and Item 4 (1) of LRA 
Schedule 8: Code of Good Practice: Dismissal………………...41-46 
1 4 Research questions……………………………………………………46 
1 5 The aims of the research ………………………………………...46-53 
1 6 Research methodology …………………………………………..53-55 
1 7 Justification and limitations of research ………………………..55-59 
1 7 1  Limitations of research………………………………………......59-62 
1 7 2 The scope of the study…………………………………………...62-63 
xii 
 
1 8 Summary of Chapters …………………………………………....63-68 
 
Chapter Two: Concepts and philosophies underlying investigation 
procedures and disciplinary hearing processes for employee criminal 
misconducts in South African labour law. 
2  Introduction………………………………………………...69-71 
2 1  The concept of an employee criminal suspect …………71-73 
2 1 1   The concept of criminal misconducts…………………….73-74 
2 1 1 1 The definition of criminal misconducts in labour law…...74-78 
2 1 1 2 The International Labour Organisation perspective of 
discipline for criminal misconduct………………………...78-84 
2 2 The general meaning of discipline and the basis for employee 
discipline…………………………………………………….84-94 
2 2 1  The rationale for the criminalisation of acts in Schedules I to 
III of the CPA……………………………………………….95-96 
2 2 1 1 The political theory underlying criminalisation of human acts 
in South Africa today………………………………………96-98 
2 2 1 2 The rationale for eradicating unjustifiable condemnation for 
Schedules I to III of the CPA transgressors …………….....99 
2 2 2 The philosophical foundations of Schedules I to III of the CPA 
transgressions………………………………………….100-102 
2 2 3 The impact of criminal labelling……………………….102-108 
2 2 4 Principles underlying discipline of employees suspected of 
criminal misconducts………………………………………...108 
2 2 4 1 The theory of proportionality and its extent of application in 
criminal misconducts discipline…………………….….108-119 
xiii 
 
2 2 4 2 The theory of flexibility and its extent in criminal misconducts 
discipline………………………………………………...120-128 
2 2 4 3 Perspectives of discipline in work environment………128-132 
2 2 5   Traditional approach or progressive approach……….132-134 
2 2 5 1  Advantages of the traditional approach ……………...134-136 
2 2 5 2  Disadvantages of employer traditional approach to 
discipline…………............................................................................136-143 
2 2 5 3 Modern approach or corrective approach…………....143-148 
2 2 5 4 The industrial relations perspective on employment 
discipline…………………………………………………………………148-157  
2 3  Conclusion……………………………………………….157-161 
 
Chapter Three: Fairness in employer criminal investigations and 
disciplinary hearings in the light of fairness in criminal justice 
      
3  Introduction……………………………………………………………162 
3 1  The nature of the right to fair dismissal on the basis of a criminal 
misconduct………………………………………………………163-179 
3 2 Theoretical implications of LRA disciplinary processes for criminal 
misconduct………………………………………………………179-182 
3 2 1 The investigation of employees who committed criminal      
misconducts by the employer to establish reasons for 
dismissal…………………………………………………………182-183 
3 2 2 Principles underlying entrenched section 35 constitutional justice 
for criminal suspects ………………………………………… 183 -186 
3 2 3 Foundational principles of constitutional fairness……………186-189 
xiv 
 
3 2 4  The principle of legality from South African criminal justice 
perspective……………………………………………………....189-196 
3 2 4 1 The principle of legality in punishment of criminal 
misconducts……………………………………………..196-197 
3 2 4 1 1 The application of iu acceptum principle to 
punishment……………………………………………....197-198 
3 2 4 1 2  The application of ius praevium principle to 
punishment…………………………………………..............199 
3 2 4 1 3 The application of ius certum principle to 
punishment……………………………………………………200 
3 2 4 1 4 The application of ius strictum principle to 
punishment………………………………………………200-201 
3 2 4 2 Effects of criminal persecution on perpetrators of criminal 
misconducts……………………………………………..201-202 
3 2 4 3 The rationale for punishment in matters of a criminal law 
nature…………………………………………………….202-307 
3 2 5 Constitutional principles underlying investigations of 
suspects of criminal acts……………………………….207-211 
3 2 6  Evidentiary principles underlying criminal liability…...211-212 
3 2 7 The rationale for the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” 
of proof in criminal persecution………………………..212-214 
3 3 The nature of the employer’s right to dismiss employees who 
committed criminal misconducts…………….…...…...214-216 
3 3 1 Content of the right to a fair procedure within the 
LRA……………………………………………………….216-224 
3 4   Conclusion……………………………………………….224-226 
xv 
 
Chapter Four:      The LRA disciplinary hearing processess for 
dismissal of employees who committed criminal misconducts and 
consequent challenges 
4  Introduction……………………………………………………...227-228 
4 1 The determination of dismissal sanction on the basis of a criminal 
misconduct ……………………………………………………..229-230 
4 2 The process of discipline for suspects of a criminal 
misconduct……………………………………………………...230-234 
4 2 1 Procedural Fairness associated with the determination of 
employee’s guilt of a criminal misconduct……………234-237 
4 2 2 The process of hearing a criminal misconduct 
matter…………………………………………………….228-244 
4 2 3 The presentation of charges to the employee criminal 
suspect…………………………………………………..244-247 
4 2 4 Adequate notice of factual criminal misconduct 
allegations……………………………………………….247-249 
4 2 5 The right of the employee criminal suspect to legal 
representation…………………………………………...250-254 
4 2 6 Opportunity to state a case and to challenge the employer’s 
evidence and arguments……………………………….255-258 
4 2 7 The possibility to dispense with the hearing of an employee 
suspected of a criminal misconduct……………………258-260 
4 2 8 Jurisdictive resolution on the charges of a criminal 
misconduct……………………………………...……….260-266 
4 2 9  The decision and reasons for the dismissal……….…267-268 
4 2 9 1 Referral of employer’s decision to dismiss the employee 
suspected of a criminal misconduct…………………..268-269 
4 3 The repercussions of decisions based on employer interests 
against employees’ rights…………………………….........269 
xvi 
 
4 3 1 The parallel nature of criminal misconduct dismissal 
processes……………………………………………………..270 
4 3 1 1 The South Gauteng Case of S v Mateke and Mabaso Case 
no: A 120/2015 heard on the 7/6/2016 (Unreported) …... 271 
4 3 1 1 1 Background to the matter…………………………………….271 
4 3 1 1 2 Sentence background………………………………………..272 
4 3 1 1 3 The sentence……………………………………………272 -280 
4 3 1 1 3 1 Critical Analysis………………………………………... 280-281 
4  4 The Case of Minister of Police v RM M & Safety and Security 
Sectoral Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/1(unreported)..281-285 
4 4 1  Critical Analysis ………………………………………………..285-286 
4 5 Conclusion……………………………………………………….286-290 
 
Chapter Five: The adoption of selected commonwealth 
countries’ application of employee criminal suspect’s right against 
self-incrimination   in terms of section 39(1) of the South African 
Constitution 
 
5 1 Introduction……………………………………………………...291-294 
5 2 The development of the right against self-incrimination in the United 
States of America……………………………………………….294-296 
5 2 1 The United States of America extension of the principle 
against self-incrimination to civil law……………..….........296 
5 2 2 The application of the American Fifth Amendment clause in 




5 2 3 South African fair dismissal perspective for employee criminal 
suspects compared to the United States 
perspective……………………………………………...298-300 
5 3 The development of the right against self-incrimination in New 
Zealand………………………………………………….300-302 
5 3 1 The effects of the Employment Relations Act of 2000 (The 
ERA) on Common Law Right Against Self-
incrimination……………………………………………..302-304 
5 3 1 2 The South African fair dismissal perspective for employee 
criminal suspects compared to The New Zealand 
perspective………………...………………………..…..304-305 
5 4  The development of the right against self-incrimination in the 
United Kingdom…………………………………………305-306 
5 4 1 Privilege against self –incrimination as a human right in the 
United Kingdom and its application in employment 
matters………………………………………….………..306-310 
5 5 The South African fair dismissal perspective for employee 
criminal suspects compared to The United Kingdom 
perspective……………………………………………...310-311 
5 6 Conclusion………………………………………………311-312 
 
Chapter Six: Conclusion and recommendations 
6 1 Conclusion……………………………………………………….313-320 
6 1 1 The United States of America’s perspective of the right to remain 
silent compared to the South African perspective…………....320-324 
xviii 
 
6 1 2  The application of section 23(1), read with sections 8 and 39 
respecting employees suspected of criminal misconducts   
.................................................………………………………..324-326 
6 2  Recommendations……………………………………………..........326 
6 2 1 Enact legislation to control massive discretion on employee criminal 
suspects………………………………………………….……...326-328 
6 2 2 Invoke section 35 of the Constitution rights in employee criminal 
misconduct matters…………………………………………..…328-331 
6 2 3  Highlight the importance in considering the second leg of natural 
justice principles………………………………………………………331 
6 2 4  Remedy parallel criminal 
investigation………………………………………..……………331-332 
6 2 5 Make a mandatory use of natural justice principles across board 
proceedings……………………………………………………..........332 
6 2 6 Eradicate discriminatory protection between employee criminal 
suspects and other criminal suspects…………………………332-333 
6 2 7 Explore the possibility for a statutory direct exclusion of privilege 
against self-incrimination……………………………………….333-334 










In South African labour law, it is the employer who oversees the execution 
of the employment contract.1 The obvious understanding is that the private 
contract of employment is such that the employer is at the top while the 
employee is at the foot.2    Their roles are different, particularly within an 
employment relationship, the employee is the submissive partner. The 
employer determines whom to employ for his own benefit as well as also 
determining the terms of employment depending on the objectives of the 
business. The source of this circumstance is the foundations of South 
African labour law. Adopted from the commonwealth system of common 
law, South African labour law has remnants of the Master and Servant 
connotation fitted in the progressive model of discipline that South Africa 
follows. 3 
From the inception of the contract of employment, the employee would be 
expected to understand and comply with the terms and conditions of 
employment set by the employer. In this respect, the employee would owe 
the employer a duty of respect. In circumstances where the employee 
falters, the employer is legally mandated to discipline and ultimately dismiss 
the employee.4  
The imbalanced nature of the employment contract approximates possible 
prejudices against the employee who remains at the mercy of the employer. 
 
1 Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others 2000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC) para 
43; Paper, Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union v Pienaar NO and Others 1993 4 
SA 631 (AD) at 638G. 
2 It is the employer who offers employment and the employee receives employment. 
See Manamela T 2013 SA MERC LJ  418. 
3 On how Master and Servant relationship evolved, read Deakin S The Contract of 
Employment 7. Consider Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 1909 (AC) 488, held to be 
correctly decided in Johnson v. Unisys Ltd [2001] IRLR 279.   
4 Item 4 of the Code.  
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Historically, during the common law era, before the South African 
Constitution was adopted, the exercise of the employer’s power to 
investigate criminal misconducts and subsequently hold disciplinary 
hearings for employee criminal suspects, received much attention from the 
Industrial Court.5  
As the Industrial Court reviews jurisdiction, the Industrial Court insisted that 
the employer observes both common law fairness principles in employer 
criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings where employees were 
suspected of criminal misconduct. 6 First, the employer would be urged to 
observe the audi alteram partem rule and second, the nemo judex in propria 
sua causa. The principle nemo judex in propria sua causa does not allow 
persecution of any one upon the particular person’s own version.7 The 
intervention of the Industrial Courts could have consistently protected 
employees from aspects of self-incrimination possible in employer criminal 
investigations and subsequent hearings for employee criminal suspects. 
Unfortunately, the Industrial Courts equity pronouncements like other 
common law courts jurisprudence, were taken with reservations, subject to 
the common law tradition that adopted South African parliamentary 
supremacy which opted for the positivists’ approach to law.8  
According to Monyakane,9 the Parliamentary Supremacy system was 
characterised by the principle that led to a positivistic approach in law. She 
alluded such a state of law to the Aristotelian description of justice which 
 
5 See Currie I & De Waal J the Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. As well, see van Niekerk 
A Acta Juridica 102, 105 also read Read Cheadle H 2006 ILJ  663-703 at 666-667 & 
686-687.  
6 Read the following cases that relate to this history, Avril Elizabeth Home for the 
Mentally Handicapped v The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & 
Others 2006 9 BLLR 833 (LC) at 839 and 841 2006 27 ILJ 1644 (LC) at 1653 and 1660 
(hereinafter Avril); Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); 
Markhams (a Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 
BLLR 1145 (LC). 
7 Regarding common law perspectives of fair trial, see Harris D 1967 ICLQR 354.  
8 Van Der Vyver J D Seven Lectures on Human Rights 1; Hart H L A 1958 HARV LR 
596. 




founded the South African common law approach. Aristotelian approach 
regards law as “what is in accordance with the nomos or positive law,”10 as 
opposed to what the law ought to be. Monyakane11 observes that positive 
law underpins the understanding that the law is aligned to authoritative 
pronouncements and not reasonable pronouncements which considers 
rational proposals in the light of natural justice principles of fairness.12 Such 
positivist understanding could therefore not be interpreted in light of 
extraneous premise, moral, metaphysical or otherwise. Such an alignment 
to authoritative pronouncements even when negating natural law 
encompassing natural justice was justifiable enough in accord to positive 
law. That such alignment was inherently and invariably inimical to the 
protection of human rights was of no consequence.13 The positivist 
approach survived in South Africa for a long time14 only to be replaced by 
the constitutional Bill of Rights entrenching human rights approach to form 
the basis of law in the current times.15 
Prior to the human rights approach, the parliament easily legislated against 
the decisions of the common law courts, hence the inconsistency of the 
common law courts equity jurisprudence, including the Industrial Court.16 
The positivist approach to law mandated uncontrolled flexibility for exercise 
of employer’s powers to carry out criminal investigations and subsequent 
 
10 Monyakane above note 9. 
11 Monyakane above note 9. 
12 Van Der Vyver J D Seven Lectures on Human Rights1; Hart H L A 1958 HARV LR 
596. 
13 Devenish et al. Administrative Law 20. 
14 From the Union of South Africa in 1910 up until the adoption of the interim Constitution 
in 1993. 
15Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146.  
16 Read Taitz J T Unreasonable Acts of Administrative Authorities 11 who exposes the 
position of common law courts justice before the coming into effect of the Constitution. 
Consider Monyakane above note 9 at 37 where she explained the extent of judicial 
review during the common law era, in particular read chapter two at part 2 2 4 on the 
extent of judicial review of administrative action under common law. As well read the 
following cases National Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 
1972 (3) SA 726 (A) 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union Government 1912 AD 651 652; 
Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 222; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African 
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; Cassim v Oos-
Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A).  
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persecution of employees suspected to have committed criminal acts 
against their employers. 17  The hasty nature of employer flexibility- 
mandated investigations and hearings, led to absurdities that the Industrial 
Court sought to mitigate.18 Acting  without delay to dismiss the employee 
suspected of a criminal misconduct, the employers who vouched to dodge 
the intervention of the Industrial Court, continued with criminal investigation 
without observing principles of fairness relating to investigation of the crime.  
Furthermore, employers held dismissal hearings against employees as 
criminal suspects without observing the principle nemo judex in propria sua 
causa. During these hearings, employees were subjected to self-
incrimination and would give self-incriminating evidence in fear of their loss 
of employment. Furthermore, employees could claim their privilege against 
self-incrimination at their own disadvantage of being excluded from the 
hearing while it proceeds in their absence. 19 
The uncertainties in labour law were part of the underlying influences to the 
adoption of the South African Constitution.20 The Constitution that 
comprises the Bill of Rights entrenching “various rights [impacting] on the 
formulation of labour market policy and labour law reform,”21 including 
sections 9(1),17,23,34, and 33 of the Constitution, was embraced with hope 
for the better. Section 23 of the Constitution entrenches labour rights. Its 
predecessor is section 27 of the interim constitution.  The integral core of 
these two sections is the same. According to Cheadle, there is insignificant 
difference in the way labour rights were cast in these two sections. 22  It is 
therefore safe to refer to them as entailing basically the same content. 
 
17 Cameron E 1986 7 ILJ 185 -186. 
18 Per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 
IC at 357-358. As well, see Davis v Tip No 1996 (1) SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 
G-H. 
19 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420. 
20 The Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
21 Monyakane above note 9 at 32; Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32 Klare K 1998 SAJHR 
146. 




The standard for the legality of employer’s disciplinary mandate for 
dismissals is found in section 23 (1) of the Constitution. Section 23 (1) 
entrenches fundamental workers’ rights in fair labour practices. Section 
23(1) of the Constitution demands that there should be fairness in employer 
and employee dealings. Among these rights is the right to fair dismissal. 
Together with section 23(1) of the Constitution, the employer’s duty to 
discipline employees is governed by Chapter VIII of the LRA. On this basis, 
the LRA is considered to have an ability to facilitate the enjoyment of section 
23(1) rights. Chapter VIII of the LRA explains in detail the specifics of the 
investigative procedures and dismissal processes.23 The rationale for the 
constitutional entrenchment of the rights to fair labour practices was the 
requirement to maintain the common law Industrial Court concern for equity 
in employment relations.24  
From this perspective, section 23(1), like all constitutional 
entrenchments, was purposed to develop the law from restricted positivists 
perspectives to a rights-based perspective.25 Section 23(1) affords 
individuals the right to fair labour practices. The right to fair labour practices 
sustained from the era of Industrial Court equity jurisprudence to the current 
constitutional era. Within this right is the individual labour law principles 
encompassing dismissal. 26 
Individual labour law is part of labour law that expresses the 
relationship between the employer and the employee. At the inception of 
this branch of law, established in 1979, the equity jurisdiction of the 
 
23 Chapter VIII read with Schedule 8, in particular Item 4. 
24 per Bulbulia AM J, in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 
IC at 357-358. As well, see  Davis v Tip No 1996 1 SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 G-
H. Applied from labour law perspective in Grogan J Workplace Law (2017) 256; From 
a civil procedure perspective  in Cilliers A C , Herbstain J, Loots C; Nel HC  The civil 
practice at page 757 and from a human rights perspective in Currie I & De Waal J  The 
Bill of Rights Handbook at 745. 
25  Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32, Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146. 
26 Read section 23(1) of the Constitution together with Chapter VIII of the LRA, in 
sections 185;186 and 188 with Schedule 8: Code of Good Practice: Dismissal in Items 
2;3;4(1) and 7.  
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Industrial Court  insisted on fairness based on principles of natural justice.27 
The Industrial Court pronouncements on equity, amongst others, insisted 
on the enforcement of common law principles of natural justice. Through 
these pronouncements, the concept of unfair labour practice was refined. It 
is submitted that the evolvement of this concept through these equity 
pronouncements bears two contours: - the common law era as a fight 
against the positivist perspective and the constitutional law era as part of 
human rights-based transformational perspective of fair labour practice. 
 At the inception of the South African Constitution, the drafters were 
mindful of the relevant Industrial Court pronouncements on fair labour 
practice. As a result, they introduced the right to fair labour practices within 
the South African Constitution Bill of Rights.28 It is upon this basis that it is 
argued in this thesis, that fair labour practices entailing the right to fair 
dismissal are founded on equity principles of fairness.  
The right to fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) of the 
Constitution addresses principal workers’ rights. Among these rights is the 
right to fair dismissal. To operationalise Section 23(1) objectives, the   LRA29 
was enacted.30   
Due to the equity background to the formation of section 23 (1), it is 
argued that the LRA, while seeking to express a section 23(1) mandate, 
cannot be interpreted without constitutional objectives informing equity. 
These are in the Preamble along with section 1, 8,9, 23(1), 33, 35, 39 and 
195 of the Constitution. The interrelationship of these provisions with 
section 23(1) cannot be overemphasised. It is based on the fundamentals 
of constitutional interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
The general understanding about the true intention of the 
developments based on the Industrial Court  equity principles ought to be  
that, equity could be adopted to protect employees from unfair labour 
 
27 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
28 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
29Act 66 of 1995 as amended.  
30Section 27 of the Interim Constitution.  
7 
 
practices similar to those that prevailed in the common law era.31 As 
mentioned before, the employer exercised uncontrolled powers over 
employees as there was no regard for individual rights. Regarding the 
employer’s criminal investigative and disciplinary hearing powers, 
employers could investigate matters of a criminal law nature in order to 
dismiss employee criminal suspects within their discretion. They would use 
flexibility-based discretion which allowed them to not observe 
proportionality-based principles even though such principles were meant to 
promote natural justice principles, intended at protecting individual rights. 
Such discretions were contrary to the principles underlying the social 
contract principles of individual condemnation. 
 Within the constitutional perspective that now recognises equity-
based principles of natural justice and entrenched equity within the Bill of 
Rights, the operationalisation of the new labour law ought to observe 
constitutionalised common law equity.  
Such equity is entrenched in the Bill of Rights. This is especially true 
in respect of section 35, which entrenches criminal suspects’ rights which 
in effect, regulate equity within the common law social contract principles of 
condemnation. In the current era of constitutional authority there ought to 
be obvious inter relationships of constitutional fairness principles in sections 
23(1) and 35 of the Constitution when dealing with the condemnation of 
employee criminal suspects. 
Based on these developments, jurisprudential interpretation of LRA 
provisions, relating to the dismissal of employee criminal suspects, must 
observe section 35 fairness principles. Such an interpretation would accord 
to what section 23(1) read with sections 1, 8, 9, 33, 39, and 195 opts for in 
alleviating employer–employee inequalities. 
 
31 In order to get the depth of what happened before the advent of constitutionalism 
read, du Toit D 2008 SALJ  98 SALJ 101; van Niekerk A Acta Juridica 102, 105; Currie 
I & De Waal J  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 499; also read, Cameron E, Cheadle H 
and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act: 144-145.  
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It is argued that if sections 23(1) and 35 of the Constitution are read 
together, the equity background to section 23(1) can be maintained in 
instances where there are employer investigations of criminal misconducts. 
Equity could apply with equal force where disciplinary hearings for 
dismissals of employees who have committed criminal misconducts, 
observe fairness mandated in the Constitution from a wide constitutional 
fairness perspective. The broad constitutional perspective is anticipated in 
section 23(1) read with sections 1, 8, 9, 33,35, 39, and 195. section 23(1) 
provisions and must be understood within the parameters of the Bill of 
Rights.32 
Within this understanding, this thesis scrutinises the current measure 
of equity within item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: - Dismissal 
procedure entailing the employer criminal investigation and dismissals 
based on employee criminal misconducts. This pursuit is amid concerns, 
levelled against labour law in general, namely, that even today in the 
constitutional era, labour law is still rigged with inequalities.33  
The major concern in this work is affected by the obvious resulting 
inequality due to the nature of the contract of employment. As the term 
contract suggested, an employer–employee contract relationship exists at 
the commencement of the contract whether verbal or written. The common 
law nature of this agreement is such that the employee offers services to 
the employer while the employer would remunerate the employee. In the 
meantime, the employer determines the terms of employment while the 
employee submits to these conditions. The employee remains a weaker 
party in this type of contract as there is no balance of power between 
employer and employee. The employer’s discretion as to who to hire and 
 
32 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
33 Grawitzky R “From Workplace Rights to Constitutional Rights in South Africa” ILO 
Century Project Roundtable November 2013  
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---




under what conditions to dismiss, has proven disadvantageous to the 
employees as will be discussed later.34  
The massive contractual powers that the employer possesses, result 
in multiple prejudices against employees as shown in chapter four of this 
thesis. The worst-case scenario is when an employee is suspected of 
criminal misconduct. In this scenario, the massive hand of the employer hits 
hard, unless it is mitigated by transparent procedures and processes like 
those entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution, along with the provisions 
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA).  
 
1 1 Background to the Study 
The massive powers that the employer has within the employer–employee 
relationship ought to be mitigated by law. However, it seems that this is not 
the case in employer criminal investigations and the subsequent disciplinary 
hearings on employee criminal suspects. Under the South African labour 
law, the power to investigate crimes allegedly committed by employees and 
to hold a disciplinary hearing of an employee criminal suspect is vested 
within the flexible procedures designed by the employer, as opposed to 
constitutionalised and established criminal investigation procedures. The 
employer flexible processes are opposed to procedures by the statutorily 
ensued personnel, like the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the 
Courts. The SAPS investigate criminal conducts guided by the procedures, 
provided for in the CPA. 
The same happens with the hearing of criminal persecutions brought before 
courts that follow the defined procedures laid down in the CPA. At the base 
of SAPS investigatory procedures and court processes, is the entrenched 
fairness principles in section 35 of the Constitution, including the prohibition 
from persecution without regard to the principle nemo judex in propria sua 
causa. Section 35 entrenches the right against self-incrimination. 
 
34 Grawitzky above note 33. 
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Against these constitutional demands, the employer’s powers to 
investigate employee criminal suspects does not rely on the 
constitutionalised investigation processes in section 35 of the Constitution 
along with the CPA. Rather the employer’s power to investigate criminal 
misconducts is governed by labour law, which deals with employer and 
employee relationships.35 Criminal misconducts discipline is part of 
individual labour law based only on the positivistic interpretation of section 
23(1) of the Constitution along with the provisions of Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
Employer criminal investigations and subsequent hearings for employee 
criminal suspects, entails flexibility approach to discipline, as opposed to 
proportionality-based approaches to discipline, encouraged in section 35 of 
the Constitution read with the CPA. 
As will be illustrated in chapters two, three, and four, there are 
limitations attached to employer flexibilities. To cement these limitations, the 
entailed jurisprudence insists that for purposes of consistency, accuracy 
and effectiveness, labour matters concerning fair dismissals, are to be dealt 
with before the Labour Court, where experts in labour law are accessible.36 
It is settled that the “Labour Court (or the CCMA)37 does not have exclusive 
jurisdiction over all disputes arising from a dismissal, but only over those in 
which the fairness of the dismissal is at issue.”38 The review of employer 
criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings, based on criminal 
misconducts falls within the fairness of dismissal determinations. 
The restrictions embedded in this development confine the 
determination of LRA fair dismissal within restricted labour law boundaries 
enabling the ignorance of section 35 fairness principles. This approach has 
negatively affected labour law fairness in that it discourages the extended 
observance of wide constitutional fairness principles in the Preamble, 
 
35 The South African Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) read with section 23 of Act 
108 of 1996 hereinafter, the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
36 Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt [2001] 12 BLLR 1301 (SCA). 
37 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). 
38 Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt [2001] 12 BLLR 1301 (SCA) para2.; as well read                                                       
van Eck S 2010 TSAR 1. 
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sections 1, 8, 9, 23, 35, 39 and 195 of the Constitution. Due to these 
confinements, employers are often unreasonable in their exercise of power 
at the demise of employees.39 Be that as it may, they are bailed out from 
accounting for their unfair decisions by the LRA’s restricted approach to the 
application of the constitutional fairness principle in labour matters.40 The 
fairness principle in matters involving employees who have committed 
criminal misconducts does not extend to the determination of such 
employees’ rights as criminal suspects, entrenched in section 35 of the 
Constitution.41 
These restrictions triggered the need to assess the constitutionality 
of employer’s criminal investigative procedures and disciplinary hearing 
processes regarding employee’s dismissal based on criminal misconduct. 
This is especially true when these procedures are supposed to observe 
section 23(1), a section within the Bill of Rights entrenching the right to fair 
labour practices.  
Employers who seek to implement section 23(1) and yet ignore the 
application of employee criminal suspects’ rights entrenched in section 35 
of the Constitution are against the constitutional mandate of the Bill of 
Rights. They are against constitutional transformative principles and 
therefore their discretion is inappropriate. The nature of the treatment of 
employee criminal suspects within employer discretion under these 
circumstances, mimics the common law positivist approach, where 
statutory protection of employee criminal suspects rights were rarely, if ever, 
in existence.42 Under common law, before the Constitution came into effect, 
fairness in labour matters was lacking due to the legal pursuit for South 
 
39 van Niekerk A 2012 Acta Juridica 102, 105. 
40 This is based on the principle that courts should exercise deference when reviewing 
employer’s decisions. 
41 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
42 Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
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African parliamentary supremacy aimed at enhancing the positivist 
approach to the law.43 
Within the positivist system, the law of master and servant was over-
emphasised against the human rights-based approach, which could have 
protected individual rights. This practice occurred in defiance of common 
law natural justice principles of fairness.44 
Common law fairness principles encompassing the enforcement of 
both audi alteram partem45 and nemo judex in proprea sua causa 46 are 
borne from the idea of jura naturale.47 Both of these principles of fairness 
were useful in protecting human rights. According to Monyakane: “[t]he 
concept of natural justice is linked to the development of the theory of law 
pertaining to the protection of individual rights.”48  
In consonance with Monyakane’s explanation, Marshall neatly 
captures the role of these principles.49 
 
Principles of natural justice are not only a part of natural 
law but are that part of natural law which relates to the 
administration of justice. That is to say, the two principles 
that no man shall be judged in his own cause and that both 
sides must be heard are so necessary for the fair 
administration of justice that they have been accepted as 
fundamental for that purpose.50 
 
 
43 Grawitzky above note 33. Also read Deakin S The Contract of Employment 7 as well 
as Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 1909 (AC) 488, held to be correctly decided in Johnson 
v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279.   
44 See Grawitzky above note 33. Also read Deakin S The Contract of Employment 7. 
As well as Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 1909 (AC) 488, held to be correctly decided 
in Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279.  
45 “Hear the other side.” 
46 “No man shall be judged in his own cause.” 
47 Natural justice. See, Marshall T Natural Justice London 6, where he explains that jus 
naturale or natural law “was originally the Stoic philosophical conception of a universal 
idea of good conduct upon which all law should be founded and which, some asserted, 
ought not to be overridden by any other laws however made.” 
   48  Monyakane Above note 9 at 32.  
49 Marshall T Natural Justice London 6. 
50 Marshall T Natural Justice London 6. 
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The application of these principles has become more important in the 
administration of justice because they founded the constitutional human 
rights-based perspective in South Africa. By constitutionally entrenching 
these principles, South African law is now based on democratic values, 
social justice, and fundamental human rights.51  
The Constitution demands recognition of these values in every 
human undertaking, be it of private52 or public 53  concern. The South African 
Constitution enshrines human rights in a written document,54 entrenches 
the values of human dignity, equality and freedom,55 and expressly provides 
for constitutional supremacy.56 Amongst the sections that emphasise 
constitutional fairness from a wide perspective, are sections 1,8,9,23, 33, 
35 and 195 of the Constitution which constitutionalise the underlying 
principles of administration of justice ensconced in natural justice 
principles.57 Through these sections, the Constitution redefines exercise of 
authority across the board, in both private and public dealings.  
Contrary to the philosophy which underlies the exercise of authority 
under the autocratic positivist system, the constitutional exercise of 
authority in private dealings is circumscribed by the need to satisfy sections 
8 and 39 of the Constitution. Section 8 on the application of the Bill of Rights 
reads:  
 
8. (1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 
 
51 Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, 158. 
52 Section 8 of the Constitution. Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC), Barkhuizen 
v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) and NM v Smith 2007 5 SA 250 (CC). 
53 Section 33 of the constitution. Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South 
Africa In Re: The Exparte Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 
(CC) 49. 
54 Chapter 2 of the Constitution. 
55 In section 1(a) of the Constitution. Sections 9, 10 and 12, tabulate the essentials of 
these values.  
56 Sections 1(c) and 2. 
57 Regarding criminal justice section 35 of the Constitution is at the fore. 
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(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person 
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature 
of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic 
person in terms of subsection (2), a court— 
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary, 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided 
that the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1). 
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the 
extent required by the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic 
person. 
 
In the context of this thesis, section 8 cannot be interpreted without section 
39. The latter gives full effect to the former, in the sense that section 39 
guides the expression of section 8 mandates. section 39 reads: - 
 
39 Interpretation of Bill of Rights 
(1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must 
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, customary 




Both sections 8 and 39 emphasise the need to observe constitutional 
fairness to attain justification.58 According to Mureinik,59 the constitutional 
era breeds “a culture of Justification” 60 as opposed to the common law era’s 
culture of authority. Thus, as indicated in sections 8 and 39 in this era, 
“every exercise of power is expected to be [constitutionally] justified.”61 
Under this system of constitutional justification, it is not possible for the 
legislature to exclude the principles of natural justice in the way that it could 
be done in the common law era under the South African parliamentary 
system. Consequently, the correct interpretation of the purpose of justice62 
is that, it promotes values63 of human dignity, equality, and freedom.  
 
Aligned to the entrenched constitutional justification requirement is the 
provision of Article 4 of Convention No. 15864 reemphasising the need for 
observation of the principle of justification within the national laws. Section 
39(1)(b) makes the observance of Article 4 provisions mandatory when 
dealing with dismissals. It is argued that in terms of these provisions, 
employers’ investigations and subsequent hearing processes ought to not 
disregard the entrenched section 35 fairness requirement in matters of a 
criminal law nature. Criminal misconducts are matters of a criminal law 
nature. 
Thus, for purposes of a justiciable and therefore dignified criminal 
persecutions, section 35 of the Constitution has entrenched the second leg 
of natural rights, including the right against self-incrimination. These are the 
essentials of the rights of criminal suspects, including employee criminal 
suspects. In chapter two, it is explained that section 35 rights, culminate in 
 
58 Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
59 Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
60 Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
61 Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
62Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, 158. 
63 Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
64 Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. 
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the procedure based on proportionality to mitigate the harshness of criminal 
condemnation. In satisfaction of the constitutional right to equality 
entrenched in section 9 of the Constitution, section 35 rights, should apply 
to all criminal suspects without discrimination. The current employer’s 
criminal misconducts investigations and hearings insinuate such 
discriminations. Against this section 9 of the Constitution reads: 
Equality  
9. (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal 
protection and benefit of the law. 
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and 
freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and 
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories 
of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National 
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
(5) Discrimination on one or more of the grounds listed in subsection 
(3) is unfair unless it is established that the discrimination is fair. 
 
Section 9 forms part of the provisions at the centre of the recognition of the 
constitutional values. Allied with section 9 are the entrenched sections 1, 
23, 33, 35 and 195. These sections are applied within constitutional 
guidelines in sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution. Through sections 8 and 
39 provisions, everyone, be it a natural or a juristic person, must recognise 
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and apply the rights, in the Bill of Rights, in their everyday dealings. These 
provisions even apply to individual disagreements.65  
 
With reference to finding resolutions for acts and omissions of a criminal 
nature, in section 35, the Constitution entrenched principles of natural 
justice that are meant for the protection of individual rights. The Constitution 
makes them central to constitutional criminal justice.66  
 
Through this entrenchment, the Constitution demands cautious and 
discreet approaches to the applications of theories67 underlying 
condemnation and labelling of individuals as perpetrators of actions or 
omissions classified as crimes. 
  
The employer labelling and condemning an employee suspected of criminal 
misconduct, as criminal, encroaches on individual rights entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights.68 Criminalised acts and omissions are defined in relevant 
schedules in the CPA.69 The very same crimes listed in Schedules I to III of 
the CPA constitute criminal misconducts subjected to investigation and 
disciplinary hearing by the employer.70 
 
65 Per section 8 (2) of the Constitution. On the explanation on indirect horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights see Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 
50-52.  
66 Steytler N Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) at page 3. 
67 For an understanding of these theories and their application, see for example, 
Wellford, C Vol 22 (3) Social Problems 332-345.  See part 2 2 4 1 on the theory of 
proportionality and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
68 See section 35 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair trial in criminal matters. 
Read it with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; 
also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 
at para 56. 
69 See schedules i–ii of the CPA. 
70 The LRA, differentiates between minor misconducts and serious misconducts but 
does not clearly specify types of misconducts for each class. It can be read to be 
attempting to generalise gross misconducts in section 3(4) which in relevant part reads; 
Dismissals for Misconduct 
…. Examples of serious misconduct, subject to the rule that each case should 
be judged on its merits, are gross dishonesty or wilful damage to the property of 




The Constitution, therefore, uses natural justice principles to 
rationalise the application of laws that criminalise particular acts and 
omissions, thus affecting individual rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
 
In the constitutional era, neither common law nor South African 
parliamentary legislation determines the process of dealing with omissions 
and actions of criminal nature as listed in the CPA. The pedestal law is the 
Constitution. Integral to the relevant constitutional provisions are the Bill of 
Rights. The Bill of Rights contain general provisions relevant to dealing with 
criminal acts specifically listed in the CPA schedules. Steytler71 similarly 
opines that: 
 
The Bill of Rights contains both general provisions which are relevant 
to criminal procedure, such as the right to dignity, the right to life, the 
right to freedom and security of persons and the right to privacy, and 
provisions aimed specifically at criminal justice, namely the right of 
arrested, detained and accused persons.72 
 
Even though natural justice principles were available in the common law,73 
they were applied differently to the way they are applied in the current 
constitutional era. The common law and South African parliamentary 
legislation were determinative in the process of dealing with omissions and 
actions of criminal nature.  
 
employer, a fellow employee, client or customer and gross insubordination. 
(added emphasis). 
It is explicit in these words that misconducts of a criminal nature are falling under serious 
misconducts because amongst criminal acts are acts of dishonesty. These include theft, 
fraud and so on and so forth. 
71 Steytler N Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) at page 3.  
72 Steytler N Constitutional Criminal Procedure (1998) at page 3. Rights applying to 
accused persons include rights for suspects. To find clarity, read S v Orrie and Another, 
2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; also read S v Sebejan and Others 
1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 at para 56. 
73 See Harris D 1967 ICLQR 354. 
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South African parliamentary system circumstances allowed for the 
enactment and application of legislation without regard to natural justice 
principles. Describing this scenario from a constitutional law perspective, 
Rose Innes writes that, “review power could be excluded by the legislature 
or restricted in extent by statute” or, “[i]n certain cases, ‘particular’ grounds 
for review could be of limited application or not applicable at all.”74 The law 
could not therefore on its own in the absence of the Constitution, “become 
an instrument of reform.”75 
 
The employment statutory law was no different. During the common 
law era, statutory law in general as well as the common law governed labour 
law aimed at amassing employers’ massive powers and ignored “workers’ 
fundamental rights.”76 The legislature in defiance of natural justice, 
empowered the employer with statutorily protected powers while the 
employee had none or few rights under the contract of employment.77 To 
curb this harsh scenario, the workplace ought to be controlled.  
 
There was a need to place limits on “the unbridled common law 
power of the employer.”78 It is submitted that if this was done, individual 
rights would be considered, and the harsh effects of the law of master and 
servant as applied then, would be mitigated. Due to the fact that there was 
no protection of human rights, “the Industrial Court79 tried to become the 
 
74 Rose Innes Judicial Review (1963) 7. 
75du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101.  
76du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101. As well read Grawitzky above note 33.  
77 Cameron E, Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act: 6. 
78 Cameron E, Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act:6. 
79 The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 94 of 1979 established the Industrial Court. 
This Court introduced the concept of unfair labour practice. The definition of unfair labour 
practice was general and therefore specifically inferred fairness to the termination of 
employment. It did not infer with definite terms any right against an employer and 
specifically defined as to when employment could be said to have been terminated in 
circumstances that could be regarded as unfair. see van Niekerk A 2012 Acta Juridica 
102, 105.  
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agent of change with the notion of ‘fairness’, 80 rather than ‘lawfulness’,81 as 
the touchstone of its jurisprudence.”82 It relied on the wide interpretation of 
fairness based on the principles of natural justice83 and it “[struck] down 
unlawful labour practices, including contractual rights and obligations that 
were found to be ‘unfair.’” 84 
 
Upon creating the tribunal (the Industrial Court), the statute defined 
“unfair labour practice”85 and granted “ostensibly unrestrained”86 powers to 
the court to declare any unlawful labour practice that “it considered to be 
unfair.” 87 Due to this relaxed approach, courts were able to protect 
employees’ rights even at the peril of dismissal. Where criminal misconduct 
 
80Monyakane Above note 9 at 11, fn 43 where she wrote that, 
[f]airness prescribes the best way to achieve a certain objective and 
relates to the underlying values in the undertaking. Procedural fairness 
then relates to the best way to undertake a decision based on the 
prescriptions of the law and the circumstances that the decision-maker 
is facing. Procedural fairness can encompass both rationality and 
reasonability, although it may not mean that what is rational is fair or 
what is reasonable is fair. 80 
 
Because nothing could measure lawfulness, statutes were enacted today and repealed 
tomorrow to suit apartheid perspectives. Laws were based on positivists’ perspectives.  
This period was characterised by the principle of parliamentary 
supremacy, which led to a positivistic approach in law. Based on the 
Aristotelian description of justice as what is in accordance with the 
nomos or positive law, positivism is underpinned by the belief that law 
is what the authorities pass as law. As a result, there is no need to 
regard any extraneous premise, moral, metaphysical or otherwise. 
Although this approach negates natural law, which encompasses 
natural justice, and it is “inherently and invariably inimical to the 
protection of human rights,” it was followed in South Africa for a long 
time. 
 Per, Monyakane Above note 9 at 32, footnotes excluded. 
82 du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101.  
83 See the decision in R v Home Secretary, ex parte Hosenball 1977 (1) W L R 766 772, 
which held that “the principles of natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach 
of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done.” 
84 du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101.  
85 du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101.  
86 du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101.  
87 du Toit D 2008 SALJ 101.  
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was an issue, the court insisted on investigation akin to that held under 
criminal procedure.88 The courts were able to do so because, in pursuit of 
the enforcement of fairness principles, they interpreted the concept of “fair 
dismissal” in a different way. Courts applied the abovementioned common 
law principle of fairness widely.89 They considered the importance of 
applying both principles of natural justice to enforce fairness in dismissal.90 
Dismissals based on criminal misconducts were not treated lightly by the 
common law courts, taking into account the atrocity of dismissal as a 
punishment on an employee.  
 To use Harcourt Mark, Hannay Maureen & Lam Helen’s 
words, dismissal was considered to have “a drastic impact on employee’s 
livelihood, self-esteem and future career.” It was found to be “a severe 
punishment, involving, drastic income loss, major stigmatization, and social 
disconnection.”91 It is argued that it is on the basis of similar considerations, 
that courts considered the persecution of employee criminal suspects’ 
within employer civil processes rather complex.92  
Confronted with a criminal misconduct case, in Mahlangu v Cim 
Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak,93 Bulbulia AM J viewed dealing with the 
question of criminal misconducts as a ground for dismissal and considered 
it a confrontation with many challenges. This was especially because even 
if this is performed within labour law prescripts, “dishonesty ought not be 
merely suspected but it ought to be proved, although that proof could be 
 
88Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. Also see Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd 
v Gumbi 2007 (5) SA 552 (SCA). 
89 See van Niekerk A 2012 Acta Juridica 102, 105.  
90 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. Also see Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA 
Ltd v Gumbi 2007 5 SA 552 (SCA). 
91Harcourt Mark; Hannay Maureen & Lam Helen 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311–325 at 311 
and 313. 
92 per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 
IC at 357–358. 
93 1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
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based on a balance of probabilities.”94 Levy, arguing from a labour law 
perspective, observed that:  
Theft is without doubt the most difficult situation that an employer has 
to deal with. I have said that it is unwise and probably unfair to dismiss 
an employee without notifying him of the reason. But proof that a man 
has committed theft is a matter for the criminal courts and not for a 
unilateral decision by an employer. Inevitably, the employer's decision 
to fire for theft is based on evidence that would not obtain a conviction 
in a criminal court. … If the employer has based his evidence on 
suspicion, hearsay or security reports and there is no hard evidence, 
he is not entitled to say that a theft has occurred. He therefore has no 
justification to dismiss for theft.95 
 
Levy’s observation cements what was held in the case of Mahlangu.96 
Specifically, dismissals based on criminal misconducts indeed have effects 
tantamount to criminal persecution. As a result, they needed to be treated 
with caution. The common law courts seem to have exercised caution when 
dealing with criminal misconducts. They greatly leaned on the natural justice 
principles to deliver fairness. They perceived the law of the day as unstable 
and insufficient. According to these courts, the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 75 of 1997, as amended, was inadequate and did not 
constitute proper compliance with the requirements of the audi alteram 
partem rule.97 
The efforts of the common law justices were, however, not worthwhile due 
to the problems ensuing in the South African system of parliamentary 
supremacy. First, the measure of justice was only limited to defined races.98 
 
94 See Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 4 SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co v 
Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351. 
95 Levy A Unfair Dismissals 81–82. 
96 Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
97Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak (986 7 ILJ 346 IC Per 
Page J at 528. In the advent of the Constitution the new Act can cater for the 
requirement of audi alteram partem rule. 
98Grawitzky above note 33.  
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Even so, courts were not at liberty to exercise their discretion.99 The 
common law courts were also forced to abide by legislative swings, which 
deprived them of independence to use their discretion in deciding 
matters.100 Parliament could undo any decision by retrospective legislation 
and pass discriminatory or unreasonable statutes, provided they were 
procedurally correct, which left the courts with no room to declare such 
practices illegal in the light of natural justice principles of fairness.101 Based 
on unclear interpretations, courts often negated their duty in fear of 
jeopardizing the limited powers that the law of the day offered them.102 
There was no certainty. As a result, labour law jurisprudence lacked 
 
99 Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier of the Province, Western 
Cape and Another 2002 9 BCLR 891 (CC) 895 para 6 (hereinafter Bel Porto). See as 
well, Beukes M Interpretation of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 33. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11 who exposes the position of common law courts justice before 
the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane Above note 9 at 37. As 
well read the following cases Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also 
see Shidiak v Union Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel 
Corporation 1928 AD 222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg 
Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 
1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; Cassim v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 
(3) SA 651 (A).  
100 Bel Porto above note 98 at para 6. See as well Beukes above note 98 at 3. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11 who exposes the position of common law courts justice before 
the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane Above note 9 at 37; 
Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 
222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 
111; South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; 
Cassim v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A). 
101 Bel Porto above note 98 at para 6. See as well Beukes above note 98 at 3. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11, who exposes the position of common law courts justice 
before the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane above note 9. at 
37; Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G . Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 
222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 
111; South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; 
Cassim v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A). 
102 Bel Porto above note 98 at para 6. See as well Beukes above note 98 at 3. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11, who exposes the position of common law courts justice 
before the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane above note 9 at 
37; Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 
222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 
111; South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; 
Cassim v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A). 
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consistency.103 In light of the problems caused by the lack of protection of 
human rights from abuse under the common law tradition that practiced 
South African parliamentary supremacy, the constitutional era was 
expected to have changed the positions of employer and employee 
drastically. At the adoption of the Constitution, it was expected that a 
massive change to all the laws, including labour law, would follow. 
The Constitution that comprises the Bill of Rights entrenching 
“various rights [impacting] on the formulation of labour market policy and 
labour law reform,”104 including sections 9(1), 17, 23, 34, and 33 of the 
Constitution, was embraced with the hope for better law enforcement.  
Section 23 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair labour 
practices in section 23(1), is the base of individual labour law fair dismissal. 
It is therefore foundational to policy objectives in this area of South African 
labour law. The LRA enacted to give effect to section 27 of the Interim 
Constitution objectives in the current expression of section 23 of the 
Constitution. Section 23(1) deals with the right to fair labour practices.105 
According to Currie and De Waal,106 “one of the declared purposes 
of the LRA is to ensure that the legislative framework governing labour 
relations is in accordance with the Bill of Rights, particularly, the right to fair 
labour practices .”107 The rationale behind the entrenchment of this right 
was to include the equity concerns of the Industrial Court prior to the 
adoption of the Constitution. These concerns entailed over a decade of 
 
103Bel Porto above note 98 at para 6. See as well Beukes above note 98 at 3. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11, who exposes the position of common law courts justice 
before the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane above note 9 at 
37; Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 (AD) 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 
(AD) 222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 
(TS) 111; South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 1 SA 263 (A) 
271; Cassim v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 3 SA 651 (A).  
104 Sections 9(1), 17, 23, 34, and 33 of the Constitution. See Cheadle H 2006 ILJ  
 663–703 at 666. 
105 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 499. 
106 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 499. 
107 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 499. 
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jurisprudence.108 It amongst others, composed the “entire terrain of 
individual dismissal law.”109 Chapter VIII of the LRA deals with unfair 
dismissals and unfair labour practices. Section 185 of the LRA prohibits 
unfair dismissals. In a nutshell, according to the LRA, unfair dismissals 
constitute unfair labour practices.110 In attempting to unpack the 
constitutional meaning of unfair labour practice, Currie and De Waal opine, 
that it is important to consider what the Industrial Court pronouncements 
entailed.111 According to the Industrial Court, lawfulness did not mean 
fairness.112  
The Industrial Court perspective was aligned with the interpretation 
of fairness from the common law courts’ perspective. The common law 
courts were averse to positivists approaches to the interpretation of the law 
for effecting justice. They relied on the common law natural justice principles 
of fairness, the audi alteram partem113 and the nemo judex in propria sua 
causa.114 It is argued that the Industrial Court’s exposition of fairness in 
dismissal, like that of common law courts’ understanding of fairness, was 
that natural justice principles of fairness must both be observed in order for 
rational, justifiable, and reasonable decisions to arise. 
The wide constitutional exposition of fairness encapsulates essential 
fairness based on natural justice. The reading of the Preamble, sections 1, 
 
108 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 499; also read, Cameron E, 
Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act:144-145.  
109 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
110 Read section 185 (a) and(b) together.  
111 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 502. 
112Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 503. Lawfulness from a common 
law positivist perspective of the parliament sovereignty, lawfulness was what was in 
accordance with the four corners of the written law. This perspective disregarded the 
consideration of the rationales of the law in question regarding, in order to test whether 
the law was reasonable. See Monyakane above note 9 at 32 who states that, “Based on 
the Aristotelian description of justice as what is in accordance with the nomos or positive 
law, positivism is underpinned by the belief that law is what the authorities pass as law.” 
Also read, Van Der Vyver J D Seven Lectures on Human Rights 1; Hart 1958 HARV LR  
596. 
113 Meaning “hear the other side”. 
114 Meaning “no one is to be judged in his own cause”. 
26 
 
8, 9, 23, 33, 35, 39, and 195 of the Constitution together expresses the wide 
constitutional fairness objectives. 
Since the LRA gives effect to section 23 of the Constitution, the 
expectation that the transformative objective of the LRA fairness principles 
is actualised through the observation of the fairness principles of natural 
justice is not without basis. This holds especially true because common law 
natural justice principles of fairness are the same principles that underlie 
constitutional objectives in the Preamble, sections 1, 8, 9 ,23, 33, 35, 39, 
and 195.115  
These constitutional provisions underpin principles of natural justice 
as they are essential in a democratic state such as South Africa, where the 
need to protect individual rights is of paramount concern.116 Today, the aims 
of the principles of natural justice as expressed in these constitutional 
provisions are still necessary to promote fairness. Specifically, the aims are 
to observe reasonableness,117 fairness,118 equality,119 accuracy, efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability120 in decision-making, and to impose a 
duty of fair hearing upon every decision maker so that individual rights are 
protected.121  
The introduction of these natural justice principles has sustained a 
consistent application of fairness from the common law courts’ insistence 
on the observance of equity to the now entrenched Bill of Rights. As shown 
above, based on natural justice principles of fairness, common law courts 
 
115 See the Preamble of the Constitution and read it with section 1,8, 9, 23, 33, 35, 39 and 
section 195 of the Constitution. As well consider Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 32; Klare K 1998 
SAJHR 146, who extensively discuss the constitutional perspective in relation to the 
exercise of authority. As well, read Preamble; chapter 1 and section 23 read with sections 
8 and 39 of the Constitution. 
116 Read Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, who extensively discuss 
the constitutional perspective in relation to the exercise of authority. As well, read 
Preamble; chapter 1 and section 23 read with sections 8 and 39 of the Constitution. 
117 In section 33 of the Constitution. 
118 In sections 23(1) read with sections 33 and35. 
119 In section 9 of the Constitution. 
120 See section 195 of the Constitution.  
121 R v Home Secretary, ex parte Hosenball 1977 (1) W L R 766, 772. Also see, Mureinik 
E 1994 SAJHR 31,32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146. 
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used a wide definition of fairness as a counter to the draconian common 
law position, which insisted on lawfulness in the absence of the 
constitutional protections. In the common law era, lawfulness was confined 
within the four corners of the statute.122 Thus, common law statutes were 
interpreted from a positivist approach. 
 The current culture of human rights introduced by the Constitution 
was missing. The South African system of parliamentary supremacy 
allowed procedures and laws that limited judicial review and access to 
courts. South African parliamentary supremacy thwarted court intervention 
in cases where labour matters were at issue and in turn resulted in a lack 
of respect to individual rights.123 The Industrial Court’s efforts were 
adversely affected. As a result, the enforcement of the right to fair labour 
practice was not only rare, but also difficult to achieve.124 
The current section 23(1) fair dismissal processes operationalised 
through the LRA are expected to stabilise the predicaments sustained under 
common law black letter law applications. If labour law, dealing with fair 
 
122 They followed the black letter law principle. A principle of law so notorious and 
entrenched that it is commonly known and rarely disputed even if its not rational, it was 
applied as it is. Black Letter Law Definition - Duhaime.org http// www.duhaime.org › Legal 
Dictionary [accessed 9 Jan 2019]. 
123Bel Porto above note 98 at 895 para 6. See as well Beukes above note 98 at 3. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11, who exposes the position of common law courts justice 
before the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane above note 9 at 
37 where she explained the extent of judicial review during the common law era, in 
particular read chapter two at part 2 2 4 on the extent of judicial review of administrative 
action under common law. As well read the following cases Chetty’s Motor Transport 
above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union Government 1912 AD 651 652; 
Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 222; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African 
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; Cassim v Oos-
Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A).  
124Bel Porto above note 98 at 895 para 6. See as well Beukes above note 98 at 3. Read 
Taitz above note 16 at 11, who exposes the position of common law courts justice 
before the coming into effect of the Constitution. Consider Monyakane above note 9 at 
37 where she explained the extent of judicial review during the common law era, in 
particular read chapter two at part 2 2 4 on the extent of judicial review of administrative 
action under common law. As well read the following cases cases Chetty’s Motor 
Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union Government 1912 AD 
651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 222; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African 
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; Cassim v Oos-
Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A).  
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dismissals, is based on section 23(1) in the Bill of Rights read with the LRA 
which aimed at operationalising the right to fair labour practice and still do 
not conform to the constitutional objectives in the Preamble read with 
sections 1, 8, 33, 35, 39, and 195, it would be contrary to the expectation 
that the constitutional era would stabilise the common law courts irregular 
application of equity principles expected in the operationalisation of the right 
to fair labour practice.    
Unfortunately, jurisprudence reveals that the operationalisation of 
section 23(1) negates the wide constitutional interpretation perspective. 
Jurisprudential interpretation of section 23(1) read with the LRA allows the 
employer to investigate and hear matters against employees who are 
alleged to have committed criminal misconducts without paying attention to 
section 35 of the Constitution mandating the implementation of natural 
justice fairness principles for the protection of criminal suspects. This 
oversight is contrary to the Industrial Court equity rationales underlying 
section 23(1). Unlike the Industrial Court, which encouraged the 
observation of equity under judicial review in the past regime of common 
law, the current perspective ignores it. The result of this is that those 
employees who are suspected of criminal misconducts are subjected to 
harsh investigation procedures125 and hearing processes by the employer—
contrary to section 35 of the Constitution mandating fairness principles 
regarding the treatment of criminal suspects.126 It is submitted that this 
approach ignores the foundational constitutional principles and 
objectives.127 
Read together, item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal128 
and the explanatory memorandum,129 authorise employer investigations, 
 
125 contrary to investigation laws under the CPA and section 35 of the Constitution. 
126 See section 35 of the Constitution, dealing with the right to fair trial. Read this section 
together with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek 
J; also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 
at para 56. 
127 In the Preamble, sections 1, 8, 9, 33, 35, 39 and 195 of the Constitution. 
128 Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
129 Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
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including employer criminal investigations. These pre-dismissal processes 
are without section 35 principles of fairness, including the right against self-
incrimination. Although item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal is 
considered a guideline, its value as a statutory authority is overwhelming. It 
is the yardstick for procedural fairness in all dismissal investigations. 
“Section 188(2) of the LRA, places an obligation on any person who is 
adjudicating the procedural fairness of a dismissal, ‘to take into account any 
relevant code of good practice’ issued under LRA.”130  
The purpose and the objective of the inscribed code of good practice 
procedure can be discerned from the wording of the explanatory 
memorandum which accompanies the draft of the LRA. Specifically, the 
explanatory memorandum states that: “The draft Bill requires a fair, but 
brief, pre-dismissal procedure…[it] opts for a more flexible, less onerous, 
approach to procedural fairness”.131  
In Avril Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v The 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & Others, 
(hereinafter Avril)132 Van Niekerk AJ held: 
 
It follows that the conception of procedural fairness incorporated into 
the LRA is one that requires an investigation into any alleged 
misconduct, 133 by the employer, an opportunity by any employee 
against whom any allegation of misconduct is made, to respond after a 
reasonable period with the assistance of a representative, a decision 
by the employer, and notice of that decision.134 
 
 
130 Naidoo M 2015 De Rebus 57. 
131 Per Explanatory Memorandum to the draft Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. As well 
read, Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi (2006) 9 BLLR 833(LC) at paras 
[5] and [7] where it exposes the context of fairness expected from the employer. 
   132 2006 9 BLLR 833 (LC) at 838; 2006 27 ILJ 1644 (LC) at 1652. 
133 Including criminal misconducts. 
134Avril above note 6note 6 at 838 and at 1652. Also see Old Mutual Life Assurance Co 
SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 (5) SA 552 (SCA). 
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The court further held that the new procedure was “informal”135 and did 
away with the criminal justice model of procedural fairness that had been 
developed by the Industrial Court and applied under the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction that evolved under the 1956 LRA.136 The employer is 
no longer mandated to follow a formal disciplinary procedure. This exempts 
the employer from observing and applying the rules of evidence. Under the 
Act, the employer may choose any means of securing the evidence to fortify 
the criminal allegation against the employee criminal suspect.  
Furthermore, in the case of Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v 
Gumbi137 it was held that “[t]he right to a pre-dismissal hearing imposes 
upon employers nothing more138 than the obligation to afford employees the 
opportunity of being heard before the employment is terminated by means 
of dismissal.”139 It is submitted that this approach opts for the view that the 
statutory right to fair dismissal observes the principles of fairness in part. It 
recognises the audi alteram partem rule140 but ignores the nemo judex in 
propria sua causa rule.141This is indeed a laissez-faire observance of 
natural justice principles contrary to the constitutional objectives.  
It is observed that, in investigating employee criminal misconducts 
and subsequently determining the employee criminal suspect’s guilt within 
the disciplinary hearing process, the employer is exempted from observing 
the second leg of the principles of natural justice. 
In accordance with Naidoo’s reading of item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 Code 
of Good Practice: Dismissal (item 4(1) of schedule 8) of the LRA,142 
 
135 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. The unjustifiable effects of informal investigations 
are imminent in these processes. Consider Gonzalez L G Connelly B G and Eliopoulos E 
1993 American Criminal Law Review 1179-1220 at 1179; Eckers S R 1998 Hofstra Law 
Review 109; Bennet P J  2011 American Criminal Law Review 381; McCastlain J C and 
Shonner L S  1986  Public Contract Law Journal 418–445; Hasset M J 1979 Washington 
and Lee Law Review 1049; Marvil F H and James A W 1991 Missouri Law Review 869. 
136Avril above note 6note 6 at 838 and at 1652. 
137 2007 (5) SA 552(SCA) at para [8]. 
138 My emphasis. 
139 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi 2007 (5) SA 552 (SCA), at para [8]. 
140 Meaning hear the other side. 
141 Meaning no one is to be judged in his own cause. 
142 Naidoo M 2015 De Rebus 57. 
31 
 
reiterating the informality and flexibility of the employer processes, it is 
submitted that in effect the pre-dismissal processes comprise of seven 
statutorily entrenched steps for employer criminal investigation.  
First, the employer is mandated to investigate and establish 
evidence upon which to charge the employee. Second, the employer 
reaches the conclusion that the employee is a criminal and makes a finding 
to dismiss the employee. Third, fourth, and fifth respectively:  
 
the employer inform [s] the employee of the allegations that need to be 
discussed, the employer informs the employee of the date on which the 
discussion will take place—that is within 48 hours’ notice or more so 
that the employee prepares for the hearing. The employer tables the 
gathered evidence before the employee.143  
 
Sixth, the employer gives the employee the opportunity to speak in reaction 
to the tabled evidence. Finally, the employer, after hearing the employee, 
makes a decision as to whether the employee is guilty of the misconduct 
and, if so, determines an appropriate sanction and informs the employee 
about it.144 This is in satisfaction of the “only, [one] rule of natural justice 
applicable to the pre-dismissal process—the audi alteram partem—the 
opportunity to be heard.”145  
Contrary to this scenario, even though courts acknowledged that the 
concept of fairness is wider than unlawfulness, thus making unlawfulness 
an aspect of the concept of fairness, our jurisprudence on fair dismissal 
overemphasises either fairness with regard to breach of employment 
contract or fairness as far as it falls within LRA expertise limitations.146 Thus, 
other constitutional fairness aspects such as section 35 fairness principles, 
inferred in employer criminal investigations; in matters concerning  
 
143 Naidoo M 2015 De Rebus 57 (emphasis). 
144 Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak, 1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
145 Naidoo M 2015 De Rebus 57.  
146 See Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt 2001 12 BLLR 1301 para 2. 
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employee criminal suspects, are left outside of the realm of employer labour 
law fairness. 
 
1 2  Statement of the problem 
In labour law procedures for employer criminal investigations and hearing 
processes for dismissal of employee criminal suspects, the employer can 
carry on to finality without paying regard to the effects of the ensued 
processes on the employee criminal suspect’s rights entrenched in section 
35 of the Constitution. 
 
 According to Grogan,147 even though the employee may argue that the 
questions that the employer is demanding answers for may be incriminating, 
the employer at the employee’s disadvantage may continue with the hearing 
because in terms of the statutory powers the employer has no obligation to 
bend towards employee’s request.148 
 
The employer is entitled to continue with the dismissal process regardless 
of a plea from the employee, that certain question enquire self-
incrimination.149The basis of such bearing is in consonance with labour law 
jurisprudential perspective to the extent of which employer may observe 
natural Justice principles compliant processes. 
 
 In Avril 150 Van Niekerk AJ expressed the nitty- gritties of a dismissal 
hearing as nothing analogous to a trial either civil or criminal. He held the 
essence of a dismissal hearing to be just a chance to hear an employee 
suspect without necessarily adhering to specific trial formalities.151   
 
147 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
148 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
149 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
150 Avril above note 6 at 1652. 
151 (2006) 9 BLLR 833(LC) at 838; 2006 (27) ILJ 1644 (LC) at 1652. 
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The implications of this reasoning eventualised hearings that do not observe 
the substance entailed in justiciable procedural principles. For example, it 
was no longer mandatory that hearsay evidence sought to be introduced in 
employee suspect’s hearing be subjected to necessary tests. Based on this 
understanding, Basson J152 held in favour of admitting hearsay evidence in 
a disciplinary hearing even though the accused employee ought to state its 
case and answer to the levelled charges.  
 
In another case Mohammed v Chicken Licken 153Van Aarde reiterated Avril 
principle in the following words, “Schedule 8 of the LRA 1995 read with Avril 
Elizabeth Home for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA (2006) 27 ILJ 1644 
(LC) contains in no uncertain terms the procedural requirements to be met 
before an employer can dismiss its employees.  These are basic rules of 
natural justice.”154 In another CCMA matter, Commissioner Bishiwe rejected 
the argument that the chairing of employee disciplinary by employer was 
unfair. The CCMA had the following to say:  
The applicant challenges his dismissal as procedurally unfair due to Mr 
Thomson chairing the disciplinary enquiry.   The applicant expected 
that a neutral third party would chair the enquiry; however, no evidence 
was adduced by the applicant to show that Mr Thomson conducted 
himself in any manner that can be construed as biased or unfair. A 
disciplinary enquiry is not a workplace trial.   It is meant to be a platform 
where an employer gives an accused employee a right to put across 
his own version and be heard before a decision is taken on any alleged 
misconduct.   The courts have even gone as far as to say that a 
disciplinary hearing need not even be held, as long as the employer 
can show that he had given an employee the right to be heard before 
taking a decision on the alleged misconduct.   In Avril Elizabeth Home 
for the Mentally Handicapped v CCMA ,155 the Labour Court 
 
152 Fawu obo Kapesi v Premier Foods Ltd (GF8274) 4.05.2010] [2010] JOL 25623; 
[2010] 9 BLLR 903; (2010) 31 ILJ 1654 (LC) para [46]. 
153 (2010) 31 ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 5.3.1 
154 Mohammed v Chicken Licken (2010) 31 ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 5.3.1. 
155 2006) 27 ILJ 1644 (LC); [2006] 9 BLLR 833 (LC). 
34 
 
emphasized that arbitrators must not apply a test for procedural 
fairness that is more stringent than that required by the Code of Good 
Practice: Dismissals.   The code guides employers to adopt a simple 
procedure in their disciplinary proceedings and not the criminal justice 
model. I have assessed the role played by Mr Thomson in this matter 
and have found that he acquitted himself fairly in his role, first as the 
superior to whom the matter was reported and thereafter as the 
presiding officer in the disciplinary hearing. 156 
It is submitted that the Commissioner’s reasoning on the predecessor 
judgments regarding the extent to which employer can honour natural 
justice principles entails the unjusticiable essence of employer’s criminal 
investigative procedures and subsequent criminal misconduct hearing 
processes. It would therefore not be without basis to argue that the entailed 
employer criminal investigative procedures and subsequent disciplinary 
hearings based on criminal misconducts seek to criticise the normal fairness 
processes in matters of criminal law nature. Instead of honouring equity-
based principles of justice embedded in natural justice, which were later 
entrenched in the South African Constitution’s Bill of Rights, they undertake 
to oppose and condemn them. Such undertakings are exposures of rushed 
justice with the aim of neglecting the rationale for proportionality when 
dealing with matters of criminal law nature. 
 
From this understanding, it is argued that the LRA is interpreted to be 
excluding the need for employer’s observance of the principle of fairness 
for criminal suspects entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution and 
entailing the principle nemo judex in propria sua causa.157 It is argued 
further that such an allowance immunises employers from effectively 
observing natural justice principles of fairness aimed at neutralising the 
harsh effects of condemnation and labelling of individuals as criminals. 
 
156 In Smit v Nashua East London (2010) 31 ILJ 1751 (CCMA)at para [13]. 
157 No man shall be judged in his own cause also referred to as the rule against bias. 
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Against the constitutional rationales of criminal justice,158 where the pre-
dismissal process concerns an employee who committed a criminal 
misconduct, the suspect is subjected to the risks of self-incrimination. 
  
The employer’s failure to observe the second leg of natural justice principles 
entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution happens regardless of the fact 
that the principle of fairness, that no man shall be persecuted at his own 
cause, is constitutionally entrenched in the principles establishing the rights 
of criminal suspects within which employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts fall.159 Under the Constitution, natural justice principles are 
deemed essential for the enforcement of wide constitutional fairness. 
  
It is argued that the interpretation of the LRA to the exclusion of the second 
leg of natural justice principles allows the employer to disregard the 
constitutional objectives of fairness in section 35 of the Constitution. The 
said objectives entrench the rights of criminal suspects from self-
incrimination. It is considered that such ignorance is against the objectives 
of constitutional fairness. It is further argued that the LRA designed 
approach is a negation of the fact that there could be other constitutional 
based reasons, which could affect the fairness of the processes aimed at 
disciplining and dismissing an employee criminal suspect. 
 
In some cases, it becomes apparent that the reason for dismissal even 
though indicated as fair could be founded on unlawful exercise of 
employer’s power to simultaneously investigate crime and preside on 
criminal condemnation hearings. The examples to these cases include 
criminal misconduct cases. In order to hold dismissal hearings based on 
 
158 See section 35 of the Constitution, dealing with the right to fair trial. Read this with 
S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; also read S 
v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 at para 56. 
159 Section 35 of the Constitution, entailing the right to fair trial.  Also read S v Orrie and 
Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; also read S v Sebejan and 
Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 at para 56. 
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criminal misconducts, the employer will have to informally secure 
evidence.160 
 
In this attempt, the employer will not follow the permissible means of 
investigating criminal suspect under the CPA because the LRA does not 
require the employer to follow formal means of investigation. In this 
situation, the means of investigation founding the LRA required “fair reasons 
to dismiss,” is unlawful. Many faults can be pinpointed in this case, including 
the fact that the employer ignored the constitutional rights of the employee 
criminal suspect. As a matter of justice, the employer’s investigation and 
disciplinary hearing processes become flawed.  
 
The thesis refers to a myriad of cases that expose the challenges that ensue 
in the approach that ignores the employee criminal suspects’ rights as a 
criminal suspect. For example, the case of AMG Coetzer v Registrar of 
Financial Services Provider A45/2014, 161 where an employee was not 
afforded an opportunity to be heard after the employer had investigated her 
criminality. During the hearing, the employee incriminated herself because 
her right against self-incrimination was never observed by the employer 
investigation procedure and subsequent hearing for dismissal.  
 
As indicated, the Coetzer matter forms part of a myriad of cases162 meant 
at enforcing the “right to fair dismissal,” entrenched in section 23(1) of the 
Constitution and operationalised through the LRA. All these cases imply that 
the employers do not observe constitutional transformative fairness 
ensconced in the Preamble, read with sections 8, 9, 23, 33, 35, 39 and 195 
 
160Read Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358 
where Bulbulia AM J explains the challenges of criminal persecution within the civil law 
perspectives of labour law. 
161 AMG Coetzer v Registrar of Financial Services Provider A45/2014. 
https://www.masthead.co.za/wp.../FSB-Appeal-Decision-AGM-Coetzernee-Kriel.pdf. 
unreported (hereinafter Coetzer). 
162 See a full discussion of this case in chapter four part 4 2 6 dealing with the opportunity 
of the employee to state a case and to challenge the employer’s evidence and arguments. 
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of the Constitution in the execution of fair dismissals. They do not follow the 
constitutional demands that the interpretation of legislation and 
development of the common law or customary law by courts, tribunals or 
forums must promote the spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights.163 These constitutional objectives and values are entrenched in the 
Preamble, sections 1, 8, 9,23,33,35 and section 195 of the Constitution.164 
Their rationale is to transform our legal perspective from authoritarian to the 
realisation of constitutional transformative objectives which aim at a rights-
based decision making.165 
 
Contrary to the constitutional call, when employers investigate, and 
discipline employees suspected of criminal misconduct, they do not observe 
rights of suspects espoused in section 35 of the Constitution. First, they 
overlook the right to privacy without applying necessary limitations and 
precautions applicable when such a right is compromised. Further, they 
disregard the constitutional rationale of section 35 fairness. They encourage 
self-persecution forbidden by the Constitution in section 35 read with the 
CPA. When the hearings for dismissals based on criminal misconducts are 
carried out, employee suspects of criminal misconducts are asked to 
provide answers against employers’ accusations at the risk of self-
incrimination.166  
 
The insistence that the employee criminal suspects divulge evidence that is 
incriminating sacrifices the principle of fairness that no man shall be 
 
163 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In Re: The Exparte Application 
of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 49. 
164 Chapter 1 of the Constitution entrenches the founding provisions that include 
supremacy of the Constitution.  
165Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, who extensively discuss the 
constitutional perspective in relation to the exercise of authority. 
166 This is tantamount to coerced and involuntary confessions and admissions to criminal 
allegations. Involuntary admissions and confessions are against constitutional demands 
of fairness entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. They are as well unprocedural in 
terms of the CPA. See sections 217 and 219A of the CPA.  
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persecuted at his own cause.167 Grogan states that an employee who 
persists against self-incrimination stands to lose an opportunity to give 
explanation regarding criminal allegations levelled against the employee.  
Regardless of the employee’s objections, the employer may continue 
unhindered with criminal investigations and subsequent dismissal based on 
criminal misconducts without the aggrieved employee’s participation. In 
these circumstances, the employer is not by law or any means forced to 
observe the employee criminal suspect’s plea for the constitutional right 
against self-incrimination. 
  
Where such compromises as it transpires in employer criminal 
investigations and employer disciplinary hearings based on employee 
criminal misconducts are made a law, in the guise to fair dismissal 
processes, they let employee suspects incriminate themselves. On the 
other hand, employers can exercise criminal investigative and disciplinary 
authority without observing necessary constitutional guidelines and 
objectives in sections 8,9; 33, 35, 39 and 195.  
 
Based on these errors which are detrimental to the wide constitutional 
fairness principles, it is argued that the procedure engaged by the employer 
when involved in criminal investigations of employee criminal suspects and 
the subsequent hearings for dismissals based on criminal misconducts are 
unfair and therefore unconstitutional. The established instruction that 
employers have no duty to observe natural justice principles hampers 
reasonableness and fairness in their decision making.168 This instruction is 
therefore a clear disregard of the constitutional objectives for justice. It 
offends theories and laws underlying justice for matters of a criminal law 
nature. This approach is unfair to the class of criminal suspects who are 
also employees. It amounts to unnecessary inequalities in criminal 
 
167 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213.  
168 see van Niekerk A 2012 Acta Juridica 102, 105. 
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persecution law and is against the constitutional principle that there should 
be observance of equal treatment of suspects.  
The same approach exposes South Africa, as lagging behind other states, 
which shared a similar common law with it. As opposed to South Africa as 
far as the application of the rights to remain silent and against self-
incrimination are concerned in employment hearings, these common law 
states have advanced. While South Africa is still lagging, the United States 
of America; the New Zealand and the United Kingdom have advanced, in 
that employers investigating employee criminal misconducts operate under 
a defined jurisprudence entailing the right to silence and against self-
incrimination. As far as South Africa is concerned, the developments shown 
in the United of States America; the New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
jurisprudence summons South Africa to align with these developments. 169 
It was expected that our law, especially that of civil law dealing with 
investigative matters of criminal law nature, should observe the right against 
self-incrimination principles entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. 
 
1 3  Item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal 
Item 4(1) of schedule 8 entails the nitty- gritties of fair procedure in labour 
law. According to item 4 (1) of Schedule 8, to determine whether there are 
grounds for dismissal, employers are mandated to conduct investigations 
against employees suspected of misconduct. In carrying out their mandate, 
their investigation need not be a formal enquiry. However they have to notify 
the employee suspects “of the allegations [against him or her] using a form 
and language that the employee can reasonably understand.”170 Further, 
 
169 To name a few, see the reasoning in Garrity v. New Jersey  385 U.S. 493 (1967); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 
L.Ed.2d 695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308. 
170 Item 4 of schedule 8. 
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“the employee should be allowed the opportunity to state [his/her] case in 
response to the allegations[against him/her].”171  
Furthermore, the employer must allow the employee  “a reasonable time to 
prepare the response and to [have] the assistance of a trade union 
representative or fellow employee [ who can come to the hearing to help the 
employee listen to the allegations.]” When all is done, after the [hearing,] 
“the employer should communicate the decision taken, and preferably 
furnish the employee with written notification of that decision.”172It is 
possible to undermine the powers that item 4(1) embeds in the employer 
but a critical reading of it exposes a cause for concern especially when 
viewed from a wide perspective of constitutional fairness. An appropriate 
example is the circumstance where the employer must investigate a 
criminal misconduct and subsequently conduct a hearing to establish the 
guilt of the employee suspected of a criminal misconduct. In that case, the 
employer found reasons for dismissal. If the employer fails to furnish 
reasons for dismissal, the employer’s decision would be labelled unfair 
against section 23 (1) read with Chapter VIII of the LRA dealing with unfair 
dismissal and unfair labour practice. 173   
Since the employer’s mandate within item 4 (1) allows the employer to be 
flexible and informal, the employer need not observe other peripheral legal 
concerns impacting on the employer criminal investigations and 
subsequent determination of employees’ guilt before dismissal.  Other than 
the power that the employer already has against the employee, culminating 
from the nature of the employment contract, item 4 (1) immunises the 
employer from scrutiny for possible prejudices that the employer’s criminal 
investigations procedures and subsequent dismissal hearing processes 
may pose.This thesis opposes employer’s flexibility canvassed in item 4 (1) 
 
171 Item 4 of schedule 8. 
172 Item 4 of schedule 8. 




of Schedule 8, fair procedure for dismissal of employees suspected of 
criminal misconduct.  
The thesis rather supports the need to adopt proportionality-based fair 
procedure entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution prescripts. It 
proposes that when employee criminal suspects are investigated and 
disciplined in dismissal hearings the employer must follow wide 
constitutional perspective of fairness. It vouches that wide constitutional 
perspective of fairness encompass the Industrial Court equity principles. It 
argues that the Industrial Court principles of equity took both natural justice 
principles into account.  This thesis views the adoption of the Industrial 
Court’s equity perspective when dealing with employee criminal suspects’ 
dismissals as correct since it observes the foundational principles of 
fairness in section 23 of the Constitution. Such an adoption is tantamount 
to observing wide constitutional principles of fairness now entrenched in 
sections 23 (1) read with the Preamble, sections 1,8,9, 33, 35, 39 and 195 
of the Constitution. 
1 3 1 The relationship between section 23(1) and Item 4 (1) of LRA 
Schedule 8: Code of Good Practice  
Section 23 of the Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights entrenched in the 
Constitution. It affords the right to constitutional labour relations. Section 
23(1) entrenches the right to fair labour practices for everyone. The 
interpretation of this right is made easy by reference to the equity principles 
of the common law Industrial Court jurisprudence on equity. Many writers 
emphasised that the right to fair labour practices was founded on the 
Industrial Court equity extrapolation.174 According to Currie and de Waal, 
The Industrial Court was intended to be a forum in which labour 
disputes could be dealt with by judicial means, thereby preventing 
labour grievances spilling over into the political arena. Over the next 
 
174 Amongst others, see van Niekerk A 2012 Acta Juridica 102, 105 and Currie I & De 
Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
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ten years the court used its equity jurisdiction to judicialise labour 
relations by setting out in its awards what were acceptable practices 
and what were not. These pronouncements effectively revolutionised 
the law governing labour relations in South Africa and led to the 
fleshing out of the concept of the unfair labour practice. Unfair labour 
practice pronouncements by the Industrial Court traversed the entire 
terrain of individual dismissal law and collective bargaining law. Mindful 
of the jurisprudence so developed, the drafters of the Constitution were 
determined to constitutionalise the gains that had been made.175 
The Industrial Court decisions on employer and employee fair practices 
were informed amongst others by natural justice principles of fairness, 
namely the principles audi alteram partem176 and nemo judex in propria sua 
causa.177  In cases where the commission of crime was the cause for 
dismissal, the Industrial Court jurisprudence insisted on fair procedure that 
observed the principle against self-incrimination.178 Be that as it may, 
Chapter VIII of the LRA covers unfair dismissal and unfair labour practices.  
The interpretation of fair dismissal is ensconced in the reading of Chapter 
VIII provisions together with Schedule 8 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, 
provisions. Section 186 in this chapter classifies dismissal and unfair labour 
practice within prescripts of fair labour practices.  Sections 187 and 188 
outline the characteristics of unfair dismissal. Unfair dismissals are in 
essence, unlawful dismissal and therefore not in accordance with affording 
employees the right to fair labour practices afforded in section 23(1) of the 
Constitution. One aspect of lawful dismissals is the kind of dismissal where 
the employer can show that “the dismissal was effected in accordance with 
 
175Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
176Meaning hear the other side. 
177 No man shall be judged in his own cause also referred to as the rule against bias. It 
also incorporates the principle. 
178 per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 
IC at 357-358. As well, see  Davis v Tip No 1996 (1) SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 
G-H. Applied from labour law perspective in Grogan J Workplace Law (2017) 256; From 
a civil procedure perspective  in Cilliers A C , Herbstain J, Loots C; Nel HC  The civil 
practice  at page 757 and from a human rights perspective in  Currie I & De Waal J  The 
Bill of Rights Handbook  at 745.   
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a fair procedure.” 179 Item 4 of Schedule 8 outlines what is meant by fair 
procedure pertaining to dismissal. Item 4, reads, 
4.Fair procedure. — (1) Normally, the employer should conduct an 
investigation to determine whether there are grounds for dismissal. 
This does not need to be a formal enquiry. The employer should notify 
the employee of the allegations using a form and language that the 
employee can reasonably understand. The employee should be 
allowed the opportunity to state a case in response to the allegations. 
The employee should be entitled to a reasonable time to prepare the 
response and to the assistance of a trade union representative or fellow 
employee. After the enquiry, the employer should communicate the 
decision taken, and preferably furnish the employee with written 
notification of that decision. 
(2)  Discipline against a trade union representative or an employee who 
is an office-bearer or official of a trade union should not be instituted 
without first informing and consulting the trade union. 
(3)  If the employee is dismissed, the employee should be given the 
reason for dismissal and reminded of any rights to refer the matter to a 
council with jurisdiction or to the Commission or to any dispute 
resolution procedures established in terms of a collective agreement. 
(4)  In exceptional circumstances, if the employer cannot reasonably 
be expected to comply with these guidelines, the employer may 
dispense with pre-dismissal procedures. 
The reading of item 4 (1) implies a legislated allowance to the employer to 
investigate employee criminal suspects without observing formal 
approaches in section 35 of the Constitution.180 Thus, within progressive 
discipline-oriented labour law processes, the employer can devise a 
procedure flexible enough to secure an employee response to the 
allegations without looking at the rationales of fairness principles engaged 
 
179 Section 188 (1)(b) of Chapter VIII: Unfair Dismissal and Unfair Labour Practice. 
180 Avril above note 6 at 1652. As well see Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 
and Others 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) at para 59 (Sidumo). Also 
read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd (2013) 2 BLLR 130 (LAC)paras 54-57. 
Mohammed v Chicken Licken (2010) 31 ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 5.3.1. 
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in criminal persecution. It is argued that Item 4(1) procedure, if applied to 
cases where employees are suspected of criminal misconducts, would not 
enable the application of ensued equity principles that the Industrial Court 
used to apply when dealing with such cases.181 
The employer who blindly adheres to item 4 (1) fair procedure would not 
bother to observe fair process entailed for suspects of crime—even though 
dealing with employees suspected of the commission of crime. In the 
circumstances, it is argued that Item 4(1) of the LRA provides a narrow 
approach to fairness as opposed to the former wide approach by the 
Industrial Court, now introduced in section 23(1) providing for the right to 
fair labour practices. If the LRA seeks to interpret fairness for criminal 
suspects as narrowly as depicted in our jurisprudence,182 it would seem the 
interpretation of the right to fair dismissal is porous. Through this 
interpretation, the employer’s investigatory and disciplinary hearing 
processes regarding employees suspected of criminal misconducts are no 
more remedial but are draconian. The jurisprudential underpinnings relate 
this to the transition from Common law to the current LRA prescripts.  The 
changes in the flow of law brought changes in the execution of the law. In 
the past, contract law sought remedies in common law. This meant that 
labour law cases could be taken to the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court 
observed and could test fairness regarding criminal offenses along the 
 
181 In accordance with the Industrial Court equity jurisprudence which was appreciated 
in founding section 23 of the Constitution. The Industrial Court equity jurisprudence 
which appreciated the complexity of dismissals based on criminal misconducts 
observed individual rights against self-incrimination and insisted on compliance with 
fairness principles of natural justice. per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, 
Gallant v Cim Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357-358. As well, see  Davis v Tip No 1996 
(1) SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 G-H. Applied from labour law perspective in Grogan 
J Workplace Law (2017) at page 256; From a civil procedure perspective  in Cilliers A 
C , Herbstain J, Loots C; Nel HC  The civil practice  at page 757 and from a human 
rights perspective in Currie I & De Waal J  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 745.   
182 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. As well see Sidumo above note 180 at para 
59. Also read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd (2013) 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) 
paras 54-57. Mohammed v Chicken Licken (2010) 31 ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 5.3.1. 
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criminal procedure demands.183 In the LRA era, labour law matters are 
statutorily mandated to the Labour Court. Supposedly this court is manned 
by experts in labour law.  
The Labour Court focuses on issues of expertise. In particular, the focus is 
on whether the evidence on table constitutes fair reason and not whether 
constitutionally mandated fair processes for suspects of crime were 
followed to gather the evidence. Contrary to both constitutional substantive 
and procedural fairness demands, the Labour Courts are confined and 
limited to determine fairness within the four corners of the LRA. When fair 
reason within the four corners of the LRA becomes the focus, 
reasonableness, rationality and justiciability of employer’s actions against 
employee criminal suspect become non-issues. 
Labour law fairness addresses the end result only; namely, whether the 
employer followed item 4 (1) to establish the required fair reason in terms 
of section 188 (1)(a),  at the same time disregarding the faults in item 4(1) 
mandated criminal investigation procedure used to determine fair reason for 
dismissing employee criminal suspects. In the light of the defects identified 
in the operationalisation of Item 4 (1) of the LRA schedule 8, whose code of 
good practice seeks to govern fair procedure for dismissal of employee 
criminal suspects, the constitutionality of employer’s investigative and 
disciplinary hearing processes regarding employee’s dismissal on the basis 
of criminal misconduct are questionable. At the center of this challenge is 
section 23(1) of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair labour 
practices. It is argued that against the equity principles founding section 
23(1), item 4(1) procedural measures incurred towards the establishment 
of LRA, fair reason for dismissal of employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts is ultimately rendered unjust. The trite argument in this 
instance is that current jurisprudential interpretations of fair dismissal reveal 
 
183 per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 




that the means to the required LRA fair dismissal, namely; the employer’s 
criminal investigations and disciplinary mechanisms for dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts, does not justify the end. In 
light of the fact that employees suspected of criminal misconduct are 
criminal suspects covered by section 35 of the Constitution, the involved 
employer criminal investigations procedures and subsequent hearings for 
dismissals are unconstitutional. It, therefore, follows that such investigations 
are illegal, given that they disregard the constitutionally entrenched rights 
of criminal suspects. 
 
1 4 Research questions 
 
This thesis reflects on the following research question: 
 
Does the employers' investigative procedures and disciplinary hearing 
processes align with the constitutional wide fairness, viewed in the light of 
broad constitutional fairness perspective anticipated in section 23(1) read 
with sections 1, 8, 9, 33,35, 39,195 and the preamble of the Constitution?  
In other terms the thesis questions the constitutionality of employers' 
investigative procedures and disciplinary hearing processes with specific 
reference to dismissal of employees on the basis of criminal misconducts in 
South Africa. 
1 5 The aims of the research  
The main aim of this thesis is to investigate how constitutionally fair is 
employers' criminal investigation procedures and disciplinary hearing 
processes. The thesis aims at redefining fairness in employer’s 
investigative processes and hearing procedures for dismissal of employees 
who committed criminal misconducts. It seeks to introduce wide 
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constitutional fairness perspective as opposed to the narrow interpretation 
of fairness within section 23 of the Constitution. Wide constitutional 
transformative fairness perspective is a concept of fairness which aligns 
with the human rights based constitutional objective. It implies fairness that 
observes all constitutional fairness prescriptions. Such entail the preamble, 
read with sections 1,8,9,23,33,35,39 and 195. The main source for this 
concern is that in moving from a common law positivist approach to the 
interpretation of the law under the Constitution of South Africa,1996, a 
rights-based approach was adopted. A rights-based approach entails the 
need to rationalise the law and writ it off possible unfairness, 
unreasonableness and unlawfulness. A rights-based approach 
interpretation questions whether the interpretation or the application of the 
law is justiciable. That is, it accords with constitutional objective in that 
individuals should not be deprived of their constitutional rights willy-nilly. 
The extent of this approach is that the Bill of Rights cannot be interpreted 
piece meal. In order that the interpretation of one right against the other 
right is avoided, rights within the Bill of Rights are interpreted while taking 
regard to other rights. Thus, the right to fair labour practice in section 23 of 
the Constitution, cannot be applied to the exclusion of other rights such as 
the rights in section 35 of the Constitution, for example, the rights against 
self-incrimination and related rights. Further, the thesis refers to the 
historical foundations of section 23 of the Constitution. It argues that section 
23 of the Constitution right to fair labour practices is drawn among others, 
from the common law Industrial Court equity perspective on fair labour 
disciplinary processes. The equity perspective on fair labour disciplinary 
process observed both principles of natural law, - audi alteram partem and 
nemo judex in propria sua causa. The thesis is concerned that the opposite 
is happening in the current constitutional era. Against the Wide 
constitutional fairness perspective audi alteram partem is respected within 
employer flexibility-based fairness while the other principle - nemo judex in 
propria sua causa is ignored. The thesis argues for the reform of the current 
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jurisprudential expression of section 23 of the Constitution right to fair labour 
practices upon which item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 fair procedure for dismissal 
of employees suspected of criminal misconducts is based. It notes that the 
application of item 4 (1) of Schedule 8 fair procedure - for dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts allows employers to 
condemn employees as criminals without following constitutionally 
mandated principles of fairness applicable on employee criminal suspects. 
In order to redefine the current perspective of labour law fairness for criminal 
misconducts hearings for dismissals, the thesis draws from the Industrial 
Court’s application of common law fairness principles of natural justice to 
maintain equity in cases involving criminal misconduct. 184 
The thesis appreciates that currently, employer-initiated criminal 
investigation procedures and disciplinary hearings processes for the 
dismissal of employees, who have committed criminal misconducts are 
based on item 4 of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal. Within this Code, 
there are no defined procedures but the courts have mandated the employer to 
use flexible and informal procedures which are not equity based like the 
Industrial Courts used to  perform.185 Item 4 procedures accord flexibility to 
found progressive discipline processes, adopted in South African system of 
labour law.186 In chapter four, it is found that flexible processes create an 
opportunity for multiple prejudices against employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts. The ensued challenges are evidenced in employer’s criminal 
 
184 In accordance with the Industrial Court equity jurisprudence which was appreciated 
in founding section 23 of the Constitution. The Industrial Court equity jurisprudence 
which appreciated the complexity of dismissals based on criminal misconducts 
observed individual rights against self-incrimination and insisted on compliance with 
fairness principles of natural justice. per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, 
Gallant v Cim Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357-358. As well, see  Davis v Tip No 1996 
(1) SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 G-H. Applied from labour law perspective in Grogan 
J Workplace Law (2017) 256; From a civil procedure perspective  in Cilliers A C , 
Herbstain J, Loots C; Nel HC  The civil practice  at page 757 and from a human rights 
perspective in Currie I & De Waal J  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 745.  
185 of Avril above note 6 at 1652. As well see Sidumo above note 180 at para 59. Also 
read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd (2013) 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 54-57. 
Myburg A & Bosch C Reviews in the Labour Courts South Africa (2016) 271-282. 
186 This process is explained in chapter two part 2 2 4 2 dealing with the theory of 
flexibility and its extent in criminal misconducts discipline. 
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investigations and employer’s subsequent determination of employee’s guilt 
before dismissal.187 The thesis argues that employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts are a category of criminal suspects within the operation of section 
35 of the Constitution. 
These categories of criminal suspects are therefore investigated in an 
unconstitutional procedure, different from the constitutionally entrenched law 
dealing with criminal investigations.188 Within the Constitution, criminal 
investigations are carried out from proportionality-based processes entrenched 
in section 35 of the Constitution.189 Contrary to these constitutionally entrenched 
fair procedures, the hearings for the determination of employee criminal 
suspects’ guilt before dismissals are executed in a different manner from the 
constitutionally entrenched processes.190 The effect of these differences are 
irregularities and therefore unconstitutional results. Considering the 
constitutional fairness principles, coupled with the constitutionally entrenched 
transformative objectives in the Preamble, read with sections 1, 8, 9, 33, 35 ,39 
and 195, the thesis argues that there is a need to adopt wide interpretation of 
constitutional fairness for dismissal of employees criminal suspects. Thus, 
reading fairness principles in both sections 23,33 and 35 of the Constitution, 
together with the constitutional transformative objectives in the Preamble and 
sections 1 and 195 of the Constitution. From a labour law fairness perspective, 
the entrenched principles in the Preamble, read with sections 1, 8, 9, 23, 33,35, 
39 and 195 should be interconnected to find the new meaning of fair labour 
practices. Consequently section 23 and the relevant LRA provisions would not 
be interpreted narrowly without paying regards to other constitutional provisions 
 
187 See chapter four in general and for examples see part 4 3 dealing with the 
repercussions of decisions based on employer interests against employees’ rights. 
Read, Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak, 1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
188 The law dealing with criminal investigations is found in section 35 of the Constitution 
read with the CPA. See chapter two part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality 
and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
189 See chapter three and chapter four. 
190 See Chapters two, three and four. Read Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak, 
1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
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entrenching fairness principles and other major constitutional objectives on 
transformation of legal prescripts. 
In satisfaction of a wide interpretation of fairness within the constitutional 
transformative objectives, it is suggested that there ought to be a better 
process that mitigates the overreach of the exercise of employers’ rights at 
the expense of concerned employees’ rights as criminal suspects. As 
opposed to the current process, a new process akin to criminal procedure 
observance of constitutional fairness principles entrenched in section 35 of 
the Constitution, which was used under common law by the Industrial 
Courts is recommended. The new process will be a sui generis procedure 
that observes both civil and criminal standards for fairness while dealing 
with criminal concerns within the labour civil law prescripts.  
The thesis will base the nature of the subject matter within the labour law 
civil processes of criminal investigation and dismissal hearings as the 
starting point to its choice of applicable fairness principles. 191   
The benchmark to constitutional fairness in labour law that seeks to deal 
with criminal misconduct should be aligned to the interpretation of section 
23(1) within constitutional fairness transformative objectives. Such would 
be fairness based on both principles of natural justice as it used to happen 
under common law Industrial Court equity jurisprudence. 
 A recognised principle in the constitutional era is that the application and 
development of common law perspectives should be within the 
constitutional mandate. As Penning, Konjn & Veldman192 extrapolate, in 
“applying or developing the common law, section 8(3) of the Constitution 
play important role in that it mandates the courts to give effect to basic 
 
191 Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 
222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; 
South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; Cassim 
v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A). 
192Penning F, Konjn Y& Veldman A eds Social Responsibility and Labour Relations 
(2008) 197; see Gobbler v Naspers BPK another 2004 5 BLLR 455 (c). 
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rights.” 193 They explain further that such an attempt would be attained by 
applying, or “if necessary, developing the common law to the extent that 
legislation does not give effect to [a particular] right.” 194 Coupled with 
section 8(3), section 39(2) is also of importance as it guides on how to go 
about expressing section 8(3) mandates. It requires the interpretation of 
“any legislation, [to]… promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.”195  
It is submitted that the interpretation and application of LRA fairness in 
matters of criminal misconduct without observing the demands of the Bill of 
Rights, in particular, section 35 fairness principles for suspects of criminal 
misconducts (as the current labour law jurisprudence exposes) works 
against the demands and objectives of the Constitution. 
On the basis of these concerns, it is trite to argue that the suggested 
observation of constitutional transformative principles will do away with the 
now strict and narrow labour law perspective of fairness engaged in 
disciplinary processes of employee criminal suspects; for, all told, these 
procedures lean more towards observing the principle of flexibility. 196 In 
chapter two the principle of flexibility is found to be capable of relaxing the 
stringent section 35 constitutional procedural protections against unfair criminal 
persecutions in cases of a criminal nature. 197 Such approach to fairness is 
devoid of the transformative constitutional fairness that observes 
proportionality central to criminal persecution. It is argued that engaging in 
 
193 Penning F, Konjn Y& Veldman A eds Social Responsibility and Labour Relations 
(2008) 197; see Gobbler v Naspers BPK another 2004 BLLR 455 (c). 
194 Penning F, Konjn Y& Veldman A eds Social Responsibility and Labour Relations 
(2008) 197; see Gobbler v Naspers BPK another 2004 5 BLLR 455 (c). 
195 Penning F, Konjn Y& Veldman A eds Social Responsibility and Labour Relations 
(2008) 197; see Gobbler v Naspers BPK another 2004 5 BLLR 455 (c). 
196 See Booysen v SAPS & another 2008 10 BLLR 928 [LC]; Jiba v Minister : Department 
of Justice & Constitutional Development  & Others 2010 31 ILJ 112 (LC); and Trustees For 
The Time Being of the National Bioinformatics Network Trust v Jacobson & others (2009) 
30 ILJ 2513 (LC) ; as well refer to Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79 read it together with 
Hoexter’s explanation of flexibility in Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 363 . It 
is referred to in chapter two under part 2 2 4 2. 




the widening of the scope of fairness has more advantages than observing 
a narrow perspective of fairness based on flexibility.  
Against the jurisprudential outcry that if employers ought to observe both 
principles of natural justice, they would be equated to courts that follow 
formal processes, it is argued that the processes expressing fairness in the 
wide sense promote an employer and employee relationship that respects 
all other constitutional rights affecting the nature of the problem in issue.  
Within this thesis discussion, the employer’s attempt to engage in criminal 
persecution for disciplinary purposes is a huge responsibility. Within the 
constitutional mandate criminalisation of individuals has been assigned 
specific fairness principles including the rights of suspects of crime. The 
South African Constitution aligns itself with universal observance of fairness 
in matters of criminal law nature.198  
South Africa is therefore encouraged to explore systems of the United 
Kingdom, the United States of America and New Zealand which first 
cracked statutory confinements in law, especially those dividing civil and 
criminal law. Through that development, these systems enabled the 
reinterpretation of formal statutory-based criminal actions and identified 
criterions based on the subject-matter in issue.  
They broke away from confining determination of subject matters in criminal 
proceedings within civil law principles. They enabled the substance of the 
situation to determine the applicable legal principles.  
Through using constitutional transformative principles, South Africa can be 
able to explore how best to redefine civil and criminal processes from a 
constitutional interpretative perspective. This approach enables a flexible 
application of legal principles across board, especially where civil and 
criminal procedure processes are concerned. For a practical application of 
 
198See S v Orrie and Another, 2005 (1) SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J and 
read Makwakwa v The State case no A409/13 South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg. 
Delivered on 24.03.2014. Per Opperman AJ pages 6–8. Also read S v Sebejan 19971 
SACR 626 (W) and S v Zuma, 1995 2 SA 642 (CC). See also S v Khan 2010 2 SACR 
476 (KZP).  
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this method, in Engel v Netherlands199 and Benham v United Kingdom200 
more caution was exercised when dealing with potentially criminal matters. 
Article 6201 of the European Convention on Human Rights was invoked to 
enable the distinction between classes of investigations not done by law 
enforcement agencies. That approach encouraged the treatment of 
investigations of criminal acts different from purely civil matter in those 
circumstances. Similarly, The United States of America perspective 
exposed in Andresen v Maryland,202 reveals, that the principle in the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution stating that: “No person shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” applies 
across the board, in criminal and civil proceedings, as long as the suspect 
or the witness apprehends self-incrimination. 
 
1 6 Research methodology  
This is a desktop research-based study where primary and secondary 
sources of literature regarding fairness in labour law from the South African 
perspective will be used to frame arguments. This thesis argues against the 
current interpretation of fairness emphasised in labour law jurisprudential 
expressions of employer criminal investigations procedures. 
Commensurately, this thesis also argues against the subsequent dismissal 
hearings that determine employee criminal suspect’s guilt before 
dismissal.203 Since this research is argumentative, it engages in discourse 
methodology. I have referred to the theories underlying labour law equity. 
These were found through reading literature in books, articles, case law and 
listening to audio recordings of court proceedings.  
 
199 (1976) 1 EHRR 647. 
200 (1996) 22 EHRR 293. 
201 Referred to and explained in chapter five. See chapter five para 5.4.1 on the Privilege 
against self –incrimination as a human right in the United Kingdom and its application in 
employment matters.  
202  427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
203 Read Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak, 1986) 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
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The thesis interlinks labour law and criminal law to come up with justiciable 
fairness for employees who have committed criminal misconducts. It has 
found that there are interlinks between constitutional principles of fairness. 
First it notes that the wide constitutional perspective of fairness demands 
that sections of the Constitution be interpreted within the wide constitutional 
mandate. The thesis therefore compares and extrapolates fairness 
principles within the South African constitutional human rights-based 
perspective. The thesis argues that the current jurisprudential interpretation 
of labour law fairness based on the principle of flexibility breeds informal 
procedural processes which exempts employers from observing important 
constitutional principles expressed through proportionality-based 
prescripts. This interpretation jeopardises the rationale of constitutional 
fairness from a wider perspective expressed in the Preamble, sections 1, 8, 
9, 23, 33, 35 read with section 195 of the Constitution. In so doing, it 
misinterprets the human rights-based rationales of the Constitution. The 
thesis argues that the flexibility-based approach affects the foundational 
constitutional principles of fairness in section 23 of the Constitution, it is 
against the Constitutional demands for the protection of individual rights at 
all costs except when constitutionally mandated that such rights may be 
overlooked.204  
The thesis therefore recommended that South Africa must draw from the 
experience of other common law states whose employment law foundations 
emanate from some similar common law perspectives like South Africa. The 
intention is to show how these jurisdictions have (regardless of the 
existence of Master and Servant connotations from common law) managed 
to overcome the possibility of prejudices emanating from the ignorance of 
the employee criminal suspect’s rights against self-incriminations.  
The United Kingdom, the United States of America and New Zealand will 
be a necessary reference in order to pursue the objective for reinterpretation 
of fairness in dismissal of employee suspects of criminal misconducts. Apart 
 
204 Per section 36 of the Constitution. 
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from these states’ similar common law background with South Africa, these 
systems are chosen because they share equivalent rights with South Africa 
especially the rights to fairness pertaining to criminal suspects and rights to 
fair labour practices.205 These jurisdictions also observe the protection of 
human rights, just like South African constitutional transformative 
perspective in the Preamble, sections 1, 8, 9, 23, 33 ,35 read with section 
195 seeks to do.  
The attempt to show how the United Kingdom, United States of America 
and New Zealand managed to overcome possibility of prejudices emanating 
from the ignorance of the employee criminal suspect’s rights against self-
incriminations needed access to international material. The thesis was 
written based on electronic resources on both primary and secondary 
resources addressing South African and international perspectives. 
Important websites such as the International Labour Organisation’s website 
were visited. Books explaining the interpretation and application of the 
fairness principles from South Africa and the chosen international 
jurisprudence were looked at. Academic articles in journals and other 
accessible materials were also considered.  
It is important to mention that there was scarcity of authority on discipline 
and misconduct in labour law as this area of research is still limited. This 
thesis is part of the foundational research in this area of research. To 
interlink my argument (s), I have cross referenced most influential literature, 
namely that is cited often, in the footnotes. 
 
1 7 Justification and limitations of research  
The foundations of equity underlying section 23 of the Constitution envisage 
fairness that is higher than lawfulness pursued from the labour law 
perspective of the common law era. On this basis, the LRA provisions 
seeking to unpack section 23 of the Constitution mandate, are considered 
 
205 For example, read the explanation of fairness from the American perspective in 
Backer L C 1997 Tulsa Law Review Vol. 33 Iss. 1, Art. 10 135-162. 
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the instrument of constitutional transformation in labour matters, especially 
regarding the right against unfair labour practices in section 23(1). 
In the aim to move away from inequities of employees and employers 
identified in the common law era, labour law fairness,206 the current 
constitutional perspective of fairness is wide. The wide constitutional 
perspective of fairness expects employers’ criminal investigations 
procedures and subsequent disciplinary hearing processes to be fair. 
Section 23(1) of the Constitution, entrenching the right to fair labour 
practices read with the LRA provisions must be interpreted from the wide 
constitutional perspective of fairness. Thus, the determination of 
employee’s criminal guilt before dismissal ought to observe section 35 of 
the Constitution amongst other provisions. To such extent the employer’s 
investigation procedures and subsequent hearing for dismissal transform 
from mere common law lawfulness to a justiciable human rights-based 
processes.  
The thesis argues against the current jurisprudential interpretation of 
section 23(1), to the exclusion of the second leg of natural justice 
principles.207 It escalates the Industrial Court equity principles founding 
section 23 of the Constitution because they observed both principles of 
natural justice. The Industrial Court equity principles effectively dealt with 
possible procedural injustices which are now evident in the current 
application of section 23(1) of the Constitution. 
The obvious multiplicity of criminal persecutions within section 23 and 
section 35 in the Bill of Rights insinuates inequalities against section 9 of 
the Constitution. The challenges brought to bear by the employers’ criminal 
investigations processes and subsequent dismissal hearing processes in 
the event that employers ignore the equity principles now entrenched in 
section 35 of the Constitution, justify that research that investigates the 
constitutionality of employer processes be carried out. 
 
206 Read, Conradie M 2016 Fundamina vol 22 (2 ) pp 163-204. 
207 Including the principles against unfair persecution of criminal suspects. 
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In the light of such research there will be an exposure regarding whether or 
not the application of section 23(1) got rid of the inequity controversy 
regarding labour issues of fair dismissal from common law perspective 
where the Industrial Court struggled to remedy inequities as there was no 
Bill of Rights.  
The current interpretation of section 23 of the Constitution outside the wide 
constitutional fairness perspective should be dissected to find if it is aligned 
with the constitutional perspective of fairness. It is therefore justifiable to 
conduct research that clarifies whether the current interpretation of fairness 
is in accordance with the constitutional transformative objectives in the 
Preamble, section 1, 8, 9, 23, 33, 35 and 195 of the Constitution so as to do 
away with the draconian processes which were inequity- based common 
law interpretations.  
The research will expose any apparent unconstitutionality in the processes 
and procedures followed by the employer who investigates and dismisses, 
and employee suspected of criminal misconducts. The research will 
propose ways to address any encountered challenges. It will emphasise 
that draconian common law-based perspective cannot be preferred over a 
human rights-based constitutional law perspective. It will harness the 
Industrial Court common law era effort when dealing with criminal 
misconducts, namely the insistence that natural justice fairness principles 
were essential, especially the nemo judex in propria sua causa208 principle 
entailing the right against self-incrimination. It begs the equity-
encompassed fairness perspective of the Industrial Courts which eventually 
founded section 23 of the Constitution. 
The Industrial Court equity-based processes urged for the observation of 
fairness principles, which principles were later adopted in section 35 of the 
Constitution. The result was that the Industrial Court’s perspective of 
criminal law procedure was opposed to the hearings of cases involving 
criminal misconduct which defied the common law natural justice principles. 
 
208 No man shall be judged in his own cause also referred to as the rule against bias. 
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Such hearings meant that there was no fairness for employee criminal 
suspects. The Industrial Court perspective included the principle that “no 
statement made by an accused person to be given in evidence against 
himself unless it is shown by the prosecution to have been freely and 
voluntarily made—in the sense that it has not been induced by any promise 
or threat proceeding from a person in authority.”209  
The current LRA fair dismissal approach will be investigated to determine if 
it entails compromises for employee criminal suspects’ rights in section 35. 
The fact of the matter is that employees suspected of criminal misconducts 
who then appear in disciplinary hearings face a hard choice of self-
incrimination, if they were not to answer to their charges, then dismissal 
would still be the ultimate. It will be found out if in this circumstance labour 
law affords any protection to employee criminal suspects in dismissal 
hearings.210 
Contrary to fairness observed in the past era there is still a need to re-
interpret the rationale for fair process principles in labour law in the context 
of constitutional objectives to justice.  I agree in this thesis that, “[w]hile the 
courts have established that the determination of a fair sanction for 
workplace misconduct necessarily entails a value judgment, they have 
failed to recognise that principled decision-making requires a coherent 
conception of justice.”211 Of significance, labour decisions on fair dismissals 
on the basis of criminal misconduct ought to be based on judgment taking 
into account the constitutional value that apply to criminal justice for criminal 
suspects.  
This thesis will help labour law scholars as well as professionals, including 
the judiciary, to look back and define the constitutional perspectives that 
should be engaged in the consideration of dismissals of employee criminal 
 
209  formulated in R v Barlin ,1926 AD 459 at 462. 
210 The contract of employment by nature is onerous as far as the employee is 
concerned. See Manamela T 2013 SA MERC LJ  418. He relates the complexity and 
difficulty that the employee could be possibly faced with in discerning the 
reasonableness of the employer’s call for action from employee.  
211van Niekerk A 2012  Acta Juridica  102, 105. 
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suspects. The thesis will put a halt to the misuse of labour processes, 
further, to find justice in matters of a criminal law nature. Most of all, it will 
emphasize the need to do away with the current unconstitutional dichotomy 
between civil and public laws. This research endeavour encourages that the 
nature of the matter determines the principles to follow. It does not 
encourage classification of the form of a matter according to whether it is a 
civil or a public matter. Furthermore, it exposes such an approach to be 
focussing on the form as opposed to the substance of the matter.  
 
1 7 1 Limitations of research  
This research interlinks public and private law principles. There is, however, 
little academic research from the South African perspective amalgamating 
perspectives of criminal or public law and civil or private law. The shortage 
of academic material in this area remains a challenge when research 
interlinking public and private law is undertaken in the thorough going 
fashion as this thesis does.  
At the inception of the Constitution in South Africa, a new perspective 
emerged that seeks to amalgamate all law disciplines from a human rights-
based approach mandating a new legal dichotomy within which the current 
research falls. 
This is a postmodernist212 approach writing criticising, comparing, analysing 
and merging the current concepts and philosophies to come up with new 
interpretation of fair dismissal of employee criminal suspects. The thesis 
therefore states existing principles of fairness without delphing into what the 
current writing and theorisation explains but focuses on their application to 
expose the loopholes in literally applying such understanding on the new 
concept of criminal misconduct. The thesis comes up with suggestions on 
how to reinterpret the current principles in order to advance fairness on 
 
212 Postmodernism also spelled post-modernism, in Western philosophy, a late 20th-
century movement characterized by broad skepticism, subjectivism, or relativism; a 
general suspicion of reason; and an acute sensitivity to the role of ideology in asserting 
and maintaining political and economic power. 
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employee criminal suspects. It uses the current principles to come up with 
a merger of principles to address hypothesised challenges. This approach 
is intending for a new understanding and application of existing principles 
and has delved in dry areas of legal discourse where there is just a little and 
possibly no research existing.  
It was discovered that there is lack of literature both nationally and 
internationally that speaks from the same perspective as the hypothesis in 
this thesis. It was hard to discover a variety of scholars who speak from the 
same understanding hypothesised in this thesis hence in most cases a 
single resource was referred to in order to express arguments in this thesis.  
This thesis forms the breaking ground towards the new study on species of 
misconducts in labour law. It has dealt with only one specie-criminal 
misconduct. It has discovered that the investigation and discipline of 
employee misconducts may draw from several areas of law. Thus, several 
disciplines of law are brought together to try and amass the employer’s 
discretion even though such disciplines’ perspectives and controls- like 
criminal law principles are not strictly observed by the employer because 
the employer operates within massive flexible means of operation. The 
employer is free from the concerned discipline protective measures which 
could benefit the employee. 
 This research has therefore become possible through a consultation of 
research in compartmentalised disciplines of legal principles. At the centre 
was an understanding sought from research in human rights discussing and 
interpreting the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution. At the 
inception of the South African Constitution, the Bill of Rights became the 
centre for legal interpretation.  
Amongst other rights in the Bill of Rights, the application of the right against 
self-incrimination—which was viewed as a criminal law prescript—was 
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applied indiscriminately between criminal and civil matters.213 Based on the 
new rights-based perspective, written material in current 
compartmentalised disciplines of labour law and criminal law was examined 
in the light of the Bill of Rights.  International research that dealt with relevant 
international law concepts and explained the application of similar clauses 
as those entrenched in the South African Constitution were found useful. 
It is however sad to note that there is no specific International Labour 
Organisation Convention that deals with issues of discipline. This encounter 
has made the research in this area very challenging. There was limited legal 
sources to refer to in expressing the international perspective on discipline 
of employees who committed crimes as misconducts. The examples drawn 
from other commonwealth states focus on the right against self-
incrimination. This right is both observed in South Africa and internationally. 
It was applied under common law as privilege. South Africa emancipated it 
into a right cross cutting fairness in matters of a criminal law nature. Foreign 
law emancipated it into a right that applies in both civil and criminal law 
matters including employment law.  Principles relating to its formation, 
namely the principles of natural justice formed the basis of discourse in this 
thesis. They were also helpful in deciphering the nature of justification 
sought by the ILO in disciplinary issues. Such justification was also 
discovered to be the same as constitutional justification sought in South 
Africa. 
The concerned literature was however not rich enough even though it was 
foundational to the area of disciplinary processes pertaining to employee 
criminals central to this thesis. To overcome the possible challenges, I have 
identified the common law concept of self-incrimination to show that it is 
possible that employees right against self-incrimination can be invoked in 
employment matters. Within the current jurisprudence self-incrimination is 
 
213 See Ferreira v Levin N O & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at paragraph 96. In the 
case of S v Krejcir and Others 2016 (2) SACR 214 Per Lamont J in his trial within trial 
decision and referring to; Black v Joffe 2007 (3) SA 171 (CPD), held that, “The privilege 
which the witness has is not limited to criminal or civil trial proceedings.”  
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a concept which underlie fairness principles in criminal punishment within 
the South African Common law214  and the entrenched section 35 of the 
Constitution.215 In South African labour law the invocation of this right is 
negated. The right against self-incrimination has currently been 
incorporated in civil punishments including labour law discipline processes 
by the European Union.216 Some of the Commonwealth states which share 
common law with South Africa are part of the European Union and will be 
invoked in terms of section 39 of the South African Constitution, to show 
that it is possible that South Africa can bridge the divide between criminal 
and labour law dealing with the investigation and hearings for dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts.217 The main reason for the 
development recognised in these Commonwealth states was to strike 
fairness in employer investigations for dismissal of employees who have 
committed crime. Such criminal acts are termed “criminal misconducts”218 
in this thesis. 
 
1 7 2 The scope of the study 
This thesis focuses on the labour law principles empowering the employer’s 
criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings involving employees who 
are alleged to have committed criminal misconduct. In the light of 
entrenched fairness principles for criminal suspects, it examines the 
application of principles informing the employer’s duty to furnish fair reason 
for employee criminal misconducts suspects. It looks at how the employer’s 
conduct of disciplinary hearings with the aim to dismiss an employee who 
committed some criminal misconduct respects constitutional objectives of 
 
214 Pittman C R The Colonial and Constitutional History of Privilege 71.  
215 Theophilopoulos C 2002 SAJHR 505. 
216 See Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
217  See chapter five showing how other common law countries like South Africa are 
dealing with this challenge. The United States of America, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom consider the employee criminal suspect’s right against self-incrimination even 
in employer criminal investigation and subsequent dismissal hearings. 
218 Read paragraphs 2 1 1 on the concept of criminal misconducts and 2 1 1 1 on the 
definition of criminal misconducts in labour law. 
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fairness and justice in the Preamble, section 1, 8, 9, 23, 33, 35 read with 
section 195 of the Constitution. It emphasises the extent to which the 
employers should respect constitutional equity-based rationales founding 
the constitutional principles of fairness in carrying out their criminal 
investigations and dismissal hearings involving criminal misconduct as 
informed by the LRA flexible and informal prescriptions.  
This thesis is based on desktop researched material. Websites with relevant 
information were consulted. Journals and books from libraries were referred 
to. In turn, ideas gathered from reading materials, where some opinions 
ensconced in this thesis were considered, were tested at relevant 
conferences through presentations.219 The study focuses on individual law 
principles of fair labour practices entrenched in section 23(1) of the 
Constitution, in particular the right to fair dismissal. It deals with fairness 
within the scenario where an employee who is suspected of committing a 
criminal act is investigated and then undergoes a dismissal hearing where 
the extent of criminal guilt is determined before dismissal. It is based on 
South African Jurisprudential interpretation of the right to fair dismissal. The 
thesis examines the application of principles informing the employer’s duty 
to furnish fair reason regarding the dismissal of criminal suspects. It looks 
at how the employer’s conduct of disciplinary hearings respects 
constitutional transformative objectives and entrenched constitutional 
fairness principles for matters of a criminal law nature. In particular, the 
thesis emphasises the extent to which the employer in carrying out the 
mentioned section 23(1) mandates informed by LRA respects constitutional 
rationales of equity founding section 23(1) and operationalised by the LRA 
principle of fairness. 
1 8 Summary of Chapters 
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction. 
It refers to the Industrial Court jusprudence as the historical foundations of 
 
219 A pioneer presentation was done at the UNISA’s 20 Years of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa: Looking Back, Thinking Forward, conference. 
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section 23 so as to bring to view section 23 “equity” rationale. It exposes 
that equity from the common law Industrial Court jurisprudence is the 
foundation for section 23(1) fair labour practice rights. Chapter one 
expresses the interrelationship between section 23(1) of the Constitution 
and the fairness provisions in the Bill of Rights as well as the Preamble, 
sections 1, 8, 9, 33, 35, 39 and 195. It considers that the constitutional 
interpretation of section 23(1) is ought to encapsulate constitutional 
transformative objectives in the Preamble, section 1, 8, 9, 33, 35, 39 and 
195. It appreciates how the ignorance of common law natural justice 
principles of fairness220 read with that of just cause breeds problems 
encountered in the current jurisprudential interpretation of fairness in cases 
of dismissals based on employee criminal misconduct. Based on the 
application of section 23(1), read in tandem with the LRA interpretation, 
chapter one shows that the current jurisprudential interpretation of dismissal 
law regarding the employer’s criminal investigation and hearing of 
dismissals of employee criminal suspects does not effectively express the 
constitutional rationale for fair investigative procedures and fair hearing 
process anticipated in matters of criminal law nature. Further, the chapter 
gives the aims of the study. It explains the extent and limits of the study. It 
shows how the work will be arranged and provides a chapter break down 
with brief summaries on the objective of each chapter.  
Chapter two explains the theoretical underpinnings of employer power 
during the disciplinary processes involving employee criminal-suspects221 
from a South African labour law perspective of progressive discipline. It lays 
a basis for exposing whether the currently followed employers’ criminal 
investigative procedures and disciplinary hearing processes, with specific 
 
220 The nemo judex in propria sua causa meaning that no man shall be judged in his 
own cause, also referred to as the rule against bias. Equity that the Industrial Court-
based jurisprudence relied on is in essence the appreciation of natural justice principles 
read with just cause principles. 
221 See section 35 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair trial in criminal matters. 
Read it with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; 
also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 
at para 56. As well, see Harris D 1967 ICLQR 354. 
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reference to dismissal of employees who committed criminal misconducts, 
express the constitutional mandate for the fair treatment of employee 
criminal suspects.222 It unpacks the rationale behind the South African 
labour law employer disciplinary powers on employees who committed 
criminal acts. It starts by exposing the philosophical understanding 
underpinning work environment discipline. It then articulates the evolution 
of employer disciplinary processes. It exposes procedural disparities 
between the treatment of employees suspected of criminal misconducts 
within section 23(1) fair dismissal processes and that of ordinary criminal 
suspects in the light of section 35 entrenched fairness principles.  
Consequently, it discovers that, even though with the same objective of 
seeking to condemn criminal behaviour, there is a clash between fair 
procedure rights in matters of a criminal law nature and labour law fairness 
procedure for employee criminal suspects. Chapter two further exposes that 
the investigation and disciplinary processes against the employee who has 
committed a criminal act, although aimed at determining the ultimate 
criminal liability, are closely linked to subsequent criminal trial proceedings. 
Chapter two consequently shows that, such proceedings have a potential 
of successive impact on the employee criminal suspect’s rights. 
Chapter three looks at the jurisprudential expression of the nature of labour 
law fairness. It compares it with the nature of constitutional fairness 
principles established for dealing with matters of a criminal law nature.223 
Based on the fact that the Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (the PAJA) 
is the umbrella legislation for administrative justice, including the employer’s 
exercise of powers,224chapter three also studies the nature of labour law 
fairness in the light of the principles of fairness understood from sections 33 
of the Constitution entrenching administrative justice principles.  
 
222 Entrenched in chapter 2 of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights. In particular section 35 
of the Constitution which adopted proportionality-based perspectives. 
223 Section 35 of the Constitution read with the CPA. 
224 See Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
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Chapter three further analyses the extent of fairness encapsulated in labour 
law jurisprudence on matters of a criminal law nature, deriving such a 
measure from section 35 constitutional fairness principles intended for a 
criminal justice perspective. It exposes the inequalities transpiring when 
dealing with criminal misconduct suspects within the labour law 
jurisprudential parameters. It answers the question whether labour law 
disciplinary processes for employee criminal misconduct suspects observe 
the established section 35 constitutional requirements of fairness 
associated with criminal suspects. Likewise, it proceeds further to study 
fairness processes in labour law in the light of proportionality and flexibility 
theories.  
Furthermore, chapter three reveals a discrepancy: while criminal justice 
fairness relies greatly on the principle of proportionality, labour law 
disciplinary perspective on fairness leans towards the principle of flexibility. 
From these revelations, it divulges that in the light of constitutionally 
entrenched fairness principles for suspects of crime, the employers’ criminal 
investigations pertaining to employees that are suspected of criminal 
misconduct and their subsequent disciplinary hearings for dismissal, in 
effect border on unconstitutionality. It is in effect a measure of unfairness.  
The conclusion drawn from chapter three revelations is that the employer 
criminal investigations and subsequent disciplinary hearings do not express 
constitutional fairness entrenched in the Constitution Bill of Rights for 
matters of criminal law nature. If anything, such investigations and hearings 
bear inequalities between the employee criminal suspects and other 
criminal suspects. This is against section 9 of the Constitution. 
Against the chapter background outlined in chapter three, chapter four 
discovers that the adoption of the principle of implied breach of trust 
between employer and employee emanating from common law225 now 
encapsulated in jurisprudential underpinnings of dismissal hearing 
 
225 Discussed in chapter two at para 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality 
and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
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processes—promotes the idea that the employer has flexibility in 
determining disciplinary hearing processes. It addresses the condition that 
the LRA disciplinary hearing processes for dismissal of employees who 
committed criminal misconducts do not observe criminal procedure based 
on section 35 entrenched fairness principles, even though dealing with 
matters of criminal law nature.  
chapter four goes further to show that, while employers feel not bound by 
the prescripts of criminal justice, they lose sight of the holistic application of 
constitutional objectives demands.226 As a result of this fault, employers 
discount the relevance of section 35 of the Constitution regarding the 
treatment of employees, who are alleged to have committed criminal 
misconduct, as criminal suspects. Ultimately, the chapter discloses that the 
extent of employer criminal investigative and subsequent disciplinary 
hearing processes is informal, and disregard formal processes prescribed 
in the CPA. Chapter four discloses that the informal employer disciplinary 
hearing goes against the essentialities of proportionality mandated in 
matters of a criminal law nature.227 It concludes that non-observance of 
proportionality culminates in multiple injustices for employees subjected to 
employer criminal investigations and the subsequent disciplinary hearings. 
Through illustrations derived from recent case law dealing with criminal 
misconduct dismissals, chapter four discovers procedural dilemmas caused 
by disunity between criminal and civil labour law. It provides for a glimpse 
of labour law related cases to illustrate the legal predicaments ensued by 
the separateness of labour law and criminal law processes dealing with 
employee criminal suspects dismissals on matters of a criminal law nature. 
Chapter five explains the approaches adopted in three jurisdictions: The 
United States of America; New Zealand and United Kingdom when dealing 
with criminal misconduct dismissals. It shows that in these jurisdictions, the 
negation of the principle against self-incrimination is rejected and employer 
 
226 Entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. 
227 Explained in chapter two. 
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criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings must respect the fairness 
principles engaged in matters of criminal law nature. Chapter five gauges 
the South African perspective of fair dismissal for employees who 
committed criminal misconduct (discussed in chapters two and three) 
against these three jurisdictions’ perspectives. Chapter five, further explains 
that, even though these jurisdictions are also common law countries, they 
have advanced legal development and now operate in a perspective that is 
different from the current South African labour law perspective when dealing 
with criminal suspects investigations and dismissal processes involving 
employees.  
Chapter six is the general conclusion. Further, it recommends a change of 
perspective, based on the identified loopholes in the South African 
interpretation of fair dismissal for employee criminal suspects. Instead of a 
narrow focus currently emphasised in our jurisprudence, a wide 
interpretation that covers a broader spectrum of involved employee criminal 
suspects rights is encouraged. Safeguarded processes for investigation 
explained in chapters two, three, four and five are encouraged in order to 






Concepts and philosophies underlying investigation procedures and 
disciplinary hearing processes for employee criminal misconducts in 
South African labour law  
 
2   Introduction 
Misconduct is an illegal occurrence that could be explicated as a breach of 
social contract between the party in possession of a system of rules and a 
subsequent agent in action within such a system. Thus, misconduct 
suggests two positions; that of an establishment and that of an agent.  
The generic application of the term thus is contextual as per each instance 
of an institution. For example, a family as an institution can posit a 
misconduct of breaking curfew for children, a state can posit a misconduct 
of assault, while an enterprise can postulate theft as a misconduct.  
Such an action of breach of contract that occurs in the employment domain 
susceptible to criminal procedure, as a dishonesty, is an instance of 
misconduct.  Where for instance the employer who seeks to proof it violates 
human rights; where evidence has to be collected and no procedure like 
that established in the CPA and section 35 of the Constitution can be 
followed to proof such an occurrence.  
In the absence of both national and international ordinances which precisely 
distinguish such misconduct, I choose to term it criminal misconduct. In the 
context of servitude or labour, the terming of these criminal occurrences as 
dishonesty enables establishments to shy away from applying the approach 
of proportionality within the CPA and section 35 guidelines for criminal 
persecution. Employers lean on flexibility in their investigations and 
subsequent hearings. 
The employer’s criminal investigative procedures and the disciplinary 
hearing processes based on criminal misconducts are part of the process 
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of discipline adopted in a work environment.228 The process of discipline is 
embedded in the terms of employment contracts containing agreements 
between employer and employee.  
To this extent, employment agreements are expressions of institutional 
policies bearing rules aimed at achieving institutional objectives.229 The 
ensued South African labour law perspective will expose that disciplinary 
rules in work environments are influenced by common law,230 statutory 
demand 231and constitutionally entrenched principles.232  
This chapter explains the theoretical underpinnings of employer power to 
discipline employees’ criminal suspects233 from a South African 
perspective. The aim is to lay a basis for exposing whether the criminal 
investigative procedures and disciplinary hearing processes currently 
followed by employers, with specific reference to the dismissal of 
employees who committed criminal misconducts, express constitutional 
mandate for the fair treatment of criminal suspects.234  
The chapter unpacks the rationale behind the South African labour law as 
it applies to employer disciplinary powers over employees who are 
suspected of having committed criminal acts. It exposes employee criminal 
misconducts as species of matters of criminal law nature. The chapter 
 
228See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) at 321-322 as well, read Hillside Aluminium (Pty)Ltd v 
Mathuse 2016 37 ILJ 2082 (LC). 
229See Free State Buying Association Ltd t/a Alpha Pharm v SACCAWU & another (1998) 
19 ILJ 1481(LC) and Highveld District Counsel v CCMA (2003) 24 ILJ (LAC)para [15]. As 
well, read Grogan J Dismissal (2018) at 333. 
230 Read the cases of Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others 2000 3 BLLR 
243 (LAC) and Paper, Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union v Pienaar NO and Others 
1993 4 SA 631 (AD) at 638G. In addition, read cases of Woods v W.M Car Services 
(Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew 1979 
IRLR 84. As well, read Reynolds F 2015 ILJ 262. 
231 Section 23 of the Constitution read with Chapter VIII of the LRA and schedule 8 
provisions. With regards to the right to fair dismissals sections 185,186 and 188 are 
relevant.  
232The Constitution of South Africa,1996. Also read sections 23, 8,9, 33, 35,39 and 195 
of the Constitution and the Preamble.  
233 See section 35 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair trial in criminal matters. 
Read it with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63 (C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; 
also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 at 
para 56. Read, Harris D 1967 ICLQR 354.  
234 Entrenched in chapter 2 of the Constitution. In particular section 35 of the Constitution. 
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expounds on flexibility and proportionality as approaches underlying the 
exploration of employee criminal misconducts. It discusses the rationale of 
South African constitutional fairness in its application on matters of criminal 
law nature. It exposes that flexibility and proportionality are philosophies 
that underlie fairness. It discusses constitutional rationality and its relevance 
to the criminalisation and punishment of matters of criminal law nature.  
 To do that, it exposes the philosophical understanding underpinning work 
environment discipline.  It articulates the evolution of employer disciplinary 
processes. It goes on to reveal procedural disparities between the treatment 
of employees suspected of criminal misconducts and that of ordinary 
criminal suspects in the light of section 35 entrenched fair trial principles. 
Thus, it discloses the ensuing clash between fair procedure rights in matters 
of a criminal law nature and labour law fairness procedure for employee 
criminal suspects. This becomes apparent in the employers’ relentless 
pursuit of one objective of condemning criminal behaviour. The 
investigation and disciplinary processes against the employee who is 
suspected of having committed a criminal act, although not aimed at 
determining the ultimate, are closely linked to subsequent criminal trial 
proceedings and therefore have a potential of successive impact on the 
employee criminal suspect’s rights. 
 
2 1 The concept of an employee criminal suspect 
The common law principle of implied breach of trust between the employer 
and the employee, amongst others, requires that employees are trustworthy 
and not dishonest to their employers.235 It is submitted that due to this 
central requirement, the contract of employment is considered a unique type 
of contract which has its basis on trust and without any compromises for 
 
235 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd (1981) ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew (1979) IRLR 84. As well, read Reynolds F 
2015 ILJ 262. 
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dishonesty.236 Court decisions have confirmed the importance of honesty 
for the existence of employer and employee contract. In the case of 
Standard Bank SA Limited v CCMA & others237 it was held that it is 
fundamental in employment relationship that the employer should be able 
to place trust in the employee. In addition, the case is investigated if the 
employee breaches the needed trust through dishonesty, and the essence 
of the relationship fractures. Thus, dishonesty is destructive to the employer 
employee relationship. 
The employer trusts that the employee will be honest and perform duties 
honestly while the employee trusts that the employer will pay for the work 
done in terms of the employment contract. Labour law Jurisprudence238 has 
shown that if the employee is dishonest in any manner, that is a 
fundamental breach which may lead to the employer repudiation of the 
contract. The fundamentals of different acts of dishonesty by the employee 
attract different reactions from the employer from act of suspending the 
employee to that of dismissing the employee.  
 
In the case of De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA & others 239it was 
observed that “the seriousness of dishonesty [namely,] whether an act can 
 
236 Standard Bank SA Limited v CCMA & others 1998 6 BLLR 622 (LC) para 39. Newaj 
K 2016 THRHR 429-442 writes on the effects of dishonesty on employer and employee 
contract. In this article it is shown that employee dishonesty affects the trust between 
employer and employee and therefore calls for harsh responses from the employer. 
The employer would consider if to keep the employee or dismiss the employee. Of 
interest is the employer interests. This approach is different from the current 
commonwealth approach where the duty of good faith has widened the trust and 
confidence principle to the extent that even the impending employee criminal suspect’s 
rights such as the right against self-incrimination are ought to be considered. This 
approach has brought a new balance still missing in South African labour law fair 
dismissal. See Sharpe v Chief of the New Zealand Defence Force ERA Auckland AA 
101/10,4 March 2010 which held against employee’s forced participation in employer 
investigation on the basis that employee owes employer trust. It embedded the duty of 
good faith in a wider scope than the common law implied duty of trust and confidence.236 
See Goddard J 2011 Canterbury Law Review 251-282, at 261.    
237 1998 6 BLLR 622 (LC). 
238 SAPPI Novoboard (Pty) Ltd v Bolleurs (1998) 19 ILJ 784 (LAC) at para 7; Nedcor 
Bank Ltd v Frank & others 2002 7 BLLR 600 (LAC) at pa 39; De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd v CCMA & others 2000 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at 1058I-J. 
239 2000 ILJ 1051 (LAC) at 1058I-J. 
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be stigmatised as gross dishonesty or not,  depends not only, or even 
mainly, on the act of dishonesty itself but on the way in which it impacts on 
the employer’s business.”240 In most cases the commission of criminal acts 
stipulated in schedules I to III of the CPA241 within the employment 
environment affects the trust between employer and employee to the extent 
that the employer dismisses the employee.  
It is therefore submitted that the employee who is suspected of committing 
schedules I to III of the CPA criminal acts commits a fundamental 
dishonesty. Such employees are therefore termed employee criminal 
suspects in comparison with criminal suspect within the criminal procedure. 
It submitted that it is this category of employees who are subjected to an 
investigation analogous to criminal investigation by the employer in 
preparation for a disciplinary hearing to establish their guilt before dismissal. 
This thesis therefore categorises employees who commit dishonesty based 
on the commission of the acts in schedules I to III of the CPA as employee 
criminal suspects. They are named after criminal suspects in criminal law 
who are persons suspected of committing amongst others acts in schedules 
I to III of the CPA. 
 
2 1 1  The concept of criminal misconducts  
The term criminal misconducts is a term devised in this thesis to refer to 
criminal acts of dishonesty committed by employees and in turn having 
negative impacts on their employment relationship with their employer. 242 
Concisely such acts are those, which if followed by criminal proceedings 
would have a criminal punishment outcome.243 In terms of the South African 
public law, such acts constitute schedules I to III crimes of the CPA. 244 They 
 
240 Act 51 of 1977. 
241 Act 51 of 1977. 
242 Act 51 of 1977. 
243 Williams G 1955 CLP 107 at 130. 
244 Act 51 of 1977. 
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range from minor acts of theft and increases in scale to more severe crimes 
such as racketeering.   
  
2 1 1 1 The definition of criminal misconducts in labour law 
The LRA does not directly interpret criminal misconducts.245 In section 3 
intended for the general interpretation of the Act, it identifies acts of 
misconduct for purposes of dismissal. It then distinguishes between two 
classes of focus, namely, minor misconducts and serious or gross 
misconducts.246 Gross misconducts are directly dealt with in section 3(4) of 
the LRA. According to the LRA, gross misconducts cover all acts of 
dishonesty. 247 
From the general wording of the LRA, it is not easy to unpack what species 
of misconduct fall under gross misconduct without seeking help from the 
literal interpretation of the meaning of the word dishonesty.  On the one 
hand, The Longman Active Study Dictionary248 describes the term 
dishonesty as a noun to the adjective, dishonest. Dishonest means likely to 
lie, steal, or cheat. On the other, The Oxford English Dictionary249 adds to 
the list of meanings and describes dishonest to mean not honest, not 
 
245 Criminal misconduct is a term devised in this thesis. There are hardly any scholars 
who wrote on criminal misconducts. 
246 See section 3 of the LRA. 
247 The LRA, can be read as differentiating between minor misconducts and serious 
misconducts eventhough it does not specify types of misconducts for each class. It can 
be read to be attempting to generalise gross misconducts in section 3(4) which in 
relevant part reads; 
“Dismissals for Misconduct 
…. Examples of serious misconduct, subject to the rule that each case should 
be judged on its merits, are gross dishonesty or wilful damage to the property of 
the employer, wilful endangering of the safety of others, physical assault on the 
employer, a fellow employee, client or customer and gross insubordination.” 
(added emphasis) 
It is explicit in these words that misconducts of a criminal nature are falling under serious 
misconducts because amongst criminal acts are acts of dishonesty. These include theft, 
fraud and so on and so forth. 
248____________Longman Active Study Dictionary (Pearson Education Limited 
Edinburgh Gate 2005) 208.  




sincere, or trustworthy. Shedding further light, The Online free dictionary,250 
interprets dishonesty, as deceitfulness shown in someone’s character, or 
behaviour. It then lists the following words as describing acts of dishonesty; 
“deceit, deception, duplicity, lying, falseness, falsity, falsehood, 
untruthfulness; fraud, fraudulence, sharp practice, cheating, chicanery, 
craft, cunning, trickery, artifice, artfulness, wiliness, guile, double-dealing, 
underhandedness, subterfuge, skulduggery, treachery, perfidy, unfairness, 
unjustness, improbity, rascality, untrustworthiness, dishonour, 
unscrupulousness, corruption, criminality, lawlessness, lawbreaking, 
misconduct”251 
While informed of the literal meaning to the word ‘dishonesty’, it is not yet 
clear what dishonesty means in legal terms.  
There is still a hanging question as far as the current thesis is concerned. It 
is trite to question as to whether dishonesty in criminal law means 
something different from dishonesty in labour law. The answer to this 
question is enquired from labour law literature dealing with misconducts 
based on dishonesty.252 A few of these from a labour law perspective are 
consulted. Thomas and Benjamin253 amongst others likened dishonesty to 
theft. They are of the opinion that an employee entrusted to keep guard of 
employer’s money would be so trusted at the reliance of the employer that 
the employee would not “steal.”254  According to them, for an employee to 
 
250The Oxford English Mini Dictionary http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty 
[accessed on the 15 April 2018]. 
251. The Oxford English Mini Dictionary http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty 
[accessed on the 15 April 2018]. 
 252 Refer to Govindjee A and van der Walt A (eds) Labour Law in Context (2017) 137-
147 at 139; Grogan J Dismissal (2018) at 272-273. As well read cases of Sappi 
Novoboard (Pty) Ltd v Bolleurs (1998) 19 ILJ 784 (LAC) at 784-786   and, Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others 
(1998) 19 ILJ 903 (L C) at 913D as well as  Metcash Trading Ltd t/a Metro Cash and 
Carry v Fobb and Another (1998) 19 ILJ 1516 (L C). 
253 Thompson C and Benjamin P South African Labour Law 2009 AA1-430.  
254 Thompson C and Benjamin P South African Labour Law 2009 AA1-430.  Also see 
Central News Agency v CCAWISA & Another 1991 12 ILJ 340 (LAC); [2006] 3 BLLR 




be said to have stolen items from the employer, the items must not have 
been thrown away as waste.255  
In accordance with Thomas and Benjamin 256 are Tryon and Kleiner,257 who 
explain employee theft in the most basic terms. Specifically, they associate 
categories of employee theft to a broad spectrum of what transpires in 
different employment systems. Their explanation exposes that the type of 
work involved varies the nature of employment theft.258 Thus, retail theft is 
within merchandising environment such as grocery stores; discount 
departments and small retail business. Petty theft involves the stealing of 
office supplies and petty cash. It is another category of theft associated with 
big and corporate businesses.259 According to them, 260 larger thefts involve 
stealing of office equipment such as office machinery including computers, 
printers and high value test equipment. There is also stealing of intangible 
things, for example, “padded travel expense reports and inflated employee 
morale functions as well as long lunches and break periods including work 
slowdowns, inferior workmanship and timecard mischarging.” 261  
From their explanation, it is discerned that employee theft is constituted by 
acts involving the taking of cash, inventory, information or other assets from 
the business or the company without permission262. It is also understood 
that acts of thefts associated with embezzling funds  fit the basic definition 
within the CPA.263  In the same manner as authorities in criminal law,264 they 
reckon that the greater magnitude of embezzlement acts throws them into 
 
255 Thompson C and Benjamin P South African Labour Law 2009 AA1-430. As well see, 
Qumsa & Others /Shoprite Checkers (2001) 5 BALR 505 (CCMA).  
256 Thompson C and Benjamin P South African Labour Law 2009 AA1-430. 
257Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20. 
258Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20.   
259 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20.   
260 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430.  
261 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20.  
262 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
263 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
264 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
77 
 
a classification higher than theft but fraud.265  Further, they observe that the 
techniques to detect both theft and fraud types of crime are the same 
although the investigation could bear some differences.266  
They associate these differences to the magnitude of the funds involved 
and the types of employee perpetrators. According to them, the difference 
in the magnitude of investigation remains the same whether the 
investigation is in private law or public law.267 The investigating personnel 
may also differ in the case of theft investigations as opposed to fraud 
investigations.268  
It is trite to argue here that Thomas and Benjamin 269 as well as Tryon and 
Kleiner270 have in both instances managed to offer a cogent explanation of 
what constitute acts of crime within the ambit of employment law in South 
Africa. Theft and fraud crimes, for example, venture as grounds for 
employee dismissal in South African labor law. In Metcash Training Ltd t/a 
Metro Cash and Carry v Fobb & Another,271 the court emphasised that theft 
is theft regardless of the value of an item taken.  Prior to the Metcash 
decision, in the case of Anglo-American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant 
v Komwayo,272 the employee who was a waiter appeared before court on a 
charge of taking a can of Fanta (cola) without permission. The employer 
had found the employee guilty of misappropriation of company property 
amounting to theft. The employee was dismissed from employment before 
seeking the Industrial Court’s intervention. 
 
265 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law AA1-430. 
266 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
267 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
268 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
269 Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430. 
270Tryon G Kleiner B H 1997 MAJ 20; Thompson C and Benjamin P South African 
Labour Law   AA1-430.  
271 Metcash Training Ltd t/a Metro Cash and Carry v Fobb & Another (1998) 19 ILJ (LC) 
272 (1992) 13 ILJ 573 LAC. 
78 
 
Labour law Jurisprudential interpretations of dishonesty in South African 
labour law relate dishonesty to various forms of gross misconducts including 
theft,273 fraud,274 misrepresentation,275 assault,276 abusive language,277 
drug use,278 sexual harassment279 and many more. These acts are concise 
to acts constituting schedules I to III of the CPA.280  In both public and 
private law, it is mandatory that any person who commits these acts is 
punished. From a labour law perspective, if an employee performs these 
Acts281 it triggers the employer’s initiative to discipline the employee criminal 
suspect. 
2 1 1 2 The International Labour Organisation perspective on 
discipline for criminal misconduct 
There is no direct ILO convention dealing with discipline of misconducts.282 
The same situation applies for dismissal of employees based on criminal 
misconduct. It is therefore of importance to source the ILO perspective of 
discipline for criminal misconducts from the way ILO treats its own 
employees.  
The ILO has its own internal standards for terminating employees’ contracts 
of employment. Specific to our topic, the Termination of Employment 
Recommendation, No. 166 of 1982 is important to the extent that it deals 
 
273 Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komwayo 1992 13 ILJ 573 LAC. 
274 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 9 BLLR 995 (LAC); Fipaza v Eskom 
Holdings Ltd and Others (JR 2220/08) [2010] ZALC 66; 2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) (6 May 
2010) Fipaza N P v Eskom Holdings LTD  & Others ; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and 
Others (JA 56/10) [2012] ZALAC 40; 2013 4 BLLR 327 (LAC); 2013 34 ILJ 549 (LAC); 
Absa Makelaars (Edms) Bpk v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk & another 2003 
24 ILJ 1484 (LC) . As well, read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 6.   
275 Thompson C and Benjamin P South African Labour Law, 2009 AA1-430. 
276Adcock Ingram Critical Care v CCMA & others (2001) 22 ILJ 1799 (LAC).  
277 AAUSA on behalf of Ncube v Northern Crime Security CC (1999) 20 ILJ 1954 
(CCMA). 
278 Prince Club v CCAWUSA (1988) ARB 8.11.5. As well see Kleinkopje Colliery/NUM 
obo Mabane [2001] 12 BALR 1289 (AMSSA). 
279 Ngantwini/Daimler Chrysler [2000] 9 BALR 1061 (CCMA). 
280 Act 51 of 1977. 
281 Schedules I to III acts encompassing labour law acts of dishonesty. 
282 Miyake S Discipline Issues in ILO Standards: Meet with the Court, Symposium 2018 
https://industrialcourt.org.tt/media-centre/presentations/category/17-meet-with-the-
court-symposium-6 [accessed 07/05/2019]. 
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with termination of employee’s contract based on misconduct. The 
Termination of Employment Recommendation, No. 166 of 1982 is read 
together with the Termination of Employment convention, No. 158 of 
1982.283 In terms of paragraphs 7-13 of the Recommendation No.166 the 
employer must warn the employee who committed a misconduct.  
The ensued ILO processes fit into progressive discipline perspective also 
practiced in South Africa.284 In accordance with the ILO dismissal 
processes, upon reaching the decision to terminate the employee’s contract 
through dismissal, the employer must give the employee reasons for the 
decision to terminate the contract. 285 Within this perspective the need for 
employer to warn an employee before deciding to dismiss the employee, 
implies that it is unprocedural for the employer to terminate employee’s 
contract without warning. 286 Warning the employee is expressed as integral 
to the employer disciplinary processes and as a measure for protecting the 
employee from unfair dismissal. 287 Warning expresses the progressive 
discipline approach where in effect not a single warning would qualify 
dismissal of an employee. In order to establish a valid reason for dismissal, 
 
283 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019]. 
284 See below para 2 2 2 dealing with traditional approach or progressive approach. 
285 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of employment https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019]. 
286 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019]. 
287 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-




the employee ought to show that the employee was warned on progressive 
basis without the employee positive response. It is however possible with 
certain types of misconducts that the employer would still be regarded to be 
fair to dismiss an employee without a single warning. 288Such instances 
include where an employee has committed some dishonesty misconducts 
which I submit, include some criminal misconducts. 289 
Article 4 of Convention No. 158 reemphasises the principle of justification 
in dismissal of employees including employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts. Article 4 of the Convention articulates this requirement as 
follows: 
 …termination of employment at the initiative of the employer within the  
definition under the Convention does not require countries to alter the 
terminology they use, so long as the substantive provisions in national 
law are applied to the persons covered by the Convention.290 ….The 
Committee of Experts has, however, stressed that the manner in which 
termination of employment is defined is of particular importance, as it 
should not enable the employer to circumvent the obligations with 
regard to the protection prescribed in [the national law] in the event of 
dismissal. 291 
It is submitted that Article 4 serves as a bulwark against unlawful processes 
of dismissals. It therefore encourages discipline and dismissal processes 
 
288 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019]. 
289 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019]. 
290 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
General Survey – Protection against unjustified dismissal (1995), hereinafter “GS 
1995”, at para. 21. 
291Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, 
General Survey – Protection against unjustified dismissal (1995), hereinafter “GS 1995” 
at para. 22. 
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that observe employee human rights. Such an understanding is triggered by 
the fact that the report of the ILC at its 67th Session is read to be making 
Article 4’s principle of justification a central reference for termination of 
employment  when it refers to it as “…centrepiece of the law governing 
termination of employment by the employer….”292   The UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also paid regard to the importance of 
Article 4’s principle of justification. It noted, in its General Comment No. 18 
on the Right to Work, that,  
…the violations of the right to work can occur through acts of omission, 
for example when State parties do not regulate the activities of 
individuals or groups to prevent them from impeding the right of others 
to work. Thus, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
considered that “violations of the obligations to protect follow from the 
failure of State parties to take all necessary measures to safeguard 
persons within their jurisdictions from infringements of the right to work 
by third parties. They include omissions such as … the failure to protect 
workers against unlawful dismissal.293  
 
In the context where the condition for dismissal is of a criminal law nature, 
unlawful dismissal indicates, as emphasized in this theses, that the 
dearth of the observance of constitutional prescripts like section 35 of the 
right to self-incrimination in employer investigations and disciplinary 
hearings, is a failure of the legislature to take necessary measures in the 
protection against infringements to the right to work by third parties. That 
the contingent labelling to result from the investigation, which prohibits 
the employee to get further employment, is also exemplary of the failure 
of legislature to take necessary measures in the protection against 
infringements to the right to work by third parties. 
 
292 ILC, 67th Session, 1981, Report VIII (1), p. 7. 
293 General Comment No. 18 on the Right to Work, UN Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/GC/18), adopted on 24 November 2005, at paragraph 35. 
See also paragraph 11 of the general comment in which reference is made to Article 4 
of Convention No. 158. 
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It is the argument of this thesis that unlawful dismissal includes offending 
procedures that are well established in “national laws”294 for suspects of 
criminal offences within which employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts fall. Such ignorance of procedures creates an approach not 
justified in terms of South African constitutional demands in the Preamble 
read with sections 1,8,9 23, 33, 35,39 and 195.  
Article 4 entrenches the need that employees suspected of every kind of 
misconduct be allowed to defend themselves in a hearing. 295 Thus, in the 
case of hearings of misconducts based on criminal acts the International 
Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal uses procedure that respects 
employee rights tantamount to South African Constitution Bill of Rights, 
including the right against self-incrimination. If such is a concern the ensued 
procedure negates purely flexibility-based approach and adopts 
proportionality-based approach. In the case of N v FAO296 the court 
emphasised on the general requirement for respect in due process in 
relation to an investigation. It was reiterated, namely that, 
investigation be conducted in a manner designed to ascertain all 
relevant facts without compromising the good name of the employee 
and that the employee be given an opportunity to test the evidence put 
against him or her and to answer the charge made…. Where…. there 
is a prescribed procedure, that procedure must be observed.297 
The court emphasised on fair investigation, namely that, 
 ….it is necessary that there be a fair investigation…. that there be an 
opportunity for the [accused] to answer the evidence and the 
 
294 Section 35 of the Constitution read with the CPA entrench the law applicable to 
criminal suspects. 
295 In terms of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. 
296International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal 126TH Session Judgment 
No 4011 9.  
297International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal 126TH Session Judgment 
No 4011 9.  
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charges…. However, due process must also be observed at all other 
stages of disciplinary proceedings. 298 
The court explained what due process entails, namely that,  
…. Due process requires that a staff member accused of misconduct 
be given an opportunity to test the evidence relied upon and, if he or 
she so wishes, to produce evidence to the contrary. The right to make 
a defence is necessarily a right to defend oneself before an adverse 
decision is made, whether by a disciplinary body or the deciding 
authority….299 
It is argued in this thesis that failure to follow established section 35 of the 
Constitution read with CPA procedures results in tainting the employee 
criminal suspect’s good name.300 It is unfair and jeopardies employee 
criminal suspect’s established rights. Such a process is anti ILO processes 
as well. In the case O. v. WHO  301 it was held that to decide a case of 
corruption against an employee  
A staff member who is accused of such dealings is certainly entitled to 
due process offering him every opportunity to defend his interests, and 
the burden of proof always falls upon the Administration …. All that is 
needed is a set of precise and concurring presumptions removing any 
reasonable doubt that the acts in question actually took place….302 
It is argued in this thesis that decision of cases of criminal misconducts on 
a balance of probabilities is antithesis any reasonable standard proposed 
by the ILO. Within the ILO prescripts even though there is no express 
disciplinary Convention, the ILO would not vouch for discipline that ignores 
 
298International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal 126TH Session Judgment 
No 4011 9. 
299International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal 126TH Session Judgment 
No 4011 9. 
300 Chapters three, four and five expose the negative impacts of ignoring the rights of 
employees suspects of crime. 
301 International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal 123rd Session Judgment. 
No 3757. 
302International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal 123rd Session Judgment. 
No 3757 para 6 . 
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the entrenched rights of either the employer or the employee, even if such 
employee committed a criminal misconduct. 
The ILO in the treatment of its employees advocates for equal treatment of 
suspects within the prescripts of the law. It was observed earlier that for 
justification purposes, the ILO takes it seriously that where there is 
established procedure for investigation that ought to be followed. At the 
center of the ILO, consideration is justification for disciplinary procedure 
measures.303 
 
 2 2 The general meaning of discipline and the basis for employee 
discipline 
There are hardly any scholarly definitions on the term discipline with regards 
to employment or labour law. In most cases this thesis will seek 
fundamental definitions from literal interpretations of discipline which are not 
from a legal perspective.  
The thesis will later decipher the meaning of discipline from case law and 
statutes that deal with disciplinary processes. Traditionally, discipline is a 
concept founded on inequality where the superior or bigger commands the 
inferior. The foundational meaning of discipline is derived from the Latin 
word discipulus, which means pupil.304 
Emanating from the word pupil is the word disciple, commonly used in the 
Bible to refer to the followers of Jesus Christ in his lifetime. In a nutshell, the 
historical connotations of discipline, “deal with study, governing one’s 
behavior, and instruction…”305  From this understanding comes the 
beginning of theories of education. Apart from these theories, there are 
 
303 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019]. 
304 The Oxford English Mini Dictionary 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty[accessed on the 15 April 2018]. 
305The Oxford English Mini Dictionary 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty[accessed on the 15 April 2018] . 
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earliest known uses of discipline. These mainly related to punishment.306 
Punishment-related discipline was first used in the 13th century to refer to 
chastisement of a religious nature.307 Amongst the punishment of this 
nature is self-flagellation.”308  
It is this category of discipline that is well emphasised. Accordingly, the 
literal meaning of the word discipline relates to words implying “punishment; 
instruction; training that corrects, molds, or perfects the mental faculties or 
moral character; control gained by enforcing obedience or order;  orderly or 
prescribed conduct or pattern of behavior;  self-control; a rule or system of 
rules governing conduct or activity.”309  
Based on this literal meaning of discipline, the author understands that there 
is a plethora of classifications of behavior inclined to the meanings of 
discipline. For purposes of this thesis, only one classification is pursued. 
This is the classification regarding discipline in work environments.310  
In the context of this thesis, I look at discipline in respect of criminal 
misconducts. In accordance with the LRA,311 discipline entails more than 
just one stage of an investigation. Although disciplinary proceedings seem 
a step following employer investigations against the employee, they are by 
nature based on the first and fundamental procedural steps. 
These steps are in effect the basis in the implementation of the principles 
of substantive and procedural fairness.312 These fundamental steps entail 
the requirement that the employer warns the employee on committed 
 
306 The Oxford English Mini Dictionary 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty[accessed on the 15 April 2018]. 
307 The Oxford English Mini Dictionary 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty[accessed on the 15 April 2018]. 
308 The Oxford English Mini Dictionary 
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/dishonesty[accessed on the 15 April 2018].  
309 Merriam Webster Dictionary https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/punishment [accessed 30 August 2018]. 
310Read Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 330-391.Consider the following literature Grogan J 
Labour Litigation and Dispute Resolution; Brand J etal Labour Dispute Resolution; 
Myburg A & Bosch C Reviews in the Labour Courts South Africa. 
311Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995. 
312Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995. 
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misconduct.313 In accordance with the minimum LRA requirement, the 
employer must establish rules and has to avail them to the employee who 
ought to comply and upon failure to do so take disciplinary action.314 The 
gravity of the action that the employer would take depends on whether the 
employee is a repetitive offender.315 The type of misconduct also plays a 
role.316 The forms of discipline vary in category from a verbal warning, to a 
written warning.317 Thereafter follows a final written warning, leading to a 
suspension which is ultimately followed by dismissal after a disciplinary 
hearing. Thus, the Act promotes the system of progressive discipline.318 
Repeated misconduct calls for measures that are more stringent. 319 In such 
cases, the employer would call the employee to a disciplinary hearing and 
afterwards decide on whether to dismiss the employee.320 The rationale for 
employer’s effort to observe several stages of discipline can be connected 
to the historical concept of just cause 321 emanating from the need for 
establishing fairness of disciplinary processes in the end. Just cause is a 
common law test used in labour matters to gauge whether employers acted 
fairly in enforcing employer and employee agreements.322   
 
313 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180. 
314 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180. 
315 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180.  
316 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180. 
317 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180. 
318 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180. 
319 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180  
320 Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995; Sidumo above note 
180.  
321 See SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601(SCA);201031 ILJ 
529(SCA) 550. 
322 See SA Maritime Safety Authority v McKenzie 2010 3 SA 601(SCA);201031 ILJ 529 
(SCA) 550 at para 43.  
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It was a wide description of fairness and took into account the nature of the 
case at hand.323 Within its application from a common law perspective, the 
Industrial Courts observed and could test fairness regarding criminal 
misconduct within fairness measures observed when dealing with matters 
of a criminal law nature.324 Since the adoption of the Constitution, the 
underlying principle of just cause has been incorporated in the LRA 
provisions for fair dealing in labour matters.325 It is however argued that its 
application within LRA is constricted and not as wide as it used to be under 
common law. 
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of the LRA was to give effect to the labour 
rights now guaranteed by section 23 of the Constitution326 and, the right to 
fair labour practice.  In terms of South African jurisprudence on employee 
discipline within the scope of the LRA, the most important rights arising from 
that constitutional guarantee is the right not to be unfairly dismissed 
embodied in section 185 of the LRA.327 Thus, discipline wanting of fair 
substantive or procedural measures is dealt with within unfair labour 
practice provisions of the LRA.328  
The employee is entitled to proceed to sue an employer within the LRA 
provisions that establish the mechanism for resolving disputes arising from 
unfair dismissal.329 Thus, such an aggrieved employee would also seek 
remedies specified in the LRA provisions.330 In the case where that remedy 
consists of compensation, the aggrieved will be compensated within the 
 
323 Read Jones Bonakele Gxolo v Harmony Gold Mine (PTY)Ltd and Others case no 
J1124/2017 heard 24th October 2017 and Decided on 27th October 2017 Per Lagrange 
J. Refer to Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623 at 595. 
324 Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 
222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; 
South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967(1) SA 263(A) 271; Cassim 
v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A). 
325 Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995.  
326  At the time of its enactment it was section 27 of the Interim Constitution. 
327 Fedlife Assurance Limited v Wolfaardt 2002 1 SA 49 (SCA) para2. 
328 Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
329 Section 191 of the LRA. 
330 Section 193 of the LRA.  
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LRA limitations.331 As stipulated in the LRA, the statutory mechanism for 
resolving disputes where an aggrieved pleads just cause is by way of 
conciliation, and if that fails, arbitration before either the CCMA or the 
Labour Court.332  
The ensued exposure guarantees the argument that as a basic principle, 
just cause underlies disciplinary processes. Even though falling within the 
limitations of the LRA, just cause as a standard behind employment 
contracts has a potential in the evaluation of employer’s decision to 
discipline an employee. The extent of its application is also confined within 
the LRA and jurisdictional extent of the CCMA and the Labour Court. This 
has altered the pertinence of just cause in dealing with matters of criminal 
misconducts as a common law test. The consequence is that it could 
encourage the observance of fairness principles applicable to matters of 
criminal law nature, such principles now entrenched in section 35 of the 
Constitution. 
Under common law, the just cause test served under seven subtests 
normally expressed directly in written contracts, or alternatively inferred in 
unwritten contracts of employment.  These considerations include several 
reflections that were considered in evaluating whether employer’s 
disciplinary action was both procedurally and substantively fair.333 It would 
be asked as to whether the employee was adequately warned in advance 
of the consequences of the offence. 334 It would be observed whether there 
was an oral or written warning in encounters prior decision to discipline. 335 
An exception could be made for certain conduct, such as insubordination, 
coming to work intoxicated, drinking on the job, or stealing company 
 
331 Section 194(1) of the LRA. 
332 Schedule 8 of the LRA. 
333 Referred to as the seven principles of just cause. 
334 Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313. 
335Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313.    
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property, that are so serious that the employee is expected to know it will 
be punishable.336 Just cause would further demand that it be considered 
whether the company's rule or order reasonably related to efficient and safe 
operations.337 It would furthermore be considered as to whether 
management investigated the employee before administering the 
discipline.338 There was a precaution applicable, that where immediate 
action was required, the best course was to suspend the employee pending 
investigation with the understanding that the employee would be restored 
back to the job and be paid for time lost if found not guilty. 339 
The nitty- gritties of the process of investigation were also at stake, in that 
it would be considered as to whether the investigation was fair and 
objective.340 Fair and objective investigation was that which observed both 
of the basic principles of fairness, namely audi alteram partem341 and nemo 
judex in propria sua causa.342 It would be checked if the investigation 
produced substantial evidence or proof of guilt. It was not, however a 
requirement that the evidence be preponderant, conclusive, or "beyond 
reasonable doubt," except where the alleged misconduct was of such a 
criminal or reprehensible nature as to stigmatize the employee and 
seriously impair employee chances for future employment. 343 
 
336Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313.  
337 Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313.  
338 Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313. 
339 Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313. 
340 Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313. 
341Meaning hear the other side. 
342 No man shall be judged in his own cause also referred to as the rule against bias. 
343 Abrams RI & Nolan DR  1985 DLR 594-623; Koven A M & Smith S L Just Cause: 
The Seven Tests; Stewart J S 1993 Michigan Law Review 8-62; Harcourt M; Hannay 
M & Lam H 2013 J Bus Ethics 115:311-325 at 311 and 313. 
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It would further be checked if the rules, orders, and penalties were applied 
even-handedly and without discrimination. If enforcement had been lax in 
the past, management could not suddenly reverse its course and begin to 
clamp down without first warning employees of its intent. Furthermore, it 
would be tested if the penalty reasonably related to the seriousness of the 
offense and the past record. If employee X's past record was significantly 
better than that of employee Y, the company properly would give X a lighter 
punishment than Y for the same offence. This requirement made flexibility 
the ultimatum of employer’s disciplinary processes. 
Consistent with these tests, in the current constitutional era and under the 
LRA, before the employer could take the employee to disciplinary hearing, 
the employer should have been satisfied that the employee had committed 
the gross misconduct by thoroughly investigating the employees’ 
misconduct.344 As in criminal investigations, the employer is  engaged in the 
investigation of the truth of the matter but due to extensive flexibility, the 
employer no longer makes similar observation of both principles of natural 
justice as it used to happen under common law.345 From this, the employer  
finds out if the employee intentionally or negligently performed a criminal 
act. Based on the gathered evidence, the employer uses discretion as to 
what form of discipline to apply on the employee.346 
If the employer discovered that the employee was indeed guilty of the 
misconduct, the employer in turn presses criminal charges against such an 
employee.347 Even if the employer could decline pressing criminal charges, 
an investigated crime has a potential to invoke criminal justice processes. 
In that case, the employee would then be prosecuted under the criminal 
justice system based on the employer investigated criminal misconduct.348  
 
344See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) at 321-322 as well, read Hillside Aluminium (Pty)Ltd v 
Mathuse (2016)37 ILJ 2082(LC). 
345of Avril above note 6 at 1652. As well see Sidumo above note 180 para 59. Also read 
Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd (2013) 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 54-57. Myburg 
A & Bosch C Reviews in the Labour Courts South Africa 2016 271-282. 
346 Grogan J Dismissal at 416-425; du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law at 461.  
347 See Grogan J Dismissal at 416-425; du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law   at 461. 
348 See Grogan J Dismissal at 416-425; du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law at 461. 
91 
 
Thus employer discipline of employee criminal misconduct has now created 
a circumstance where there is a real or appreciable risk that an employee 
would face criminal prosecution.349 It exposes the employee criminal 
suspect to double jeopardy hence the argument that employee criminal 
misconducts could attract the wrath of both criminal and civil law systems 
discipline to run concurrently. The reason why it was possible that an 
offending employee be subjected to these severe repercussions is that the 
South African legal system is parallel by nature. 350 
The South African legal system creates a lacuna that makes it possible for 
aggrieved employers to exploit, often at the expense of the employee.  The 
legal system allows employer opportunities to pursue remedies within both 
civil and criminal law systems as far as discipline of employees who 
committed criminal misconducts is concerned. Thus, there is likelihood for 
the entailed employer investigation to have a substantial influence on 
possible future criminal prosecution.351 Even though there is a single 
objective in pursuing remedies against the employee alleged to have 
committed any misconduct, namely to condemn and discipline the criminal 
behaviour, the attendant civil and criminal processes follow disparate 
procedures.  
The labour law disciplinary procedures for disciplining employees who 
committed criminal misconducts are founded from a diverse theoretical 
perspective compared to the underlying criminal law theories that found 
discipline of criminal perpetrators in proportionality. While criminal law 
punishment greatly relies on the principle of proportionality, labour law 
disciplinary perspectives greatly lean towards the principle of flexibility, 
enabling employer to act within informal processes.352 
 
349 See Grogan J Dismissal at 416-425; du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law at 461. 
350 Consider Gonzalez L G Connelly B G and Eliopoulos E  1993 American Criminal Law 
Review 1179-1220 at 1179; Eckers S R 1998 Hofstra Law Review 109; Bennet P J  2011 
American Criminal Law Review 381; McCastlain C J  and Schooner L S 1986 Public 
Contract Law Journal 418-445; Hasset M J 1979 Washington and Lee Law Review 1049; 
Marvil F H and James A W 1991 Missouri Law Review 869.  
351 See Grogan J Dismissal at 416-425; du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law at 461. 
352Sidumo above note 180. 
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The ironical circumstance is that they both seek to pursue constitutional 
fairness against a perpetrator of a criminal act. In chapter one, it was 
exposed that constitutional fairness relating to matters of criminal law nature 
has its roots in the common law fairness principles entrenched section 35 
of the Constitution. These fairness principles emphasise the recognition of 
both twin principles of natural justice—audi alteram partem353 and nemo 
judex in propria sua causa.354 The core of these principles is fairness justice 
based on proportionality. 
As seen earlier, employer criminal investigations are currently done within 
the prescripts of LRA and are confined to fairness limitations within LRA 
prescripts.355 In chapter one, it was explained that employer disciplinary 
processes in accordance with the LRA observe one principle of natural 
justice—audi alteram partem 356and disregards nemo judex in propria sua 
causa.357 Nemo judex in propria sua causa demands cannot accommodate 
extensive flexibility allowed in the current era employer disciplinary 
processes on employees suspected of criminal misconduct within LRA 
prescripts. This principle sheds procedural bias obviously negated when 
dealing with employees suspected of criminal behaviour, especially where 
limited proportionality measures358 are used as opposed to those used 
when dealing with other criminal suspects.  
It is argued that employer flexibility-based processes in investigating and 
disciplining the employee suspected of criminal misconducts is contrary to 
the need for justification proposed in Article 4 of Convention No. 158.  The 
LRA disciplinary processes are also against the South African constitutional 
principles of justification entailed in the Preamble read with sections 1,8,9 
23, 33, 35,39 and 195. 
 
353 Meaning hear the other side. 
354 No man shall be judged in his own cause also referred to as the rule against bias. 
355 Sidumo above note 180. 
356Meaning hear the other side. 
357 No man shall be judged in his own cause, also referred to as the rule against bias. 
358For example, precautionary measures used in the gathering of evidence, observance 
of the principle against self-incrimination and many others, discussed below. See 
Grogan J Dismissal at 416-425; du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law at 461. 
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Within the South African perspective, the principle of justification entails the 
observance of the South African Constitution as legitimately a paramount 
law, based on the Grundnorm.359 The Constitution as the source of 
justification of every law applicable in South Africa, is a testament of the 
existence of social contract in South Africa and it affords equal protection to 
all, be it individuals, private companies and public institutions.360 The 
Constitution controls massive powers of the private and public bodies alike 
while addressing the needs of the public and protecting the natural rights of 
individuals. 361 Chapter 2 of the Constitution entrenches the Bill of Rights; 
 
359 Monyakane above note 9 at 21 footnote 89, extensively describes what Grundnorm 
means from a South African Constitutional perspective, she relates,   
 As Dietl et al Dictionary of Legal, Commercial and Political Terms 
(1979) 344, explains, Grundnorm refers to the basic standard of 
behaviour in democracy.   Fuller The Morality of Law (1964) 69 referring 
to Grundnorm maintains that “Parliament legislation should reflect ‘the 
basic rule’ or ‘Grundnorm’ which relates to the rationale of state 
existence and to a greatest extent is reflected in the relevant state’s 
constitution.” Also see Bennet Administrative Law (2001) 6. Based on 
these explanations, in the South African constitutional context, 
Grundnorm comprises the basis for a basic standard of behaviour in 
the South African democracy based on human rights. The Preamble of 
the Constitution directly entrenches the rationale for the adoption of the 
South African Constitution, namely that South Africans having learned 
from the past experiences of injustices and being aware that there are 
special contributions to the existence of South Africa such as sufferings 
in pursuit of justice and freedom, economic and social developments, 
believed that South Africa belongs to all South Africans. Consequently, 
South Africans adopted a Constitution as the supreme law of the 
Republic in pursuit of healing the divisions of the past and establishing 
a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental 
human rights. The Constitution therefore laid the foundation for a 
democratic and open society in which government is based on the will 
of the people and where every citizen is equally protected by law. It 
further urges governance that improves the quality of life of all citizens 
and frees the potential of each person. It intends constitutional 
governance that builds a united and democratic South Africa, which will 
be able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of 
nations. 
360 Section 1 explains the foundation of the document to be human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms. It further 
explains that the Constitution negates racialism and sexism and that it sets up universal 
adult suffrage, a national common voters’ roll, regular elections and multi-party system 
of democratic government, to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.” 
361 Chapter 2 on the Bill of Rights, constitutional transformative objectives in the 




central to the Bill of Rights is the right to administrative justice362 and the 
right to fair dismissal,363 within which the LRA legislation provisions fall. The 
labour law jurisprudential interpretation of the LRA supports the view that 
section 145 of the LRA categorises legislation in consonance with the PAJA 
review standards umbrella.364  
It is within these constitutional entrenchments that the justification and 
legitimacy of the LRA provisions must be sought. The South African 
Constitution justifies the inclusion of natural justice principles in the 
expression of the new human rights-based culture of justification.365 Under 
this system of justification, it is argued that it is impossible that the 
legislature in enacting LRA could have aimed at negating just cause-a 
principle that founds section 23 and embraced both principles of natural 
justice. Section 23 of the Constitution also existed to follow the ILO 
perspective of justification. It is therefore argued that any attempt to exclude 
judex in propria sua causa which is also the principle of natural underlying 
the Bill of Rights just like the audi alterum partem rule in interpreting the 
LRA perpetrates the apartheid era situation of South African parliamentary 
supremacy which legislated against the Industrial Court effort to enforce just 
cause366in criminal misconducts cases.  
Just cause in criminal misconducts coincides with the rationale for the 
criminalisation of acts in Schedules I to III of the CPA which are classified 
as dishonesty in LRA. 
 
 
perspective of Section 23 entails that it cannot be read in isolation but as part of the Bill 
of Rights. 
362 As Fedsure Life Ass Ltd v Greater Johannesburg TMC 1998 12 BCLR 1458 (CC) 32 
underscores, the right to administrative justice, is now rooted in the Constitution itself. 
This right builds in this regard on the Constitution, which “has radically changed the 
setting within which administrative law operates in South Africa.” 
363Cameron E, Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act: 144-145 
explained that section 23 entrenches the right to fair labour practice.  
364 Sidumo above note 180. 
365 See Klare K 1998 14 SAJHR 146, 158 and Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
366 Is the embodiment of both principle of natural justice. 
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2 2 1 The rationale for the criminalisation of acts in Schedules I to III 
of the CPA 
Through voluntary interaction and conduct, from time immemorial, humanity 
existed in groups which later became societies. The need to form a society 
came with the need to conform to certain norms. They entered the social 
contract. 367The pedestal of social theory or political theory is this agreement 
that humans made between each other, even though unwritten. The public 
could frown upon those who did not comply with societal norms. Defaulters 
were excluded from societal benefits as a form of condemnation. For 
example, some offenders were banished while some were killed as a form 
of revenge. An eye for an eye principle underpinned the justice system of 
that era. 
From this perspective, criminalisation of certain acts can be defined as a 
system for public communication of acceptable values.368 It is these values 
which defined the destiny to acceptable norms. Due to the need for 
consistency and rationality in societal undertakings there emerged a need 
for rules governing societal decisions. This led to the adoption of natural 
justice principles.  
At the center was the need for proportional criminal justice for offences of 
criminal nature. In criminal law, the principle of proportionality 
conceptualises the nature of punishment for criminal acts and inactions. It 
demands that punishment be in proportion to the gravity of the deed 
pertaining to crime. Proportionality apprehends indiscriminate and impartial 
justice and stimuluses the attainment of individual self-determination 
through fair means as opposed to survival of the fittest measures. Survival 
of the fittest measures normally bred unreasonable condemnation.  
In this thesis, it is argued that against the essentials of social contract, the 
employer investigative procedures and hearings for dismissal of employees 
 
367 Read Locke’s theory of “social contract,” where he explained the human’s state of 
nature, in Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
368 Read Locke’s theory of “social contract,” where he explained the human’s state of 
nature, in Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2.   
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suspected of criminal misconducts do not abide with the nitty- gritties of 
justice embodied in the social contract. The employer has flexibility to go in 
between civil and criminal procedure to the extent that neither civil nor 
criminal procedure is strictly followed. Flexibility allows employer to ignore 
social contract protective measures; it creates unreasonable 
condemnations and therefore imbalances in justice.  Social contract 
protective measures enliven the political theory underlying criminalisation 
of human acts. 
 
2 2 1 1 The political theory underlying criminalisation of human 
acts in South Africa today 
With the objective of protecting its society, South Africa classifies particular 
acts as crimes.369 The rationale behind the protection of individual members 
of society is to practicalise the essence of “social contract” founding the 
principle of legality in South Africa. Through the social contract, South 
African society has entrusted the state with its protection against persons 
that the society views as criminals. As well, persons being condemned, or 
labelled criminals, look upon the state for the protection of their dignity. They 
expect the law and its application to be consistent and clear. This marks the 
interrelationship between the legislation, enacted with the view to express 
societal objectives and the punishment meted out to persons labelled 
criminals by members of society. 
The genesis of the principle of “social contract” is found in the interpretations 
by renowned philosophers 370 who are now acclaimed in the South African 
interpretation of the principle of legality. Locke’s theory, for example, 
centres on the need for balance of power within the society. He reckoned 
that such balance can be maintained through law. The law ought to 
 
369 There are both common law crimes and statutory crimes.  
370 Locke; Montesquieu and Dicey.  
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suppress bad behaviour and protect the vulnerable from the powerful. 371 
Within this understanding, Locke372 explains the evolution of society. He 
mentioned that it depended on the human decision to transform from the 
state of nature to that of humanity. The state of nature from his observation 
was a state of lawlessness where the fittest exercised power against the 
weaker.373 They made powerless their subordinates.374 Humanity therefore 
meant surrendering human hope for justice to a chosen ruler. Humans 
decided to empower their ruler to govern them.375 The ruler was set to allay 
the fears of humans by assuring them protection against the dangers 
associated with their state of nature.376 The rule was to execute humans 
“common agreement on the nature of natural rights.”377 The ruler is 
supposed to proportionately protect the interests of the aggrieved and the 
perpetrators alike.378 As the principles of natural justice, extrapolated from 
Locke’s theory, demanded that at the instance of an allegation that an 
individual committed prohibited acts, the ruler ought to hear both sides and 
ought to not punish the aggrieved at their own cause.379 
According to Monyakane380” Locke’s interpretation of social contract, makes 
natural law the starting point of his theory of the rule of law. She observed 
that Locke insists that the main purpose of natural law is to explain the 
foundation and maintenance of legal order.381 She further referred to 
Locke’s argument on natural justice as providing the establishment of the 
 
371 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government  2, where he writes: “since no man or society 
of men having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to 
the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another, whenever anyone shall go about to 
bring them into such a slavish condition they will always have a right to preserve what they 
have not a power to part with and rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental, 
sacred and unalterable law of self- preservation for which they entered into society. And 
thus, the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power.”  
372 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
373 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
374 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
375 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
376 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
377Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2.  
378 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
379 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
380 Monyakane above note 9 at 10.  
381 Monyakane above note 9 at 10.  
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legal order which forms the primary right that protects individual rights. She 
maintains that this primary right is original and inalienable.  
It is submitted that her interpretation of Locke’s theory is close to the 
expression of criminal justice in South Africa and not labour law employer 
criminal persecutions. 382 
As mentioned earlier,383 the South African criminal justice observes both 
principles of natural justice, not only one leg as sought in labour law.  
Through this observation, the criminal justice system centres on the 
principle of proportionality and not flexibility experienced in labour law. It is 
through maintaining proportionality that individual rights are protected from 
the harsh nature of punishment in matters of a criminal law nature. 
Adherence to proportionality mitigates the inequalities inherent in criminal 
persecution where the persecuted rely on the mercy of the authorities.  
This is the same situation in employer criminal investigations of employees 
suspected of criminal misconduct. The employer has power over the 
employee who stands at its mercy.384 However, labour law does not bind 
the employer to observe proportionality.385 Employers are flexible enough 
to can disregard the observance of fairness principles entrenched in section 
35 to protect suspects of crime. Inherent in these principles is the twin 
principles of natural justice. The nemo judex in propria sua causa386 
principle is ignored in this attempt. This approach ends up in unjustifiable 
condemnations to employee suspects of criminal misconducts. 
 
 
382Monyakane above note 9 at 10. 
383 Chapters one and two. 
384 By nature, the employer and employee relationship is unequal. 
385 See chapter two part 2 2 4 1 dealing the theory of proportionality and its extent of 
application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
386 Meaning no man shall be judged at his own cause. 
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2 2 1 2 The rationale for eradicating unjustifiable condemnation 
for Schedules I to III of the CPA transgressors 
In most cases in the absence of governing rules, the society made irrational 
decisions which sometimes were irreversible.387 Some members of society 
wielded massive powers and turned into the law themselves.388 As referred 
to above, an eye for an eye was the rule of the day. Predominantly bullying 
manifested the uncontrolled societal justice perceptions.389 Members of 
society who were weaker required the law urgently so that they do not suffer 
effects of unreasonable condemnations.390 There was a need for a 
stabilised justice system. There was also a need to prevent the powerful 
from taking the law unto themselves. This philosophical milestone marks 
the formation of consistent systems for public communication of values.391 
It is through the set values that the criminalisation of certain acts and 
omissions was regulated and accepted. 
It is argued that flexibility of employer who makes decisions to investigate 
the suspected employee criminal suspect for purposes of dismissal and yet 
does so without justified criminal procedure, creates inconsistencies and 
inequalities of justice for suspects of crime. While other criminals are 
investigated within the CPA and section 35 of the South African Constitution 
the employee criminal suspect is investigated within the employer 
discretion. Employer discretionary means of investigation offends the 
philosophical foundations of Schedule i and ii transgressions encompassing 
employee criminal misconducts. 
 
387 Locke J  Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
388 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
389 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
390 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
391 See Coffee J C 1991   Boston University Law Review 193 at 194 where he 




2 2 2  The philosophical foundations of Schedules I to III of the CPA 
transgressions  
Borne from the political theory, criminalisation of acts emanates from public 
concern. The concerns of South African public regarding the criminalisation 
of human behaviour are marked by diverse conceptions to the evolution of 
crime within the South African society. There were various apprehensions 
during the common law era compared to concerns in the current 
constitutional era. Public reaction to individual deeds is therefore moulded 
by culture within the societies. This understanding is acclaimed by White 
and Haines.392 They reckoned that there is no straightforward answer to the 
question whether an act is a crime or not? This question is surrounded by 
changing ideas, perceptions, and conceptions. The fact that definitions are 
compliant to societal declarations and interests or that, the world has 
dispositions towards certain acts or omissions lead to these changes. These 
changes in turn lead to uncertainties. 
Within the South African societies, for instance, there have been contours 
of acculturation. The most recent and predominant ones are the apartheid 
era culture and the democratic era culture of human rights. Both eras dealt 
differently with the definition of acts as crimes. For example, criminal 
labelling was inferred on employees who participated in picketing393 against 
their employers. Before the right to picket came into effect, there was a 
borderline between picketing and conspiracy.394Commenting on the South 
African law before and after the Constitution, Leysath,395 reckoned the 
controversy that ensued on the issues of picketing. He explained that there 
has always been a clash of interests between employers and employees in 
South Africa whereby employers were concerned with profit gain while 
employees sought decent wages that enable them to survive. Due to this 
clash, persons partaking in pickets could inevitably breach either common 
 
392 White R and Haines F Crime and Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. 
393 Some involvements in picketing could be considered conspiracy. 
394 S v Smith 1984 1 SA 583 (A).  
395 Leysath C L Picketing 1. 
101 
 
law or statutory criminal law.396 Contrary to the common law era the 
constitutional era protects picketing. Section 17 of the Constitution 
entrenches the right to picket. Section 69 of the LRA provides protection for 
picketing and immunises participating employees from employers’ possible 
inferences for criminal allegations.397  
The South African legal experience therefore defies some of the 
sociological definitions of crime while it agrees with some of these 
definitions. As shown above, South African legal experience does not 
comply with a cross-cultural norm argument regarding crime. According to 
this norm, the conception of crime in essence does not vary against different 
cultures.398 It is however true as far as South Africa is concerned, that South 
African legal experience conforms to labelling approach which marks the 
existence of crime in relevant circumstances.399 Further than that, the South 
African law that criminalises condemned acts is embedded in formal legal 
instrument by the legislature or common law precedent.400 The defined 
crimes are sanctioned in the form of specific penalties.401 It is also true that 
South African criminal law observes human rights approach402 which 
defines crimes where certain violations of human rights are considered 
criminal.403 Due to the irreversible impacts of criminal labelling, the law 
protects individuals from being dispossessed of  individual rights including 
dignity, unless proper procedure designed for matters of criminal law nature 
 
396 Leysath C L Picketing 1. 
397  Section 69 of the LRA. 
398 White R and Haines F Crime and Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. 
399The South African Criminal Law is found in statutory laws apart from the common 
law. On the interpretation of this approach, read White R and Haines F Crime and 
Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. The main statute containing this law is the 
Criminal and Procedural Act 51 of 1977. As shown in chapter one, criminalised acts 
and omissions are defined in relevant schedules in the Criminal and CPA, in Schedules 
I to III. 
400 See the provisions of the CPA and read White R and Haines F Crime and 
Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. 
401 White R and Haines F Crime and Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. 
402 See Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, 158. and Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32.  
White R and Haines F Crime and Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. 
403 See section 35 of the Constitution. Read with White R and Haines F Crime and 
Criminology an Introduction 5 and 96. 
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is followed.404 Flexibility of employer criminal condemnations exposes 
employee criminal suspects to irreversible impacts. Employees are 
condemned as criminals without following procedure intended for criminal 
suspects labelling. 
2 2 3 The impact of criminal labelling    
Criminalisation and labelling have a damaging impact on an individual. 
Criminal labelling has a damaging civil impact on an individual; it interferes 
and compromises individual dignity and integrity,405 causing the labelled to 
endure unnecessary criminal liability. According to Ashworth,406 criminal 
liability is the strongest formal condemnation that society can inflict on an 
individual as it results in a sentence, which amounts to severe deprivation 
of ordinary liberties of the offender. The liability, resulting from labelling is 
therefore unnecessary for persons who have completed their sentence and 
remains inappropriate for individuals not yet convicted. However criminal 
liability resulting from labelling persists in our civil systems.  
Under labour law, a mere allegation that an employee is a criminal, amounts 
to a gross misconduct and allows the employer to automatically dismiss the 
employee. 407  
The standard of proof that founds guilt for labour matters is on a balance of 
probabilities as opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt required in proving 
guilt under the criminal justice system.408 This means that a remedy for a 
criminal misconduct of theft is attained in a lesser standard under labour 
law measures than in case where theft is prosecuted in terms of the criminal 
procedure. Even if the employee later wins a criminal case, that decision 
 
404 These are found in the CPA. See Cheh M M 1991The Hastings Law Journal 1325  
 where she suggests ways of finding possible solutions. 
405 See Ashworth A Principles of Criminal Law Page 1. 
406Ashworth A Principles of Criminal Law Page 1.  
407 Ashworth A Principles of Criminal Law Page 1. 
408 See Avril above note 6 at 1652; Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 
(20) ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams (a Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & 
others (2003) 11 BLLR 1145 (LC). 
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does not affect the employer’s prior decision to dismiss the employee nor 
does it restore the employee’s dignity.409 
According to Grogan,410 South African labour law adopts the understanding 
that the employer’s disciplinary powers be extended only to acts which 
constitute breaches of contract by employees.411 This apprehension 
excludes a possible analysis, that as employers exercise their discretion to 
dismiss employees suspected of criminal misconducts, they in fact inherit 
criminal jurisdiction over their employees.  As Grogan acknowledges, 
“employee misconduct may amount to both a breach of the employment 
contract and a criminal offence. In such cases, the employee may face the 
wrath of both the employer and the State”412. An employee cannot plead 
either in disciplinary proceedings or in a criminal trial that prosecution 
breaches the double jeopardy principle because action has already been 
instituted in another tribunal. Disciplinary proceedings against employees in 
their capacity as subjects of the State are different and separate 
proceedings.413 An employee can therefore be punished separately by both 
criminal court and disciplinary hearings arising from the same facts.”414 It is 
submitted that this scenario breeds injustices. 
 
Wainwright415 equates these injustices to the underlying rationale to the 
principles that guide the employer, she writes that, 
If an employee has been dismissed and is subsequently found not 
guilty in a criminal court of the alleged misconduct, this will not as 
matter of courses render the initial dismissal unfair. The essential 
question remains whether the evidence and information known to the 
 
409 See Wainwright A FASSET Labour Relations Guideline  
www.fasset.org.za/downloads/Labour_Legislation_Guideline.doc  [accessed 12 07 2016]  
11.  (Hereinafter Wainwright). 
410 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
411 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
412 Martins v Roopa NO & Others (2011) 32 ILJ 353 (LC). 
413 Zondi and SA Police Service (2011) 32 ILJ 1796 (BCA). 
414 Moshela v CCMA & others (2011) 32 ILJ 2692 (LC). 
415 Wainwright above foot note 408 at  11.   
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employer at the time of the dismissal was sufficient to justify it.416 The 
reasoning for this is that different standards of proof are required by the 
employer in the disciplinary inquiry and by the criminal trial.417 
The South African law of evidence can also be pin pointed for these skewed 
results because it maintains the well challenged common law principle in 
Hollington v Hewthorn & CO Ltd.418 The rule in Hollington 419 says that 
evidence of a criminal conviction is not admissible in subsequent civil 
proceedings to prove the facts on which the conviction is founded, where 
those facts are an issue in the civil proceedings. As early as the late sixties, 
there has been widespread criticism against this rule from the jurisdiction 
where it originates.420The strongest argument in pursuit of change is that 
the trier of fact in the civil action may give more weight to the conviction than 
it deserves.421 
 
416 Even if it was wrong, I suppose, in cases where subsequent criminal trials prove it 
wrong. 
417 Wainwright above foot note 408 at  11.   
418 Hollington v Hewthorn & CO Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 35. 
419 Hollington v Hewthorn & CO Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 35. 
420 Refer to authorities mentioned in Footnote 3 in Dean M  “Law Reform Committee: 
Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v Hewthorn”  MLR Vol 31 No 1 1986  58-64  
at page 58 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Modern Law Review Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1092315 [Accessed: 27-05-2018 23:48 UTC.] For ease of 
reference some literature and cases are here mentioned as per footnote; 
Goody v. Odhams Press Ltd. [1967] 1 Q.B. 833; Barclays Bank v. Cole 
[1967] 2 W.L.R. 166; these cases are discussed in [1967] Crim.L.R. 
441; Cross, Evidence, 3rd ed. pp. 360 and 373 et seq.; Wigmore 
Evidence, 3rd ed., Vol. V, p. 687 et seq.; Cowen & Carter, Essays on 
the Law of Evidence, Chap. VI; Wright 21 Can.B.R. 653; Goodhart 
(1943) 69 L.Q.R. 299; Coutts (1955) 18 M.L.R. 231; the rule is 
defended by Hinton, 27 Illinois L.R. 195. There have always been a 
number of recognised exceptions: Criminal Procedure Act 1865, s. 6, 
allowing proof of convictions to discredit a witness; Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1965, s. 3 (1) (2); Ingram v. Ingram [1956] P. 390; Petrie v. Nuttall 
(1856) 11 Exch. 569. In certain cases the effect of the conviction and 
sentence may itself be relevant, as in the exercise of the court's 
discretion to pass over the defendant's personal representatives in 
granting probate: Re S. [1967] 3 W.L.R. 325; explaining In the Estate 
of Crippen [1911] P. 108. A plea of guilty would be admissible as an 
admission if made by a party to the action. 
421 Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn 
Author(s): Michael Dean Source: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), 
pp. 58-64 at pages 58-60, Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Modern Law Review 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1092315 [Accessed: 27-05-2018 23:48 UTC ]. 
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From the Canadian perspective,422 the risk is particularly great in civil jury 
trials. On the other hand, bearing the fact that the convicted person had not 
only been present, but had all the safeguards that the criminal law provided, 
including the presumption of innocence, an advantage is noted.  
Advocates of change argue that there ought to be statutory reforms.423 They 
recommended that evidence of the conviction of any person for an offence 
in a Canadian court, whether federal or provincial, be admissible to prove 
that the suspect committed that offence. That such evidence be admissible 
regardless of whether the suspect was convicted on a plea of guilty, was a 
party to the civil proceeding or all else.  
The other recommendation is that the contents of the information, 
complaint, indictment or charge sheet be admissible as well. Further, that 
in suitable circumstances, proof of a subsisting conviction or acquittal be 
conclusive evidence that the convicted person committed the offence or did 
not commit the offence.424 
If the above suggestions for change would be adopted in South African 
labour law, the opposite of what is currently taking place would be assured. 
Inadmissible evidence of a criminal conviction would be admissible in 
subsequent labour law proceedings to prove the facts on which the 
conviction was founded, where those facts are an issue in the dismissal 
proceedings. Consequently, inadmissible acquittals would be admissible 
and, as such, the labelling of employees as criminals within balance of 
probabilities standards would be mitigated. 
 
422 Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn 
Author(s): Michael Dean Source: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1968) 
pp. 58-64 at pages 58-60, Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Modern Law Review 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1092315 [Accessed: 27-05-2018 23:48 UTC]. 
423 Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn 
Author(s): Michael Dean Source: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), 
pp. 58-64 at pages 58-60, Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Modern Law Review 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1092315 [Accessed: 27-05-2018 23:48 UTC]. 
424Law Reform Committee: Fifteenth Report on the Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn 
Author(s): Michael Dean Source: The Modern Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Jan., 1968), 
pp. 58-64 at pages 58-60, Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Modern Law Review 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1092315 [Accessed: 27-05-2018 23:48 UTC]. 
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The opposite is happening under the current application of the Hollington v 
Hewthon rule. 425 Once an employee has been labelled a criminal offender 
within the current unjustified employer criminal investigative processes and 
hearing processes, it is the end of the story. Even if the criminal court 
acquits the employee, such would not form evidence before the labour 
court, the labelled  employee would not easily find employment.426 Certain 
laws in the form of statutes, principles and case law precedent, act as direct 
barriers.427 In other jurisdictions, these barriers are found in various 
statutes, for example, occupational code licensing requirements.428 These 
laws require employers to exclude applicants with criminal convictions and, 
in some cases, arrest records.429 In most cases, the discretion to exclude 
previously condemned employees is not controlled via legislation.430 This 
circumstance makes it difficult to monitor this system of exclusions.431 In 
 
425 Hollington v Hewthorn & CO Ltd [1943] 2 All ER 35. 
426Du Plessis v Department of Correctional Services PSGA 787-05/06 (2006) General 
Public Service Sectoral Bargaining Council, Edgemead. It held for the principle that an 
employee ought to disclose previous convictions during interviews. In South African law 
there are set rationales in principles of evidence regarding disclosure of previous 
convictions. In this regard, the labour law does not subject itself to these principles. In  
Bhembe / Independent Development Trust (IDT) - 2015 24 CCMA 7.17.1  2015]11 
BALR 1149 (CCMA) the court found that it was never a requirement set by the employer 
for employee to disclose that she was previously dismissed and that she was subject 
to pending criminal charges. Also read Keller S K and Harris M P Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 6-30.  
427 See Du Plessis v Department of Correctional Services PSGA 787-05/06 (2006) and 
Bhembe / Independent Development Trust (IDT) - 2015 24 CCMA 7.17.1 2015 11 BALR 
1149 (CCMA). Also read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 6-30.  
428 See Du Plessis v Department of Correctional Services PSGA 787-05/06 (2006) and 
Bhembe / Independent Development Trust (IDT) - 2015 24 CCMA 7.17.1 2015 11 BALR 
1149 (CCMA). Also read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 6-30. 
429 See Du Plessis v Department of Correctional Services PSGA 787-05/06 (2006) and 
Bhembe / Independent Development Trust (IDT) - 2015 24 CCMA 7.17.1 2015 11 BALR 
1149 (CCMA). Also read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 6-30. 
430 See Du Plessis v Department of Correctional Services PSGA 787-05/06 (2006) and 
Bhembe / Independent Development Trust (IDT) - 2015 24 CCMA 7.17.1 201511 BALR 
1149 (CCMA). Also read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 6-30. 
431 See Du Plessis v Department of Correctional Services PSGA 787-05/06 (2006) and 
Bhembe / Independent Development Trust (IDT) - 2015 24 CCMA 7.17.1 2015 11 BALR 
1149 (CCMA). Also read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of Contemporary 
Criminal Justice 6-30. 
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these circumstances the fairness of this discretion cannot be vouched for. 
From a constitutional perspective, the impact of matters of a criminal law 
nature on perpetrators amounts to harsh realities. 
While it could be argued that a criminal would have brought the 
condemnation upon oneself, it is also important that right persons are 
condemned, and only correct ways are used to condemn an individual. In 
order to rescind exceptional cases where errors were performed, in an 
attempt to find justice for the aggrieved, only rational measures ought to 
apply before an individual can be condemned. 
As seen above, detriments attracted by perpetrators of criminal acts bear 
similar gravities regardless of whether they are remedied under civil law or 
criminal law. It has been argued that civil remedies even attract harsher 
punishment than criminal remedies.432 The civil remedy is guided by 
intuition of the presiding person as opposed to prospective, general, clear, 
consistent, verifiable, strictly construed, and defined law.  In these 
circumstances, criminal persecution within the LRA terms bears consistent 
injustices.433 It is trite to view it as an antithesis to the rationale for 
punishment in matters of a criminal law nature.  
In order to discipline the employee criminal suspects, they are labelled 
criminals. The ensued procedure is on the balance of probabilities as 
 
432 See Bagaric M 2004 Journal of Criminal Law 329-355 at page 332. 
 The disunity between criminal sanctions and employment deprivations 
is arguably objectionable for four  reasons: (1) it leads to double 
punishment; (2) it  reduces the rehabilitation  prospects of  offenders; 
(3)  it violates the  principle of proportionality; and  (4) it violates the  
principle of equality of sanctions. 
 As well see Coffee J C 1991 Boston University Law Review 193 at 194 where he 
acknowledges the nature of criminal law. Regarding the possibility of prejudicial 
processes read Cheh M M 1991The Hastings Law Journal 1325. Also read Basdeo V 
2013 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 303-326; McCastlain C J  and 
Schooner L S 1986 Public Contract Law Journal 418-445; Gonzalez L G Connelly B G 
and Eliopoulos E  1993 American Criminal Law Review 1179-1220 at 1179; Hasset M J 
1979 Washington and Lee Law Review 1049; Eckers S R 1998 Hofstra Law Review 109. 
433 See Bagaric M 2004 Journal of Criminal Law 329-355 at page 332. As well, read 
Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 17. Consider, Martins v Roopa NO & Others 2011 32 ILJ 
353 (LC); Zondi and SA Police Service 2011 32 ILJ 1796 (BCA); Moshela v CCMA & 
others 2011  32 ILJ 2692 (LC). 
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opposed to a standard used for criminal suspects. Section 35 of the 
Constitution read with the CPA entrench the standard: beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This implies that an accuser must provide such evidence that does 
not pose a doubt that the suspected criminal has perpetrated the alleged 
criminal act. 
 
2 2 4 Principles underlying discipline of employees suspected of 
criminal misconduct 
Proportionality and flexibility are the two major principles behind the 
perspectives on the discipline of employees who are alleged to have 
committed criminal misconducts. As it will be realised below, their outlooks 
differ widely. Proportionality advocates for the consideration of the interests 
of the individual who is subject to discipline, while flexibility seeks to satisfy 
only the interests of the employer disciplinarian regardless of what is at 
stake for the employee criminal suspect.434  
Employer investigations for disciplinary hearing of employees suspected of 
criminal misconducts is more inclined towards flexibility than proportionality, 
hence the understanding that it is civil procedure and not criminal 
procedure. 
 
2 2 4 1 The theory of proportionality and its extent of application 
in criminal misconducts discipline 
The literal interpretation of proportionality relates to the balancing of two 
interests to find a solution.435 Bearing the contours of the South African legal 
system, an argument that the proportionality principle in South Africa has 
evolved in two stages, cannot be without basis. Originally from Germany436 
and then wider Europe,437 the principle of proportionality is understood to 
have embraced South African common law at the adoption of English 
 
434 Barrie G N 2013 SAPL1. 
435  Barrie G N 2013 SAPL1. 
436 Barrie G N 2013 SAPL1. 
437 Barrie G N 2013 SAPL1. 
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procedural law in 1917. 438 The gist of its existence was ensconced in the 
principles of natural justice from the Roman-Dutch law perspective of the 
South African common law.439  
Natural justice principles as explained in chapter one maintains a balance 
in the administration of justice,440 an aspect analogous to the objective of 
proportionality principles. As shown in chapter one, even though natural 
justice principles were of paramount importance in pursuit of proportionality, 
they were negated by default when civil law matters were an issue.441 This 
ensued at the peril of the rule of law and the rise of South African 
parliamentary supremacy aimed at promoting the principle of separate 
development to subdue individual rights.442   
Due to this pursuit, courts shied away from invoking the principles of natural 
justice and hence the minimised reference to the principle of proportionality 
especially in civil matters comprising employer and employee relationships. 
As chapter one exposed, it was through sheer pursuit of integrity that the 
Industrial Courts insisted on the application of natural justice principles at 
the peril of South African parliamentary scrutiny and their decisions being 
overruled through South African parliamentary legislations. The common 
law position has been transformed in the current constitutional perspective.  
The Constitution provides that the judiciary should be free and 
independent.443 It demands that the courts should “promote and fulfil”444 
through their professional work the “democratic values of human dignity, 
 
438Schreiner M CThe Contribution of English Law 10. 
439 Schreiner M CThe Contribution of English Law 10. 
440 Marshall Natural Justice 12. 
441This is marked by the different decisions, which lacked consistency regarding the 
extent of administrative discretion. See Shidiak v Union Government 1912 (AD) 651; 
Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 (AD) 222; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African 
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 (1) SA 263 (A); Cassim v Oos-Kaapse 
Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A).  
442 Schreiner M C The Contribution of English Law 10. As well read Monyakane above 
note 9 at pages 5, 22, 38 and 61. 
443 Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
444 Klare K 1998 SAJHR  146 158. 
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equality and freedom,”445 and they should work to “establish a society based 
on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.”446 In 
particular, section 39(2) of the Constitution provides that, when interpreting 
legislation and developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.447 Justice Aurther Chaskalson448 mentions specifically that “the 
need for… [controlling power]… through courts is vital for the welfare of 
individuals in that it preserves their constitutionally entrenched rights.”449 
The Constitution also sets the extent of and limits to proportionality review, 
as it demands that the judiciary must “be conscious of the values underlying 
the Constitution and interpret the Constitution bearing in mind the involved 
technique of making constitutional choices by balancing competing 
fundamental rights and freedoms.”450 To effect this requirement, the 
judiciary must refer to a system of values extraneous to the constitutional 
text, but “embraced by, contemplated in or underlying the text, or immanent 
within the legal order, that is, they must be legal, not personal or political, 
values.”451 
In short, what this explanation entails, is the need for persons in authority 
to observe proportionality in order to balance the clashing interests within 
their control. This indicates that the principle of proportionality sustained in 
the constitutional era is considered a useful tool in the application of section 
36 of the South African Constitution, particularly with regard to the 
 
445 Klare K 1998 SAJHR  146 158. 
446 Klare K 1998 SAJHR  146 158. 
447 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In Re: The Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 49. 
448 President of the Constitutional Court of South Africa 1991-2004. 
449 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In Re: The Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) 45; also see 
Mahambehlela v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE). 
450State v Zuma 1995 (4 ) BCLR 401 (CC) 17. 
451 Per Mokgoro J, in State v Makwanyane, 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) 302-304. 
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limitations clause on individual rights.452 As Barrie453 extrapolates, “…this 
general limitation clause (which was also included in South Africa’s Interim 
Constitution of 1993,454) for all practical purposes introduced the doctrine of 
proportionality to our constitutional455 jurisprudence.”456 He acknowledges 
the observation that there is a close link between proportionality,457 
justifiability, rationality and reasonableness.458Thus he sees the principle of 
proportionality not as a limitation to the way decisions were reached, but as 
an elevated concept enabling consideration of both substance and merits 
of case matter.459 This is understood to mean that unlike under common 
law, where proportionality could be used to establish the resultant decision 
in accordance with the positivist approach adopted in the parliamentary 
supremacy approach, the constitutional era proportionality also tests the 
fibre of the law sanctioning the decision taken.  
The essence of the limitation’s clause is well captured by Woolman and 
Botha460 where they refer to it as possessing a proportionality assessment, 
 
452 Read the Canadian perspective in R v Oakes 1986 1 SCR and compare with 
Constitutional jurisprudence on proportionality. In particular read S v Makwanyane 1995 
6 BCLR 665 (C);1995 3 SA 391(CC). 
453 Barrie G N 2013 SAPL 1. 
454 Section 33. In Roman v Williams No 1997 9 BCLR 1267 (C) which dealt with s24(d) 
of the Interim Constitution the close link between proportionality, justifiability, rationality 
and reasonableness was demonstrated. Van Deventer J at 1275 held that s24(d) 
“imports the requirement of proportionality between means and end and the role of the 
courts in judicial reviews is no longer limited to the way in which an administrative 
decision was reached but now extends to its substance and merits.” 
455 The term “constitutional” must be interpreted broadly as it also encompasses our 
administrative law. An example is Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty)Ltd t/a Live Africa Network 
News v The Honorable Mr Justice King No 2000 4 All SA 128(C) at 128-132;2000 4 SA 
973 (C) para 61, where it was held that the decision of the chairperson of a commission 
of inquiry into match fixing in cricket to ban radio broadcasts of the proceedings could 
not be justified with reference to the limitations clause. This was because no 
consideration was given by chairperson to less restrictive means. 
456 Barrie G N 2013 SAPL1. 
457 In terms of section 35 of the Constitution. 
458 Well espoused in section 33 of the Constitution.  
459 The term “constitutional” must be interpreted broadly as it also encompasses our 
administrative law. An example is Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty)Ltd t/a Live Africa Network 
News v The Honorable Mr Justice King No 2000 4 All SA 128(C)  at 128-132 ;2000 4 
SA 973 (C)  para 61 where it was held that the decision of the chairperson of a 
commission of inquiry into match fixing in cricket to ban radio broadcasts of the 
proceedings could not be justified with reference to the limitations clause. This was 
because no consideration was given by chairperson to less restrictive means. 
460Woolman S and Botha H Limitations 13. 
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demanding at least that there ought to exist a rational connection between 
the means employed and the objective sought. Further, this clause 
entrenches assessment on the extent of impairment imposed by the 
adopted means on the constitutional right in issue. The demand is that the 
impairment must be minimal. Furthermore, that the “burdens that flow from 
the limitations and imposed on those whose rights are impaired [ought not] 
outweigh the benefits to society.”461 The ensued constitutional impression 
regarding the reasonable and necessary limitation of individual right in a 
democratic society would concisely be considered as calling for “the 
weighing up of competing values and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality.”462 As to how this attempt unfolds, section 36 463prescribes 
the following steps:- 
• that the rights in the Bill of Rights be limited only in terms of the law 
of general application; 
• that the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality, and freedom, 
• that all relevant factors must be considered including the nature of 
the right; 
• the importance of the purpose of the limitation, 
• the nature and extent of the limitation, 
• the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and the 
availability of less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Regarding labour law, the adoption of this assessment was validated by 
courts but within a limited extent. According to Sidumo and Another v 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (hereinafter Sidumo)464 the 
assessment of proportionality entails the assessment of the employer’s 
decision to dismiss an employee who has committed a gross misconduct. 
 
461 Woolman S and Botha H Limitations 13. 
462 S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 665 (C);1995 3 SA 391(CC) para 104. 
463 Section 36 of the Constitution. 
464 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) at para 75. 
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The Constitutional Court,465 unanimously set aside the decision of the court 
a quo and held that on a plain reading of all the relevant provisions of the 
LRA, it is clear that a commissioner or arbitrator must, as an impartial 
adjudicator, determine whether the dismissal was fair and that the 
commissioner’s sense of fairness must prevail and not the employer’s 
view.466  The Constitutional Court went on to indicate what ought to be the 
basis of commissioner’s sense of fairness. It held that a determination of 
the fairness of a dismissal requires a consideration of the following: 
• the totality of the circumstances of the matter; 
• whether what the employer did was fair within LRA prescripts; 
• the importance of the rule that the employee breached; 
• the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal; 
• the basis of the employee’s challenge to the dismissal; 
• the harm caused by the employee’s conduct; 
• whether additional training and instruction may result in the 
employee not repeating the misconduct;  
• the effect of dismissal on the employee; and 
• the long service record of the employee.467 
According to Sidumo468 read together with the Code,469 the list is not 
exhaustive and none of the above factors will be determinative; the factors 
must all be weighed in determining what is fair in the circumstances. 
Practically, what transpires in disciplinary proceedings is that the employer 
establishes the factual basis or a fair reason for the dismissal the above-
tabled considerations. However, the employer can exclude in its 
assessments, the effects of its actions on any other underlying rights. In 
employer criminal investigations and disciplinary hearings on employees 
 
465 2007 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2007 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) at para 75. 
466 Sidumo above note 180 at para 75. 
467 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
468 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
469 LRA Schedule 8: Code of Good Practice. 
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who have committed criminal misconduct, the employer is not tasked to 
consider employee rights as criminal suspects. 
The employee in turn would not have access to the CCMA to review 
employer processes vis-a-vis these rights because they fall out of the 
circumstances outlined for application within the LRA prescripts as held in 
the Sidumo470 matter. Thus, within the LRA review, proportionality is viewed 
as a mere limitation to the way in which decisions are reached. There need 
not be consideration of both substance and merits of the matter as 
constitutionally envisaged.471 
The situation here is comparable to untransformed common law processes 
where proportionality could be used to test the resultant decision and not 
the fibre of the law sanctioning the decision taken. Seemingly, employers 
are allowed to overlook the ensued employee rights, but only centre their 
decisions on their interests, regardless of whether such employee rights are 
constitutionally entrenched. The common law breach of the trust principle 
supersedes the fair trial rights entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. 
The employer must heed that objectively, the reason for the decision to 
dismiss the employee must have been based on an act of grave or serious 
misconduct warranting permanent termination of the employee relationship 
with the employer. The nature of the misconduct does not matter.472 The 
employee’s act of misconduct must render the continuation of the 
employment relationship intolerable to the employer. Mindful of the fact that 
what is intolerable to one employer may be tolerable to another, there are 
inevitable inconsistencies in disciplining perpetrators of the same criminal 
act.  
 
470 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
471 The term “constitutional” must be interpreted broadly as it also encompasses our 
administrative law. An example is Dotcom Trading 121 (Pty)Ltd t/a Live Africa Network 
News v The Honorable Mr Justice King No 2000 4 All SA 128 (C) at 128-132 ;2000 4 
SA 973 (C) para 61, where it was held that the decision of the chairperson of a 
commission of inquiry into match fixing in cricket to ban radio broadcasts of the 
proceedings could not be justified with reference to the limitations clause. This was 
because no consideration was given by chairperson to less restrictive means. 
472 Ashworth A Principles of Criminal Law page 1. 
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It is here worth considering Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal 
Restaurant v Komwayo,473 and Donald Baphuthi v The CCMA and 
Others,474respectively, where in both cases the employees were accused 
of dishonesty. In one case the employee who had had a long period of 
service stole a can of Fanta while in another case two employees were 
found to be dishonest to their employer because of their involvement in the 
perpetration of a single act of dishonesty. In the former case, dismissal was 
guaranteed regardless of the gravity of mitigating factors. Among these 
factors was the fact that the employee had worked for the company for a 
long period of time while honest. In the latter case one employee was 
expelled while the other was given a written warning.  
These cases symbolise a fluid approach towards the discretion to dismiss. 
The basis of these varying decisions was whether the employer felt that the 
action of an individual had negatively affected the relationship between the 
employer and the employee. In a way, the employer’s discretion is based 
on simulated procedural guidelines.475 Due to lack of defined rules 
pertaining to the exercise of discretion to dismiss where an alleged criminal 
conduct breach is at issue, the employer’s decision settles on the nebulous 
employer allegation that the employee has breached the implied mutual 
trust and confidence.  
Consequently, if the matter is taken before the CCMA for review, where the 
conduct of the employee is found to be unacceptable, but the sanction of 
dismissal is in all the circumstances not a fair sanction,476 the dismissal will 
be substantively unfair. Similarly, where the conduct of the employee is 
 
473 1992 13 ILJ 573 (LAC). 
474 Unreported case no J1901/99, Labour Court 1999. 
475 Read Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 (AD) 302 at 309 and compare with Roschon (Pty) Ltd 
v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC 2014 4 SA 319 (SCA); Ackermans Ltd v Commissioner, 
South Africa Revenue Service 2015 6 SA 364 (GP); Bosch and Another v Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Service (WCC) (unreported case no A94/2012, 20-11-
2012)  and Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v NWK Ltd 2011 2 SA 
67 (SCA). As well read the note of Barry G 2013 DEREBUS 25. 
476 Refer to Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
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unacceptable, and the sanction of dismissal is in all the circumstances a fair 
sanction, the dismissal will be substantively fair. 
From a labour law perspective, the approach to the consideration of fairness 
endorsed by the Constitutional Court in the Sidumo matter creates an even 
balance between the competing interests of the employer and the 
employee, and both are guaranteed the right to fair labour practices. 
Viewed from a constitutionally mandated proportionality which 
acknowledges the link between proportionality, justifiability, rationality and 
reasonableness, this approach limits constitutional proportionality, although 
used in guaranteeing the right to fair labour practices. Regarding cases 
involving criminal misconducts, it is unjusticiable, 477 and therefore irrational 
and unreasonable because it tramples on the involved employee’s rights as 
a criminal suspect.478 
The general assessment of the employer’s decision at the higher jurisdiction 
as envisaged in the Sidumo finding, if strictly complied with, leaves the law 
without the need to scrutinise the  intricacies of the internal levels of 
employer discipline.479 Thus, the labour law proportionality test does not cut 
across employer investigation processes. If anything, it leaves the 
investigation process without legal guideline and relies solely on the 
discretion of the employer. Without limits, the employer is at liberty to resort 
to any means of securing evidence including the disregard of constitutional 
measures enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution. Section 35 fair trial 
principles enshrine common law proportionality principles as far as matters 
of criminal law nature are concerned; their ignorance amounts to the 
negation of proportionality. 
 
477 In terms of the due process principles in sections 33 and 35 of the Constitution. 
478 Thus, the employer had not weighed all possible serious objections to the processes 
followed; had ignored possible serious alternatives to the processes it took and had failed 
to test the rational connection between its processes and individual rights at stake. 
Compare with the argument in Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 40. 
479Sidumo above note 180 para 59. Also read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd 
(2013)2BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 54-57. Myburg A & Bosch C Reviews in the Labour Courts 
South Africa 2016 271-282. 
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The LRA prescripts on procedural fairness in relation to the dismissal of 
employees who have committed criminal misconducts fail to meet minimum 
constitutional compliance. They ignore natural justice principles entailing 
section 35 fairness. They also negate ensued constitutional lawfulness 
encompassing all grounds of review. In addition, they submit to a narrow 
interpretation of review by requiring that employer actions should fall within 
the four corners of the LRA even if they have a negative and therefore 
unreasonable and irrational impact on employee criminal suspect rights.480 
They exclude the rationality review of employer disciplinary actions against 
constitutional reasonableness. Procedural fairness within the LRA 
prescripts accept employer actions as reasonable, even where they tend to 
solicit unconstitutionality. Constitutional lawfulness does away with 
unreasonableness. According to Monyakane, “…the term constitutional 
reasonableness means that the decisions should be rational and 
constitutionally justiciable in that they follow coherent constitutional 
decision-making processes.”481 
Proportionality in relation to criminal persecution, for example, demands 
that punishment must fit the crime. As an integral to the political theory 
underlying social contract, it influences the need for consistency and 
certainty in meting justice for perpetrators of criminal acts and omissions. It 
prescribes specific procedures to attain consistency and certainty in 
processes of punishment. The engaged procedures are followed as 
standard procedures without compromise from the period of suspicion to 
that of evidence-gathering before the suspect could be arrested and put to 
trial. Failure to follow them breeds multifarious prejudices, which are 
threatening to criminal justice. 482 As far as criminal justice is concerned and 
 
480 Entrenched in section 35 of the constitution, among them is the right against self-
incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is disregarded in employer disciplinary 
processes, Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 416-425. 
481 Monyakane above note 9 at page 51. Also read Mureinik E1994 SAJHR 31,40. 
482 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 9 BLLR 995 (LAC); Fipaza v Eskom 
Holdings Ltd and Others (JR 2220/08) (2010) ZALC 66; 2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) (6 May 




in pursuit of proportionality, there are principles emphasising consistency in 
dealing with matters of a criminal law nature. These principles are well 
organised under common law,483 statutory484 and constitutional law485 
consecutively.  
In accordance with the principles of fairness in criminal punishment,486 it 
can be submitted that proportionality in criminal punishment has four 
aspects of concern. Firstly, it avenges the offended. Secondly, it 
rehabilitates the offender to make the offender a new person. Third, it shows 
by example that criminal acts are consistently punishable and, fourth, it sets 
a precedent that prevents future criminal behaviour.  Successfully punishing 
the offender brings change to those who transgress and maintain the social 
contract rationales. The indication of criminal punishment is therefore that 
perpetrators ought to be reformed and not perpetually condemned. Failure 
to follow the prescribed procedure is successfully tested before court. As 
far as punishment of criminal perpetrators is concerned, the principle of 
proportionality enforces constitutional fairness through satisfying 
entrenched section 35 fairness principles. Thus, the negation of 
proportionality is a disregard of the twin principles of natural justice—audi 
alteram partem487 and nemo judex in propria sua causa.488 The recognition 
and application of both these natural justice principles safeguards suspects’ 
involved rights. At the centre of these rights is employee suspects’ right 
against self-incrimination, ignored in labour law disciplinary processes.489 
 
Others (JA 56/10) (2012) ZALAC 40; 2013 4 BLLR 327 (LAC); (2013) 34 ILJ 549 (LAC) 
(3 October 2012); Absa Makelaars (Edms) Bpk v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 
& another 2003 24 ILJ 1484 (LC) . As well read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal 
of Contemporary Criminal Justice 6.   
483 The previously referred to maxim of nulla poena sine lege and its subsidiaries actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. 
484 The Major Act is the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
485 In particular, section 35 of the Constitution. 
486 Mentioned in S v Zinn 1969 2 SA 537 (A) S v Rabie 1975 4 SA 855 (A). For a detailed 
discussion of these principles consider Terblanche S S The Guide to Sentencing in 
South Africa 151. Also see Shabalala v Attorney General of Transvaal 1995 2 SACR 
761 (CC) para 51. 
487 Hear the other side. 
488 No man shall be judged in his own cause, the rule against bias. 
489 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 416-425. 
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The state of the limited application of proportionality principle in 
labour law disciplinary processes leaves unguided employer investigation 
processes and leads employees to self-incrimination. This is exacerbated 
by the disguise that employees are being allowed opportunity to be heard 
while incriminating answers are solicited from them. Writing from a labour 
law perspective, Grogan490 confirms how the right against self-incrimination 
is regarded insignificant in disciplinary processes.491 The ensued limited 
application of proportionality principle in labour law does not exclude the 
argument that inherent in labour law discipline is the principle of flexibility, 
allowing employer extensive discretion on the fate of the employment 
agreement. 
It would be fair that the right against self-incrimination would be recognised 
within employer investigatory powers in matters of a criminal law nature and 
the related subsequent employee criminal suspects disciplinary hearings. It 
would be important that the employee criminal suspect’s right against self-
incrimination is not ignored when such employee draws the investigatory 
team to it. It would not be mandatory that employees answer to allegations 
without them pleading self-incrimination. Disciplinary hearings would be 
considerate of the employees’ rights against self-incrimination. Such a 
consideration in labour law would call for a better and fair disciplinary 
process which would ultimately move from a flexibility based disciplinary 
process. Most of the fairness principles based on proportionality would be 
applicable in employer investigation and hearing processes for employees 
who committed criminal misconducts. 
 
 
490 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 416-425. 
491Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 416-425. 
120 
 
2 2 4 2 The theory of flexibility and its extent in employment 
criminal misconducts discipline 
The Flexibility principle is the progeny of the common law principle of 
implied breach of trust between the employer and the employee.492 It was 
a formulation that resulted as a matter of fact and not one of law.493 It was 
later accepted in law as an implied term in every employer and employee 
contract.494 Some cases that elucidate the operation of this principle in our 
courts are the cases of Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe& 
others495 and that of Paper, Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union v 
Pienaar NO and Others.496 
The epicenter for both cases is the emphasis on fair reason to dismiss, due 
to the breach of the relationship of trust. The breakage in trust is confirmed 
to have occurred upon the employer-determining the employee’s guilt of 
criminal dishonesty.  In these cases, theft and fraud were found to be 
fundamental breaches of employment contracts and therefore good 
grounds for dismissal. They were in short, breaches of the relationship of 
trust between employees and employers.  It was maintained in these cases 
that the employer and employee are parties to an enterprise that produces 
goods or services to generate profits. That should either party be dishonest 
to a degree that compromises the enterprise, the instance of a fundamental 
breach would ensue.497  
 
492 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84. As well read Frederic R 
2015 ILJ 2 262. 
493 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84. As well read Reynolds F 
2015 ILJ 262. 
494 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84. As well read Reynolds F 
2015 ILJ 262. 
4952000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC) para 43.  
496 1993 4 SA 631 (AD) at 638G. 
497 Toyota South Africa Motors (Pty) Ltd v Radebe & others 2000 3 BLLR 243 (LAC) 
para 43; Paper, Printing Wood and Allied Workers Union v Pienaar NO and Others 1993 
4 SA 631 (AD) at 638G. 
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The ensued adoption of purely contractual law principles offered a wide 
range of choices for both the employer and the employee in cases of a 
breach of contract by either of the parties to the contract. As far as the 
contract of employment is concerned, a breach of contract by either party 
entitles the other party either to accept the breach and sue for damages or 
to reject the misconduct and sue for specific performance or privileges.498In 
many cases employers would dismiss employees who broke trust through 
committing criminal acts. This is because these misconducts constitute 
material breaches of contract. 
The South African law of contract dictates that material breaches of contract 
constitute repudiation.499 Repudiation means that the aggrieved party would 
renege the contract and therefore force the guilty party out of the 
contract. Under contract law circumstances, repudiation by a party does not 
imply termination of the contract.500 It is a mere signal that the innocent party 
has chosen to accept the treachery by the opposite party. The aggrieved 
party may alternatively seek an order for specific performance, which 
effectively declares the contract of full force and effect. Through invoking 
the principle of implied mutual trust and confidence, employers choose as 
to whether to take drastic acts of dismissal or to condone the employees’ 
actions.501 The employer routinely capitalises on the flexibility within 
contract law principles. These principles have greatly influenced the flow of 
employment law remedies including the remedy of dismissal. 
The principle of breach of the relationship of trust between employer and 
employee is now encapsulated in jurisprudential underpinnings of dismissal 
law. This jurisprudence promotes the idea that the employer has flexibility502 
in determining whether to dismiss an employee, even when they committed 
 
498 Vettori S 2011 STELL LR  173 at 179. 
499 Read Vettori S 2011 STELL LR  173 at 179. 
500 Nyathi v Special Investigating Unit 2011 12 BLLR 1211 (LC). 
501 Read cases of Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79 and Edcon Limited vs Pillermer 
NO & Others 2009 ZASCA 135 ;2010 1 BLLR 1 (SCA).  
502 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd (1981) ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew 1979 IRLR 84. As well read Reynolds F 
2015 ILJ 262 and van Niekerk A 2012 Acta Juridica 102. 
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criminal acts. In turn, while feeling not bound by the prescripts of criminal 
justice, employers lost sight of the holistic nature of constitutional demands 
to the extent that their criminal investigative and disciplinary processes 
metamorphose towards informality as not to mirror the observance of the 
nature of criminal justice. This understanding is alive in South African labour 
law jurisprudence. Accordingly, the jurisprudential interpretation of the 
labour law employer discretionary powers is that this power is one-sided. 
Labour law Jurisprudence confirms an impression that there is an inequality 
of arms between the employer and employee. In this scenario the employer 
is put on a high pedestal whereas the employee is a mere subject for 
oppression.503 The employee, for example, is indirectly forced to answer to 
the employer’s accusations at the risk of self-incrimination, owing to the 
one-sided observance of the principles of natural justice. 
It is submitted that, the nature of this centre principle for dismissal—the 
breach of the relationship of trust—between the employer and the employee 
mimics a simulated legal scenario. Marking of the effects of its operation on 
the rights of the criminal suspect employee, it is encapsulated in the maxim 
plus valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur. This maxim means 
that ‘what is actually done is more important than that which seems to have 
been done.”504 This expression bears reference to common law unrestricted 
employer discretion entitling the employer to ignore the legal substance of 
fair dismissal and, rather, to concentrate on the ultimate form of discipline. 
Employer flexibility has found support in labour law jurisprudence as a 
principle that facilitates quick and efficient dispute resolution and, for that 
 
503 Bearing that employer and employee relationship is unequal by nature, see Davies 
and Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law at 18. 
504 Read Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 at 309 and compare with Ackermans Ltd v 
Commissioner, South Africa Revenue Service 2015 (6) SA 364 (GP); Bosch and 
Another v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (WCC) (unreported 
case no A94/2012, 20-11-2012)  and Commissioner for the South African Revenue 




matter, labour courts exercise deference on disciplinary decisions. 505 
Comparable to this scenario is the common law quasi-judicial administrative 
action.506 It presupposes an existing dispute between two or more parties 
and involves the same procedure as that for a judicial decision. Unlike the 
judicial act, however, it does not involve a decision. This disposes of the 
whole matter by finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the 
law to the facts so found, including where required “a ruling upon all 
disputed questions of law.” 507 
This procedure did not provide the courts with much leeway to use their 
discretion to protect individual rights. In Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and 
Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another508  the Court held that the right to a fair 
procedure in terms of the LRA requires, “less stringent and formalised 
compliance than was the case under the unfair labour practice 
jurisprudence of the Industrial Court.”509 Following Moropane, the Labour 
Court in Avril510 held against strict adherence to legal stipulations in labour 
matters and shunned against following the Industrial Court precedence 
regarding the strict observation of both of natural justice principles.511 
When the Code refers to an opportunity that must be given by the 
employer to the employee to state a case in response to any 
allegations made against that employee, which need not be a formal 
enquiry, it means no more than that there should be dialogue and an 
opportunity for reflection before any decision is taken to dismiss.  In the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, the substantive content of this 
process as defined by item 4 of the Code, requires the conducting of 
 
505 See Booysen v SAPS & another 2008 (10) BLLR 928 [LC]; Jiba v Minister: 
Department of Justice & Constitutional Development & Others 2010 31 ILJ 112 (LC); 
and Trustees for The Time Being of the National Bioinformatics Network Trust v 
Jacobson & others 2009 30 ILJ 2513 (LC).  
506 Referred to as delegated judicial action. 
507My emphasis. 
508 Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1997 10 BLLR 1320        
(LC); 1998 19 ILJ 635 (LC) 641G. Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
509 Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1997 10 BLLR 1320 
(LC); 1998 19 ILJ 635 (LC) 641G. Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
510 Avril above note 6 at 1653 and 1660. 
511 Audi alteram partem and nemo judex in propria sua causa.  
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an investigation [on the employee by the employer] and [the] 
notification to the employee of any allegations that may flow from that 
investigation. [It also requires that an employee is given] … an 
opportunity, within a reasonable time, to prepare a response to the 
employer’s allegations with the assistance of a trade union 
representative or fellow employee.  The employer should then 
communicate the decision taken, and preferably communicate this in 
writing.  If [the employer’s] decision is to dismiss the employee, [the 
employer should give the employee] the reason for dismissal. The 
employer should also remind the employee of his or her rights to refer 
any disputed dismissal to the CCMA or to a bargaining council with 
jurisdiction; or any procedure established in terms of a collective 
agreement….There is clearly no place for formal disciplinary 
procedures that incorporate all of the accoutrements of a criminal trial, 
including the leading of witnesses, technical and complex ‘charge 
sheets’, requests for particulars, the application of the rules of 
evidence, legal arguments, and the like.512 
 
Against the jurisprudential understanding and support of the flexibility 
principle is the argument in this thesis that, in substance, labour law is 
inextricably part of constitutional law in a wide sense. Consequently, the 
specific right to fair dismissal must observe constitutional demands in 
general, unlike what ensues in pursuit of fair dismissal. The means to the 
required LRA dismissal fairness principles employed, in the employer’s 
criminal investigations and disciplinary mechanisms for dismissal, does not 
justify the end. The involved mechanisms are illegal and disregard the rights 
of criminal suspects in the light of the fact that employees suspected of 
criminal misconduct are also criminal suspects from the constitutional 
perspective of fair trial.513  
 
512 Avril above note 6 at 1653 and 1660. 
513 See section 35 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair trial in matters of 
criminal law nature. Read it with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 
70(c) per Bozalek J; also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per 
Satchwell J Page 1096 at para 56. 
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The adopted common law principle of implied breach of trust between the 
employer and the employee has left the employer with a wide discretion to 
dismiss.  Within this scenario, employer powers are protected rather than 
controlled. The LRA jurisprudential perspective of flexibility reveals that in 
labour law, there is presumption that a responsible employer carries out its 
discretion properly514. This limitation places an exceedingly heavy onus on 
an aggrieved party, thereby reducing individual ability to seek review of 
employer decisions.515  
In the attempt to discipline an employee criminal suspect, the employer-
enforces criminal justice through LRA provisions which do not allow the 
employee to insist on the right against self-incrimination. The employee 
cannot scrutinise the procedures that the employer followed in securing the 
evidence incriminating the employee even if such procedures were unfair 
and did not meet section 35 of the Constitution requirements. In this way, 
the right to fair dismissal provided by the LRA excludes the right to remain 
silent and the right against self-incrimination.  
In effect, the employer’s power to dismiss employees in terms of the LRA 
excludes the employer from observing the rights of employee criminal 
suspects. Labour law review guidelines are limited to LRA prescripts 
coupled with what constitutes employer’s codes and rules of conduct. In 
consequence, the basis of these guidelines is the limited questions that the 
employer ought to traverse before reaching its decisions. These include 
questions of whether there was a contravention of a rule regulating conduct 
in the workplace, or of relevance to the workplace. Second, the employer 
ought to find out if the rule is reasonable and valid. Third, there is a need to 
establish if the employee was aware of the rule or could reasonably have 
 
514This is based on the implied principle that courts should exercise deference when 
reviewing employer’s decisions. To the extent that the review of employer processes 
and decision ought to fit within the four corners of the LRA without regard to other 
involved justiciable rights. 
515 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79; Avril above note 6 at 838 and 1652 and 
Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1997 10 BLLR 1320 
(LC); 1998 19 ILJ 635 (LC) 641G). Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
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been expected to know it and, fourth, it is necessary to ask if the dismissal 
was an appropriate sanction. 516 
Flexibility with respect to discipline therefore entails the ability of the 
employer to exercise discretion and choose whether to discipline the 
employee perpetrator or not. The employer needs not consider the wide 
constitutional demands concerning the nature of the matter at hand.  In this 
regard, even if a matter is concerning a criminal misconduct, it makes it 
plausible for an employer to discipline two employees who commit a similar 
crime differently depending on how the employer feels about each. The 
employer is not bound to follow strict rules of procedure entrenched in 
section 35 of the Constitution, nor the principle of equality entrenched in the 
Constitution. The employer would choose whether to investigate and hold a 
disciplinary hearing against the employee who committed a criminal 
misconduct. The choices that the employer makes are hardly questioned as 
courts exercise deference when tasked to review these decisions in most 
cases.517 The flexibility of the employer process is vouched at the need for 
the employer to quickly and efficiently resolve disputes.518  
The principle of flexibility relaxes the stringent procedural protections 
against unfair criminal persecutions in cases of a criminal nature. 
Flexibility519 limits available employee rights and affords the employee 
minimum content of the prescribed right. For example, an employee 
 
516Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
517 See for example, Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd 2013 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) 
paras 54-57 Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2013 34 ILJ 2795 (SCA), Gold Fields Mining South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v CCMA and Others 2014 35 ILJ (LAC) and other cases decided based 
on Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79 reasoning. Based on this jurisprudence, the 
employer could argue that the breakage of relationships between itself and respective 
employees differed to the extent that the employer chose to keep one and not the other. 
Thus, argument that employer reasonableness could not be standardised. Employer 
reasonableness is subjective as opposed to objective standard of reasonabless in 
PAJA. Unlike employer reasonableness, PAJA reasonableness is based on decisions 
that are rational, constitutionally justiciable and following coherent constitutional 
decision-making processes. See Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 40. 
518 See Booysen v SAPS & another 2008 10 BLLR 928 (LC); Jiba v Minister: 
Department of Justice & Constitutional Development  & Others 2010 31 ILJ 112 (LC); 
and Trustees For The Time Being of the National Bioinformatics Network Trust v 
Jacobson & others 2009 30 ILJ 2513 (LC). 
519 Even though they both use the term “informal.” 
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suspected of a criminal misconduct would be notified of the charges against 
him.520 The employee would be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare a response while being assisted where appropriate by experts. The 
employee would then have an opportunity to state its case. The employee 
would be informed of the employer’s decision and reasons for the employer 
decision.521 The employer on the other hand would not be required to 
observe formal procedures prescribed for matters of a criminal law nature 
in pursuit of a fair criminal condemnation. Speaking from the administrative 
law perspective, Cora Hoexter522 maintains that flexibility process “…seems 
to be a [mixture of] variability523 within a framework of conceptualism.”  In a 
nutshell, the principle of flexibility waters down the principle of fairness 
pertinent in matters of criminal law nature, and therefore negates 
proportionality within criminal justice. It acknowledges some aspects of 
fairness while to some extent limiting the application of the rest of the 
requirements.  
The employer disciplinary processes on acts of dishonesty have a 
theoretical foundation that suggests that, regardless of the move from the 
law of master and servant era,524 the employer still wages extremely 
unfettered powers over the employee who ought to act according to the 
employer’s commands even in the light of constitutionalised individual 
rights. If the employee commits a forbidden act classified under criminal 
misconduct, the employer investigation and discipline is exercised as an 
appropriate remedy that serves only the interests of the employer. This is 
allowed in the disciplinary system that embraces the common law prescripts 
of a master and servant relationship.  Integral the prescripts of master and 
law relationship is the principle of flexibility emanating from the common law 
of contract perspective. Observance of flexibility without regard to 
 
520 In terms of Item 4 of the Code. 
521 In terms of Item 4 of the Code. 
522 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 363. 
523 She uses the term ‘variability’ instead of ‘flexibility’ 
524Grawitzky above note 33. 
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proportionality allows the employer ample room for discretion in exercising 
disciplinary powers. The processes that the employer follows in 
investigating the criminal misconduct, and in disciplinary hearings based on 
criminal misconducts, do not embrace equality.  Hence the employee 
criminal suspect’s rights as a criminal suspect are largely ignored in the long 
run. This approach is semi anti-criminal justice principles of proportionality 
mandatory in dealing with matters of a criminal nature. Flexibility as 
opposed to proportionality hailed the foundations of discipline in work 
environments. 
 
2 2 4 3 Perspectives of discipline in work environment 
As indicated earlier, the starting point for employer and employee 
relationship is rule based. As a rule, institutions are established because of 
objectives and aims. It is upon these aims and objectives that codes of 
conduct are drawn up as terms of reference for regulating the relationship 
between the employer and the employee.  Codes of conduct obviate certain 
behaviours. They condemn such unwarranted behaviour with sanctions.  
Upon entry into a contract of employment, employees are orientated with 
the expected standards which in most cases are inferred in their 
employment contracts. In most instances, the employer provides newly 
employed staff with trial periods. For example, there are put in place 
probation periods of three to twelve months. To test whether the employee 
is fit for the work, performance gets measured against the policies, 
procedures, work rules, and performance standards of the institution. It is 
through such codes of conduct that institutions try to maintain discipline in 
their employment relationships with their employees. If an employee 
commits or omits the standard rules, the employment contract terms would 
indicate that as misconduct.  
The ensuing discussions deal with various perspectives attached to the 
definition of discipline. There are diverse theoretical angles to the definition 
of discipline attached to the different schools of thought. Some of the 
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schools of thoughts, share a similar perspective, that discipline in work 
environments maintains proportionality. Some other schools of thought 
seem to be insisting that employer discipline must lean on flexibility. 
Kroon,525 for example, equates the aim of discipline to the elimination of 
employee’s undesirable behaviour. His understanding expresses that the 
employer would be charged with meting out unpleasant consequences at 
the employee who flouts institutional rules. The ultimate long-term effect 
would be that the perpetrator employee and other colleagues would learn 
that negative performance would also be rewarded negatively.526 This 
perspective makes punishment the objective of the employer-employee 
relationship.  it therefore regards discipline as an end rather than a means 
to an end. This is contrary to the principle of proportionality which makes an 
individual’s right the epicentre of discipline. Due to the nature of employer 
and employee relationship it leaves much to be desired in the hands of the 
more powerful partner: the employer. Accordingly, Kroon’s527 
understanding reinforces flexibility principle as the underlying principle in 
the employer and employee relationship. 
Departing from this uneven conception of relations, Grossett528 and 
Marker529 belong to the corrective discipline school of thought. They 
theorise that discipline is a means to achieving institutional goals. In the 
same vein, Grossett530 reckoned that discipline ought to be corrective rather 
than punitive. He equates employer and employee relationship to a parent 
and child association, where a parent corrects and guides the child with the 
aim to help the child not to commit the forbidden behaviour. Grossett’s531 
explanation of what discipline entails is based on the value that institutions 
attach to their employees.  In the instance where an institution considers 
 
525 Kroon J (ed) General management 171. 
526  Kroon J (ed) General management 171. 
527 Kroon J (ed) General management 171. 
528 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
529  Marker A Raising children to be their best 18. 
530 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
531 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
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that employees have potential to perform and contribute to the ultimate 
goals and objectives of the company, the role of employers lean more 
towards mentoring the employees than punishing them. Thus, discipline 
becomes a process that enhances performance towards goals and not an 
end to itself. The function of discipline in such institutions is to ensure that 
employees contribute effectively and efficiently to the goals of the 
institution.532  
According to Grossett’s533 proponents, the employer and employee 
relationship has its point of reference, the binding contract entailing 
institutional standards. These, as mentioned earlier, are synthesised 
institutional objectives and aims vis-a-vis employees’ duties and rights. It is 
within this contractual bond that disciplinary measures are expressed. 
Through these disciplinary measures, the employer monitors and controls 
employee behaviour and makes sure that an employee adheres to the goals 
and objectives of the institution. To do this, the employer utilises his right 
entailed in his authority and duty to ensure that employees adhere to 
reasonable standards of efficiency and conduct. The only way through 
which an employer may ensure that employees’ conduct conform to the 
required standards, is to enforce discipline.  It may therefore be argued that 
institutions tend to realise their objectives and goals by inter alia, 
maintaining discipline in the working environment.534 
Through monitoring and controlling employees’ behaviour, the employer 
simultaneously investigates possible misconduct in the case of any 
allegation of untoward behaviour. As the guardian of institutional objectives 
and aims, the employer would also use discretions and make conclusions 
regarding the ability of the employee to perform the contracted duties. The 
employer will decide as to whether the calibre of the employee fits the 
institutional credentials. Therefore, the employer is at liberty to decide on 
 
532  Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
533 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
534 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
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measures to be taken as to whether to impose sanctions. The nature of 
sanctions to impose, would depend on the nature of the action or inaction 
entailed. In this aspect, Grossett’s535 explanation is analogous to Kroon’s536 
reasoning that discipline often implies employee’s deprivation of valued 
reward. Thus Kroon537 supports the thought that the principle of flexibility 
underlies employer and employee relationship. 
Concomitant to Grossett,538 Marker539 founds his perspective on discipline 
to an understanding of a parent-and-child relationship. As mentioned 
earlier, this relationship is founded on hope and trust where the parent has 
the best interest of the child at heart. Thus, an employee is trusted to have 
a potential to perform and that any negative behaviour would be just an 
unintentional hiccup due to unforeseeable circumstance. In Marker’s540 
understanding, where a child knows its parent’s expectations, they would 
be motivated to exhibit positive behaviour because they feel secure. 
Consequently, this perspective entails that the employer-employee 
relationships must aim at building a secure relationship where employees 
do not regard discipline as the employer’s way of catching them. Since the 
employer serves as a guardian of institutional interests expressed in the 
rules, the employer, like a parent to a child, will teach the employees what 
is expected of them. The employer works at mentoring the employees so 
that they are well behaved and conform to the set institutional rules. The 
employer is expected to enforce the rules incrementally. First, the employer 
will be expected to be lenient to the first-time offenders when enforcing 
discipline.  
The application of sanctions would then increase with the frequency of 
offences by the employee. But the employer will, in a lenient manner, 
impose disciplinary sanctions upon employees who misbehave, in order to 
 
535 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
536Kroon J (ed) General management 172. 
537Kroon J (ed) General management 172. 
538 Grossett M Discipline and dismissal 21. 
539Marker A Raising children to be their best 18.  
540 Marker A Raising children to be their best 18. 
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prevent a repetition of the undesirable conduct in future. From the above 
explanation, it is apparent that discipline in the work environment varies in 
accordance with choices of flexibility perspectives adopted in an institution. 
At the core of these choices is the legal system in place, which underlies 
the foundational prescripts of labour law and thus influences their 
interpretation. It is submitted that the above explanation has exposed that 
the concept of discipline in work environments is mainly based on two 
flexibility perspectives, namely the progressive or traditional process and 
the modern or corrective approach. The rationale for these twists and turns 
on flexibility perspective is to try and mete out proportionality in disciplinary 
matters.  However, such flexibility would apply as far as the employer 
criminal investigations and the employer hearing of employee criminal 
suspect’s’ misconduct for dismissal. In these cases, it would seem the 
struck measure of proportionality is deemed both scarce and inadequate. 
 
2 2 5  The traditional approach or progressive approach 
According to Zack and Bloch541, progressive discipline maintains a system 
of escalated penalties. These are made known to employees upon entering 
a contract of employment. Employees are told in advance that certain 
behaviours are not tolerated. They are also informed that an employee who 
transgresses the rules would face certain repercussions. Normally, the 
penalties are meted out in an incremental manner from less severe 
punishment to a more severe punishment in the case where the employee 
repeats forbidden behaviours.542 This is best expressed by Marciano’s543 
outlook on progressive discipline. According to him, progressive discipline 
entails a policy that emphasises on progression of disciplinary actions taken 
 
541 Zack A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline cases 84. Also refer to Asherman IG 
1982 Personnel Journal 528 - 531at 528. 
542 Adams G W Grievance Arbitration 28; Palmer E Collective Agreement Arbitration in 
Canada 248; Failes M D Statutory Protection from Unjust Dismissal 42; Dolan S L and 
Randall S S Personnel and Human Resource Management at 483; Brown D J M  and 
Beatty D M Canadian Labour Arbitration at 490. 
543Marciano P L Carrots and Sticks Don’t Work pages 1-14 where he argues on operant 
conditioning. (Hereinafter Marciano).  
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when an employee violates work rules embedded in the employment 
contract.544  Typical of the progressive disciplinary policy is the inclusion of 
a chronology of measures taken when an employee flout. 
Among these measures is the initial step of verbal warning. This is an 
informal procedure aimed at ensuring that employees are aware of their 
forbidden inaction or action. It also aims at the employees’ opportunity to 
remedy their infractions. A verbal warning is normally followed by a written 
warning, which is a more formal warning.545  
In terms of this perspective of discipline, an employee who faults for the 
second instance shows the unpreparedness to have changed negative 
behaviour. Thus, a written warning is a preliminary step to the consequent 
formal steps if no improvement in employees’ behaviour becomes apparent. 
In most cases, it would entail an action plan towards tougher steps.546 The 
employer and employee would sign the agreement regarding how the 
employer would carry out discipline on the employee who has 
misconducted. Further infraction by an employee would lead to the 
suspension stage. Suspension as a major punishment comes after the 
employer has negotiated compliance with the employee. 547 It is engaged in 
order to carry out to a further step of termination of employment contract 
through dismissal.548 By its nature, suspension serves as a final warning to 
the employee who has misbehaved. If there is no improvement, then 
 
544 Marciano above note 542 at pages 1-14 where he argues on operant conditioning. 
545 Fielkow B Why its Time to Kill Progressive Discipline 12/06/2018 
https://chiefexecutive.net/why-its -time-to-kill-progressive-discipline [accessed 21 07 
18]. (hereinafter Fielkow). Also read Marciano above note 542 at pages 1-14 as well as 
Zack A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline cases 84. Also refer to Asherman IG  
1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528  
546 Fielkow above note 544. Also read Marciano above note 542 at 1-14 as well as Zack 
A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline cases 84. Also refer to Asherman IG 1982 
Personnel Journal 528 -531 at 528  
547 Fielkowabove 544. Also read Marciano above note 542 pages 1-14 where he argues 
on operat conditioning as well as Zack A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline cases 
84. Also refer to Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528  
548 Fielkow above note 544. Also read Marciano above note 542 pages 1-14 as well as 
Zack A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline cases 84. Also refer to Asherman IG 1982 
Personnel Journal 61 July 528 -531at 528   
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termination would follow.549 In certain circumstances the progressive 
disciplinary system supports the application of serious measures of 
discipline such as the termination of contract of employment without having 
gone through other measures. 
As Asherman550 reckoned, progressive discipline exposes three common 
characteristics. Namely: punitive discipline, negative feedback and labelling 
of perpetrators in terms of their negative behaviour.551 These aspects are 
concomitant to the underlying principle of flexibility more than 
proportionality. 
 
2 2 5 1 Advantages of employer traditional approach to discipline 
The traditional approach bears many advantages, especially for the 
employer. It sustains a system where the underlying foundations of labour 
law are largely supported by master and servant relationships rules.552 This 
is because the master and servant models of relationship enforce fear and 
keep employees on their toes for fear of being negatively disciplined if they 
transgress the stipulated rules.553 At the centre of the traditional approach 
to discipline is the urge to protect employer discretion and flexibility to retain 
or dismiss an employee who has defaulted. This approach maintains strict 
adherence to institutional rules and regulations imposed on the employee 
by the employer. It does not pay regard to mitigating circumstances 
underlying the employee’s misconduct. There would be no need to consider 
circumstances under which the employee committed the misconduct.  
The relevance of common law prescripts of master and servant in the 
current systems cannot be undermined. As Deakin554 exposed, the 
 
549 Marciano above note 542 at 31-43. 
550 Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528. 
551 Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528. 
552Deakin S The Contract of Employment 7; Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 1909 (AC) 
488, held to be correctly decided in Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279.   
553Deakin S The Contract of Employment 1-7. Also see Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 
1909 (AC) 488 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279. 
554  Deakin S The Contract of Employment 1-7. Also see Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 
1909 (AC) 488 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279. 
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common law played a major part in shaping the law of employment in the 
twenty first century.555 Embedded in the founding principles of today’s 
labour law are the same challenges accustomed in common law because 
of the hybrid nature of labour. As it developed with time, the common law 
traditional prescript continues to influence its interpretation and thus its 
application. Deakin mentions that in current times, courts turn to 
acknowledge the relevance of these customary prescripts in the 
interpretation.556 In particular, Deakin writing from the British perspective 
observes that,  
the role played by the eighteenth and nineteenth-century poor law and 
master and servant legislation in shaping the common law of 
employment can be discerned, along with the persistence of the 
service model long into the twentieth century, in large part as a result 
of the quasi-disciplinary jurisdiction retained by the courts under the 
Employers and Workmen Act 1875. While at every stage, legislation 
has built on and incorporated the common law, statutes themselves 
have a curious half-life, continuing to influence legal development long 
after their formal repeal.557 
His analysis is very much akin to South African labour law perspective. 
South African labour law bears its origins from common law. South African 
common law embraced the principle of master and servant because its 
common law originated from its commonwealth inheritance of legal 
prescripts in addition to the Roman-Dutch law.558 
In the light of this explanation, it is trite to argue that the rationale of this 
principle is that the master remains in control of the relationship between 
self and the servant. The servant maintains the status of obedience. It was 
 
555 Deakin S The Contract of Employment 1-7. Also see Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 
1909 (AC) 488 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279. 
556  Deakin S The Contract of Employment 1-7. Also see Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 
1909 (AC) 488 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279. 
557 Deakin S The Contract of Employment 7. Also see Addis v Gramophone Co. Ltd. 
1909 (AC) 488 and Johnson v. Unisys Ltd. [2001] IRLR 279.  
558 To find the origins of South African Common Law, read Schreiner M C The 
Contribution of English Law 10. 
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the master who controlled the beginning and the end of the relationship. 
The servant who was equated to a pauper ought to be ordered by the 
master as to what ought to be the conditions of work. Rare interference on 
the execution of the agreement was expected from the servant or anyone 
else. In short, justice meant the will of the employer and not the servant. 
 
2 2 5 2  Disadvantages of employer traditional approach to 
discipline 
The traditional approach to discipline bears multiple challenges as far as 
fairness is concerned. It has a multiple of unfair results from employees’ 
perspective. Progressive discipline adheres to punitive discipline, which 
encourages top-to-bottom disciplinary measures.559 No attempt is made by 
the supervisor or employer to understand the employee, regarding the 
cause of the misconduct so that a reasonable decision as to whether to 
impose sanctions or not, may be taken.560 Once the institutional rule or 
regulation has been broken, incremental punishment is imposed.  
As shown above, such traits survive within the master-servant relationship 
prescripts. They are a top-down unilateral communication stream 
emanating from the employer to the employee.561 Such a relationship in the 
working environment will mean that the supervisor will give orders which 
may not be questioned by subordinates. A progressive approach to 
discipline 562 instils behaviour through fear of punishment because 
employees’ minds register the punitive aspects. They comprehend that 
failure to adhere to rules and adapt to necessary changes as required by 
the employer would mean that the employer would engage harsher 
punishment.563   
 
559 Asher RF 1983 FBI - Law - Enforcement -Bulletin 52 April 12 – 15 at12(herein after 
Asher). As well refer to Fielkow above note 544.  
560 Asher above note 558 at 12. As well refer to Fielkow above note 544. 
561Asher above note 558. at 12. As well refer to Fielkow above note 544. 
562 Asher above note 561 at 12. As well refer to Fielkow above note 544.  
563 Asherman IG  1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 529. 
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Fear of punishment aligns employees and motivates them to comply with 
employer commands.564 Effectively, punitive measures promote 
demotivation. Employees would be discouraged and demoralised and so 
become unproductive.  In an endeavour to limit the processes of punitive 
discipline, the disciplinary process will become a process of 
inconsistencies.  Asherman565 opines that circumstance underlying this kind 
of disciplinary process allow employee abuse, where instead of 
acculturating employees to change their behaviour from negative to 
positive, employers would utilise the process to promote discouragement 
and work towards removing employees from employment. Managers would 
work at making their job easier through orchestrating the removal of the 
supposed problematic employee. It may therefore be enough to state that 
employees under these conditions do not have labour rights, namely the 
right to fair labour practice and the right to be fairly heard, for example at a 
departmental hearing. 
Supervisors using progressive discipline generally provide feedback only 
when an employee’s performance is below standard.566 The progressive 
discipline processes encourage only negative responses. If an employee 
behaves well in accordance with institutional standards, nothing is said to 
encourage the performing employee. As Daniels567 stated, the importance 
of feedback in work environment cannot be underrated. Due to consistent 
feedback, employees enhance their performance. Negative feedback in 
most cases disregards previous positive work performance and overrates 
punitive measures.568  
When employees are not reassured, they work in fear and are not sure of 
their performance. They do not know as to when the employer would strike 
because they are not sure as to whether their behaviour is still at the level 
 
564Asherman IG1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 529.  
565Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 529. 
566Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 529. 
567 Daniels AC Bringing out the best in people 101. 
568Capozolli TK 1997 Supervision 58 16 – 26 at 17. 
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appreciated by the employer and within the institutional rules and 
regulations.569  
Progressive disciplinary processes create lacunae for a deliberate labelling 
of employees by managers who may dislike them. Ashermen570 confirms 
that in certain instances, managers tend to label employees rather than 
describe their unacceptable behaviour. Should an employee commit a 
misconduct at a certain stage, chances are that the employee will be 
labelled as a culprit and bear that label. Even if such an employee corrects 
that behaviour by acting positively and responsibly, other people’s 
perceptions of the employee may not change. 
If employees are always criticised, they will soon get the impression that 
they do not matter, as only the things they do wrong are recognised. This 
means that the relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate can be 
permanently marred by ill-feeling.571 Labelling is deceptive, for employees 
carry their labels with them from department to department and from one 
institution to another.572  In other words, labels attached to employees may 
remain with those employees for a very long time and in some instances 
may affect their future prospects of employment as the very same 
supervisor may be the subordinate’s reference.  
It is submitted that labour law labelling of criminal suspects is antithetical to 
constitutional principles of fairness for criminal suspects. Constitutional 
fairness demands that labelling of individuals as criminals be subjected to 
cautious and discreet approaches573 to ensure that it does not encroach 
individual rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights.574 The review above 
 
569 Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528. 
570 Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528. 
571Ströh EC “Personnel motivation: strategies to stimulate employees to increase 
performance” 2001 Politeia 20(2) 59 – 74 at 66. 
572Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528. 
573 For an understanding of these theories and their application, see for example, 
Wellford, C Vol 22 (3) Social Problems 332-345.  
574 See section 35 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair trial in criminal matters. 
Read it with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63 (C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek 
J; also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 
at para 56. 
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indicates that a purely traditional approach tallies with Rycroft and 
Jordaan’s575  conclusion that labour law criminal persecution processes are 
by nature “authoritarian and paternalistic.”576  
Concomitant to this observation is the exposure that the correction and 
rehabilitation themes of progressive discipline are imported from the 
theories of criminal law.577 This is evident in Alexander,578 who to some 
extent compared the themes of correction and rehabilitation in labour law to 
that of criminal corrective discipline, where he states, 
 
Most simply put, the principle of corrective discipline requires that 
management withhold the final penalty of discharge from errant 
employees until it has been established that the employee is not likely 
to respond favourably to the lesser penalty. To draw an analogy from 
criminal, corrective discipline is somewhat like a habitual offender 
statute. It presupposes that the preliminary purpose of punishment is 
to correct wrongdoing rather than to wreak vengeance or deter 
others.579 Corrective discipline assumes that the employer as well as 
the employee gains more by continuing to retain the offender in 
employment, at least for a period of future testing, than to cut him from 
the rolls at an earliest possible moment.580 
 
There are however several expositions regarding this comparison. The first 
to note is that labour law jurisprudence tends to down-play or ignore the 
idea of employee punishment.581 To do that, some scholars put more 
emphasis on the “neutral desire to soften and disguise the pain of 
punishment on employees by [describing it as if it is more beneficial to 
employee] in terms of rehabilitation.”582 The main aim for this explanation, 
has been described as shying away from a clear exposition that labour law 
 
575Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 178  
576Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 178. As well see 
Asher above note 558 at 12. 
577 Alexander D 1956 9th Annual Proceedings of the National Academy of Arbitrators 
79-80 (hereinafter Alexander); Adams G W Grievance Arbitration 6; England G 1978 
Alberta Law Review 16, 470-520, at 473; Heenan  Unjust Dismissal 156. 
578 Alexander above note 576 at 79-80. 
579 Emphasis added. 
580 Alexander above note 576 at 79-80. 
581 Adams G W Grievance Arbitration 30. 
582 Adams G W Grievance Arbitration 30. 
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discipline to some extent has to subscribe to criminal law theories. 583 This 
indirect application of criminal law theories has been responsible for the 
accommodated lack of observation of the underlying rationales of criminal 
condemnations by the employer who seeks to condemn the defaulting 
employee.584 
The widespread prevalence of employers’ discretion to not comply with 
rationales of criminal punishment in civil justice pursuits of matters of 
criminal law nature has resulted in many interpretations of punishment.585 
These have led to the emergence of differing perspectives on rehabilitation 
in the context of labour law.586 Some scholars, writing from the labour law 
perspective, have insisted that the concept of rehabilitation as a purpose of 
punishment be based on a criminal theory understanding.587  
A renowned scholar on criminal justice sentencing from South African 
perspective threshed out the rationales of various sentencing rationales as 
well as their purposes.588 He expounded that in criminal 
justice,589rehabilitation is pursued as a purpose of punishment if the 
sanction actually has the potential to achieve it.590 However,  in the case 
where a crime is of a very serious nature and long terms of imprisonment 
become appropriate, rehabilitation ceases to be the objective of punishment 
and deterrence is recognized as the goal.591  
It is submitted that his explanation marks the distinction between deterrence 
and rehabilitation in criminal justice.592 He maintained that deterrence has 
 
583  Eden G 1992 Relations industrielles 514. 
584 See Ashworth A Principles of Criminal Law Page 1. Read, Henry M and Hart Jr 1958 
Law and Contemporary Problems 401-441; Wellford C 1975 Social Problems 332-345; 
Glanville W  The Cambridge Law Journal Vol 42, Issue 1 pp. 85-95  
585 Interpretations of punishment.  
586  See Eden G 1992 Relations industrielles 514. 
587Alexander above note 576 at 79-80; Adams G W Grievance Arbitration 6; England G 
1978 Alberta Law Review 16, 470-520, at 473; Heenan Unjust Dismissal 156.  
588 Terblanche S S The Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349 read with Eden G 
1992 Relations industrielles 514 
589 See Eden G 1992 Relations industrielles 514 compare with Snyman CR Criminal 
law (1989) 22. As well see Alexander above note 576 at 79-80. 
590 Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
591 Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
592 TerblancheS Sthe Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
141 
 
two components, namely, to deter the offender from relapsing, and to deter 
the other would-be offenders.593  
Deterrence is therefore seen as a concept in labour law that retains its 
criminal law theory foundations and is used as the rationale in the 
punishment of faulted employees. 594   
However, there is yet an anomaly posed in the labour law application of 
deterrence. Even though employers are clothed with judicial powers unlike 
criminal courts, they cannot send an employee criminal suspect to prison.595  
Under these circumstances, employers can decide to punish misconduct for 
deterrence; a matter exercised in criminal justice under stringent 
circumstances. Within their flexible powers they can opt for stringent 
punishments which are worse than simple imprisonment. They can 
condemn employee suspects of crime through dismissal and later hand the 
evidence to police to prosecute the employee suspect of criminal 
misconduct. The cases of prosecution are an exemplary case of these 
detrimental punishments because they ended in double punishments.596 
The possibility of this ending once more exemplifies lack of fairness in 
labour law prescripts. 
In most labour law cases, which are progressive discipline based,597 
deterrence is reflected as an overriding factor for punishment of the 
defaulted employee criminal suspects. This is in the instance of gross 
misconduct such as misconducts of a criminal nature.598 A defaulting 
 
593 Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
594 Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
595 within the CPA criminal offences schedules. Schedules I to III of the CPA 
encompassing crimes classified under LRA jurisprudence as dishonesty misconducts, 
for example misconducts relating to theft. 
596 To appreciate the danger of double punishment, see para 4 3 1 on the parallel nature 
of criminal misconducts dismissal processes.  
597 South African labour law jurisprudence is based on the law that expresses 
progressive discipline. Consider Item 7 of Schedule 8 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 
of 1995; Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
598On the concept of employer implied intorability read Newaj K 2016 THRHR 429-442 at  
433; De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others 2000 9 BLLR 995 (LAC) at 
para 17; as well, Edcon Limited vs Pillermer NO & Others 2009 ZASCA 135 ;2010 1 BLLR  
(SCA) , as well  see Eden G 1992 Relations industrielles 514. 
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employee for example, would be disciplined to the extent that the sanction 
would  make a statement that if any other employee acts similarly, the 
employer would not tolerate the behaviour and would react harshly to the 
wrong doer.599 The employee criminal suspect in turn would be condemned 
as a criminal and be dismissed from employment. If the employee criminal 
suspect is condemned as a thief, the employee criminal suspect would 
therefore be labelled a thief even if imprisonment would not be the ultimate 
sanction, as it would have been in criminal justice system. 
The above-mentioned characteristics of progressive discipline are affirmed 
in a plethora of authorities which also mete out criticism against the use of 
deterrence and similar punishments for organisational behaviour 
purposes.600 Eden601 for example, has summarised the criticisms against 
progressive discipline as follows: 
It is ineffective in eliminating undesirable behavior. It serves to 
suppress behavior temporarily rather than change it permanently. 
Once the threat of punishment is removed, the undesirable behavior 
will return to force. 
It may result in escape or avoidance by the employee (e.g. 
absenteeism, turnover). 
It generates emotional behavior, often directed against the person who 
administers the punishment (e.g. Sabotage). 
 
599 For example, see De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others 2000 9 
BLLR 995 (LAC) at para 17. 
600 Booker G S 1969 Personnel Journal 48(7) 525-529, at 526-527; Wheeler H N 1976 
Industrial Relations 15 235-243, 235-236; Dessler G Human Behaviour: Improving 
Performance at Work  89-90; Gibson J L et al Organisations 82; Arvey R D  and 
Ivancevich J M  1980 AMR 123-132,125-131; Kerr S and Slocum J W Controlling the 
Performance of People 123; Luthans F Organisational Behaviour  261-286;  Asherman 
IG  1982 Personnel Journal   528 -531 at 529; Arvey R D and Jones A P  The Use of 
Discipline in Organisational Settings 368-383.  Dolan S L & Randall S S Personnel and 
Human Resource Management at 278; Ivancevich J M & Mattison M T Organisational 
Behaviour 181. 
601 Eden G 1992 Relations industrielles 514, 517-518. 
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It can turn the person doing the punishing into an “aversive stimulus” 
with the result that the person cannot take any action that will be 
perceived as positive reinforcement. 
It may have a disastrous effect on employee satisfaction and morale 
It is difficult for supervisors to administer. It is stressful for them to 
handle, and difficult to switch roles from punisher to positive reinforcer. 
It may be used as a mechanical process to justify termination. 
Supervisors who use discipline as their preferred strategy may be 
viewed negatively by upper management because of a perceived 
overreliance on aversive control systems. 
It can lead to an increase in the expensive, time consuming grievances. 
It is often thought to be unethical and non-humanitarian.602 
 
 The ensuing progressive discipline challenges have triggered the need to 
improve on disciplinary processes. It is this concern that led to a formulation 
of a new school of thought based on corrective steps on employee 
discipline. This new school of thought removed the room for deterrence-
based discipline endowed in progressive discipline. Corrective discipline 
places more focus on correcting employee behaviour from as early as the 
time when employees default. Employees are hence encouraged not to 
default from consistent training.603 
 
2 2 5 3  Modern approach or corrective approach 
According to Rycroft & Jordaan, 604 the corrective approach accords to 
modern employment practices. They argue that current times encourage 
more enlightened approaches to the formulation of standards for the 
maintenance of discipline.605 It is submitted that such approaches seem to 
 
602 See Eden G 1992 Relations industrielles 514, 517-518. 
603Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 179. 
604Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 179. 
605 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 179. 
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be aiming at correcting the unwanted behaviour as opposed to punishing 
the perpetrators. It is further submitted that, if this approach is adopted, the 
employer would need not venture into punishment that borders on illegality. 
Illegality arises due to employer tendencies of avoiding standards that must 
be observed in meting out punishment on employee criminal suspects. 
What the employer would be ordered with, would be basically, to put 
emphasis on corrective discipline, where appropriate, with the aim not to 
punish, but to encourage both the employee and employer to act together 
and find solutions to occurring work problems. In cases of complex 
challenges such as dishonesty cases, the employer due to the lack of 
expertise and the involved extensive processes would hand matters to 
appropriate authorities, for example, the SAPS. 
As opposed to progressive discipline-based processes where employees 
are viewed as objects of work challenges, employers following corrective 
approach would rather see employees as part of the body of the institution 
and treat them from a solution-based perspective.  
Employees would be perceived as agents of positive change to the 
workplace. The results to this change of perspective would be that 
employees would desist from offending but contribute tremendously to 
institutional productivity.  
Employers focussing on corrective approach discipline would rather remedy 
the circumstances surrounding the fault that occurred and try to remedy its 
repeated occurrence. Such employers would not perceive employees as 
potential defaulters who ought to be punished. The fault in issue would be 
understood to constitute a challenge to both the employee and employer. 
In cases where an employee commits a misconduct, the employer would 
find the reasons for the commission of the misconduct so that it is not 
repeated. The employer would evaluate the circumstances to determine the 




Through evaluating the circumstances, the employer would find out if the 
occurrence was not beyond the employee’s control. The underlying factors 
would be the central focus for eradication and would need the employer and 
employee to work at eradicating them and not at eradicating the defaulting 
employee.  
From the same perspective as Rycroft & Jordaan,606 Asherman 607 is of the 
opinion that the eradication of circumstances surrounding the employer’s 
behaviour would mitigate the employee’s negative behaviour. To add on, 
the employer would be saved from pondering into criminal investigative 
authority and leave it to appropriate bodies. This is called proactive 
management. 
The employee would then respond positively to corrective discipline 
measures to avoid a more severe situation.  
Corrective approach credentials reflect a different approach to that followed 
by the progressive approach. However, not everyone agrees. Some writers 
found corrective discipline fallacious.608 They found both corrective and 
progressive discipline disciplinary approaches to share close rationales, 
where the top-bottom approach is still at play. 
 From that perspective, Wheeler609 exclaimed: 
Arbitral writers expound the distinction between [progressive discipline 
or] authoritarians’ discipline, which is based on fear, and corrective 
discipline, which attempts to instil ‘self-discipline’ in the employee. They 
deny that the purpose of corrective discipline is punishment. Yet it 
seems that corrective discipline is nothing more, or less, than a 
sophisticated form of punishment which, in the case of the disciplined 
employee, attempts to make full use of the effect of anticipated 
punishment described by Berkowitz [ as a ] negative incentive causing 
 
606Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 179.  
607 Asherman IG  1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 530. 
608 See for example, Wheeler H N 1976 Industrial Relations 15 235-243, at 240 and 
Asherman IG  1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 531. 
609 Wheeler H N 1976 Industrial Relations 15 235-243, at 240. 
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the suppression of actions that might bring about unwanted 
consequences.610 
Wheeler’s611 observation tallies well with the interpretation of corrective 
discipline as a system based on the application of disciplinary sanctions. 
However, corrective discipline maintains that a disciplinary sanction should 
be aimed at correcting the employee’s behaviour and not at working at the 
employee’s removal from the employer’s institution.612 This perspective, like 
the progressive discipline process, is from top to bottom. It is only the 
employee’s behaviour that requires correction in both approaches.613  
Under these systems, the employer is perceived as targeting the 
employee’s bad behaviour and not the employee. This is because 
disciplinary sanctions in these disciplinary processes are regarded as 
stimuli for employee change in behaviour. Both corrective and progressive 
disciplinary measures are supposed to mould employee behaviour and not 
employer behaviour. According to Asherman,614 corrective measures are 
not simply punishment or steps towards the termination of service as 
emphasised in progressive disciplinary approaches. 615  
Proponents of this school of thoughts argue further that corrective discipline 
regards disciplinary sanctions as a way to clarifying the employer’s 
expected behaviour and as a way to express the extent of employer’s wrath 
in cases where employees default.616 This understanding resonates with 
the possible understanding of the corrective approach. South African labour 
law uses corrective approach to employee discipline.617 It is possible to view 
corrective discipline as an improvement on progressive discipline.  
The improvement can be observed from the fact that the employer’s 
concern when disciplining the employee is impersonal. This analysis 
 
610Wheeler H N 1976 Industrial Relations 15 235-243, at 240.  
611Wheeler H N 1976 Industrial Relations 15 235-243.  
612Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 182. 
613 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 182. 
614 Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 531. 
615 Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 531. 
616Cameron D 1984 Personnel Journal   37- 39 at 39. 
617 Rycroft A & Jordaan B A guide to South African labour law (1992) 182. 
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indicates that this approach bears just slight improvements on the traditional 
approach. Against the above understanding outlined in this thesis, it still 
negates the need to respect and consider employees as individuals who 
have rights to be respected just as entrenched in section 35 fair trial rights 
entail. In doing so, corrective discipline at the end enables the employer’s 
disciplinary measures to disregard individual rights. 
The employer considers the employee’s behaviour as far as it is punishable 
by rules and regulations. For instance, where an employee commits 
criminalised acts, the employer would discipline the employee and would 
not keep the employee in the service. In this way corrective discipline can 
be compared to the reformative theory of punishment. Accordingly, Snyman 
explaining reformative theory mentioned that, it is a means to reform a 
criminal offender so that it may become a normal law-abiding member of 
the community once again.618 Arguing from a criminal law perspective, 
Snyman’s619 observation is grounded on principles of proportionality 
threading punishment of criminal perpetrators. His analysis on criminal 
punishment may seem analogous to the understanding cast on the 
corrective discipline approach. However, it is based on extensive criminal 
processes aimed at satisfying aspects of proportionality principle.  
Even though there is a major theoretical commonness between discipline 
in labour law and criminal law sanctioning, procedures adjacent to each 
have differences. Labour law follows informal procedure processes which 
lean towards civil procedure at the expense of defaulting constitutionally set 
proportionality-oriented principles in criminal procedure. Criminal law is 
more formal and strictly adheres to constitutionally entrenched section 35 
fairness principles. This thesis criticises this disparity as unjust with respect 
to the employer’s investigation and disciplinary hearing of criminal 
misconduct with the aim to dismiss an employee suspected of committing 
 
618  Snyman CR Criminal law (1989) 22. 
619 Snyman CR Criminal law (1989) 22.  
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any category of criminal acts. This approach causes inequalities in reaching 
justice for the involved employee criminal suspect.620 
 
2 2 5 4 The industrial relations perspective on employment 
discipline  
Overreliance on corrective or progressive discipline in labour 
relationships has been criticised by the new school of thought outside 
labour law management systems, such as the team based approaches to 
organisational management.621 The industrial relations perspective on 
employment discipline is one of the major schools of thought intending to 
bring a change in labour relations and hence a foreseen tremendous 
change on the concept of discipline in labour law. Paul Marciano is a 
renowned proponent of this school of thought. 622  
This thesis considers his model a possible foundation towards a new 
perspective of criminal employee discipline. He opines, amongst others, 
that employees must be engaged in organisational development. His 
philosophy maintains that behavioural solutions must come out of a 
cultivation and management of human capital. He deposes punishment- 
based623 leadership as tantamount to transactional leadership, which it is 
submitted in this thesis that it cannot pass muster in democratic states like 
South Africa with a human rights-based Constitution.624 According to 
Marciano; 
 Carrots and sticks” refers to using rewards and punishment to motivate 
others.625 This system is based on the principles of operant 
conditioning. Similarly, there is the expression “carrot-on-a-stick,” 
 
620 South African Constitution is against inequality. See section 9 of the Constitution 
bearing the equality clause. 
621 Marciano above note 542 at 26-27 and 75-76. As well as Marciano P L& Wingrove 
C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 119-132. 
622Marciano above note 542 at 5. 
623 Carrots and sticks. You perform I give you a carrot. You offend I punish you. 
624 Read Marciano above note 542 at 1-2 and Marciano P L& Wingrove C Super Teams: 
Using the Principles of RESPECT 119-132. 
625 Similar to progessive discipline model used in South African labour law. 
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which conjures up the image of a carrot tied to a stick held just beyond 
the reach of a donkey to encourage the animal to go faster.626 In 
organizations, “carrots” refer to rewards or incentives dangled in front 
of employees to motivate them to strive toward some goal. These 
incentives range from coffee mugs to lucrative financial bonuses and 
everything in between. The obvious assumption is that employees are 
actually motivated by the particular carrot being offered. [On the other 
hand, it can be said that the expectation is that employees are deterred 
from offending the institutional rules in fear of the apprehended 
punishment.]627 
Against carrots and sticks model of discipline, Marciano proposes team-
based approaches to organisational management.628 He comes across 
as a supporter of transformational leadership entrenched in the Preamble 
read with section 1, 8, 9, 23 ,33, 35 and 195 of the South African 
Constitution. South African constitutional human rights-based 
perspective of leadership entrenches transformational leadership based 
on principles that encourage checks and balances on the exercise of 
power—be it on private or public interactions.   
The epicentre of these principles is the respect of individual rights 
expressed in the Bill of Rights. As far as the persecution of criminal suspects 
is concerned, section 35 of the Constitution entrenches the right to a fair 
trial.  To accord with these constitutional demands the exercise of employer 
criminal investigative and disciplinary powers on employees who committed 
criminal misconducts needs to observe constitutional fairness. In chapters 
one, two and three, it was argued that such fairness does not depend on a 
piecemeal interpretation of the constitutional clause of fairness in section 
23(1) but on wider observance of fairness in accordance with the 
constitutional transformative objectives in the Preamble, section 1, 8, 9, 23, 
33, 35 and 195 of the Constitution. Such approach will do away with 
 
626 An emulation of master and servant relationship. 
627 Marciano above note 542 at 1-2. 
628 Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  148-
156 and 200 -217. 
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draconian processes that are avoiding the necessary checks and balances. 
The epicentre of transformational leadership perspective regarding criminal 
persecution is pursuance of proportionality. 
The CPA operationalises section 35 of the Constitution and unpacks the 
procedure satisfying the principle of proportionality. The constitutional 
objective of rights-based transformation makes it mandatory that the 
transformational principles are considered in day-to-day legal interactions, 
even in private governance.629  
The relevant constitutional sections emphasising either a horizontal630 or a 
direct631 application of a rights-based constitutional objective in common 
law-influenced matters of a private nature are sections 8 (2), (3) and 39(2) 
of the Constitution. 
In some instances, our jurisprudence exposed a mixed approach where 
both direct and horizontal approaches are employed. The invocation of 
either section 8(2) and (3) or 39(2) of the Constitution would mean that 
these sections can be resorted to, in influencing constitutionally compliant 
private engagements. The use of these sections in this perspective would 
suggest that the constitutional objectives introduce a new perspective of 
morals observed in private engagements hence the requirement that private 
dealings ought not be contra bonos mores.  
On this basis, it is argued in this thesis that an attempt by any law to promote 
negation of constitutional principles would deem such a law 
unconstitutional. In particular, a contract that bases its execution on 
principles seeking to exclude entrenched principles is contra bonos mores.  
In the light of this argument, it would be contrary to the Constitution to 
promote employer flexibility in disciplinary processes affecting matters of a 
criminal law nature at the expense of the constitutional principle of 
 
629 See Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) ; Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 
401 (CC) ; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) and NM v Smith 2007 5 SA 250 
(CC). 
630 Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC) ; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 
(CC) and NM v Smith 2007 5 SA 250 (CC). 
631 Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 5 SA 401 (CC). 
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proportionality entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. If anything, the 
principle of proportionality is mandatory, dealing with punishment in matters 
of a criminal law nature. Such an attempt would be criticised as contrary to 
constitutional fairness expected in employers' criminal investigative 
procedures and disciplinary hearing processes involving employees 
suspected of criminal misconduct.  
The employer’s power to investigate an employee’s criminal misconduct 
would certainly not be based on constitutionally entrenched measures. If it 
was found that the LRA supports this move, it could be criticised in turn for 
facilitating the employer’s inability to respect the employee’s constitutional 
rights affected in the course of the criminal misconduct investigation and 
therefore disciplinary hearing. Such a criticism would influence the need for 
investigative and disciplinary hearing processes to align with the 
constitutional imperatives to fairness inferred in section 23(1) read with 
sections 8 (2), (3); 9,33,35 and 39(2) of the Constitution. This would 
therefore mean, that employer’s powers in investigating criminal 
misconducts against an employee observe the constitutional rights of 
employee suspects pertaining to employees suspected of criminal 
misconduct. It would also mean that the means employed by the employer 
in satisfying the LRA objective of fairness when disciplining employees 
suspected of criminal misconducts would not need to ignore entrenched 
constitutional rights of employees suspected of crime. Employers would 
observe that a need to establish a reason for dismissal where employees 
are suspected of criminal misconduct in labour law ought not supersede 
other constitutional rights. The principle of flexibility ought to have a narrow 
application and in cases where employees are suspected of criminal 
misconducts, employers should not exercise unfettered discretion. 
Paul Marciano’s model vouches respect garnered by employer’s inspiration 
and influence on employees.632 According to Marciano’s philosophy 
 
632 Read Read Marciano above note 542 at 63 and Marciano P L& Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT18 and 39. 
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employers are ought to engage employees towards attaining institutional 
objectives.633 Marciano suggests that through such employee engagements 
a new perspective of discipline would be born. It is submitted that 
Marciano’s perspective, influences employers to raise the status of 
employees from the common law labour law perspectives of master and 
servant. Employees would be treated as individuals clothed with 
constitutional rights. Under this model, employees are not just tools of 
performance but are valued and respected. Through respecting employees, 
employers recognise, acknowledge and show appreciation for employees’ 
efforts and contributions.   Employers who tell their employees that they 
appreciate their work, obviate this through improved performance. Such 
employers will from time to time give credit to employees where it is due. 
They will reward employees’ good job performance regularly. 
In order to attain institutional objectives employers would undertake to 
empower employees.634 They will provide employees with tools for 
performance including, training, resources, opportunities and information to 
be successful.635 The provision of information and direction would be 
necessary for employees to succeed in the implementation of assigned 
tasks. 636 Employers would actively promote development opportunities for 
the employees. Employees would have a sense of independence, as the 
top down oriented disciplinary measures would be minimised. Employers 
would know what is expected of them and know how to go about their task 
and would have the necessary tools, resources and skills to succeed. 
In the aim to attaining institutional objectives, employers would also 
undertake to give supportive feedback to employees.637  Supportive 
 
633 Read Marciano above note 542 at 63 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super Teams: 
Using the Principles of RESPECT  5 and 41. 
634 Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-163 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  5 and 41. 
635 Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-163 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  50 and 97. 
636 Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-163 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  50 and 97. 
637  Read Marciano above note 542 at 115-130 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  62-74. 
153 
 
feedback entails employer’s regular provision of constructive performance 
feedback where not only negative behavior is overemphasized but positive 
performance is indicated.638 The employer would vouch at assisting 
employees who are struggling with their performance.639   
Marciano’s respective model also encourages the attainment of institutional 
objectives through efforts towards employer and employee partnering.640 
Partnering encourages collaborative working relationships at the individual, 
team and organizational levels.641 It promotes teamwork while encouraging 
employers to actively reach out and collaborate with employees.642 
Partnering breaks down compartmentalized and segregated discipline.643 It 
encourages cross-departmental cooperation, where employers and 
employees from different departments within an institution negotiate and 
compromise to meet institutional objectives.644  
Under this model, employers are expected to be actively involved in 
employee orientation on what is expected of them and on what support they 
can expect from the institution.645 The informed employees would then be 
accountable for their actions and inactions.646 They would know where to 
draw their mandate in order to achieve institutional goals and objectives 
because the employer would have set clear and consistent direction 
 
638 Read Marciano above note 542 at 115-130 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  50-74. 
639  Read Marciano above note 542 at 115-130 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  50-74. 
640  Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-143 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  75-87. 
641  Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-143 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  75-87. 
642  Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-143 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 75-87. 
643  Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-143 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  75-87. 
644  Read Marciano above note 542 at 131-143 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  75-87. 
645  Read Marciano above note 542 at 39-63 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  75-87. 
646  Read Marciano above note 542 at 39-63 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 108-116. 
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regarding work priorities.647 The employer would also orientate employees 
on reasonable standards applicable in working environment.648 The 
employer would from time to time and with clarity communicate goals and 
objectives of the institution.649 
The employer is duty bound, to be considerate when taking decisions that 
affect the employees.650 The set institutional standards would reflect rules 
that took into account the interests of all concerned parties.651 Thus, rules 
that are inconsiderate of the impact on the rights of employees would be 
avoided.652 In making and implementing the governing rules, the impact of 
such rules on all stakeholders would be integral to the ultimate results.653 In 
all instances, the employer would solicit ideas and concerns of the 
employees.654 
Very close to the idea of actively involving the employee in decision-making, 
is the employer’s characteristic of trust towards the employee.655 The 
employer has to demonstrate that employees are trusted.656 In turn, this 
characteristic would promote employees who have trust in the institutional 
aims and objectives as well as trusting each other.657 Employees’ decisions 
 
647  Read Marciano above note 542 at 39-63 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 148-155. 
648 Read Marciano above note 542 at 39-63 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 148-155. 
649  Read Marciano above note 542 at 39-63 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 148-155. 
650  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 18-23 and 97-107. 
651  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 18-23 and 97-107. 
652 Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 18-23 and 97-107. 
653 Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 18-23 and 97-107. 
654  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 62-74. 
655  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 108-116.  
656  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 108-116. 
657  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and 181-200 and Marciano P L & 
Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  5-17 and 108-116. 
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would be trusted by the employer and vice versa.658 This aspect enhances 
integrity among employees where employees would be trusted to deal 
directly with sensitive information.659  
The employer would lead by example, simply by being direct with 
employees where the need arises instead of harboring grudges against 
employees.660 Employers would be committed and consistently keep to 
promises agreed upon between the employer and the employees.661 Failure 
by the employer to honor these aspects, would demonstrate that the 
employer does not respect the employees.662 In turn, the employer would 
endure disrespect from employees.663 The importance of respect for 
employees in a work environment cannot be overrated.664 Respect is a 
crosscutting characteristic for transformational leadership envisaged in 
Marciano’s model of discipline.665 According to this model, it is important 
that employers demonstrate respect for employees.666 This is reflected 
where the employees’ opinions are accounted for in decision-making.667 In 
turn, the employees would enjoy a treatment that is fair and dignified.668 
 
658  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and 181-200 and Marciano P L & 
Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  5-17 and 108-116. 
659  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180 and 181-200 and Marciano P L & 
Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  5-17 and 108-116. 
660  Read Marciano above note 542 at 163-180; 181-200; 39-83 and Marciano P L & 
Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  132-147. 
661  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super 
Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 132-147. 
662  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 39-61. 
663  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  39-61. 
664  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 39-61. 
665  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 39-61.  
666  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 39-61. 
667  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 39-61.  
668  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 39-61. 
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 These aspects would breed fair and honest processes in the interactions 
between employers and employees even in compromising situations.669 For 
instance, where an employer wishes to exercise discretion on matters 
entailing the disadvantage of the employee, the fact that the norm is to 
respect an employee would inform the ensued discretion. In the case where 
an individual is suspected of a criminal misconduct, the respect of an 
employee would demand that the employee is not judged at his own course.  
The employer’s flexible exercise of discretion regarding principles, to 
choose in avoidance of the rigid legal rules would not cost the employer 
disrespect on the part of employee suspected of criminal misconduct. 
Before the employer concludes that the employee is a criminal, and 
therefore worthy of dismissal, the employer who has been acculturated,670 
from Marciano’s perspective of discipline, to respect his employees would 
realise the repercussions of criminal labelling of an individual and would 
choose to consider principles entailing fair criminal persecution. 
 These principles are entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution.  
At the center of section 35 principles is, that a criminal suspect must be 
treated fairly. The interpretation of section 35 relates the perspectives of 
fairness from a criminal persecution `perspective. As opposed to the way 
the LRA relates fairness, namely that only the audi alterum principle 
matters, the criminal persecution perspective takes cognizance of both 
principles of natural justice, namely, the ruler ought to hear both sides and 
ought to not punish the aggrieved at their own cause. These principles are 
extrapolated in chapters three and four. Their synopsis is that a criminal 
 
669  Read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P 
L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT  5-17 and 39-61. 
670 Consider suggestions against old models of discipline for adoption of new models. 
Read Fielkow above note 544. Also read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-
208; 68-69;78-79 and Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles 
of RESPECT 5-17 and 39-61. as well as Zack A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline 
cases 84. Also refer to Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531at 528. The 




suspect must be heard, however in that course a criminal suspect should 
not be driven to make up a case against itself.671 
 
2 3  Conclusion    
This chapter has managed to unpack the rationale behind the South African 
labour law fairness as it applies to employer disciplinary powers over 
employees who are suspected of having committed criminal acts. It has 
shown that employee criminal misconducts are a species of matters of 
criminal law nature. The chapter has expounded on the flexibility and 
proportionality as theories founding approaches underlying the dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts. It proved that although 
proportionality related principles are constitutionally entrenched principles 
for dealing with matters of criminal law nature, they are not consistently 
invoked by the employer investigation and dismissal processes for 
dismissal of employees suspected of criminal misconduct. These processes 
are predominantly reliant on flexibility. 
 In this chapter, the rationale for South African constitutional fairness in 
matters of criminal law nature was expressed through interpreting 
proportionality-based principles. The chapter exposed that flexibility and 
proportionality are philosophies that underlie fairness expressed in the 
application of sections 23; 33 and 35 of the Constitution. It has shown the 
rationality of South African Constitution fairness principle. It has explained 
how constitutional fairness ought to apply in matters of criminal law nature 
within which criminal misconducts are classified.  
It found that the philosophical understanding underpinning work 
environment discipline, namely flexibility does not accommodate 
 
671 This is a major principle in criminal punishment procedure where the standard of 
proof is that the persecutor must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. That is why 
in situations where there is no evidence against an accused, the accused cannot be 
compelled to open its mouth and make out a case against itself. The gathering of 
evidence against the suspect is also supposed to follow the prescribed procedure and 
not be as willy-nilly and as uncontrolled as the gathering of evidence within the 
prescripts of flexibility allowed in labour law. 
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constitutional fairness principles intended to be applied on matters of 
criminal law nature. 
The chapter established the evolution of employer disciplinary processes in 
South African common law era and constitutional law era. The common law 
era of the Industrial Court was found to have accommodated proportionality-
based measures similar to those now expressed in section 35 of the 
Constitution read with the CPA. 
 The chapter revealed that the constitutional era has procedural disparities 
between the treatment of employees suspected of criminal misconducts 
and that of ordinary criminal suspects. In the current time employers treat 
employee criminal suspects differently from the common law era by ignoring 
the application of section 35 entrenched fair trial principles. The employer 
investigation and dismissal processes seek to rely only on fairness 
principles entrenched in section 23 read with section 33 while dealing with 
dismissals based on criminal misconducts. Thus, dismissal processes 
based on criminal misconducts discloses ensuing clash between fair 
procedural rights in matters of criminal law nature and labour law fairness 
procedure for employee criminal suspects. This becomes apparent in the 
employers’ relentless procedural pursuit of one objective of condemning 
criminal behaviour of employee criminal suspect. In this chapter it was 
shown that the investigation and disciplinary processes against the 
employee who is suspected of having committed a criminal act, although 
not aimed at determining the ultimate guilt of the suspect, are closely linked 
to subsequent criminal trial proceedings and therefore have a potential of 
successive impact on the employee criminal suspect’s rights. 
Even though criminal persecution is embedded in strict foundations of 
criminal condemnations, it was found in this chapter, that employer criminal 
persecutions underrate these foundations.  
It was observed that this otherwise approach is in effect constitutionally 
unfair. It was also observed that it is unfair from a criminal justice 
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perspective to negate principles of natural justice,672like employer criminal 
investigations and dismissal hearings seek to do. Criminal justice was found 
to be centred on proportionality negated by the employer in dealing with 
matters of a criminal law nature. It was observed that natural justice 
principles based on proportionality were negated to sustain progressive 
discipline approach in labour law. 
 Progressive discipline adopted in employee criminal persecution has been 
criticised as purposely selective of the principles of punishment mandatory 
for the needed balance in criminal condemnation. The interpretation of 
progressive discipline exposed it as lacking the details outlined in 
Marciano’s perspective of discipline.673 Marciano approach advocating for 
discipline that considers individual interest,674was seen to be proportionate 
with South African constitutional fairness justification based on human 
rights grounded culture.  
The perspective maintaining employer flexibility was read to suggest that, 
the employer as the master, deserves to satisfy only its interest at the 
expense of employee suspect’s rights. This perspective was seen to be 
outrightly anti-constitutional fairness perspective on individual rights. 
The grip on the foundations of master and servant relationship in South 
African labour relations could not be underestimated. The inclination to 
flexibility and negation of proportionality in the current labour law 
jurisprudence revealed that master and servant prescripts are still pervasive 
in current labour law systems. This is so even though the master and 
servant relationship were the nerve of revolution in South African labour 
relations. This inclination at least as far as employer criminal investigations 
 
672 That the ruler ought to hear both sides and ought to not punish the aggrieved at their 
own cause. 
673 In para 2 2 2 on the traditional approach or progressive approach 
674 Fielkow Brian Why its Time to Kill Progressive Discipline 12/06/2018 
https://chiefexecutive.net/why-its -time-to-kill-progressive-discipline [accessed 21 07 
18]. Also read Marciano above note 542 at 181-200; 201-208; 68-69;78-79 and 
Marciano P L & Wingrove C Super Teams: Using the Principles of RESPECT 5-17 and 
39-61 as well as Zack A & Bloch R The arbitration of discipline cases 84. Also refer to 
Asherman IG 1982 Personnel Journal 528 -531 at 528  
160 
 
and discipline are concerned cannot stand water in South African 
constitutional and ILO perspectives of justification provided in Article 4 of 
Termination of Employment convention, No. 158 of 1982.675  Every law in 
South Africa has to be constitutional fairness inclined and therefore observe 
constitutional fairness within its wide constitutional perspective. 
The labour law principle of flexibility segregating the full application of 
natural justice risks letting employers’ compromise of essential principles of 
criminal condemnation. Within the employer’s flexibility to choose as to 
whether the employee’s criminal act could be offensive to the extent that it 
renders the employer-employee relationship disintegrated, lies the 
opportunity to create other species of unlegislated creatures of crime.  
As shown above, the employer, for example, is not bound to follow proper 
principles of criminal investigation and presentation of evidence, although 
the employer would be dealing with criminal misconducts. As early as the 
investigation stage, the employer can lead the employee to self-
incrimination at the disguise that the employee is being allowed opportunity 
to be heard in terms of Item 4 of the Code.  
Looked at from the obverse side, the employee’s right to be heard without 
recognition of employee’s right against self-incrimination bears no 
guarantee that the employer would appreciate employee’s right against self-
incrimination.676 In accordance with section 35 of the Constitution, the right 
against self-incrimination underlies every aspect of criminal persecution 
from investigation up to the hearing stage. 
Based on the expounded theories of flexibility and proportionality in this 
chapter, the next chapter evaluates the principle of fairness as applied by 
 
675 Per Article 4(b) of the Termination of Employment Convetion, No. 158 of 1982. As 
well see Note on Convention No. 158 and Recommendation No. 166 concerning 
termination of mployment 
 https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/ed_norm/-
normes/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf [accessed on the 12 Jan 
2019] 
676 The situation in the current labour law is that employees’ right against self-
incrimination is considered a triviality, see Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
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Fairness in employer criminal investigations and disciplinary 
hearings in the light of fairness in criminal justice 
 
3 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter confirmed that in proceedings against matters of a 
criminal law nature couched within either civil or criminal justice systems, 
some measure of fairness is observed. Chapter two, further, exposed the 
extent to which this observance differs between civil proceedings in labour 
law and criminal proceedings under the criminal justice system; providing 
the underlying theoretical causes of such discrepancies. The variations 
were linked to the underlying progressive discipline theory of labour law 
adopted in South African labour law which negates some fundamental 
measures of proportionality principles to accommodate flexibility.  
This chapter investigates the South African jurisprudential expression of the 
nature of labour law fairness and compares it to the nature of entrenched 
constitutional fairness principles dealing with matters of a criminal law 
nature. 
In anticipation, a study of fairness processes in South African labour law 
viewed in the light of proportionality and flexibility theories extrapolated in 
chapter two is eminent. The chapter shows that while processes of fairness 
that are established 677 in dealing with matters of a criminal law nature 
largely rely on the theory of proportionality, from the labour law disciplinary 
perspective for matters of a criminal misconduct, processes of fairness 
greatly lean towards the theory of flexibility.  
 
 
677 Found in the CPA and section 35 of the Constitution. 
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3 1  The nature of the right to fair dismissal on the basis of a criminal 
misconduct.  
 
The determination as to whether an employee has been afforded a fair 
dismissal depends on whether the employer followed requirements in item 
4 of LRA Schedule 8 code of good practice: Dismissal. It is item 4(1) and 
(3) of the code that gives guidelines on how the employer may carry out 
discretion to dismiss an employee suspected of criminal misconduct. The 
LRA678 draws a distinction between the procedure for the dismissal and the 
reason for a dismissal679. In terms of section 188 of the LRA, the employer 
has to establish that the decision to dismiss an employee was based on fair 
procedure and that it was substantively fair680 to dismiss an employee.  
The manner of the dismissal or the right to a fair procedure remains, in our 
law, a crucial component in the determination of a fair decision. Even though 
the LRA does not define the concept of substantive fairness, it does refer to 
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal (the Code) as a guide in respect of 
such issues. An enquiry into the substantive fairness of a dismissal is in fact 
an enquiry as to whether there is a valid and fair reason for the dismissal. 
The facts of a particular case, and the appropriateness of dismissal as a 
sanction in the context of such facts, constitute the basis upon which a 
determination as to whether a fair reason exists must be made. 
Jurisprudentially, substantive fairness in labour law is equated to 
constitutional administrative fairness.681  
According to Monyakane, constitutional administrative fairness embraces 
both natural justice principles of fairness.682 Monyakane gleans the essence 
 
678 Section 188 of the LRA. 
679This is a reference to section 188 of the LRA which draws a distinction between a 
‘fair reason’ and a ‘fair procedure.’ 
680 In accordance with the internal rules; policy read together with LRA. To identify what 
constitutes essential questions in misconduct cases, read page 213 of Grogan J 
Dismissal (2018) 213. Also see Ncgobo J in Sidumo above note 180 paras 80-141.  
681Brassey Employment and Labour Law at A7-1 - A7-2; Currie I & De Waal J The Bill 
of Rights Handbook at 651, fn 34; Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79.  
682Monyakane above note 9 at page 11.  
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of constitutional administrative fairness from reading section 33 of the 
Constitution together with the Preamble, sections 1 and 195 of the 
Constitution.683 Monyakane further explains the objective of constitutional 
administrative fairness in the promotion and the protection of individual 
rights through urging accountability in the exercise of public power. 
Accordingly, every exercise of constitutional fairness should refrain from 
actions that might jeopardise constitutional individual rights.684 Such 
exercise of authority must realise lawfulness, reasonableness and fairness.  
In Sidumo, 685 the Constitutional Court pronounced, inter alia, that 
commissioners acting under the auspices of the CCMA exercise a public 
power and that when they conduct arbitration proceedings, they are in fact 
performing administrative functions. Within these functions falls the CCMA’s 
duty to review substantive fairness in employer dismissals based on 
employee criminal misconducts.686 Thus the CCMA awards on whether 
employers observed substantive fairness constitute administrative action 
within the meaning of section 33, which establishes the individual right to 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action (the right to 
just administrative action). 687 
Section 33 of the PAJA established right sui generis. In recognition of this 
special right, Monyakane688 refers to it as the right to administrative justice 
as a human right (RAJAH). In her study on the foundation to this right, she 
finds the position of section 33 within the wide constitutional transformative 
principles and the rule of law. She then sees interlinks between the 
preamble, sections 1, 33 and 195 of the Constitution. In analysing their 
interrelationship, she finds the purpose of PAJA in encompassing 
 
683Monyakane above note 9 at page 11. 
684 In support of this view consider Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR  
1998 146; Burns Y 2002 SAPL  283; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 12 
BCLR 1593 (CC);Fose v Minister of safety and Security 1997 7 BCLR 851 (CC) &1997 
3 SA 786 (CC) para 98 and 99; Monyakane above note 9 at pages 2 and 11. 
685 Sidumo above note 180 para 139. 
686 Sidumo above note 180 para 139. 
687 Sidumo above note 180 para 139. 
688 Monyakane above note 9 at pages 2 and 11. 
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transformative principles entrenched in the Preamble, sections 1, 33 and 
195 of the Constitution. She observes that section 33 gives effect to the 
right to lawful, reasonable and fair decisions provided for in section 33(1) 
and (2) of the Constitution and thus calls for efficiency and accountability in 
the performance of administrative functions. 
Taking this further, Monyakane689 argues that through facilitating 
administrative review, PAJA gives individuals the ability to challenge the 
justiciability of decisions by authorities before the courts of law. She then 
concludes that PAJA is the umbrella statute for all legislation dealing with 
administrative issues and serves as an expression of the constitutional right 
to administrative justice as a human right, which outlines how every 
administrator should do their duty in the constitutional dispensation.  
The labour law jurisprudential interpretation of the LRA supports the view 
that section 145 of the LRA categorises legislation in consonance with the 
PAJA review standards umbrella.690  
Through Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others (hereinafter 
carephone)691 the Labour Appeal Court maintains that even though section 
145 of the LRA was enacted within the previous constitutional standard for 
the justification of the outcomes of administrative decisions only, through 
reasons provided in the case, section 145 of the LRA now is reflective of 
the constitutional standard of reasonableness within section 33 
prescripts.692 Applying the latter standard affects not only the constitutional 
right to fair labour practices, but the right to lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair administrative action.693 In addition, section 145 was to 
some extent held to enable a section 33-compliant interpretation of 
fairness.694  
 
689 Monyakane above note 9 at pages 2 and 11. 
690 Sidumo above note 180 paras 138. 
691Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) paras [17]-
[19] and paras [25]-[38]. 
692 Entrenched in section 33 of the Constitution. 
693 Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1998 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC) paras [17]-
[19] and paras [25]-[38]. 
694 Sidumo above note 180 paras 139-141. 
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As explained earlier, section 33 is one of the fundamental provisions that 
give substance and effect to the constitutional values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness entrenched in section 1(d) of the 
Constitution and section 195(1) of the Constitution. These qualities were 
also held to be the essentials of labour law fairness qualities.695 
It is therefore submitted that the provisions of the Constitution are a 
backbone to the labour law review process. As such, the constitutional 
provisions ought to be the starting point in attempts that seek to ascertain 
the parameters for standard review of fairness.696 Section 2 of the 
Constitution describes the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic; 
bearing the principle that any legislation inconsistent with the Constitution 
is invalid. Section 195 (3) of the Constitution insists that national legislation 
must ensure the promotion of the values and principles in section 195(1) of 
the Constitution. This obligation is imposed on both private and public law 
and must be fulfilled. In addition, section 39 (2) of the Constitution 
commands every decision maker to promote the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation.  
Within the employment scope, the legislation referred to in sections 2 and 
39(2) of the Constitution is the LRA. It is this law that regulates the judicial 
review of fairness as in the CCMA arbitration awards, where substantive 
fairness regarding employer dismissals based on employee criminal 
misconducts is determined. The LRA does recognise the supremacy of the 
Constitution. The interpretative injunction in section 3(b) of the LRA 
provides that any person applying the provisions of the LRA must interpret 
such in compliance with the Constitution. Furthermore, the finding in 
 
695 Sidumo above note 180 paras 137-141. 
696 Of the same notion are cases of Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and 
Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 1995 4 SA 877 (CC); 
1995 10 BCLR 1289 (CC); at para. 62; Hugo v President of the Republic of South Africa 
and Others 1997 4 SA 1 (CC); 1996 6 BCLR 876 at paras. 11 and 28. 
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Sidumo697 that commissioners of the CCMA exercise a public power 
denotes that the CCMA is an organ of the State.698  
On this basis, it is trite to argue that as it is expected in exercising public 
power, the CCMA, being an organ of State that exercises public power, 
invites the application of the provisions of section 195 of the Constitution to 
its commissioners when they conduct arbitration proceedings under the 
LRA.  
According to Monyakane,699 section 195 outlines the basic values and 
principles governing public administration. It can therefore be argued that 
section 195 values which in effect relive section 33 principles are ought to 
be observed by employers to meet substantive fairness in dismissals of 
employees who committed criminal misconducts. 
Writing from an administrative law perspective, Monyakane700 explicates 
how the stipulations of section 33 relate to section 195 of the Constitution 
in the formulation of ‘the right to administrative justice as a human right’. 
Section 33 of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution provides for the limitation 
of administrative power. It mitigates against possible negative effects, such 
as decisions that may have been taken in haste, based on ill conception or 
eccentric idiosyncrasies that are contrary to constitutional demands. In 
conjunction with this is section 195 of the Constitution, which provides that 
public administration be governed not only by democratic values,701 but also 
by the following principles enshrined in the Constitution: encouragement of 
broadly representative public participation in policy-making, equitable and 
unbiased provision of services, accessible and accurate information and the 
maximization of human potential. 702 
The provisions of section 33 and its mitigating effect guarantee different 
elements of the right to administrative justice. In particular, they set out 
 
697 Sidumo above note 180 paras 137-141. 
698 Sidumo above note 180 paras 139. 
699 Monyakane above note 9 at page 2 and 11. 
700 Monyakane above note 9 at page 2 and 11. 
701 The Preamble, section 1 and Section 33. 
702  Monyakane above note 9 at page 2 and 11. 
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specific rights to safeguard justifiable administrative action, namely, that 
administrative action should be fair, lawful and reasonable. The section 
therefore establishes a ‘general duty to act fairly,’ where individual rights 
are effected in accordance with the rule of law as spelled out in the 
Constitution.703 Through its provisions, section 195 contemplates a 
transformed public service within the broader context of transformation as 
envisaged in the Constitution. In this way, the new constitutional 
dispensation reverses the unreasonable decision-making which hitherto 
influenced the behaviour of administrators empowered to make decisions 
in the manner that the employers do.  
It is appropriate to note the observation by Monyakane704 that under the 
common law era administrative power was abused and hence was 
characteristically unreasonable without observing current constitutional 
checks.705 A similar argument is possible in the scenario of employer 
criminal investigations and subsequent dismissals on the basis of criminal 
misconduct where the essentials of fairness in matters of criminal law nature 
is underrated with flexibility-based principles as opposed to proportionality 
mandatory in meting out criminal justice. It would not be possible to 
measure reasonableness in terms anticipated in administrative justice 
rationales from the employer’s flexible criminal investigation discretions and 
dismissals; for, if anything, most of the anticipated rules and principles706 
would have been overlooked. 
The purpose behind the South African formulation of the “right to 
administrative justice as a human right” is two-fold. It promotes public 
participation in public governance and ensures everyone a right to lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action.707 Besides ensuring 
 
703 Du Plessis and Corder H Understanding South Africa’s Transitional Bill of Rights 
169. 
704 Monyakane above note 9 at pages 2 and 11. 
705 Monyakane above note 9 at pages 2 and 11. 
706 Entrenched in section 35 read with the CPA. 
707 Monyakane above note 9 at pages 2 and 11 Pharmaceutical Manufacture 




that public administration complies with the constitutional demands to curb 
possible maladministration, the right to administrative justice as a human 
right allows every person to challenge the unreasonable exercise of power 
action before the courts of law.708 It mainly affords affected persons loci 
standi in judicio.709 It therefore remedies the restrictive common law 
procedures. By reducing these obstacles, the Constitution unleashes 
individual potential to realise self-determination. 
In employer criminal investigation and dismissal processes, a similar 
scenario to common law is experienced by the employees. Employees are 
facing employer discretionary and flexible procedures. These procedures 
are not controlled by the law as they are just in a code, not legislation. 
Employees are not able to challenge the employer discretion because they 
do not have such liberty to self-determination. They are left without an 
alternative. They are unable to challenge the employer’s unreasonable 
decision to condemn them without following available constitutional 
provisions in section 35 of the Constitution. Employer criminal investigatory 
procedures and disciplinary hearing processes are purely discretionary and 
pays no regards to section 35 of the Constitution. Through exercising 
criminal investigatory discretions, the employer is not bound by criminal 
justice prescripts710 even though dealing with matters of criminal law 
nature.711 
The employer’s actions, which in effect deny employee criminal suspects of 
their constitutional rights as criminal suspects, are also contrary to the 
enforcement of the right to administrative justice effecting the right of access 
 
2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 696 C-D; Devenish et al. Administrative Law 4; Brigid H Judicial 
Review a Thematic Approach 3. 
708 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa in re: the Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 696 C-D; Devenish et 
al. Administrative Law 4; Brigid H Judicial Review a Thematic Approach 3. 
709  The right of standing before court or tribunal. 
710 Per section 35 of the Constitution read with the CPA. 
711 See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213 who clearly explains that employee criminal 
suspects cannot claim certain rights encompassed in the right again self-incrimination. 
The right against self-incrimination is part of section 35 rights. 
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to court.712 Access to courts is a necessary and implicit right in the 
protection of other more substantive rights like the right against self-
incrimination. 713  In facilitating the right to access to courts in administrative 
matters, the right to administrative justice as a human right can be termed 
a ‘collateral right’.714 Therefore it is a right that guarantees that individuals 
may challenge administrative action before the courts of law.715 
According to Monyakane, 716 the right to challenge administrative action, 
…means that if the law or conduct of the state violates the Bill of Rights, 
an affected person can approach the courts’717 to examine whether 
subordinate legislation or administrative conduct conforms to the 
Constitution and gives appropriate relief to the affected. The 
Constitution therefore provides for a drastic change in the position of 
administrative law.718 
In the light of the fact that employer criminal investigations are 
discretionary and based on flexibility principles, employers are able to 
quash employee criminal suspects’ rights from the valuable initial stages 
of the criminal charges.719The employee criminal suspects who do not 
have much room to exercise their anticipated rights as criminal suspects 
 
712 Entrenched in section 34 of the Constitution. 
713 This concerns the subjective claims of individuals vis-‘a-vis authority as opposed to 
procedural rights which denote a set of legal rules which lay down basic standards of 
conduct to be observed by authorities in the course of the administration of justice. 
714 In describing the conceptual nature of rights of access in public law, Suskin The 
Problematical State of Access 3 writes,  
access rights may take one of two forms, or be a combination of the 
two forms. They may be either collateral rights or autonomous rights. 
The term collateral refers to the right of access as a necessary and 
implicit element in the protection of other more substantive rights. An 
autonomous right of access is a free standing right existing irrespective 
of the specific nature of the substantive claims being made.  
715 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa in re: the Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 45; Devenish et al. 
Administrative Law 4; Currie I & De Waal J (eds) Administrative Law 318-319. 
716Monyakane above note 9 at pages 49-52. 
717 Currie I & De Waal J (eds) Administrative Law 318-319. 
718 Monyakane above note 9 at pages 49-52. 
719 See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213 who clearly explains that employee criminal 
suspects cannot claim certain rights encompassed in the right again self-incrimination. 
The right against self-incrimination is part of section 35 rights. 
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are deprived from the collateral rights to administrative justice, including 
the right of access to court until the employer has certified them criminals 
and dismissed them. 
Employer discretion to dismiss employees who are alleged to have 
committed criminal acts falls within the four corners of the LRA,720 employer 
rules and policies.721 Even if employer processes have a negative impact 
on the rights of employee criminal suspects, they are still reviewed within 
the employer rules, policies and laws without regard to these rights.  
In cases where employer criminal investigations do not observe the 
principle that ‘a man be judged not at his own cause’, employee criminal 
suspects, risk subjection to self-incrimination722 and consequently double 
punishment.723 As a result, the arbitration service of the CCMA should 
require a broader perspective of review which takes into account these 
rights at stake and the fairness principles entrenched in section 35 of the 
Constitution. Additional questions pertaining to the justiciability of 
employer’s exercise of discretion must be answered as well. This is even 
more necessary in the case where the review of decisions under section 33 
of the Constitution put in operation by PAJA is operationalized. 
In the framework of the judicial review of CCMA arbitration awards on 
whether the employer has established substantive fairness, section 195 
would require that compulsory arbitration service of the CCMA be provided 
impartially, fairly, equitably and without bias. It ought to give constitutional 
expression instead of the “narrow” LRA substantive fairness taking into 
regard that section 145 of the LRA is subsumed into justiciability prescripts 
in section 33 of the Constitution.724 This move ought to do away with 
 
720 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and 
Others 2003 3 SA 1 (CC); 2003 2 BCLR 154 (CC) (NEHAWU) Para 33; Sidumo above 
note 180 paras 80-141.  
721Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
722 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
723 In most cases after dismissals based on criminal misconducts, employee criminal 
suspects are subjected to criminal prosecutions. See cases discussed in chapter four 
at para 4 3 1 on the parallel nature of criminal misconducts dismissal processes. 
724 Narrow in the sense that it aims at catering for employer flexibility and therefore 
observes only one leg of the principles of natural justice. The audi alterum partem rule. 
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unreasonable CCMA reviews on substantive fairness is apparent in matters 
entailing dismissals on the basis of criminal misconducts. Section 195 read 
with section 23, section 33 and section 35 would further require 
mechanisms to be in place to hold CCMA accountable for the manner in 
which it conducts arbitration proceedings. These concerns would trickle 
down to questioning the extent of the employer’s exercise of power in 
investigations that culminate in dismissals based on employee criminal 
misconducts. 
In terms of these provisions,725 the CCMA would exercise a wide review of 
employer’s discretion to establish rationality and the constitutional 
justiciability of the employer’s criminal investigations. In the best interests 
of promoting transparency, arbitration awards would be accessible, given 
timeously and accurately to the parties of these proceedings.726 Lastly, but 
of essential importance: the arbitration process within section 195 values 
would require sufficient and effective results. The employee would not find 
himself faced with parallel proceedings and giving evidence that 
incriminates him.727 Thus, the CCMA would be tasked with ridding off 
peripherals of arbitrariness that happened when the employer made internal 
decisions to  investigate the employee criminal suspect within uncontrolled 
means and decide to dismiss the employee who is condemned and 
stigmatised a criminal without following principles constitutionally 
entrenched for condemning criminals.728  
It would be at this stage that the substance of employer criminal 
investigations and dismissals would be subjected to an examination against 
tenets of substantive fairness as understood from a criminal justice fairness 
perspective. The CCMA would embark on a constitutional review to remedy 
 
725 Section 195 read with section 23; section 33 and section 35. 
726 For example, currently the employee suspected of a criminal misconduct cannot 
access CCMA review regarding employer’s ignorance of employee rights against self-
incrimination.    
727 The right against self-incrimination is the central right in section 35 of the constitution. 
It is the central right in section 35 fairness principles. 
728 The CCMA would insist that employers’ discretion be exercised with caution not to 
jeopardise other constitutional rights.  
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internal decisions’ lack of observance of constitutional demands, including 
the criminal suspects’ rights. Its review ought to extend to procedural 
propriety and substantive reasonableness. It would dissect the rationale of 
employer decisions as opposed to merely interpreting legislation, internal 
rules and policies to find the employer intentions.729 It is at this stage that 
the broader constitutional substantive fairness perspective on employee 
criminal proceedings would be realised. 
In pursuit of these constitutional duties against the CCMA, two further 
fundamental rights explicitly contemplated in sections 23 and 34 of the 
Constitution come into play if one considers the constitutional impact on the 
Labour Court’s supervisory functions in respect of CCMA arbitration 
awards. In Sidumo,730 the Constitutional Court held that in this context the 
right to fair labour practices that protect workers’ right to employment 
security is consistent with the right to just administrative action. It can be 
argued that, in part by entrenching this right, the Constitution advocated for 
a flexcurity731 approach.732 By doing so, it seeks to maintain a balance 
between employer flexibility in the employment arena and other social 
rights, which from a South African constitutional human rights-based 
culture, are constitutional rights. 
In a related context, Alena Nešporová, Sandrine Cazes,733 referring to Auer, 
Berg and Coulibaly734 explain this approach from an international law 
perspective, as an approach that rearranges employment protection 
 
729 Grogan J Dismissal (2018)  213. 
730 Sidumo above note 180 para 139. 
731 A concept adopted from The Commission of the European Communities    
Communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Brussels, 
27.6.2007 COM (2007) 359 final https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
[accessed on 10/08/2017]. 
732 A mitigation of flexibility and social security including employment security. 
733Alena Nešporová, Sandrine Cazes. Combining flexibility and security for employment 
and decent work in the Western Balkans SEER - South-East Europe Review for Labour 
and Social Affairs 02:7-23. https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=104574   
734 Auer P Berg J and Coulibaly I Insights into the tenure 14-28. 
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legislation and social protection.735 Regarding the right to a fair public 
hearing before an independent and impartial court or tribunal in section 34, 
the Constitutional Court 736 held that Labour Court’s supervisory functions 
in respect of CCMA arbitration awards, enables parties to enforce their 
sections 23 and 33 rights before the CCMA acting as an impartial tribunal. 
As such, the Constitutional Court concluded that in this context those rights 
“in part overlap and are interconnected.”737  
According to, Cora Hoexter,738 arguing from administrative law perspective, 
section 33 fairness process making is concerned with giving people an 
opportunity to participate in the decisions that will affect them. Through 
section 33 the public is afforded a crucial opportunity to influence the 
outcome of decisions affecting them. Such participation is a safeguard that 
 
735 See the interpretation of this approach in Alena Nešporová, Sandrine Cazes. 
Combining flexibility and security for employment and decent work in the Western 
Balkans SEER - South-East Europe Review for Labour and Social Affairs 02:7-23. 
https://www.ceeol.com/search/article-detail?id=104574 page 8 explaining that, 
The term ‘flexicurity’ stems originally from a Dutch law (Wet Flexibiliteit 
en Zekerheid, dated 1999) that holds out the prospect of permanent 
employment to temporary agency workers after two years’ work, and 
thus links employment security with flexible assignments of staff. 
However, the term has been extended to mean, more generally, labour 
market settings that provide security for more flexible employment 
relations. The extended concept implies a new combination of 
employment security provided at the firm level (through employment 
protection legislation and collective agreements) and protection 
provided through the social protection system in the form of 
unemployment insurance/assistance and active labour market policies. 
The flexicurity approach advocates a certain degree of rearrangement 
between employment protection legislation and social protection so as 
to permit an optimal combination of labour market performance and 
workers’ security but not at the expense of economic performance (see 
Auer, Berg and Coulibaly, 2004). However, there is no one-size-fits-all 
flexicurity model and different combinations of employment protection 
legislation and social protection (also with different forms of social 
protection, i.e. combinations of active and passive labour market 
policies), associated with national differences in tradition and culture 
but also with variations in the structure of national economies, as well 
as other factors, might produce results acceptable for all the parties 
concerned.  Both employment protection and labour market policies 
are important in providing security for workers. 
736 Sidumo above note 180 Per Sachs J paras 142-159. 
737 Sidumo above note 180 Per Sachs J para 142-159. 
738 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 326-327. 
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only signals respect for the dignity and worth of the participants but is also 
likely to improve the quality and rationality of decision making to enhance 
its legitimacy.739 It is argued that if the interpretation of section 33 would be 
applied to labour law decision making, it may be regarded as putting to the 
pedestal the importance of the recognition of employee interests, bearing in 
mind the imbalanced nature of the employer and employee relationship.740 
Otto - Kahn Freund neatly captures the nature of employer and employee 
relationship where he states that: 
 
[T]he relation between an employer and an isolated employee or 
worker is typically a relation between a bearer of power and one who 
is not a bearer of power.  In its inception it is an act of submission, in 
its operation it is a condition of subordination, however much the 
submission and the subordination may be concealed by that 
indispensable figment of the legal mind known as the ‘contract of 
employment.’  The main object of labour law has always been, and we 
venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract 
the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be 
inherent in the employment relationship.741 
 
The cracks of fairness from a labour law jurisprudential perspective expose 
yet another purpose of a fair procedure. As a philosophical phenomenon, 
procedural fairness in the workplace seeks to enforce good workplace 
governance.  In essence, the observation of fair hearing is not only morally 
right but leads to attaining transparency in the workplace. Accordingly, a 
transparent environment enables employees to understand the value of 
employer-set rules and to accept consequences in breach of such rules.  
Within the pursuit of transparency, when the employer exercises fair 
procedure, the employer does not only seek to expose his understanding of 
 
739 Hoexter C Administrative Law in South Africa 326-327. 
740 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law at 18. 
741 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law at 18. 
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the internal rules but also aims to satisfy the constitutionally required 
standards.742 At the centre is the need to satisfy the constitutionally 
entrenched principle of employment as a core value of the LRA.743  
 
In the light of the above entrenched constitutional objectives in sections 23, 
33 and 195 of the Constitution, it remains questionable in the context of this 
thesis, whether in the circumstance where the employer investigates an 
employee who is alleged to have committed a criminal misconduct without 
taking into account the involved constitutionally entrenched section 35 
rights for criminal suspects complies with constitutional fairness. Further, it 
can be questioned if indeed the satisfaction of only the first leg of fairness 
principles, namely that both sides must be heard and not touching on the 
need to not judge any man on his own cause as envisaged in employer 
criminal investigations is a true reflection of substantive fairness in matters 
of a criminal law nature. 
Bearing the fact that each case has to be treated on its own merits and that 
the circumstances of each case, this thesis does not support the 
jurisprudentially supported ignorance of the important provisions of the Bill 
of Rights in the labour law perspective when dealing with criminal 
misconduct dismissals. The thesis argues that the nature of the misconduct 
must determine the selection of principles that the employer ought to use to 
deal with the matter at hand. 
It is a bit amiss to submit that a lower level of substantive fairness is 
observed in labour law perspective as compared to substantive fairness in 
criminal justice, even in employer criminal investigations and dismissals 
based on criminal misconducts. However, from a jurisprudential view, it 
suffices to argue that in labour law, substantive fairness would have been 
satisfied where employer shows merit to the allegations levelled against the 
 
742 Of accountability, responsiveness and openness entrenched in section 1(d) of the 
Constitution. As well as fair, reasonable and rational. 
743 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and 
Others 2003 (3) SA 1 (CC); 2003 (2) BCLR 154 (CC) (NEHAWU) at paras 37-38. 
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employees who committed criminal misconducts. The employer need not 
only table enough information to the determination that the employee has 
indeed transgressed but ought to also show that the details of substantive 
fairness observed in matters of a criminal law nature were complied with. 
Concisely every attempt must have led to answering the question as to 
whether the employee had breached a valid rule and went further beyond 
the rationales of the rules that the employer followed. The employer, in 
short, would establish that the dismissal resulted from the employee’s 
transgression of a rule, policy or law; and nothing more or less.  
Contrary to this apprehension, the current jurisprudence744 reveals that in 
the context of employers’ criminal investigations aimed at dismissing 
employees who committed criminal misconducts, there is no need for the 
CCMA’s review. In accordance with this jurisprudence, the CCMA ought not 
to ponder on the constitutionality of the rules themselves and on how their 
determination transgresses on other constitutional demands. The reading 
of the reasoning in this jurisprudence exposes that, provided that the 
employer can motivate and justify the decision to dismiss before the CCMA, 
it is enough. Such a direction leaves the employer with lavish measure of 
flexibility while limiting employees from any further protection in case the 
applied rule does not agree with some constitutional rationality. Such an 
example is in the case of dismissal based on investigations contrary to 
section 35 of the Constitution.  
The lavish measure of flexibility and ignorance of proportionality in employer 
criminal investigations leaves managers an opportunity to slavishly follow 
companies’ disciplinary matrix without having regard to the circumstances 
of matters where the cause of action is a criminal misconduct. In 
 
744 Including the following cases Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1998 11 
BLLR 1093 (LAC);Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and others [2001] 9 BLLR 
1011 (LAC); Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79 ;Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA and others 2009 11 BLLR 1128 (LC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2012 9 BLLR 
857 (LAC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd  2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA);Gold Fields Mining 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd; (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and others 2014 1 BLLR 20 (LAC)  
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consonance with Sidumo,745  it is considered that the arbitrator as a 
‘reasonable decision maker’ must apply its own sense of fairness in 
deciding whether a dismissal was fair. The principle that the arbitrator has 
no obligation to exercise deference to the employer’s decision excludes any 
possible opportunity to dig deep in the nature of rules and therefore 
procedure followed. The employer could successfully defend their decisions 
by furnishing evidence supporting their decisions and not delve into the 
rationality of their decisions. They are not expected to convince the 
arbitrator that they went further than observing the internal rules, statutes 
and policies and delved into the affected section 35 of the Constitution rights 
pertaining to criminal suspects.  
The employer only has to explain its decision with reference to its business 
and the impact of the employee’s misconduct.746 In accordance with the 
principle of flexibility engaged in employment law fairness, the employer 
would then equate its decision to the ultimate sanction, which is normally 
dismissal in matters of criminal misconduct. The employer decides on a 
balanced sanction by considering the circumstances of the offence, the 
circumstances of the employee as well as the interests of the employer and 
the other employees and nothing less or more. Factors such as the risk of 
continued employment of the employee; the message sent to other 
employees regarding misconduct of that nature; and a lack of 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing and remorse on the part of the employee, 
are considered essential. 747 
The breakdown of the trust relationship is very important in relation to 
dismissal, but it is not something that an employer can simply declare, and 
have it accepted as fact. The employer has a duty to establish its extent. In 
Edcon Ltd v Pillemer NO and Others748 the SCA held that employers need 
 
745 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79.  
746 On the impact of dishonesty constituting criminal misconduct read Newaj K 2016 
THRHR 429-442 at 433. 
747 De Beers Consolidated Mines (Pty) Ltd v CCMA & Others 2000 9 BLLR 995 LAC) 
748 Edcon Limited vs Pillermer NO & Others 2009 ZASCA 135 ;2010 1 BLLR 1 (SCA). 
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only to provide evidence to support their claims only to demonstrate how 
the trust relationship has been destroyed by the conduct of the employee.  
The requirement that employers only demonstrate the extent of damage on 
their relationship with the employee suspected of criminal misconduct omits 
the need to observe fair processes which are equally important when 
dealing with criminal misconducts.749  
The employees’ role as far as whether fair reason existed in their dismissal 
is within the requirement in section 192(1). In terms of this section, they are 
required to establish the existence of the grounds for dismissal. Once 
established, the onus shifts to the employer, who must prove, on a balance 
of probabilities, that the dismissal was for a fair reason and in accordance 
with a fair procedure.  
The onus is discharged, only if the employer can demonstrate through 
credible evidence that its version is more probable or more acceptable than 
that of the employee. The required standard on a balance of probabilities is 
too limiting a requirement in matters of a criminal law nature. When used it 
draws several prejudices to the criminal suspect. The employee criminal 
suspect is left susceptible to losing protection entrenched in the section 35 
fairness principles mandatory in matters of a criminal law nature. 
 
3 2 Theoretical implications of LRA disciplinary processes for 
criminal misconduct 
 As indicated earlier in chapter two, South African labour law has its system 
of labour law discipline rooted in corrective discipline regardless of its 
identified faults when viewed from the industrial relations perspective as 
explained in chapter two. To add on to this challenge, even though there is 
a major theoretical commonness between discipline in labour law and 
criminal law sanctioning, procedures adjacent to each, are completely 
different as shown earlier. As seen above, within the context of LRA, the 
discipline of employees suspected of criminal misconduct follows informal 
 
749 As demanded in section 35 of the Constitution. 
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civil procedure processes. This excludes such suspects from protections 
offered in the law designated for disciplining criminal behaviour.  
 As it will be seen in the upcoming discussions, criminal law is more formal 
and strictly adheres to constitutionally entrenched criminal law-oriented 
principles of fairness entrenched in section 35 of the Bill of Rights. Unlike 
the basis of fairness in labour law aiming at certifying only the first leg of the 
natural justice principles, section 35 entail the satisfaction of both legs of 
the natural justice principles- the audi alterum partem rule and judex in 
propria sua causa rule. This thesis criticises this disparity as unjust 
regarding the nature of matters involving criminal misconduct.   
The obvious is that the solution for this problem cannot be found within the 
existing foundations of labour law as labour law arbitration seeks to do.  It 
will be shown in chapter four that insistence on corrective discipline in 
pursuit of employer flexibility will forever breed injustices instead of the 
envisaged constitutional justice in the constitutional era.  
On the same note, regarding ensued civil sanctions against criminal 
misconducts, it is an argument in this thesis that the sanctioning of criminal 
misconduct within corrective approach theories is marred with faults. The 
major fault is, amongst others in the foundations of labour law theories of 
discipline seeking to negate the rationale of punishment of criminal 
behaviour. As noticed above, discipline in labour law largely relies on the 
amalgamation of deterrence and rehabilitation principles of punishment that 
aim to validate labour law disciplinary processes based on flexibility. 
Unlike its original perspective of criminal justice, labour law has easily 
twisted the interpretation of deterrence and rehabilitation to accommodate 
the principle of employer flexibility primarily founding employer and 
employee relationship.  
It has been argued that disciplinary processes in labour law insist on 
applying private law and therefore civil law procedure on criminal 
misconducts, with the hope to ignore integral rationales and procedure 
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necessarily intended for matters of a criminal law nature.750 Progressively, 
the divergence unfolding in the application of labour law of discipline waters 
down the ensued theoretical convergence between criminal justice 
principles of punishment and labour law principles of discipline. 
This procedural divergence ignores the importance of adhering to rationales 
for punishment in matters of a criminal law nature. As shown in the 
forthcoming text, the criminal justice rationales are purposely adopted to 
mitigate against injustices associated with their ignorance. At the centre of 
these injustices is the negation of constitutionally entrenched rights of 
criminal suspects.751 
While criminal law insists on respect of suspected individual to attain 
fairness, labour law understanding of fairness centres on employer 
discretion to decide whether the employee has breached the employer’s 
trust.752 In this pursuit, the employer is not bound to respect the criminal 
suspects’ rights observed in dealing with matters of a criminal law nature. 
The rationale that underpins disciplinary process for employee criminal 
misconducts is borne from progressive disciplinary perspectives.  
As indicated earlier, progressive disciplinary perspective supports flexibility 
in disciplinary discretions entrusted on the employer and seem to overlook 
individual employee interests. This becomes obvious in matters of 
employee criminal misconduct, which demand a degree of proportionality. 
The insistence on flexibility sacrificing proportionality ponders very far from 
the rationales for punishing criminal behaviour. Very precise to what was 
 
750  As argued in chapter two para 2 2 4 dealing with principles underlying discipline of 
employees suspected of criminal misconduct. Refer to the following authorities 
Including the following cases Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1998 11 
BLLR 1093 (LAC);Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and others 20019 BLLR 
1011 (LAC); Sidumo above note 180  paras 78-79 ;Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) 
Ltd v CCMA and others  2009 11 BLLR 1128 (LC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd  2012 9 
BLLR 857 (LAC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA);Gold Fields Mining 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd; (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and others 2014 1 BLLR 20 (LAC). 
751 Section 35 of the Constitution 
752 See Gogo v University of KwaZulu-Natal & Others 2007 28 ILJ 2688 (D); Chirwa v 
Transnet Ltd & Others 2008 29 ILJ 73 (CC); Baloyi v Minister of Communications 
&Others 2013 34 ILJ 890 (LC), as well see Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 212. 
182 
 
earlier captured by Cameron, 753  that even though flexibility is deemed 
appropriate in the context of industrial relations, it ought to be controlled 
within appropriate boundaries that respect essential fairness depending on 
the circumstances of a case.  
Essential fairness in matters of a criminal law nature demands the 
observance of proportionality. Without a fault of proportionality, employer 
criminal investigations for dismissal of employees who committed criminal 
misconducts would be marred with irrationality. 
 
3 2 1  The investigation of employees who committed criminal 
misconducts by the employer to establish reasons for dismissal 
Before the employer dismisses the employee, the employer primarily 
investigates the employee with a view to establishing charges or complaints 
against the employee. To establish the truth of the allegations, the employer 
must also invite the employee to come forth and offer its version of the story. 
In other words, the employer is under obligation to provide the employee an 
opportunity to establish the basis of its defence in cases where the 
employee is alleged to have committed a criminal misconduct.754  
In terms of the law, the employee may in this regard choose whether to 
accept this invitation or not. In case the employee chooses otherwise, the 
employer will not be stopped to continue with its decision to dismiss the 
employee, if the employer has at their disposal facts that support the 
employee’s transgression.755 This scenario can be interpreted as complex 
in the sense that the employee is subjected to trading any other involved 
rights, which might be at stake. In particular, an employee criminal suspect 
has constitutional rights afforded to criminal suspects. At the centre of these 
rights is the determinations and stipulations of what ought to be fair 
 
753 Cameron E 1986 7 ILJ 185 -186 at p187. 
754du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law  461.  
755Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213.  
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procedure and substantive fairness in matters of a criminal law nature.756 
These were postulated in chapters one and two as the rights enshrined in 
section 35 of the Constitution. In the next part of this chapter the 
foundational principle underlying section 35 of the constitution principles are 
dealt with.  
In effect, substantive fairness and fair procedure for matters of a criminal 
law nature are underlined by principles aiming at securing proportionality. 
Section 35 of the Constitution enshrines these principles. 
 
3 2 2 Principles underlying entrenched section 35 constitutional 
justice for criminal suspects including employee criminal suspects 
 
The constitutional era transformed and re-emphasised social contract 
principles.757 By constitutionally entrenching social contract principles 
pertaining to criminal persecution,758 South African society is now based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights.759  
Consequently, the right interpretation of what purpose justice serves760 is 
that, it promotes values761 of human dignity, equality and freedom.  The 
Constitution demands recognition of these values in every human 
undertaking, be it a private762 or public 763 concern.  
The constitutional provisions at the centre to the recognition of these values 
regarding private engagements are the constitutional guidelines in sections 
 
756See section 35 of the Constitution entrenching the right to fair trial in criminal matters. 
Read it with S v Orrie and Another, 2005 1 SACR 63(C) at 69(i) to 70(c) per Bozalek J; 
also read S v Sebejan and Others 1997 8 BCLR 1086 (T) per Satchwell J Page 1096 
at para 56.  
757Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146 158. 
758 Including section 35 of the Constitution. 
759Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146 158. 
760 Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146 158. 
761 Section 165(2) of the Constitution. 
762Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In Re: The Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 49 also read Du Plessis 
v De Klerk 1996 3 SA 850 (CC), Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) and NM v 
Smith 2007 5 SA 250 (CC). 
763 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In Re: The Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 49. 
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8 and 35, of the Constitution. Through these provisions everyone, be it a 
natural or a juristic person has to recognise and apply the rights in the Bill 
of Rights in day to day dealings, even in resolving clashes between one 
individual and another. These provisions also subject the courts, tribunals, 
the legislature and the executive to the constitutional demands. According 
to these provisions, the legislature cannot legislate against the Bill of Rights. 
The executive cannot implement the law against the Bill of Rights. The 
courts764 cannot interpret or allow as justiciable an attempt to interpret and 
apply the law contrary to the Bill of Rights except where the Constitution 
has allowed for such deviation.765   
Through judicial review, the Constitution has mandated courts to keep 
guard of a proper observance of democratic values, social justice and 
fundamental human rights. As Monyakane766 reckoned, for the courts to 
effectively guard constitutional interest, the Constitution established the 
extent of and limits to judicial review. It demanded a judiciary that is 
conscious of the values underlying the Constitution. Further, the 
Constitution requires767 the judiciary that interprets the Constitution while 
bearing in mind the involved technique of making constitutional choices.768 
It recommends that the judiciary should balance competing fundamental 
rights and freedoms.769  
The Constitution mandates that the judiciary refers to a system of values 
extraneous to the constitutional text.770 However, such text must be 
immanent within the legal order and weaned from personal or political 
 
764 Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South Africa In Re: The Exparte 
Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) 45; also see 
Mahambehlela v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another 2002 1 SA 342 (SE). 
765 See section 36 of the Constitution. The limitations clause. 
766 See Monyakane M An evaluation of the administrative justice in South Africa 37. 
767See Monyakane M An evaluation of the administrative justice in South Africa 37 as 
well as Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146; Burns Y 2002 SAPL  
283; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 (12) BCLR 1593 (CC).  
768See Monyakane M An evaluation of the administrative justice in South Africa 37 as 
well see Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146; Burns Y 2002 SAPL  
283; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 12 BCLR 1593 (CC). 
769State v Zuma 1995 4  BCLR 401 (CC) 17. 
770 Section 39 of the Constitution. 
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whims.771 What these provisions relate is that ,instead of the application of 
pure political theory attributes established above, the modern social 
contract is founded in the Constitution. The society must align with 
constitutional guidance in its undertakings and decisions. The law and its 
application must be constitutionally compliant. Failure to do that intrigues 
the action of courts as bodyguards of the South African Constitution 
entrenching the social contract. Ironically, labour law judicial review is not 
as wide as the Constitution demands. Review in labour law is limited to what 
the LRA demands.772  
Grogan773 neatly captures questions to assimilate in satisfaction of these 
demands. Recognising that misconduct cases have their own facts and 
merits, he relates that, central to every case is the need for employers or 
judges and arbitrators first to seek answers as to whether there was a 
contravention of a rule regulating conduct in the workplace, or of relevance 
to the workplace. Second, to find out if the rule is reasonable and valid.774 
Third, to establish if the employee was aware of the rule or could reasonably 
have been expected to know it. Finally, to ask if the dismissal was an 
appropriate sanction.775 Looking at these essentials, it suffices to say that, 
the nature of a review guideline from a labour law perspective is limited.  
 With particular reference to cases involving dismissals on the basis of 
criminal misconducts, the employer’s decision to dismiss cannot be 
reviewed by the CCMA to the extent that the employer’s decision may be 
interrogated as to whether it complied with these demands and something 
more.  
 Accordingly, Sidumo776 states that, “the right to fair labour practices, in the 
present context, is consonant with the right to administrative action that is 
 
771  Also see Mokgoro J’s reasoning in State v Makwanyane, 1995 6 BCLR 665 (CC) 
302-304. 
772 Sidumo above note 180 paras 80-141. 
773Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
774 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
775 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
776 Sidumo above note 180 at para 112. 
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lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  Everyone has the right to have 
these rights enforced before the CCMA acting as an impartial tribunal.777  In 
the present context, these rights in part overlap and are interconnected.778”  
Contrary to a justiciability review envisaged in section 33 of the Constitution, 
with regard to reviews pertaining to criminal misconducts, it seems that it is 
not of importance to take into account that while the employer sought to 
satisfy these demands, the employer trampled on the employee suspected 
of criminal misconducts’ right to protections within section 35 of the 
Constitution.   
The established view, triggers the pursued chapter one observation that 
even though labour law processes for dismissal on the basis of the 
misconduct of a criminal nature aim at punitive civil sanctions with an impact 
similar to criminal law remedies, they are amounting to “[authorised] punitive 
civil sanctioning without the stringent safeguards of criminal law.”779  This 
aspect operates against constitutional rationales safeguarding criminal 
persecutions. Criminal persecutions must comply and satisfy the political 
theory underlying criminalisation of certain human acts in South Africa. 780 
 
3 2 3 Foundational principles for constitutional fairness 
 
The concept of natural justice is linked to the development of the theory of 
law pertaining to the protection of individual rights and therefore like the 
purpose of administration of justice in democratic South Africa. Born from 
 
777 The right in terms of section 34 of the Constitution to have a dispute resolved before      
an impartial tribunal underscores the point made in relation to the first issue, namely, that 
the commissioner must act impartially. 
778 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Others 1999 1 SA 6 (CC); 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) at paras 112 and 114. 
779 Lynch G E1997Corporate Misconduct 23-65. As well see Henry M and Hart Jr 1958 
Law and Contemporary Problems 401, 417- 422; also see Parker, H L. The Limits of the 
Criminal Sanction 9; Steiker, C 1997 GEO. L.J. 775. 
780 These were discussed in chapter two at para 2 2 1 1 dealing with the political theory 
underlying criminalisation of human acts in South Africa today. 
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the idea of jura naturale,781 natural justice encompasses the principles of 
audi alteram partem and nemo judex in propria sua causa.782 Marshall783 
neatly captures the role of these principles as follows: 
 
Principles of natural justice are not only a part of natural law but are 
that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice. 
That is to say, the two principles that no man shall be judged in his own 
cause and that both sides must be heard are so necessary for the fair 
administration of justice that they have been accepted as fundamental 
for that purpose.784 
 
Locke’s785 theory of law also explains the purpose of these principles. His 
interpretation of natural justice, which protects individual rights, is based on 
the theory of natural law, which is in turn based on the concept of social 
contract. 
The  concept of social contract describes the process of transformation of 
humans (“man”) from the free state of nature, which lacked governance, to 
humanity.786 In order to be civilised, humans are said to have surrendered 
their fears and the dangers associated with their state of nature and reached 
a common agreement on the nature of natural rights. 787  In this way, Locke 
makes natural law the starting point of his theory. For him, the main purpose 
of natural law is to explain the foundation and maintenance of legal order. 
 
781 Marshall Natural Justice 6, where he explains that jus naturale or natural law “was 
originally the Stoic philosophical conception of a universal idea of good conduct upon 
which all law should be founded and which, some asserted, ought not to be overridden 
by any other laws however made.” 
782 Marshall Natural Justice 12. 
783 Marshall Natural Justice 12. 
784 Marshall Natural Justice 12 (my emphasis). 
785 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government  2, where he writes: “since no man or society 
of men having a power to deliver up their preservation, or consequently the means of it, to 
the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another, whenever anyone shall go about to 
bring them into such a slavish condition they will always have a right to preserve what they 
have not a power to part with and rid themselves of those who invade this fundamental, 
sacred and unalterable law of self- preservation for which they entered into society. And 
thus, the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power.”  
786 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
787 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
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He argued that natural justice provides that the right of people to establish 
the legal order that protects individual rights is a primary right and, as such, 
original and inalienable.  
Locke’s788 understanding which is very close to the constitutional 
expression of criminal justice in South Africa, states that in order to maintain 
good conduct in criminal administration, there ought to be a supreme law 
that cannot be easily altered, and which sets the extent of and limits to 
administrative discretion on human rights. In order to promote effective 
public administration, the aim of natural justice as well as South African 
constitutional administrative justice is to maintain accuracy, efficiency, 
effectiveness and accountability in decision-making and to impose a duty of 
fair hearing upon every decision-maker so that individual rights are 
protected.789 
Today, the twin principles of natural justice are still necessary. They are the 
basic elements of the right to fair trial entrenched in section 35 of the 
Constitution. Section 35 of the Constitution is integral to criminal justice in 
South Africa. Fairness790 has therefore become the basis of criminal justice 
 
788 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 2. 
789 See the decision in R v Home Secretary, ex parte Hosenball 1977 (1) W L R 766 772, 
which held that “the principles of natural justice are those fundamental rules, the breach 
of which will prevent justice from being seen to be done.” Section 33 of the Constitution 
read with the Preamble, section 1 and 195 of the Constitution promote the protection of 
individual rights by urging that public administration must be carried out accountably. 
790  Accordingly, Monyakane above note 9 at 11 fn 43 observed the nature of fairness in 
the following words;  
The demand for fairness varies from case to case. Fairness prescribes 
the best way to achieve a certain objective and relates to the underlying 
values in the undertaking. Procedural fairness then relates to the best 
way to undertake a decision based on the prescriptions of the law and 
the circumstances that the decision-maker is facing. Procedural 
fairness can encompass both rationality and reasonability, although it 
may not mean that what is rational is fair or what is reasonable is fair.  
Concomitent to this observation Baxter L B Administrative Law 482 explains reasons 
that; 
what is rational can depend entirely upon one’s personal values, aims 




entrenched in the Constitution. These are embedded in the principle of 
legality embodying the rationale for criminal justice. As far as labour law is 
concerned, only one leg of the principles of natural justice is satisfied.  
Against the principle of legality, the employer’s criminal investigatory 
powers are marred with flexible choices including non-observance of rights 
of criminal suspects within which employees who have committed criminal 
misconducts fall. Employees, by contrast, are left to choose between losing 
employment and engaging in processes that incriminate them. They can 
either claim or not claim the right against self-incrimination at their own 
peril.791 These circumstances fail the rationales of the principle of legality as 
understood in the current constitutional era. 
 
3 2 4  The principle of legality from a South African criminal justice 
perspective 
 The South African Constitution, as the supreme law from which every 
power affecting individual rights emanates and is controlled, expresses 
Dicey’s notion of the rule of law in this regard.792 For Dicey793, the rule of 
law also means equality before the law. “[E]quality before the law as 
expressed by the rule of law excludes the idea of any exemption of officials 
or others from the duty to obey the law which governs other citizens or from 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals.”794 
This understanding is expressed in the reading of the Preamble, sections 
1, 8, 9, 23, 33, 35 and 39 of The Constitution regarding the observance of 
 
overtones; reasonableness is a social concept which relies on an 
appeal to reasons accepted or recognised by others.  
Also see the holding in MacLean v The Workers Union 1929 (1) Ch. 602, 624 explaining 
that the duty to act fairly is therefore an integral principle in the promotion of justice. It 
serves two purposes: firstly, it makes the decision makers to be answerable for their 
actions if they act unfairly and secondly, it provides room for questioning where 
unfairness is suspected: It therefore controls decisions in that if found to be unfair they 
will affect justice. 
791 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420. 
792 Read section 1 of the Constitution, the Preamble, section 8 and 29 of the 
Constitution.   
793 Dicey Study of the Constitution 202. 
794 Dicey Study of the Constitution 202. 
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individual rights in taking decisions affecting them. Sections 8 and 39 in 
particular, entrench the need to consider the Bill of Rights provisions even 
in private engagements. Section 39 calls for courts and tribunals to 
consider, not only domestic human rights but also international as well as 
foreign deliberations on human rights. Section 35 falls within the Bill of 
Rights provisions. It establishes the rights of every criminal suspect 
including employees who are suspected of criminal misconduct. It is 
therefore important that its provisions are not ignored in relevant matters. 
The investigation and discipline of employee criminal suspects falls within a 
category of matters subject to the application of section 35 because they 
are matters of a criminal law nature.  
The employer criminal investigations and hearings based on the 
employee’s criminal misconduct create imbalances because the employer 
does not observe the rights of individual employee criminal suspects. While 
other criminal suspects are dealt with within the entrenched section 35 
protections, the employees suspected of criminal misconducts are not 
clothed with these protections. They are stripped off these rights because, 
even if they invoke them, their plea can be easily ignored, and investigations 
and hearings would go on without their involvement.795 This approach defies 
the rule of law. It is contrary to the demands set in the Preamble, sections 
1, 8 ,9 ,23, 33, 35 and 39 of The Constitution.796 
Dicey also argues that as the common law expressed the rule of law, it had 
the capability to protect individual rights. His expression tallies with the 
Marciano perspective of discipline preferred in this thesis, which expounds 
that the consideration of individual interest in industrial relations discipline 
is vital and marks improvement from simply progressive discipline that does 
not centralise individual employee interests. He797 therefore maintains that 
the violations of individuals’ rights can be effectively remedied by common 
 
795See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
796 Read together these sections emphasise individual rightsbased approach to the 
enforcement of the law.  
797 Dicey Study of the Constitution 202. 
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law through judicial declarations and therefore the application of natural 
justice. 
This is similar to the attempts by both ordinary courts and the Industrial 
Courts before the Constitution798 came into effect. Both ordinary courts and 
Industrial Courts that dealt with labour matters before the coming into effect 
of the Constitution celebrated his notion.  During the common law era, the 
Industrial Court presiding officers were informed with the rationale of natural 
justice within the call to establish just-cause and thus respected Dicey’s 
perspective of justice. Industrial Courts did not promote employer flexibility 
at the ignorance of natural justice principles. They judiciously reviewed 
employer decisions. 
However, Dicey’s understanding regarding common law courts justice, 
based on unwritten constitution perspectives of the Westminster system, 
does not fit the present South African perspective which now expresses the 
rule of law through a written Constitution as opposed to relying only on 
common law. The notions of natural justice are now, amongst others, 
expressions in the Preamble, section 8, section 23, section 33, section 35, 
section 39 and section 195 of the constitutional fairness principles. In this 
dispensation, the Constitution improved the position of the common law 
review. Judicial review is no longer an inherent power of the ordinary courts, 
but is now a constitutionally entrenched duty, which redefines the role of 
courts. 
As mentioned in chapter one, courts and tribunals now operate within 
constitutional limits to enforce constitutional objectives and values.799 These 
objectives expressed in section 35 of the Constitution as far as criminal 
justice is concerned, are of essence in all matters of a criminal law nature 
such as employee criminal misconduct. Nevertheless, in satisfaction of 
flexibility, the progressive discipline-oriented perspective adopted in South 
 
798The Industrial Courts engaged both natural justice principles in deciding matters of a 
criminal law nature. 
799 Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, 158; Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32. 
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African labour law might overlook these objectives. This may lead to unfair 
criminal persecutions. 
Central to criminal persecution is punishment that is proportional. 
Proportional criminal punishment is founded on the central principle that 
punishment is not a necessary, but rather an appropriate condition for a 
breach of law.800 That there may never be punishment that does not bear 
reference to an established law. This principle expresses the rationale for 
punishment in that it requires punishment to conform to specific standards. 
These specific standards are constitutional standards. If the labour principle 
of flexibility allows the employer to make choices to follow based on a 
subjective evaluation of circumstances surrounding criminal misconduct, 
the inference in this central principle might be reversed. To this extent, there 
might exist punishment without law, thus basing punishment on undefined 
principles. 
If punishment is sanctioned by the LRA but turns out unfair due to the 
progressive discipline-oriented model of punishment followed by the 
employer criminal persecutions, it would be in rejection of CPA-enforced 
principles. These CPA principles are subjected to the application of section 
35 of the Constitution. Entrenched in section 35 principles of fairness 
negated by the employer approach are foundational criminal justice 
objectives. Included in section 35 principles are the seminal common law 
features of the principle of legality, evaluated in the earlier discussion, which 
enforce proportionality. 
As opposed to an objective standard mandated by criminal persecution, the 
employer uses a subjective analysis of the matter. Earlier in this thesis, 
employer decisions have been found to be based on the test whether the 
criminal act committed by an employee renders the continuation of the 
employment relationship intolerable. 801  Subject to this evaluation, is the 
employer’s pursuit of the master and servant founded principle in breach of 
 
800  nulla poena sine lege principle. 
801 Item 3(4) of Schedule 8 to the LRA. 
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relationship of trust. As opposed to the need to attain proportionality, the 
employer will make its determination of whether the employee charged with 
a criminal misconduct is guilty of such a criminal misconduct based on the 
discretion as to whether the employer’s trust has broken down to the extent 
that the employer and employee relationship is untenable. 
There are four principles that follow from the fundamental principle that 
associates punishment and law. The first to chronologically follow is the 
common law principle that relates furthermore, that persons may be found 
guilty by courts only where the type of conduct performed is classified as 
crime under the appropriate law. 802 This means that courts or tribunals may 
never create punishment for a crime if that crime is not defined, 803 
suggesting a human right purported by section 35 of the Constitution that 
the accused have a right to fair trial and are immune from convictions that 
could result from actions that were not offenses at the time of the alleged 
conduct. 804  The subsequent analysis that sheds to light the shortcomings 
of flexibility in the constitutional context will reveal the principle of ius 
praevium805, which speaks in the same accord.  
The third principle of ius certum806 demands that there ought to be a clear 
formulation of crimes. The ius certum807 principle is against punishing a 
transgressor based on legal prescripts that are ambiguous. Types of crimes 
 
802 See Ramosa R (2009) 3 SACJ 553. As well read Shannon H (2007) 20 SACJ78 at 
81; Snyman C R Criminal Law (2008) 46-7. 
803 See Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA). 472g-h. 
804 See Ramosa R (2009) 3 SACJ 553. As well read Shannon H (2007) 20 SACJ78 at 
81; Snyman C R Criminal Law (2008) 46-7. 
805 Equated to the section 35(3)(1) right against conviction of an offence based on an 
act or omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the 
time of its commission or omittion. See Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 
(2) SACR 435 (CC) at paras 51 to 52 Snyman C R Criminal Law (2014) 39-49. As well 
read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
806 Consider section 35(3) to the effect that vague or uncertain legislative constitutes no 
crime. Hanid 1950 (2) SA 592 (T) held that ambiguous acts must be interpreted in favor 
of accused. Also see Snyman C R Criminal Law (2014) 39-49 as well as Katz L etal 
(eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
807  Can be inferred from the constitutional right to fair trial, in particular section 35(3) to 
the effect that crimes should be clearly defined and not vaguely presented. Consider 
Snyman C R Criminal Law (2014) 39-49 As well as Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of 
Criminal Law 193-195. 
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and related types of punishments must be clearly defined in law. This 
principle tallies with the “void-for-vagueness doctrine” explained by Katz L, 
Moore M S and Morse S J.808  According to this doctrine, legislatures are 
required to frame acts with enough clarity to enhance understanding. 
Vagueness of a law raises ambiguity and breeds inconsistencies between 
statutory provisions. Such vague law remains a slippery slope for it cannot 
be comprehended as to what categories of behaviour are entailed in its 
provisions. Ambiguous laws cause individuals who seek to apply them to 
ponder on defaulting the due process of law. It breeds inequalities in the 
application of law. Enforcement officials whose discretion relies on such 
ambiguous prescripts would be descending into a Pandora box of 
discrimination. Their penultimate justice will be disproportionate. 
The last principle to follow from the fundamental nulla poena sine lege is 
the ius strictum. This 809principle calls for a strict interpretation of a crime. 
Ius strictum 810principle in punishment is to the effect that the statutes 
criminalising acts and omissions that are lax and breeding ambiguity must 
be strictly interpreted. The courts and tribunals dealing with such laws 
cannot by analogy extend the rationale of the statute beyond its limits. In 
the light of the constitutional principle of fairness, the interpretation of 
relaxed or too broad statutes must fit the South African objectives of 
criminalisation expressed in section 35 of the Constitution.  
In satisfaction of the rationale for the principle of legality regarding 
criminalisation and punishment of perpetrators, all the above stated 
principles are echoed in the subsequent processes of punishment to 
individuals who are alleged to have committed criminal acts.  
 
808 Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. Also refer to Snyman C R 
Criminal Law (2014) 39-49.  
809 See court decisions to this effect in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 
(2) SACR 435 (CC) at paras 51 and 52 read with S v Masiya 2006 2 SACR 357 (T) para 
61 as well as S v Mshumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E). Read Snyman C R Criminal Law 
(2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
810 Expressed in Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions 2007 2 SACR 435 (CC) at 
paras 51 and 52 read it with S v Masiya 2006 2 SACR 357 (T) para 61 as well as S v 
Mshumpa 2008 1 SACR 126 (E). Also read Snyman C R Criminal Law (2014) 39-49. 
As well, read Katz L etal (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
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Snyman,811explained the rationale for this link to be a connection to policy 
consideration emphasising on the prior warning of people. Thus, the law 
lets people know that certain acts are legally criminalised and therefore 
punished in a particular way so that they do not commit such acts or else 
be ready to suffer specified consequences if they commit the prohibited 
acts.  It can be argued that through these well-established procedures, 
people are forewarned as to the processes to be followed in dealing with 
the persons who committed criminalised acts or omissions.  
Neatly couched by Katz L, Moore M S and Morse S J,812 the principle of 
legality is dependent on four values, namely, fairness, liberty, democracy 
and equality. Concomitant to the above discussion on legality, Katz L, 
Moore M S and Morse S J,813  argued that the principle of legality does not 
classify as fair a law that abruptly criminalises acts or omissions which were 
not so criminalised at the time perpetrated.814 They added that such law 
would surprise citizens. They are also of the view that legality is prone to 
law that protects individual liberty. This is true because, through this virtue, 
the content of the criminal law is made known to citizens in advance and 
well enough so that they can account for their transgressions.  
Katz L, Moore M S and Morse S J,815  also align the nature of criminal law 
to authority as they reckoned that criminal sanction ought to emanate from 
appropriate authority. Only the elected legislature ought to decide what is 
and what is not criminal. Legality is against courts and tribunals that make 
 
811 Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
812  Katz L e tal (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193 at 194-195. Also see Snyman C 
R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49.  
813 Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well read Katz L etal (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law 193 at 194-195. 
814 Similarly, Ramosa R 2009 SACJ   353-370,  at 370, argues that an attempt to punish 
what was not subject to punishment at the time of commission is against the constitutional 
rule of law. The same argument comes from Snyman CR 2007 SALJ 677 at 677-678 who 
considered the constitutional court’s decision to positively find the accused guilty of 
committing an act which was not criminalised under common law nor statutory law  as an 
overstep of judicial function and therefore violating the principle of legality that no man must 
be punished without the law. Law first and punishment later Snyman and Ramosa argue. 
815 Snyman C R Criminal Law (2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L etal (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law 193 at 194-195. 
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a conduct criminal and punish it without statutory authorisation. Adding on 
to their perspective, it is not one of the rationales of the principle of legality 
that criminals are arbitrarily differentiated. Similar criminal acts and 
omissions are not to be investigated, prosecuted and punished differently 
under different laws. Concisely, punishment of legislated criminal acts and 
omissions must be prospective, general, clear, consistent, verifiable, strictly 
construed, and be under defined law. 816  The processes entailing employer 
criminal investigations and subsequent dismissal processes do not observe 
these principles even though they seek to discipline criminal misconducts 
of employees suspected of criminal misconducts.   
 
3 2 4 1 The principle of legality in punishment of criminal 
misconducts 
The maxim nulla poena sine lege, meaning no punishment without law,817 
expresses the rationale for punishment in that it requires punishment to 
conform to specific standards.818 Thus in law, punishment for alleged 
criminal conducts should not result from circumstantial whims alone but 
must be based on well-defined principles.819  
As explained earlier, the four major facets of the nulla poena sine lege  
principle 820 apply across all stages of a constitutionally justified criminal 
persecution.821 It is submitted that, even though employers hope at labelling 
employees suspects with dishonesty (and thereby charge criminal suspects 
within crimes prescribed in the CPA crime schedules822) employer criminal 
investigations procedures and dismissal processes for employees 
 
816 Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well read Katz L etal (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law 193 at 194-195. 
817 Refer to chapter two paras 2 2 to 2 2 4 2. 
818Refer to chapter two paras 2 2 to 2 2 4 2.  
819 Refer to chapter two paras 2 2 to 2 2 4 2. 
820 Read chapter two para 2 2 4 1 on the theory of proportionality and its extent of 
application in criminal misconduct discipline. The four facets referred to are ius 
acceptum; ius praevium; ius certum and ius strictum. 
821 In terms of section 35 of the Constitution read with the CPA. 
822 Schedules I-III of the CPA were 2 2 4 2 described to be containing acts of dishonesty 
which are considered criminal misconducts  in labour law. 
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suspected of criminal misconducts do not follow the proportionality-based 
CPA procedures. Rather these procedures and processes follow the LRA 
relaxed processes with the aim of satisfying employer flexibility.823 As seen 
earlier,824 flexibility does not observe the principle of legality based on 
proportionality.  
It is argued that as employer criminal persecution is based on Item 4 of the 
LRA which complies with a flexible procedure, it however, does not comply 
with specific criminal procedural standards as criminal punishment ought to 
be, if following the CPA criminal punishment based on proportionality. In the 
circumstances, the employer could exercise discretion and give two 
employees who committed the same criminal misconduct different types of 
punishments.825 
 
3 2 4 1 1 The application of iu acceptum principle to punishment 
With regard to punishment, iu acceptum rule denotes that an accused 
person must be punished in terms of a defined law, be it common law or 
statutory law.826Thus it would be against the rule of law for a court to create 
punishment for a crime that does not exist in law.827 With reference to 
constitutional criminal justice, section 35(3)(l) supports the rationale of this 
principle. This section mandates that accused persons have a right to fair 
 
823 Chapter two of this thesis makes a distinction between flexibility based criminal 
percecution and proportionality based criminal percecution. See paras 2 2 4 1 on the 
theory of proportionality and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline 
and 2 2 4 2 on the theory of flexibility and its extent in criminal misconducts discipline.  
824 See paras 2 2 4 1 on the theory of proportionality and its extent of application in 
criminal misconduct discipline and 2 2 4 2 on the theory of flexibility and its extent in 
criminal misconducts discipline. 
825 On this differentiation, see Metcash Training Ltd t/a Metro Cash and Carry v Fobb & 
Another 1998 19 ILJ (LC); Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v 
Komwayo 1992 13 ILJ 573 LAC.  
826 See Malgas 2001 1 SACR 469 (SCA). 472g-h. 
827 See Ramosa R “The Limits of Judicial Law Making in the Development of Common 
Law Crimes: Revisiting the Masiya Decisions” (2009) 3 SACJ 553. As well read Hoctor 




trial, including the right not to be convicted for acts or inactions, which were 
never offences at the time of the alleged conduct.828 
The undefined employer criminal misconduct investigations are a scenario 
of an undefined law contrary to what the iu acceptum rule denotes. The 
ensued sanctions based on these devoid criminal investigations are anti-
constitutional human rights-based objectives. They are an antithesis to the 
rule of law envisaged in the Constitution.  
  
3 2 4 1 2  The application of ius praevium principle to punishment 
Ius praevium829 principle nullifies retrospective punishment regarding 
alleged acts and inactions of criminal nature. Thus, in pursuit of the right to 
fair trial, no one must be punished of criminal acts or omissions which were 
never declared illegal by law at the time of their conduct. Snyman,830 
reasoned that the rationale for section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution 
incorporates this principle in its provision that accused persons cannot be 
convicted for acts or omissions that were not offences under either national 
or international law at the time of their commission.831 
Even though the employer bases its allegations for misconducts on well-
established crimes the employer’s way of punishment is marred with 
ambiguities to the extent that the employee may be proactively condemned 
without establishing the commission of a valid criminal act. The fact that the 
employer bears no duty of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
employee committed the alleged acts of crime is closely connected with an 
illegality that an employee is dismissed without establishing all elements of 
the alleged crime. That is indeed tantamount to retrospective justice 
prohibited by the ius praevium principle. 
 
828 Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law 193-195. 
829 Entrenched in section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution.  
830Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law 193-195.  
831 Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations 




3 2 4 1 3 The application of ius certum principle to punishment 
 The ius certum832 principle is against punishing a transgressor based on 
legal prescripts that are ambiguous. Types of crimes and related types of 
punishments must be clearly defined in law. This principle tallies with the 
“void-for-vagueness doctrine” explained by Katz L, Moore M S and Morse 
S J.833  According to this doctrine legislatures are required to frame acts 
with enough clarity to enhance understanding.  
It is argued that vagueness of a law raises ambiguity and breeds 
inconsistencies between statutory provisions. Such vague law remains a 
slippery slope for it cannot be comprehended as to what categories of 
behaviour are entailed in its provisions. Ambiguous laws cause individuals 
who seek to apply them to ponder on defaulting the due process of law. It 
breeds inequalities in the application of law. Enforcement officials whose 
discretion relies on such ambiguous prescripts would be descending into a 
Pandora box of discrimination. Their penultimate justice will be 
disproportionate. 
It is argued further that employers’ exercise of too wide discretions as in the 
investigation and dismissals of employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts works contrary to the principle ius certum. Too much discretion 
is left to the employers as to how to investigate as the process to follow is 
not prescribed with definite criminal procedure processes but the LRA. As 
seen earlier, the LRA fairness processes are based on flexible and informal 
measures disregarding the principles of proportionality. These processes 
breed inequalities. First, the possibility that employees who committed 
similar criminal misconducts are punished differently. Second, that 
employee criminal suspects are not afforded fair rights as other ordinary 
criminal suspects who are treated within section 35 fair rights. 
 
832  Entrenched in section 35(3) of the Constitution. See Snyman C R Criminal Law  
(2014) 39-49 As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
833 Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations 




3 2 4 1 4  The application of ius strictum principle to 
punishment 
Ius strictum 834principle in punishment is to the effect that statutes 
criminalising acts and omissions and yet are too lax and breeding ambiguity 
must be strictly interpreted.835 The courts and tribunals dealing with such 
laws cannot by analogy extend the rationale of the statute beyond its 
limits.836 In the light of the constitutional principle of fairness, the 
interpretation of relaxed or too broad statutes must fit the South African 
objectives of criminalisation expressed in section 35 of the Constitution 
discussed above. 837  
It is submitted that the initiative to seek to deal with matters of a criminal law 
nature within the LRA (as in the employer criminal investigations and 
dismissals) creates massive challenges. Against the principle ius strictum, 
employers act within too relaxed prescripts offering processes marred with 
ambiguities. Within these unclear processes, there is a possibility that 
instead of operating within the constitutional limits in following the LRA 
employers’ discretion is extended beyond constitutional demands.  
The obvious situation regarding employer criminal investigations and 
hearings on matters of a criminal law nature is the employer’s failure to 
observe employee criminal suspects’ individual rights within fairness 
principles entrenched in section 35. Employers’ power to investigate 
criminal misconducts and to dismiss employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts by far overlook South African objectives of criminalisation 
expressed in section 35 of the Constitution. In these circumstances, it is trite 
 
834 Entrenche in section 35(3) of the Constitution. Read Snyman C R Criminal Law  
(2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations of Criminal Law 193-195. 
835 Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well, read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law  193-195. 
836 Snyman C R Criminal Law (2014) 39-49. As well read Katz L et al (eds) Foundations 
of Criminal Law 193-195. 
837Snyman C R Criminal Law  (2014) 39-49. As well read Katz L et al (eds)Foundations 
of Criminal Law  193193-195.  
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to relate that the employers’ criminal investigative procedures and 
subsequent dismissal hearings are unfair and therefore unconstitutional. 
 
3 2 4 2 Effects of criminal persecution on perpetrators of 
criminal misconducts 
Criminal persecution pursues from the time an individual is identified as a 
perpetrator and is maintained throughout punishment. Nevertheless, even 
long after the law had taken its toll, the stigma of being considered a criminal 
remains.838 Like Keller S K & Harris M P839 reckoned, this stigma is long 
lasting because it becomes a barrier to the condemned transgressor.  South 
African labour law jurisprudence840 reveals that previous criminal pursuits 
remain a decisive factor as to whether a person can be re-employed after 
the commission of a criminal misconduct.841 
 
838 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 9 BLLR 995 (LAC); Fipaza v Eskom 
Holdings Ltd and Others (JR 2220/08) [2010] ZALC 66; 2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) (6 May 
2010) Fipaza N P v Eskom Holdings LTD  & Others ; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and 
Others (JA 56/10) [2012] ZALAC 40; 2013 4 BLLR 327 (LAC); 2013 34 ILJ 549 (LAC); 
Absa Makelaars (Edms) Bpk v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk & another 2003 
24 ILJ 1484 (LC) . As well, read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 6. 
839De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 9 BLLR 995 (LAC); Fipaza v Eskom 
Holdings Ltd and Others (JR 2220/08) [2010] ZALC 66; 2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) (6 May 
2010) Fipaza N P v Eskom Holdings LTD  & Others ; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and 
Others (JA 56/10) [2012] ZALAC 40; 2013 4 BLLR 327 (LAC); 2013 34 ILJ 549 (LAC); 
Absa Makelaars (Edms) Bpk v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk & another 2003 
24 ILJ 1484 (LC) . As well, read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 6.    
840 De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 9 BLLR 995 (LAC); Fipaza v Eskom 
Holdings Ltd and Others (JR 2220/08) [2010] ZALC 66; 2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) (6 May 
2010) Fipaza N P v Eskom Holdings LTD  & Others ; Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and 
Others (JA 56/10) [2012] ZALAC 40; 2013 4 BLLR 327 (LAC); 2013 34 ILJ 549 (LAC); 
Absa Makelaars (Edms) Bpk v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk & another 2003 
24 ILJ 1484 (LC) . As well, read Keller S K and Harris M P 2005 Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 6.  
841Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 1999 20  ILJ 2133 (LC) read it with Wyeth SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Manqele & Others 2005 26 ILJ 749 (LAC) ; Auret v Eskom Pension & Provident 
Fund 1999  20 ILJ 2133 (LC);  De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v CCMA 2000 9 BLLR 
995 (LAC); Fipaza v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others (JR 2220/08) [2010] ZALC 66; 
2010 31 ILJ 2903 (LC) (6 May 2010) Fipaza N P v Eskom Holdings LTD  & Others ; 
Eskom Holdings Ltd v Fipaza and Others (JA 56/10) [2012] ZALAC 40; 2013 4 BLLR 
327 (LAC); 2013 34 ILJ 549 (LAC); Absa Makelaars (Edms) Bpk v Santam 
Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk & another 2003 24 ILJ 1484 (LC) . As well, read Keller S 




However, as far as criminal justice in pursuit for proportionality is concerned, 
there are principles emphasising consistency in dealing with matters of a 
criminal law nature which serve to mitigate the harsh effects of criminal 
labelling. These principles are well organised under common law,842 
statutory law843 and constitutional law844 consecutively. The reverse is the 
starting point for the application of these principles, hence the phrase 
constitutional criminal procedure. Constitutional criminal procedure must be 
aligned with common law theories of punishment for criminal behaviour to 
mitigate the impact of criminal labelling.845 
 
3 2 4 3 The rationale for punishment in matters of a criminal law 
nature 
As opposed to condemnation in the state of nature prior to social contract, 
punishment under constitutional criminal justice must be balanced. As 
indicated before, the rationale for the punishment of criminal behaviour 
within constitutional demands aims at attaining proportionality. 846 It is 
submitted that within these constitutional demands, proportionality in 
criminal punishment has four aspects of concern.847 Firstly, it avenges the 
 
842 The previously referred to maxim of nulla poena sine lege and its subsidiaries actus 
non facit reum nisi mens sit rea 
843 The Major Act is the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
844 In particular, section 35 of the Constitution. 
845 Discussed in chapter two at para 2 2 3 dealing with the impact of criminal labelling. 
846 Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1. Marshall Natural 
Justice 12. Criminal proceedings are mainly related to the principle nemo judex in 
proprea causasua which literally means that human beings should not take the law upon 
themselves but they must follow a just course. Also see Burchell et al Burchell E M and 
Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure at 53ff, who emphasise on the principle 
nulla poena sine lege.  Also read Van Zyl D S in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of 
South Africa para 28-1 who explains that;  
in respect of punishment the principle has at least two implications. 
First, penalties themselves should be reasonably precisely defined. 
Secondly, the imposition of such penalties should be governed by clear 
legal rules, which themselves should meet the requirements of the 
principle of legality. 
847 Consider Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1 read 
together with Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
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offended.848 Secondly, it rehabilitates the offender with the intention to make 
the offender a new person.849 In the third place, it shows by example that 
criminal acts are consistently punishable and fourth, it sets a precedent that 
prevents future behaviour. 850 Successfully punishing the offender brings 
change to those who transgress and maintain the social contract rationales 
discussed above.851 The suggestion of criminal persecution is,  in doing so 
that perpetrators ought to be punished in order to be reformed; it is not that 
they should be perpetually condemned. 852  
The guiding principles for a proportional punishment are entrenched in 
section 35 of the Constitution. These are principles embodying fair 
procedure in criminalisation of individual behaviour. They prescribe steps to 
be followed for reaching a proportional punishment. The constitutionally 
entrenched fair procedure principles assign duties to concerned authorities 
to follow specified principles. Considering these duties, the courts that 
impose punishment must mould appropriate punishment through a 
sentence. Judicial sentences must be based on all the circumstances of the 
case. Thus, the involved circumstances ought to relate to the inception of 
the allegation, the investigation stage, the trial stage and the post-conviction 
stage.  
The ultimate sentence should be fair in that it is neither too light, nor too 
severe.  An appropriate sentence should reflect the severity of the crime, 
while at the same time giving full consideration to all the mitigating and 
aggravating factors surrounding the person of the offender; in other words, 
the sentence should reflect the blameworthiness of the offender, or be in 
 
848 Consider Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1 read 
together with Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
849 Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1 read together with 
Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
850 Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1 read together with 
Terblanche S S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 348-349. 
851 Consider, Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1 read 
together with Terblanche S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa. 2007, 348-349. 
852 See Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 28-i para 28-1 read together 
with Terblanche S the Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2007 348-349. 
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proportion to what is deserved by the offender as formally prescribed by the 
law. 
By adhering to the constitutionally entrenched principles of fairness, courts 
are expected to pass a “proper” sentence while giving full reasons for their 
decision to find the transgressor guilty. Their decision to convict is very 
important because it lays a basis for the sentence that the court ultimately 
passes.853 As to what constitutes a “proper sentence” varies from case to 
case and probably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.854   
For instance, the court ought to consider the crime, the criminal and the 
offended comprising of the victim and the interests of society to find a 
proportionate sentence.855  That sentence ought to objectively best balance 
the mentioned considerations with retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and 
incapacitation. This is necessary so that an imposed sentence aligns with 
proportionality principles. In the case of employer criminal investigations 
and hearings based on criminal misconduct, the sentence would barely 
meet the proportionality principles because the inception of the proceedings 
would be based on the wide discretion of the employer grounded on 
flexibility. 
du Toit et al,856 when explaining the aspect of criminal proceedings within 
the determination of fair dismissal, exposes the predicament embedded in 
the employer investigation demands for fairness. 
According to du Toit et al,  
A number of issues arise if the employer alleges that the conduct of an 
employee amounts to a criminal offence.857 Parallel process may take 
place where an employee faces disciplinary and criminal proceedings 
 
853 See section 146 (a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; S v Immelm 1978(3) 
SA 726(A) 729 B: R v Van der Walt 1952 4 SA 382 (A) 383 D; R v Henbsch 1953 2 SA; 
S v Masuku 1985 (3) SA 908 (A) 912 F. 
854 Jurisdiction of a court determines the extent and nature of the sentences which it 
may impose. 
855 The element of the interest. 
856 du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law  461. 
857 Grogan J 2001 EL 14; du toit D 2003 Labour Law News and CCMA Reports 12; 
Mohlala v Citibank 2003 5 BLLR 455 (lC); Van Eyk v Minister of Correctional Services 
2005 6 BLLR 1106 (EC).  
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arising from the same or similar facts. The guiding principle is that such 
processes are separate and independent of each other. An employee 
may thus assert a right to silence during internal proceedings and ask 
for such proceedings to be postponed pending the conclusion of the 
criminal trial. An employer is not, however, obliged to grant such a 
request.858 The rationale would be that workplace fairness demands 
greater promptness and it is inappropriate that criminal proceedings, 
over which the employer has no control, should delay the conclusion of 
internal process. It follows that the employee who asserts the right to 
silence in internal proceedings bears the risk of an adverse result. An 
employer should, however, alert the employee to the right to remain 
silent if criminal charges have been laid. 
 
Embedded in this understanding is that the LRA’s main demand with regard 
to fairness, which means that the employer affords the employee a fair and 
reasonable opportunity to speak  against the allegations, oblivious of the 
inherent constitutional right to remain silent, which supersedes verbal 
defence and is the most relevant in this context. As mentioned in chapters 
one and two, the entailed flexibility principle is maintained through satisfying 
just one leg of the natural justice fairness principles—audi alteram partem 
and not the second leg nemo judex in propria causa sua.  
It can be argued that this approach is tantamount to haste criminal justice.  
If the employee’s communication with the employer is in the positive, 
meaning that the employee’s presentation amounts to a guilty plea to the 
crime at issue, the employer takes heeds and makes a conclusion as to 
what sanction to impose. This determination may be influenced by the 
implied mitigation within the employee’s presentation. Based on the 
employer investigative findings and the employee mitigation, the employer 
would then determine fair reason to dismiss.859  
 
858 Davis v Tip NO 1996 1 SA 1152 (W); Straub v SA Barrow NO 2001 6 BLLR 679 
(LC); Fourie v Amatola Water Board 2001 22 ILJ 694 (lC). 
859 National Union of Mineworkers & others v Durban Roodepoort Deep Ltd 1987 8 ILJ 
156 (IC) at 164-165. 
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Indicatively, employer’s investigation serves a further purpose. It goes 
beyond a fact-finding mission. It extends to an assessment of competing 
versions of employer and employee. It can be argued that it has a dual 
purpose: that of determining the validity of the charges against the 
employee and that of determining an appropriate sanction in the context of 
the principle of ‘fairness’ within the limited LRA demands. Fundamentally 
that means that even if the “facts speak for themselves”, and the conduct of 
the employee is in the circumstances so obvious as to appear to render a 
hearing unnecessary, an employee is still entitled to a hearing to give 
meaning to the “audi alteram partem” principle only. 
Within the LRA, ‘fair reason’ envisages the disclosure of charges, employee 
and employer representation of relevant information, the consideration of 
evidence in support of employer allegation and in defence of such 
allegations by the employee, as well as evidence tendered by the employee 
in mitigation860 and given by the employer aggravation of the sentence.  This 
process exposes a compressed approach to criminal justice, prone to the 
exclusion of essential section 35 protections in matters of a criminal law 
nature. As opposed to what criminal justice requires, the LRA enshrined 
fairness process, legitimises workplace decision originating from an 
objective and independent consideration of employer views, in a process 
that encourages dialogue and reflection within flexibility limitations. This 
outlook discourages the employer from engaging in wider constitutional 
fairness perspective, which ought to remind the employer that an employee 
 
860 The significance of considering the personal circumstances of an employee or any 
evidence in mitigation has long been recognised. In Moahlodi v East Rand Gold & 
Unranium Co Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 597 (IC) at 605, the Industrial Court held that 
 “it is the duty of the person who presides over a disciplinary enquiry to 
obtain all relevant information about an employee’s personal 
circumstances as well as his service record, and if need be to lean over 
backwards in an effort to find other extenuating circumstances in the 
employee’s favour” and thereby to consider “alternative penalties 
appropriate to the circumstances of the case”. 
 This approach is recognised in item 3(5) of Schedule 8. 
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criminal suspect enjoys rights and protections like other criminal suspects 
within entrenched section 35 constitutional fairness requirements. 
 
 3 2 5  Constitutional principles underlying investigations of suspects 
of criminal acts 
Section 35 fairness requirements entrenched in the Constitution, bear their 
foundations within the historical foundations to the rule of law in South 
Africa. At the integral is the protection of well-established rights of criminal 
suspects as well as accused persons. Under South African law, the 
application of the principles protecting suspects in the course of criminal 
investigations is no longer doubted.861 Apart from them being common law 
principles,862 they are included in legislation863 dealing with evidence 
gathering,864 arrests and the prosecution of criminal trials.865 The apex is 
the constitutionally entrenched section 35(1) and 35(2) concerning the 
rights of suspects as well as the right to privacy.866 
Both the right against self-incrimination and the right to remain silent found 
the rights of criminal suspects spelled out in the Constitution. They both 
have procedural and substantive law implications for criminals. ‘The South 
African courts have characterized the silence principle as one ‘integral to a 
fair [process]’867 and as a protection for the ‘fundamental freedom and 
dignity’868 of an accused person.’869 In the event that the employer 
 
861See how this law used to be doubted before it was constitutionalised in South Africa 
by reading Hiemstra V J 1963 SALJ 187. Also see Theophilopoulos C The right to 
silence and the privilege against self-incrimination in Chapters 2 and 4 relating to 
the discussion on theories for and against these principles.  
862 S v Daniëls 1983 3 SA 275 (A); S v Lwane 1966 2 SA 433 (A); R v Camane 1925 
AD 570 at 575. 
863 Read sections 196(1)(a) and 203 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
864 The admissibility of evidence gathered by unconstitutional means is always doubted 
and invokes the exercise of constitutional discretion from the judiciary. See section 
35(5) of the Constitution. 
865Sections 196(1)(a) and 203 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
866 Section 4 of the South African Constitution. 
867Osman v Attorney-General Transvaal 1998 (4) SA 1224 (CC) at 1229F per Madala 
J.  
868 Thebus v S 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 at 1121 para 54 per Moseneke J. 
869 See Theophilopoulos C 2006 SALJ 516. 
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investigation processes and hearing procedures fail to recognise the need 
for respecting employee criminal suspects rights entrenched in section 35 
of the Constitution, including employee criminal suspects’ right to remain 
silent, the employee has no alternatives offered under criminal justice 
procedure. The employee suspected of crime cannot appeal the employers’ 
decision because such procedure is not offered within the labour law 
prescripts.870 The right against self-incrimination is centre for criminal 
persecutions justification.871It insists on cautious and principled measures 
in gathering evidence as well as presenting the evidence before the 
presiding person who would ultimately condemn the persecuted.872  
 The observance of this right binds both the persecutor and the 
persecuted. Contrary to this constitutional requirement, the employer armed 
with flexibility in its criminal investigations chooses not to observe this right, 
leaving the employee at the peril of losing the protection. Such protections 
including the right against self-incrimination are considered trivialities in 
labour law.873 In terms of the principle against self-incrimination, the 
authority is bound to respect and not compel any person to give self-
incriminating evidence in criminal matters. It is this duty at law that binds 
criminal investigative teams to observe sections 203, 204 and 205.874 
Section 203 entrenches the common law privilege of refusing to answer 
self-incriminating questions.  
Based on sections 203 and 35, section 204 avails indemnity from 
prosecution for a suspect who later turns witness and gives self-
incriminating evidence before court. Section 205 regulates the procedure to 
be followed when sourcing information from potential section 204 
witnesses. Investigating police officers cannot, at will, extract self-
 
870 Evident to this is court jurisprudence concerning the proper recourse to this right. 
See Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 
1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). Also read Davis v Tip NO and Others 1996(1) SA 1152 (W). 
871 Entrenched in section 35(3) of the Constitution. 
872 Refer to the interrelationship between sections 203, 204 and 205 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  
873 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420. 
874 Of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
209 
 
incriminating evidence from a suspect or witness without authorisation 
through a subpoena issued by the magistrate. A person who holds 
incriminating information and refuses to release it to the police will be forced 
to do so under oath by means of a subpoena. For the secured information 
to be used as evidence, where the informant refuses to take the stand in a 
criminal trial, section 204 becomes applicable.  
In light of this procedure, it is clear that although there is some form of 
coercion when an individual is compelled to furnish incriminating 
information during an investigation, the nature of the privilege and the rights 
attached to it for protection against self-incrimination, mitigates the process 
to maintain fairness in this undertaking. To put it concisely, this privilege 
implies first, that information which from evidence against an individual’s 
innocence must be independent of an individual coerced into participation 
and that second, an individual has the right to remain silent. Based on these 
rights, suspects can refuse to answer questions put to them for fear of self-
incrimination. 
These rights are made operative by the surrounding processes in the 
investigation of criminal cases. Information that investigators use to find a 
criminal charge, ought to be secured through sanctioned legal means. The 
use of search warrants, amongst others, is essential to secure 
information.875 Furthermore, the suspect ought to secure legal 
representation for his or her interrogation.876 As Theophilopoulos reiterates: 
‘[t]he traditional silence principle is not a uniform one but a bundle of 
disparate and sometimes overlapping immunities which arise at different 
stages of the legal process.’877 In this way criminal investigations respect 
the due process of law.  
 
875 Edwards G 1966 JCLC 133. 
876 Edwards G 1966 JCLC 133. 
877 See Theophilopoulos above note 869. Also read R v Director of the Serious Fraud 
Office: Ex parte Smith (1993) AC 1 at 30–1 per Lord Mustill. For an analytical description 
of the Anglo-American right to silence, see Theophilopoulos C 2003 TSAR 258 and 
Theophilopoulos C 2002 SAJHR 505. 
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A different scenario is portrayed in employer criminal investigations and 
hearings for dismissals based on criminal misconduct. The employer, 
although bearing an upper hand in the employment relationship, is not 
subjected to the formal investigations prescripts and engages in informal 
investigation processes. The employer, who has well placed technology 
and financial muscle, searches and finds any information regarding the 
employee. Without legal limitations like those that apply under the CPA 
sanctioning criminal investigations processes, the substantial employer 
criminal investigative procedures which are left uncontrolled, pose prejudice 
against the employee, suspected of a criminal misconduct.  
Amongst others, the employer uses entrapments, such as tapping 
employee’s communication without the employee’s knowledge. Such 
information would include emails, telephone communications, faxes and 
many others that the employer can privately access. In so doing, the 
employer exposes the employee to self-incrimination and breaks the 
employee’s rights to privacy and silence while the employer pays no regard 
to the lawful processes regarding criminal case related access to 
information.878 
At worst is the employer’s ability to directly force the employee to make 
submissions and concessions regarding the criminal allegations without 
being bound to exercise due diligence normally exercised in criminal 
investigations.879 This was the situation in the case of Coetzer discussed in 
chapter four. It would therefore not be wrong to refer to these employer 
criminal investigations as draconian. Their nature renders them 
disrespectful of the due process of law as compared to criminal 
investigations under the C P A.   
Much like this scenario, is the decision by the Constitutional Court over a 
decade ago, in the case of Thebus v S. 880 This case exemplifies that 
 
878Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420.  
879 See Coetzer above note 160 para [24]. 
880 Thebus v S 2003 10 BCLR 1100 at 1128 para 81H per Goldstone and O’Regan JJ. 
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employer criminal investigations disrespect the delicate balance of the right 
to silence and the right against self-incrimination.881 The current situation in 
South African labour law is unlike the situation in the United States of 
America where defined jurisprudence882 surrounds the application of the 
right to silence, even in employer criminal investigations. 
Further, the secured evidence ought not to strictly comply with principles of 
admissibility of evidence or follow presentation of evidence principles 
mandatory in the criminal justice system. Regardless of the ensued 
procedural faults, this evidence therefore directly becomes the basis of the 
employer’s decision to dismiss the employee suspected of criminal 
misconducts.883 In the circumstances where the SAPS in terms of the CPA 
simultaneously perform investigations, there is a possibility that the 
employer obtained evidence may be an easy target.884   
 
3 2 6  Evidentiary principles underlying criminal liability 
The investigation stage discussed above, precedes the hearing stage. At 
the hearing, courts and tribunals are informed of the guilt of the transgressor 
through evidence. As far as criminal evidence is concerned, only relevant 
evidence would be admissible.885 Relevant evidence is evidence that 
speaks to the issues before courts.886 Thus each element of crime 
prescribed in the CPA schedules would have to be proven through evidence 
before an individual suspected and arraigned for a matter of a criminal law 
nature is held liable.887 The CPA prescribed that the standard of proof for 
 
881 Thebus v S 2003 10 BCLR 1100 at 1128 para 81H per Goldstone and O’Regan JJ. 
882 To name a few, see the reasoning in Garrity v. New Jersey  385 U.S. 493 
(1967);Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968);Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 
139 L.Ed.2d 695;Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64;U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174;U.S. v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87;Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43;Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 
883 See the case of Minister of Police v RM M & Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining 
Council Case no: JR56/14 discussed in chapter one.  
884Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420.  
885Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 50.   
886 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 50. 
887 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 613-614. 
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matters of a criminal law nature is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.888 Thus 
the criminal suspect cannot be held liable unless the allegation is proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.889  
Contrary to these requirements, employer criminal investigations and 
dismissal processes are based on flexibility and therefore do not observe 
formal principles. As a result, the employer is flexible to choose civil system 
of evidence. Evidence in labour law matters is measured on a balance of 
probabilities standard. In the end, the employee’s guilt may be inferred even 
if all elements of crime are not sufficiently proven.890 If in turn the employee 
is subjected to a proper criminal investigation and trial, the outcome of the 
criminal trial would not influence the decision of the employer. Even if on a 
higher scale, beyond a reasonable doubt the employee is found not guilty 
of a crime, the employer would not reinstate the dismissed employee. 
Alternatively, the employee cannot submit the evidence and outcome of the 
Criminal Court before the employer disciplinary committee.891 
 
3 2 7  The rationale for the “beyond a reasonable doubt standard” of 
proof in criminal persecution 
As opposed to employer criminal investigations founding criminal 
misconduct dismissals, proof requested in matters of a criminal law nature 
is proof beyond reasonable doubt and not proof on a balance of 
probabilities.892 This does not mean proof beyond the slightest doubt.893 
 
888 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 613-614. 
889 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 613-614. 
890Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams (a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC). 
891Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril  above note 6 at 839 and 841; 2006 27 ILJ 
1644 (LC) at 1653 and 1660; Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 20 ILJ 
2679 (LC); Markhams a Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 
2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC).  
892Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams (a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty) Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC). 
893 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC). 
213 
 
However, it is a requirement for a standard of proof higher than civil law 
standard of proof be used in employer criminal investigations.  
The proof that founds guilt for civil labour matters is on a balance of 
probabilities, as opposed to beyond a reasonable doubt required in proving 
guilt under the criminal justice system. This means that criminal misconduct 
of theft is prosecuted on a lesser standard when employer disciplinary 
processes are made to run on employees who committed criminal 
misconduct, than in case where theft is prosecuted in terms of the criminal 
procedure.894 Employer criminal dismissal hearings’ standard of proof 
cannot be equated to a prima facie proof required before a criminal suspect 
can answer to allegations.895 For this purpose, a higher standard of proof is 
required.896 This standard is attained when the accuser has managed to 
prove the accused’s commission of all elements of crime.897   
At the ultimate, before the accused is found to be guilty of theft, the accuser 
must give all evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.898 The accused must 
not be made to prove the accuser’s case but to defend himself against the 
accuser’s accusations.899  The main reason why criminal persecution 
demands this high standard of proof, is to guard against wrong persecution 
of innocent people.900 This rationale equates to the principle of 
 
894Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams (a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC).  
895Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams (a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145 (LC).   
896Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC). 
897 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420. 
898Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA &Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145 (LC). 
899 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 839 and 841 at 1653 and 
1660; Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams 
(a Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty) Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145 
(LC). 
900 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420; Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; 
Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & Others 1999 20 ILJ 2679 (LC); Markhams (a 
Division of Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145 (LC). 
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proportionality explained in chapter two.901 As indicated before, 
proportionality cannot be honoured where a criminal perpetrator is made to 
make a case against itself like it is in the case of employer criminal 
persecution where the employee is supposed to answer to its cause without 
regard to the principles of fairness, in particular the principle against self-
incrimination,902 implored in matters of a criminal law nature. Due to its roots 
in natural justice principles entailing fairness in matters of a criminal law 
nature, proportionality negates self-incrimination. 
 
3 3 The nature of the employer’s right to dismiss employees who 
committed criminal misconducts 
During the era of the LRA 28 of 1956, the previous labour law legislation, 
the Industrial Court took a turn from strict observation of natural justice 
principles which entailed fairness even in matters of a criminal law nature.903 
It maintained  the view that whilst the principle of a fair procedure was 
innately linked to the determination of a fair decision, the rules of natural 
justice could not be “applied mechanically or with the trappings of strict 
legalism.”904  It is submitted that the ensued approach emanates from the 
perspective that workplace governance, is by its nature characterised by an 
inherent flexibility. As seen in the previous chapter two, the essence of 
flexibility in workplace related matters amounts to the understanding that 
the daily direct interactions between employees and employers requires 
quick, efficient, fair and effective dispute resolution procedures.  Edwin 
Cameron905 explains the need for flexibility as follows: 
 
 
901 Chapter two part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality and its extent of 
application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
902 Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420.  
903 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652; Potgietersrus Platinum Ltd v CCMA & Others 
2006 9 BLLR 833 (LC) 838; 2006 27 ILJ 1644 (LC) at 1652; Markhams a Division of 
Foschini Retail Group (Pty)Ltd v Matji No & others 2003 11 BLLR 1145(LC). 
904 NAAWU v Pretoria Precision Castings (Pty) Ltd 1985 6 ILJ 369 (IC). 
904 Cameron E 1986 ILJ 185-186. 
905 Cameron E 1986 ILJ 185 -186. 
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Employers and employment conditions vary hugely in their 
circumstances, and to oblige a one-man trader to comply with the same 
procedures and formalities which may reasonably be expected from a 
mining operation employing tens of thousands would not only be 
impractical and unnecessary, it would also be unfair.  Just as the 
principles of natural justice – upon which the Industrial Court has 
increasingly begun to draw for its formulations - are flexible and have 
no precisely fixed content, so too the exact requirements of the right to 
a hearing before dismissal must depend on various considerations. 
 
But ‘flexibility’, as Cameron points out906, although appropriate in the context 
of industrial relations, “has its limits and these seem to lie along the 
boundaries of essential fairness.” 907 There is a possibility of differing 
arguments on this approach.  Whilst it can be argued that there is merit in 
this approach both from a practical and conceptual approach, there is also 
a possibility of a differing view.  
A positive perspective may entail that from a practical perspective, it allows 
an employer, with reference to the context in which it finds itself, to ensure 
that a fair process is implemented without all the trappings of formality or 
the strict application of the rules of evidence.  From a labour law conceptual 
perspective, the maintained jurisprudential principle of procedural fairness 
considers the nature of employment relations. By the same token, it also 
recognises the adaptability of the principle to suite the occasion and yet 
maintains the benefit for all participants to enjoy its essential content.  
However, if the same understanding that excludes formalities inscribing 
proportionality is adopted, from a criminal justice perspective there 
emanates injustice. The employer who ventures into administering criminal 
justice is expected to exercise cautions relevant in attaining criminal justice 
in order to satisfy fairness. Fairness from a criminal justice perspective 
entails the need to observe both principles of natural justice. At the centre 
 
906Cameron E 1986 ILJ 185, at 187. 
907Cameron E 1986 ILJ 185 -186. 
216 
 
of criminal justice is the need to satisfy proportionality in dealing with 
matters of a criminal law nature.  
The question is, does the LRA support the notion of ‘flexibility’ and if so, to 
what extent?  Section 188 imposes a statutory right to a fair procedure and 
expresses nothing more, apart from a reference to Schedule 8.  To that 
extent, the LRA upholds the idea of flexibility beyond a necessary extent 
and overrides proportionality necessary for criminal justice. Thereafter, 
Schedule 8 stipulates a range of factors that should be considered to 
determine whether a fair hearing has been afforded.  To that extent, and 
even in the context that Schedule 8 is a ‘guideline’, it establishes the 
minimum content of that right and effectively limits the extent of the 
flexibility, but not to the extent that the mandatory rationales in punishing 
criminal suspects are satisfied. This issue is explored further in the context 
of the examination of the constituent parts of the right, below. 
  
3 3 1 Content of the right to a fair procedure within the LRA 
Procedural fairness in terms of the LRA is dealt with in item 4 of the Code.  
The content of this right was initially articulated by the Industrial Court in the 
context of the previous Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956 and its “unfair 
labour practice” jurisdiction.908  Bulbulia in Mahlangu 909 indicated that a 
procedure which aims to promote the principle of fairness must include the 
general right to challenge “any statements detrimental to his credibility and 
integrity”, and specific rights, such as the right: 1) to be informed of the 
nature of the charges together with relevant particulars of the charge; 2) to 
a ‘timeous’ hearing; 3) to adequate notice of the hearing; 4) to 
representation; 5) to call witnesses; 6) to an interpreter; 7) to a finding and 
a sanction, if any, and reasons; 8) to have the previous record considered; 
and the right to an internal appeal.910 The right against self-incrimination is 
 
908 Read Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC 356-567. 
909 1986 7 ILJ 346 (IC). 
910 Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC 356-567. 
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however excluded. It may be argued that it is impliedly inferred although not 
binding to the employer. The employee may invoke it at its own prejudice. 
The employer may continue with the process without the employee’s 
involvement.911 
These requirements are now codified.  In contrast however, the 
requirements of a fair hearing previously referred to as ‘rights’912 are stated 
in ‘directory’ terms913 rather than ‘peremptory’ ones in the Code.  This is not 
surprising in the context that the Code provides guidelines only and does 
not give rise to rights in and of itself.914  Item 4 restates the general principle 
that the employee should be allowed the opportunity to state a case in 
response to the allegations against him.  In order to give meaning to this 
principle, Schedule 8, in addition, specifies the broad principles of a fair 
hearing915 in the following terms: 
The employer should ‘normally’ investigate to determine whether there 
are grounds for dismissal.  This does not need to be a formal enquiry; 
The employee should be informed of the allegations using a form and 
language that the employee can reasonably understand; 
The employee should be entitled to a reasonable time to prepare a 
response, and to assistance from a trade union representative or fellow 
employee; 
After the enquiry, the employee should be furnished with written 
notification of the decision and, if applicable, the reasons for the 
dismissal; 
If dismissed, the employee should be reminded of any rights to refer 
the matter to a council with jurisdiction or to the CCMA, or to any 
 
911 See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 213. 
912 Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
913 Item 4 uses the term ‘should’ rather than ‘must’. Something of a difference, in 
Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358 Bulbulia M 
refers to these as rights. 
914Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1997 10 BLLR 1320 
(LC); 1998 19 ILJ 635 (LC) 641G. Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
915 Item 4 of Schedule 8. Also read, Malelane Toyota v CCMA  1999 6 BLLR 555 (LC). 
218 
 
dispute resolution procedures established in terms of a collective 
agreement.916 
The labour law disciplinary process unfolds in accordance with section 23 
of the Constitution read with sections 185 and of the LRA. Section 23 of the 
Constitution entrenches the right to fair labour practices. This right covers 
several terrains of labour law including individual dismissal law. Thus, the 
right to fair dismissal is a constitutional right, entitling employees to fair 
conduct from employers. In effect, it ties down employer conduct to 
established constitutional fairness.  According to De Waal and Currie917   
under normal circumstances, Bills of Rights are intended to regulate 
legislation and public power and not private dealings. Based on the 
requirement in section 8 of the Constitution, read with section 23(1), it is trite 
to argue that unique to South African constitutional perspective of law, 
private dealings are also subjected to observing the Bill of Rights. 
In consonance with Cheadle’s918 observation that South African 
Constitution has introduced a sui generis right entrenching the right to fair 
labour practice,919  it can be argued that this right is an example, that from 
a South African constitutional law perspective, the Bill of Rights matter in 
every aspect affecting individual rights. 920 
Another indication regarding this right is that, the employer and employee 
dealings which under common law were considered issues of purely private 
concern have been subjected to constitutional rights scrutiny. It is argued 
 
916 Item 4 of Schedule 8. 
917Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
918Cameron E, Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act: 144-145.  
919 Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook at 501. 
920 This is not as such novel, taking into regard other common law countries 
perspectives. For example, American perspective on matters of a criminal law nature 
where employees are perpetrators is that the Fifth Amendment clause is observed. This 
clause emphasises the observance of proportionality principles similar to principles of 
fairness entrenched in section 35 of the constitution. 
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that this is in effect the constitutionally entrenched effort to marry public and 
private law which is a move accustomed with progressive systems.921 
It is submitted, further, that the rationale behind this is seen as an attempt 
to expand the individual employment relations from a narrow common law 
perspective so as to do away with the extent of inequalities between the 
employer and employee embedded in the nature of a private contract of 
employment. As shown earlier the employment contract embeds in its 
foundations the negative and imbalanced relationship of master and 
servant. Worldwide, this relationship has been mitigated through the 
observation of individual rights.922 
The need for the same attempt from a South African constitutional view is 
implied in Ngcobo J’s decision in the case of National Education Health and 
Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town.923 Ngcobo J even though 
seized with an appeal on the interpretation and application of the LRA with 
reference to the right of fair labour practice, examined section 23(1) of the 
Constitution.924  
He exposed the apprehended possibility of misinterpreting this right but 
recognised the relevance of both domestic and international experience in 
unpacking the content of the concept of fair labour practice. He held that fair 
labour practice is incapable of a precise definition due to the ensuing 
 
921Regarding the negative aspects of the divide between public and private law read 
literature on parallel investigations. See Coffee J C 1991 Boston University Law Review   
193 at 194 where he acknowledges the nature of criminal law. Regarding the possibility 
of prejudicial processes read Cheh M M The Hastings Law Journal Vol 42 1325. Also 
read Basdeo V 2013 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 303-326; 
McCastlain C J and Schooner L S 1986 Public Contract Law Journal 418-445. 
; Gonzalez L G Connelly B G and Eliopoulos E 1993 American Criminal Law Review 
1179-1220 at 1179; Hasset M J 1979 Washington and Lee Law Review 1049; Eckers 
S R 1998 Hofstra Law Review 109. 
922 See Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor   378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
Followed in M alloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) 
and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).  
923 2003 3 SA 1 (CC) paras 33-35. 
924 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 
(3) SA 1 (CC) paras 33-35. 
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tension between the interests of the employer and employee which it seeks 
to address.925  
He advised that a proper extrapolation of this right may be guided by the 
explanations in human rights instruments such as Conventions and 
Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation and other 
comparable foreign instruments such as European Social Charter.926 He 
observed that the right to fair labour practice seeks to maintain a balance of 
employer, employee interests.927 His observation does not expose an 
untoward approach but an approach that is human rights-based. It is 
opposed to the employer interest-centred approach interpretation. It 
advocates for the mitigation of both employer and employee rights.  
It is submitted that the need to balance the interests between employer and 
employee under the constitutional era invariably considers individual rights. 
On that basis, it is not constitutional fairness to overemphasise employer 
interests at the expense of employee constitutional rights as portrayed in a 
system that promotes flexibility and negates proportionality as sought in the 
current labour law fair dismissal jurisprudence.928 
In the context of this thesis, the chickens come to roost in the case where 
the interpretation of labour law fairness is sought from sacrificing 
entrenched fair rights like in the currently scrutinised employer criminal 
investigations powers and disciplinary processes on which the employer 
relies for investigating and hearing matters of employee criminal 
misconduct. 
Ironically, the jurisprudential interpretation of labour law fairness portrays 
that fairness excludes proportionality and promotes flexibility at the expense 
 
925 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 
3 SA 1 (CC) paras 33-35. 
926 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 
3 SA 1 (CC) paras 33-35. 
927 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 
3 SA 1 (CC) paras 33-35. 
928 du Toit et al Labour Relations Law at 23-28 and “Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Draft Labour Relations Bill, 1995” (1995) 16 ILJ 278. 
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of individual rights.929 Fairness enquiry in South African labour law bears a 
jurisprudence of ages even prior the Constitution.930 The reasoning of courts 
in labour matters prior the Constitution have played some major importance 
towards the current understanding.931 In Media Workers Association of 
South Africa and Others v Press Corporation or South Africa932 the 
Appellate Division933 held that a decision on a question of fairness is “the 
passing of a moral judgement 934on a combination of finding facts and 
opinions.”935  It went further to hold that “a fairness determination is a 
judgement made by a Court in light of all relevant considerations.  It does 
not involve a choice between permissible alternatives.” 936  
Consequent to this decision, the Appellate Division937 having considered 
the implications of moral or value judgement, determined an appropriate 
sanction for misconduct, found favour in the words of Cameron, Cheadle 
and Thompson938 when describing fair reason, to wit that,  
 
929 Including the following cases Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1998 11 
BLLR 1093 (LAC); Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and others 2001 9 BLLR 
1011 (LAC); Sidumo above note 180. (CC);Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA and others [2009] 11 BLLR 1128 (LC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd  2012 9 BLLR 
857 (LAC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA);Gold Fields Mining South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd; (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and others 2014 1 BLLR 20 (LAC). 
930 See for example, Moahlodi v East Rand Gold & Unranium Co Ltd 1988 9 ILJ 597 
(IC) at 605. 
931 per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak (1986) 7 ILJ 346 
IC at 357-358. As well, see  Davis v Tip No 1996 1 SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 G-
H. Applied from labour law perspective in Grogan J Workplace Law  (2017) 256; From 
a civil procedure perspective  in Cilliers A C , Herbstain J, Loots C; Nel HC  The civil 
practice  at page 757 and from a human rights perspective in Currie I & De Waal J  The 
Bill of Rights Handbook at 745.  
932Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation or South 
Africa 1992 4 SA 791 (A). 
933The Appellate Division made its decision in the context of the previous Labour 
Relations Act 28 of 1956. It was deciding on unfair labour practice. 
934 My emphasis. 
935 Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation or South 
Africa 1992 4 SA 791 (A) page 798 at para 25 per Perskor judgement. 
936 Media Workers Association of South Africa and Others v Press Corporation or South 
Africa 1992 4 SA 791 (A) at page 800 para 31 per Grosskopf JA. 
937 National Union of Mineworkers & others v Free State Consolidated Gold Mines 
(Operations) Ltd 1996 1 SA 422 (A) at 446G-I 1995 16 ILJ 1371 (A)] . 
938 Cameron E, Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act: at 144-
145.   
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A fair reason in the context of disciplinary action is an act of misconduct 
sufficiently grave as to justify the permanent termination of the 
relationship…. Fairness is a broad concept in any context, and 
especially in the present.  It means that the dismissal must be justified 
according to the requirements of equity when all the relevant features 
of the case including the action with which the employee is charged are 
considered.939 
Consistent with this interpretation is the Constitutional Court’s approach in 
the Nehawu940 matter where Ngcobo J held that “…what is fair depends 
upon the circumstances of a particular case and essentially involves a value 
judgement.”941 
The case of BMD Knitting Mills (Pty) Ltd v South African Clothing & Textile 
Workers Union942 decided within the constitutional era defined the concept 
of fairness as follows: 
The word ‘fair’ introduces a comparator that is a reason which must be 
fair to both parties affected by the decision.  To this extent the court is 
entitled to enquire as to whether a reasonable basis exists on which 
the decision, including the proposed manner, to dismiss for operational 
requirements is predicated.  Viewed accordingly, the test becomes less 
deferential and the court is entitled to examine the content of the 
reasons given by the employer, albeit that the employer is not directed 
to whether the reason offered is the one which would have been 
chosen by the court. Fairness, not correctness is the mandated test.943 
The case of Sidumo944 decided by the Constitutional Court 945 rejected the 
principle of employer reasonableness. This principle relates to a test 
whether a reasonable employer in the same employment situation as the 
 
939Cameron E, Cheadle H and Thompson C The New Labour Relations Act: at 144-
145. 
940National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and 
Others 2003 3 SA 1 (CC); 2003 2 BCLR 154 (CC) (NEHAWU) Para 33.  
941 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and 
Others 2003 3 SA 1 (CC); 2003 2 BCLR 154 (CC) (NEHAWU) Para 33. 
942 2001 22 ILJ 2264 (LAC). 
943 The court was dealing with dismissal for operational requirements. 
944Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
945 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79 . 
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current employer in dispute would also have dealt with the matter or issue 
the same way as the current employer. The court regarded it to be 
imbalanced. It considered the test as based on the perceptions and values 
of the employer side of the dispute and therefore placing emphasis on the 
interests of employers more than those of workers. If sustained, it would be 
parallel to possibly an employer objectionable test if applied vice versa as 
reasonable employee test. 
The Constitutional Court therefore set aside the previous decision that 
supported the employer reasonableness. Basing its decision from reading 
relevant provisions946 from the LRA, it clarified the powers of the 
commissioners in determining the fairness of a dismissal. According to this 
judgment, commissioners and arbitrators are impartial adjudicators who 
must determine whether the dismissal was fair in an impartial manner. 
Accordingly, the court decided it is the commissioner’s sense of fairness 
that must prevail and not the employer’s view.947 The Constitutional Court 
gave a guideline that in determining fairness of a dismissal certain 
requirements are mandatory, including; 
• the totality of the circumstances of the matter; 
• whether what the employer did was fair; 
• the importance of the rule that the employee breached; 
• the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal; 
• the basis of the employee’s challenge to the dismissal; 
• the harm caused by the employee’s conduct; 
• whether additional training and instruction may result in the employee not 
repeating the misconduct;  
• the effect of dismissal on the employee; 
• the long service record of the employee.948 
 
 
946 Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79. 
947 Sidumo above note 180 para75.  
948 Sidumo above note 180  paras 78-79. 
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As decided by the court949 the mentioned aspects, although mandatory 
considerations, are not determinative. The employer has a flexible way of 
complying with them. The commissioners must weigh all deciphered factors 
in order to reach a fair determination in the circumstances of matters before 
them. Commissioners ought to consider whether employers had managed 
to establish the factual basis or a fair reason for dismissing the employee. 
This means, that viewed objectively, the reason for the dismissal must be 
an act of grave or serious misconduct which warrants the permanent 
cessation of the employment relation or renders the continuation of the 
employment relationship intolerable, in the context of the balancing of all 
the factors identified by the Constitutional Court.950  
By way of example, where the conduct of the employee is found to be 
unacceptable, but the sanction of dismissal is in all the circumstances not a 
fair sanction,951 the dismissal will be substantively unfair.  Similarly, where 
the conduct of the employee is deemed unacceptable and the sanction of 
dismissal is in all the circumstances a fair sanction, the dismissal will be 
substantively fair.   
 
3 4  Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the South African jurisprudential expression 
of the nature of labour law fairness and has compared it to the nature of 
entrenched constitutional fairness principles dealing with matters of a 
criminal law nature. 
In anticipation, a study of fairness processes in South African labour law 
viewed in the light of proportionality and flexibility theories extrapolated in 
chapter two was eminent. The chapter has shown that while processes of 
fairness that are established952 in dealing with matters of a criminal law 
nature largely rely on the theory of proportionality, from the labour law 
 
949 Sidumo above note 180  paras 78-79.  
950 Sidumo above note 180  paras 78-79.  
951 Sidumo above note 180  paras 78-79. 
952 Found in the CPA and section 35 of the Constitution. 
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disciplinary perspective for matters of a criminal misconduct, processes of 
fairness greatly lean towards the theory of flexibility. 
What was deciphered from the above analysis was that the central objective 
of the current perspective of labour law fairness is to create an even balance 
between the competing interests of the employer and the employee so that 
both are guaranteed the right to fair labour practices. It was however sad to 
note that regarding dismissals emanating from criminal misconduct 
investigations the reverse is achieved. As mentioned in chapter two, an 
overemphasis on employer flexibility as opposed to proportionality 
accustomed in matters of a criminal law nature waters down the justified 
fairness for dealing with employee criminal suspects.  
It was indicated in chapter two that the nature of proportionality emphasised 
in the labour law jurisprudence is compromised because it is founded on 
informal proceedings. These informal proceedings were found not to be 
observing both principles of natural justice explained in chapters one and 
two. They were also found to ignore principles of fairness for criminal 
suspects entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution.  
This chapter has found that the basis for labour law fairness as far as 
employer investigations and disciplinary hearings are concerned is weak 
and unjustified. The chapter deems such a basis to be devoid of conscious 
regard to the Bill of Rights embracing constitutional justification of fairness. 
Labour law fairness was found unable to afford employee criminal suspects 
constitutional rights. It was found to create vast inequalities between 
criminal suspects within the wide constitutional fairness perspective. 
Consequently, in the light of constitutionally entrenched fairness principles 
for suspects of crime, the employers’ investigations pertaining to employees 
that are suspected of criminal misconduct and their subsequent disciplinary 
hearings for dismissal are viewed to be constitutionally unfair. 
Through the exposition of what transpires when dealing with criminal 
misconduct suspects within the labour law parameters against the 
established constitutional requirements of fairness associated with criminal 
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suspects, the employer investigations and hearings render noticeably 
unconstitutional consequences.   
The next chapter shows how the determination of fairness discussed in this 
chapter unfolds in matters where employees were suspected of criminal 
misconduct. Chapter four in effect shows the unconstitutional 
consequences of flexibility based criminal justice as opposed to 
proportionality based criminal justice. It is an illustration of how unfair and 
constitutionally unjustified it is to refuse employee criminal suspects of their 




The LRA disciplinary hearing processes for dismissal of employees 
who committed criminal misconducts and consequent challenges 
 
4 Introduction 
The previous chapter looked at the jurisprudential expression of the nature 
of labour law fairness. It interlinked it to the nature of constitutional fairness 
principles entrenched in section 35,953 in the context of dealing with 
employment disciplinary matters of a criminal law nature. It studied the 
nature of labour law fairness entrenched in section 23(1) in the light of 
constitutional fairness principles as understood from sections 33954 and 
35955 of the Constitution. 
Chapter three exposed the inequalities arising when dealing with criminal 
misconduct suspects within the labour law jurisprudential parameters. It has 
shown that labour law disciplinary processes for employee criminal 
misconduct suspects are against the established section 35 constitutional 
requirements of fairness associated with criminal suspects. As anticipated, 
the study of fairness processes in labour law viewed in the light of 
proportionality and flexibility became eminent. 
The chapter exposed that while criminal justice fairness relies greatly on the 
principle of proportionality, the labour law disciplinary perspective on 
fairness leans towards the principle of flexibility. From these revelations, it 
was exposed that in the light of constitutionally entrenched fairness 
principles for suspects of crime, employers’ criminal investigations 
pertaining to employees that are suspected of criminal misconducts and 
their subsequent disciplinary hearings for dismissal, border on constitutional 
unfairness. The conclusion from chapter three exposures is that, the 
 
953 Section 35 of the Constitution read with the CPA. 
954 Section 33 entrenches administrative fairness and is the umbrella provision for all 
administrative fairness including LRA related fairness. See Sidumo above note 180 
para 138. Read chapter 3 at part 3 1 dealing with the nature of the right to fair dismissal 
on the basis of a criminal misconduct.  
955Section 35 fairness is intended for a criminal justice perspective.   
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employer criminal investigations and subsequent disciplinary hearings do 
not express constitutional fairness entailed in matters of a criminal law 
nature because they bear inequalities between criminal suspects. 
Against the chapter three background, this chapter exposes that the 
adoption of the principle of implied breach of trust between employer and 
employee emanating from common law956 and now encapsulated in 
jurisprudential underpinnings of dismissal hearing processes promotes the 
idea that the employer has flexibility in determining disciplinary hearing 
processes.  Within this condition, the LRA disciplinary hearing processes 
for the dismissal of employees who committed criminal misconducts, even 
though dealing with matters of criminal law nature, do not observe criminal 
procedure based on section 35 entrenched fairness principles.  
While employers feel not bound by the prescripts of criminal justice, they 
lose sight of the holistic application of constitutional demands.957  Therefore 
there is a blatant disregard for the relevance of section 35 of the constitution 
regarding the treatment of employees who committed criminal misconduct 
as criminal suspects.  
Due to this, the extent of employer criminal investigations and subsequent 
disciplinary hearing processes are informal, and disregard formal processes 
proscribed in the CPA. This chapter ultimately exposes that the informal 
employer disciplinary hearing flaunts the essentialities of proportionality 
mandated in matters of criminal law nature.958 This circumstance culminates 
in multiple injustices for employees subjected to employer criminal 
investigations and their subsequent disciplinary hearings. 
 
 
956 Discussed in chapter two at part 2 2 4 2 dealing with the theory of flexibility and its 
extent in criminal misconducts discipline. 
957 Entrenched in section 35 of the constitution. 
958 Explained in chapter two at part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality and 
its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
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4 1 The determination of dismissal sanction on the basis of a 
criminal misconduct  
An employee who has been investigated for a criminal misconduct faces a 
penalty airing out of a disciplinary hearing. The hearing is eminent so that 
the employer determines whether dismissal would indeed be an appropriate 
sanction. In terms of Item 3(5) of the LRA Code, the employer would make 
consideration based on factors tabled in the hearing.  Since the hearing is 
informal, criminal procedure is not followed and rules of evidence are 
applied casually,959with undue premium placed upon the balance of 
probability. 
The circumstances that determine the resulting sanction of dismissal, 
instead of adhering to standard rules established under criminal justice 
processes, turn out in variety and dependent on the uniqueness of each 
case in question. Hence instead of determining whether the guilt of the 
employee has been proven beyond reasonable doubt, the presiding officer 
considers merely on a balance of probabilities only whether the allegation 
that the employee is a criminal has broken down the trust relationship 
between the employer and employee. As seen in Chapters one, two and 
three, the employers’ discretion plays a vital role in determining if the guilt 
of an employee may have adverse impact on the employer and employee 
relationship.  
The employer can then label the employee a thief and dismiss the employee 
if the employer feels that the relationship has broken down.960 Certain 
factors, either to a mitigating or an aggravating effect also play a role. These 
include factors such as the length of service that the employee provided 
 
959 Consider, the case of Minister of Police v RM M & Safety and Security Sectoral 
Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/14   discussed below in para 4 3.   
960 In that sense, two employees who have committed a similar criminal misconduct 
may be treated differently. One may be dismissed while the other is retained. See the 
cases of Anglo-American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komwayo, 1992 13 ILJ 
573 (LAC) and Donald Baphuthi v The CCMA and Others, Unreported case no 
J1901/99, Labour Court 1999. Referred to in chapter two part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the 
theory of proportionality and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
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before the alleged criminal misconduct.961 It would be divulged if the 
employee had had previous disciplinary records. The employee’s personal 
circumstances also matter, coupled with the nature of the job the employee 
was engaged in, the conditions surrounding the infraction and the degree 
of damage, meted out by the committed criminal misconduct to the 
employer and employee relationship.      
The employer is mandated to hold only one enquiry. In accordance with 
section 188(1)(a) the single enquiry is supposed to determine whether the 
sanction of dismissal is fair considering all the circumstances of the case. 
The determination of fairness in this account follows the approach 
extrapolated in chapter three, namely that which observes the audi alterum 
partem rule and against the judex in propria sua causa rule.  Having taken 
the decision to dismiss, the employer remains with the duty to show that 
both the reason for dismissal and the procedure assumed were fair within 
labour law standards explained in chapter three.962 
 
4 2 The process of discipline for suspects of a criminal misconduct 
In chapters one, two and three, the basis for employer criminal investigation 
has been explained as the initial step towards disciplining an employee 
suspected of criminal behaviour.963 As seen earlier, this serves as a 
foundational step to the process of discipline. Labour law disciplinary 
process unfolds in accordance to section 23 of the Constitution read with 
sections 185 and of the LRA. Chapter three exposed that a comprehensive 
understanding of what fair and unfair dismissals entail can be devised from 
reading Chapter VIII of the LRA and Schedule 8.  
 
961 See Anglo American Farms t/a Boschendal Restaurant v Komwayo, 1992 13 ILJ 573 
LAC  and Donald Baphuthi v The CCMA and Others, Unreported case no J1901/99, 
Labour Court 1999. Refer to chapter two part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of 
proportionality and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
962 Within the Sidumo guidelines. See chapter three part 3 1 discussing the nature of 
the right to fair dismissal on the basis of a criminal misconduct. Fairness in this respect 
relates to the substantive and the procedural fairness. Sidumo above note 180 paras 
78-79 . 
963 Within the LRA provisions in Chapter VIII read with Schedule 8.In particular item 4(1) 
of Schedule 8. 
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Chapter VIII of the LRA is composed of sections 185, 186 and 187 and 
188.964 These sections make a distinction between fair reason and fair 
procedure. Further, they serve as guidelines on how an aggrieved 
employee can claim relief in the case where an unfair dismissal is 
insinuated.  Furthermore, they provide remedies where any are available to 
a dismissed employee. In short, they contextualise the relationship between 
the employer’s reason for dismissing an employee and the process that the 
employer must follow in dismissing the employee. Thus, in effect, these 
sections prescribe the general approach to the disciplinary process without 
specifically outlining what fairness entails.  
The basic requirement is that employers ought to demonstrate both 
procedural and substantive fairness when disciplining employees for 
misconduct. There is no specific inference in these sections to the formal 
way of disciplining an employee. The ensued jurisprudence has leaned so 
much towards the avoidance of formal processes risking prejudices avoided 
within formal procedural processes. Such an approach means that an 
employer has unlimited discretion on how to run a disciplinary process. The 
leading Labour Court case of Avril 965 emphasised the need for the lack of 
formal procedure in employer disciplinary process. It held from labour law 
jurisprudential perspective that an internal disciplinary process shies away 
from being legalistic and that it adopts minimal procedural formalities. It 
does not differentiate between matters of criminal law nature and purely civil 
matters.966 
Basically, what Avril 967 argued for, was that the exclusion of formalities in 
the initial employer dismissal processes is not prejudicial because the 
ensued external arbitration process at the CCMA stands as a primary forum 
in determining disciplinary dismissal dispute.968 The CCMA therefore 
 
964  See chapter three, para 3 1 on the nature of the right to fair dismissal on the basis 
of a criminal misconduct. 
9652006 27 ILJ 1644 (LC) 44. 
966Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. 
967Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652.   
968Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. 
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engages in more formal processes to mitigate possible prejudice. It was the 
court’s observation that there is no benefit to either the employee or the 
employer to duplicate the formal hearing process, even if the result is the 
dismissal of the employee.969 This lack of formalities on employer 
investigations applies across board on labour matters including matters 
where employees are suspected of criminal misconduct.  
This reasoning can be criticised as not apprehending the possibility of 
prejudice that an informal approach to the investigation of an employee’s 
criminal guilt would pose. If an employer investigates an employee 
suspected of criminal misconducts but does not follow the normal 
precautions that are formalised in the investigation of crime, there is a 
blatant ignorance of fairness requirements regarding criminal suspects.970  
 
This thesis opposes the capacity of the CCMA to function as the ‘primary 
forum’ to determine fair procedure regarding the investigation of criminal 
misconducts. In effect in these cases the CCMA would only be confined to 
reviewing what the employer would have already done while engaging in 
informal processes.  
Due to the jurisprudential limitations on the CCMA, namely that it has to 
decide matters within the prescripts of the LRA and nothing more or less, it 
is impracticable even if it were possible to insist at that stage that a formal 
procedure encompassing fairness which observes proportionality principles 
as justice in matters of criminal law nature would demand, should resume 
at that later stage post-dismissal. 
In addition to the imposed limitations at the stage of review the CCMA would 
be seeking to unscramble the scrambled egg. Many of the precautions 
observed within proportionality perspectives would have been 
overstepped.971  
 
969Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. 
970 In accordance with fairness principles in section 35 of the Constitution.  
971 Refer to chapter two part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality and its 
extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
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The ignorance of these processes needed in investigating acts of a criminal 
nature from the onset cannot be remedied on review and within the 
prescribed CCMA remedies. This situation leaves the employee without 
remedies as far as the insistence on the observance of fairness principles, 
which are constitutionally entrenched for the treatment of criminal suspects 
is concerned. Amid these complexities where employers are not bound to 
observe entailed rights in disciplining employees who have committed a 
criminal misconduct, employee criminal suspects are left to fight a losing 
battle. As it was decided in the case of Davis v Tip No.972 
 
…civil proceedings invariably create the potential for information 
damaging to the accused to be disclosed by the accused himself, not 
least so because it will often serve his interests in the civil proceedings 
to do so. The exposure of an accused person to those inevitable 
choices has never been considered in this country to conflict with his 
right to remain silent during the criminal proceedings….The 
preservation of the applicant’s rights lies entirely in his own hands, and 
there is no such element of compulsion. What the employee seeks to 
be protected against is the consequence of the choices he is being 
called upon to make…. The applicant may well be required to choose 
between incriminating himself or losing his employment. If he loses his 
employment, that becomes a consequence of the choice he has made 
but not a penalty for doing so. It will be the natural consequence of 
being found guilty of misconduct, not a punishment for inducing him to 
speak.973 
 
This case in effect exposes the complexities entailed in soliciting the 
employee to answer criminal allegations by the employer. The labour law 
 
972 1996 1 SA 1152 (W) 1157 F-G and 1158 G-H. Applied from labour law perspective 
in Grogan J Workplace Law  (2017) 256; From a civil procedure perspective in Cilliers 
A C , Herbstain J, Loots C; Nel HC  The civil practice  at page 757 and from a human 
rights perspective in Currie I & De Waal J  The Bill of Rights Handbook at 745. 
973 Per Nugent J in Davis v Tip No 1996 1 SA 1152 (W) 1157F-G and 1158 G-H. This 
was also quoted in Nedcor Bank Ltd v Behardien 2000 1 SA 307 (C) at 313G-314H. 
234 
 
approach in disciplining employees suspected of criminal misconduct 
seems to be opposed to the criminal justice formal model that must embrace 
the fairness principles entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. 
Embedded within these principles is the principle against self-incrimination. 
As seen in Chapters two and three, section 35 is founded on principles of 
fairness embracing proportionality. Proportionality was earlier described as 
the cornerstone for dealing with matters of criminal law nature. 
Proportionality is observed in every process of criminal persecution, from 
as early as the beginning of the criminal investigations. The investigation of 
crime within flexibility approaches results in absurdities. 
The evaluation of the observance of fairness by the employer is expected 
to be done by the commissioners at the CCMA at the moment when the 
matter goes for review is tantamount to latching the stable door after the 
horse had bolted. At that moment, the employee criminal suspects’ rights 
would have been violated and what would have been done, would not have 
been undone.  
Trite to this circumstance is an argument that the ensued understanding of 
the reason to observe fairness in labour law criminal investigations and 
dismissal hearings only extends to substantive fairness and not procedural 
fairness. Even the ensued labour law substantive fairness is constricted 
within the confines of the LRA.974 LRA provisions guarantee flexibility 
against proportionality. They encourage employer disregard one of the 
principles of natural justice, which underlie constitutional fairness for 
criminal suspects.975 
 
4 2 1 Procedural fairness associated with the determination of 
employee’s guilt of a criminal misconduct 
At the exclusion of other formal procedures entailing proportionality, the 
LRA makes certain requirements mandatory in determining procedural 
 
974 Per Ngcobo J in Sidumo above note 180 paras 80-141. 
975 The principle that no man shall be judged on his own cause. 
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fairness.976 In Chapters one, two and three it was shown that it is schedule 
8 of the LRA, in particular read with other provisions977 that prescribes the 
steps that an employer has to comply with in order to establish procedural 
fairness. 
It can be argued that these steps entail several aspects that must be 
investigated and satisfied in order to determine the guilt of the employee. In 
close proximity, these requirements can be said to encompass some of the 
elements of common law aspects of just cause mentioned in the previous 
Chapters—except the requirement of whether the investigation was fair and 
objective, which could enable traversing into the justiciability of the 
employer decisions.978 Schedule 8 steps are read to only include: 
• The need for the employee to understand the levelled allegations. 
• The need for the employee to be given an opportunity to respond to 
the allegations upon the employer providing the employee with 
sufficient information regarding the allegations. 
• For the employee to understand that there ought to have been an 
explanation to the terminology used. 
• That the terminology ought to have been explained in a language that 
the suspect understands. 
• The employee is entitled to an opportunity to present its case in 
responding to the allegations. Such an opportunity entails being 
provided with a reasonable time to prepare a response. In order to be 
able to present the case, the employee must be allowed a 
representation of its own choice, even if it’s a co-worker. The employee 
must be facilitated with an interpreter where required to help in the 
representations. 
 
976 Chapter VIII of the LRA read with Schedule 8 provisions. 
977 Chapter VIII of the LRA read with Schedule 8 provisions. 
978 To the extent that it could be questioned if the employer observed all the ensued 
individual rights before, the employer made the decision to investigate the employee 
who committed a criminal misconduct. 
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• The person taking the decision must be neutral. If not, an objective 
person must ultimately inform the employee of the decision reached. 
• The employee must have been aware of the existence of the rule and 
standard that has allegedly been breached. That the employee was 
aware or could have been reasonably expected to have been aware 
of the rule or standard. Not every institutional rule is written down, for 
example, some rules could be common knowledge while others could 
be either custom or practice. Some types of rules are normally 
communicated during meetings or posted on common walls and 
boards. The nature of employment relationships may be prone to 
certain specific rules automatically required in the existence of the 
employer and employee relationships.  
• The rules or standards must be valid, lawful, and reasonable. 
• Such rules or standards should generally be justifiable with reference 
to the operational requirements of the employer. 
• The rule must be consistently applied by the employer in the 
workplace. 
• The employee’s breach of the rule / standard must be proved (who, 
what, when, why, how, where). 
• Once breach of the rule by the employee has been established, it 
would still only constitute misconduct if there was fault / blame on the 
part of the employee in doing so (this is a common law requirement). 
• Intention – a deliberate or “don’t care” approach to breaching the rule 
and any possible harmful consequences. 
• Negligence - if a reasonable person in the position of the employee 
would have foreseen possible harm being caused by his/her actions 
or omissions and would have taken steps to prevent such harm; but 
the employee in question failed to do so. 
The abovementioned considerations whilst important, do not satisfy all the 
complexities of fairness procedures entailed in constitutional fairness 
principles entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. Instead of being 
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oriented to justice necessary for criminal suspects, these considerations 
only focus on employer interests and not employees’ involved rights and 
interests.  It can be argued that the entailed considerations are meant for 
creating a room for employer ability to express whether in the circumstances 
of the matter, the employee can be said to have breached their employer’s 
trust. Nothing in these considerations contemplates the possibility that the 
employer may affect the employee rights as a criminal suspect and 
therefore be cautious not to jeopardise such rights. 
 
In Avril979 a synthesised summary of schedule 8 employer interests reads; 
The Code specifically states that the investigation preceding a 
dismissal “need not be a formal inquiry.” The Code requires no more 
than that before dismissing an employee the employer should conduct 
an investigation, give the employee or his/her representative an 
opportunity to respond to the allegation after a reasonable period, take 
a decision and give the employee notice of that decision. This approach 
represents a significant change from what may be termed the “criminal 
justice” model developed by the erstwhile Industrial Court under the 
1956 LRA. Complex tests for bias may have been appropriate under 
that model. However, the rules introduced by the Code are based on 
the idea that true justice for workers lies in a procedure for expeditious 
and independent review of the employer’s decision, with reinstatement 
stipulated as the primary remedy if the employer cannot defend its 
decision to dismiss the employee.980 
The Avril case981 exposes that schedule 8 expounds duties that, if 
performed, would vindicate the employer’s decision to dismiss the 
employee as justified before the CCMA. 982 
 
 
979 Avril above note 6 at 834-838 at 1652.   
980 Avril above note 6 at 834-838 and at 1652.  
981 Avril above note 6 at 834-838 and at 1652.   
982 Avril above note 6 at 834-838 and at 1652. 
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4 2 2 The process of hearing a criminal misconduct matter  
The LRA Schedule 8983 expresses indicators of a process for hearing 
criminal misconducts. At the onset, the employer is mandated to prepare 
for a hearing of employee criminal suspects matters.984 On this stance, the 
employer can be compared to the Director of Public Prosecution who is 
dominus litis in matters of criminal law nature. Before the hearing, as shown 
earlier in Chapters one, two and three, the employer will investigate the 
allegations against the employee.985 It will be the outcome of internal 
investigations that would prompt the hearing that possible misconduct is 
apprehended.  
As explained earlier, the LRA Code prescribes an informal enquiry 
process.986  According to this approach, a minimal proportional process is 
apprehended to meet fair procedure. This means that the employer is 
mandated to observe one leg of the natural justice fairness principles—the 
audi alteram partem rule—and not the nemo judex in propria sua causa 
rule. In terms of the LRA, the initiative to hear the employee’s side of the 
story cements the fundamental right to a fair hearing. But the procedure is 
flexible and does not become uniform to all employers. Each employer may 
devise a mixture of formal or informal processes.   
The Labour Court has taken cognisance of the ‘informality’ of the process. 
In Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another, 987 the 
Court held that the right to a fair procedure in terms of the LRA requires less 
stringent and formalised compliance than was the case under the unfair 
labour practice jurisprudence of the Industrial Court.  The same approach 
 
983 Item 3 (5) of Schedule 8. 
984 Item 3 of Schedule 8. 
985 Read chapter three part 3 2 1 dealing with the investigation of employees who 
committed criminal misconducts to found reason to dismiss.  
986 Item 4(1) of Schedule 8. 
987 (1998) 19 ILJ 635 (LC) 641 G. Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
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as Moropane 988 was also adopted by the Labour Court in Avril 989  where 
the court held that, 
 
When the Code refers to an opportunity that must be given by the 
employer to the employee to state a case in response to any 
allegations made against that employee, which need not be a formal 
enquiry, it means no more than that there should be dialogue and an 
opportunity for reflection before any decision is taken to dismiss.  In the 
absence of exceptional circumstances, the substantive content of this 
process as defined by item 4 of the Code requires the conducting of an 
investigation, notification to the employee of any allegations that may 
flow from that investigation, and an opportunity, within a reasonable 
time, to prepare a response to the employer’s allegations with the 
assistance of a trade union representative or fellow employee.  The 
employer should then communicate the decision taken, and preferably 
communicate this in writing.  If the decision is to dismiss the employee, 
the employee should be given the reason for dismissal and reminded 
of his or her rights to refer any disputed dismissal to the CCMA, a 
bargaining council with jurisdiction, or any procedure established in 
terms of a collective agreement….There is clearly no place for formal 
disciplinary procedures that incorporate all of the accoutrements of a 
criminal trial, including the leading of witnesses, technical and complex 
‘charge sheets’, requests for particulars, the application of the rules of 
evidence, legal arguments, and the like.990 
Consequent to labour law jurisprudential fairness perspective explained in 
Chapter three, the Moropane 991and the Avril 992 decisions emphasise 
flexibility within a caution of labour law acceptable limits. This approach 
seeks to exclude proportionality necessary in matters of criminal law nature.  
 
988Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1998 19 ILJ 635 
(LC)641G. Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
989Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652.  
990 Avril above note 6 at 834-841and at 1644-1652. 
991 Moropane v Gilbeys Distillers and Vintners (Pty) Ltd & another 1998 19 ILJ 635 
(LC)641G. Also read Grogan J Dismissal (2014) 265. 
992 Avril above note 6 at 834-841 and at 1644-1652. 
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In effect, the Avril993 judgement recognises that even in the context of 
flexibility or ‘informality’, an employee is entitled to the minimum content of 
the right such as notification of the charges, a reasonable opportunity to 
prepare a response with appropriate assistance,994 an opportunity to state 
a case, the decision and reasons for the decision, amongst other things.  
In BEMAWU and Others v SABC and 10 Others,995 Steenkamp AJ, 
while dismissing the appeal in this matter, held against the invocation of a 
hearing analogous to a hearing inclined to criminal procedure and 
supported the flexibility approach that was taken by the SABC in disciplining 
100 employees.  In his view “…a hearing chaired by an independent and 
experienced chairperson on the panel of a respected dispute resolution 
agency…envisages a hearing, albeit on paper without hearing oral 
evidence or argument….” Referring to the holding in Avril’s case,996 he held 
that the approach adopted by the SABC satisfies the requirements set out 
in the Code of Good Practice of the LRA. He held that it would be impeding 
for SABC to submit to the challenge of “having individual hearings for each 
individual employee numbering more than 100, along the lines of a criminal 
justice model.”  
Referring again to Avril’s case, he outlined the encountered challenges as 
mentioned by Van Niekerk J, who deliberated that the conundrums that 
ensued in a disciplinary matter need not impede the workplace efficiencies. 
The court held that the essence of the LRA strikes balance in  
…recognis[ing] not only that managers are not experienced judicial 
officers, but also that workplace efficiencies should not be unduly 
impeded by onerous procedural requirements.  It also recognises that 
to require onerous workplace disciplinary procedures is inconsistent 
with the right to expeditious arbitration on merits. Where a 
 
993 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. 
994 Not essentially a legal practitioner even though the matter engaged is that of a 
criminal nature.   
995In BEMAWU and Others v SABC and 10 Others (J2239/2015) [2016] ZALCJHB 74 
(2 March 2016), paras [16]-[18]; 2011 (32) ILJ 112 (LAC) at para 54. 
996 Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. 
241 
 
commissioner is obliged (as commissioners are) to arbitrate dismissal 
disputes on the basis of the evidence presented at the arbitration 
proceedings, procedural requirements in the form that they developed 
under the criminal justice model are applied ultimately only for the sake 
of procedure, since the record of a workplace disciplinary hearing 
presented to the commissioner at any subsequent arbitration is 
presented only for the purpose of establishing that the dismissal was 
procedurally fair.  The continued application of the criminal justice 
model of workplace procedure therefore results in a duplication of 
process, with no tangible benefit to either employer or employees.997 
In determining whether it was trite for the court to intervene in the matter 
between parties, it referred to Booysens v Minister of Safety and Security998 
which held that courts can only intervene in incomplete disciplinary hearings 
under exceptional circumstances. Inferring that the matter of whether a 
formal criminal justice procedure is appropriate for employer investigatory 
and disciplinary hearings is not of these exceptional scenarios. The court 
considered that even if the procedure is informal, that would not lead to 
grave injustice. In the same note, the court999 ruling for the SABC, had this 
to say, 
…. [I]n this case, it would appear to me that, firstly, the process adopted 
by the SABC will not lead to grave injustice. The union members will 
still have an opportunity to be heard.  Secondly, and this foreshadows 
the question of an alternative remedy, justice may be attained by other 
means, that is the dispute resolution system prescribed by the L R A. 
In fact, in the case before me, the exceptional circumstances go the 
other way. Exceptional circumstances have necessitated the 
Corporation to adopt a procedure other than the normal procedure 
envisaged by its Disciplinary Code. Those circumstances are the 
number of employees involved and the operational efficiencies of the 
 
997 2011 32 ILJ 112 (LAC) at para 54. 
998(C60/08) [2008] ZALC 87; 2008 10 BLLR 928 (LC); 2009 30 ILJ 301 (LC) (14 
February 2008)  paras 40-43; also read, BEMAWU and Others v SABC and 10 Others 
(J2239/2015) [2016] ZALCJHB 74 (2 March 2016),paras [16]-[18];2011 32 ILJ 112 
(LAC) at para 54. 
999 BEMAWU and Others v SABC and 10 Others (J2239/2015) [2016] ZALCJHB 74 (2 
March 2016), paras [16]-[18];2011 32 ILJ 112 (LAC) at para 54. 
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organisation.  I would therefore have formed the view on the merits that 
the union has not established a clear right as is required for final relief. 
As I have mentioned, I have also foreshadowed the question of an 
alternative remedy. The union members in this case, as any other 
employee in any other dismissal case, have the alternative remedy of 
approaching the CCMA, should the independent chairperson 
appointed by Tokiso find that they committed the misconduct 
complained of; should that chairperson recommend a sanction of 
dismissal; and should the SABC implement that sanction.  For that 
reason, also, I would have turned down the application.1000 
 
 Using Cora Hoexter’s terminology, the flexible approach confirmed by 
Steenkamp AJ,1001  “seems to be a mixed one of variability within a 
framework of conceptualism.” In plain language, the jurisprudence referred 
to above, very clearly establishes that while the overall principle of fairness 
cannot be compromised, the constituent elements of that right might to a 
greater or lesser extent be limited or rendered inapplicable  consistent with 
the currently explained employer criminal investigations for the dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconduct.  
 It appears that, in keeping with the flexibility of the process and the need 
for quick and efficient dispute resolution procedures, the Labour Court has 
refused to intervene in employer criminal disciplinary proceedings. 1002 To 
this extent, labour law seems to have, instead of adopting the constitutional 
perspective of reasonableness within section 33 of the Constitution, 
sustained the common law administrative review rigidity. Under common 
law, prior recognition of individual rights, quasi-judicial review was highly 
 
1000 BEMAWU and Others v SABC and 10 Others (J2239/2015) [2016] ZALCJHB 74 (2 
March 2016), paras [16]-[18];2011 32 ILJ 112 (LAC) at para 54. 
1001BEMAWU and Others v SABC and 10 Others (J2239/2015) [2016] ZALCJHB 74 (2 
March 2016), paras [16]-[18]; 2011 32 ILJ 112 (LAC) at para 54. 
1002 Including  the following cases Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO and others 1998 
11 BLLR 1093 (LAC);Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO and others 2001 9 
BLLR 1011 (LAC); Sidumo above note 180 paras 78-79;Southern Sun Hotel Interests 
(Pty) Ltd v CCMA and others 2009 11 BLLR 1128 (LC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2012 9 
BLLR 857 (LAC);Herholdt v Nedbank Ltd 2013 11 BLLR 1074 (SCA);Gold Fields Mining 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd; (Kloof Gold Mine) v CCMA and others 2014 1 BLLR 20 (LAC). 
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limited because decisions were highly protected from review.  Much like the 
current labour law demands, Courts were to exercise some extent of 
deference in reviewing decisions by the authorities.  
The case of the National Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport 
Co, (Pty) Ltd,1003 for example, confirmed limitations regarding the 
application of the “symptomatic unreasonableness rule” by insisting on a 
higher degree of unreasonableness. It introduced the presumption that a 
responsible administrative authority carries out its duty properly and 
honestly.1004 Together these two limits placed an exceedingly heavy onus 
on an aggrieved party, thereby reducing individual ability to seek review of 
administrative decisions. Since this approach was premised on the legal 
order, any attempt by the courts to move away from the interpretation was 
usually met with restraint and rejection.1005 
In the same circumstances, the hope for an aggrieved employee that the 
rights that were not observed in the initial employer criminal investigations 
and the subsequent hearing for dismissal could be redeemed at the review 
stage before the CCMA becomes detrimental. Apart from the limited scope 
of review, the nature of substantive fairness afforded by labour law within 
which parameters the employer investigates, employee criminal 
misconducts do not equate to substantive fairness as envisaged in the 
domain of the criminal justice.  
Substantive fairness in labour law is contextualised within the employer 
flexibility. As seen earlier, the employer exercises discretion to dismiss 
 
1003 1972 3 SA 726 (A). Also see Taitz above note 16 at 11. 
1004Chetty’s Motor Transport above note 16 at 735 F-G. Also see Shidiak v Union 
Government 1912 AD 651 652; Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 AD 
222; Johannesburg Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 
111; South African Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 19671 SA 263(A) 271; 
Cassim v Oos-Kaapse Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 (3) SA 651 (A). 
1005 This is marked by the different decisions, which lacked consistency regarding the 
extent of administrative discretion. See Shidiak v Union Government 1912 (AD) 651; 
Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 (AD) 222; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African 
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 1 SA 263 (A); Cassim v Oos-Kaapse 
Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 3 SA 651 (A). 
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based on rules, policies and the LRA requirement. As illustrated in Chapters 
two and three, if the employer could demonstrate that necessary 
progressive steps were followed in dealing with the issue at hand, the 
employer would have managed to satisfy substantive fairness.1006 Within 
the scope of LRA requirements, as explained in Chapter three, the CCMA 
determines if the employer decision satisfies the test in Sidumo.1007 
 
4 2 3  The presentation of charges to the employee criminal 
suspect 
In terms of the LRA, an employee suspected of crime is charged and served 
with documents containing the allegations to answer.  This process is 
synonymous to the procedure under the CPA. The charge contains 
employer allegations against the employee. The case of Korsten v MacSteel 
(Pty)Ltd & another, for example, 1008held that in order that employees are 
enabled to prepare for their defences, charges must be appropriate and 
clear. It is also the employer’s responsibility that the concerned employee 
is notified of the charges or allegations to answer. The supposition is that in 
cases where employees are not made aware of the charges, they will not 
be able to prepare.1009 
In terms of Item 4 of the Code, the charges need not be formal charge 
sheets annexed to formal procedures for the leading and cross examination 
of witnesses and the use of formal rules of evidence, legal representation, 
and independent decision-making. In anticipation, a more informal 
approach to the employer’s charges is expected, unlike in the case of 
criminal justice processes where the underlying objective in drafting a 
 
1006 Per Ngcobo J in Sidumo above note 180 paras 80-141. 
1007 Sidumo above note 180 paras 80-141. 
1008 Korsten v Macsteel (Pty) Ltd & another 1996 (8) BLLR 1015(IC) at 1020 C-E. Also see 
Doody v Secretary of State for the Home Department & others [1993] 3 All ER 92 at 106.  
1009 Korsten v Macsteel (Pty) Ltd & another 1996 (8) BLLR 1015(IC) at 1020 C-E. Also 
see Samtor Tankers (Pty)Ltd v Kule 1993 14 ILJ 1038 (LAC).  
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charge sheet is the avoidance of uncertainty regarding the facts that ought 
to be proven against the criminal suspect.1010  
The employer’s allegations against the employee are drafted on a form and 
language that the employee can understand. The drafted charges are 
expected to enable the employee to understand the nature and the cause 
of the allegations. The objective of these charges is to enable the employee 
to properly consider the matter, and to give the employee suspected of a 
criminal misconduct the opportunity to prepare a reply. The employer will 
divulge the basis of its blames in broad terms. The employer will state the 
circumstances on which such accusations originated.  
The employer will, in addition, supply documentary evidence if such will be 
relied on during the hearing. Such evidence must accord with the standard 
admissibility principles of evidence.1011 The case of Klein v Dainfern 
College1012 deals with disclosure in the context of disciplinary proceedings. 
According to this case under common law, employees were entitled to have 
charges clearly formulated. They ought to be of sufficient particularity.1013  
From a criminal law perspective, in Mkolo and Others v Jacobs and 
Another,1014 applicants lodged a complaint in terms of section 85 (1) (a), (b), 
(c) and (d) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. They pleaded that they 
were before court on charges lacking sufficiency. They said charges lacked 
sufficient details because, amongst others, “not all the requested particulars 
were provided by the second respondent as to how each of the accused 
 
1010 To understand the requirements from a criminal justice perspective, read Joubert JJ 
Criminal Procedure Handbook 172. 
1011  The provisions dealing with documentary evidence pertain the following; The Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965: sections 19 and 33; The Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977: sections 221(5), 234, 246 and 247. Legal meaning of document can be 
secured from Seccombe v Attorney-General 1919 TPD 270 at 277. The meaning of 
documentary evidence is in section 33 of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965; 
sections 221(5) and 247 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and Schwikkard and 
Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 50 § 202. Court differentiation of admissibility and 
authenticity of a document presented as evidence is in Motata v Nair NO and Another 
2009 1 SACR 263 (T) at 254. 
1012 2006 3 SA 73 (T), at para [9] and [35]. 
1013 2006 3 SA 73 (T), at paras [9] and [35]. 
1014 Mkolo and Others v Jacobs and Another (1831/2015) [2017] ZAECGHC 46 (11 April 
2017) para [8]. 
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acted in common purpose with the others.” 1015This circumstance affected 
their ability to plead to the charges in accordance with entrenched section 
35 (3) (a) of the Constitution.1016 The applicants, therefore, requested the 
court to order the first respondent to withdraw the charges and that if the 
respondents may wish to reinstate the charges, they should do so with “the 
authority of the Director of Public Prosecutions as provided for in section 
342 A of the Act.”1017 
It is submitted that lack of particularity goes with the foundation of a matter 
to the extent that the person charged may be exonerated if the charges are 
lacking particularity. It is through the charges that the court may decipher 
trivialities from realities. The seriousness of drafting proper charges seems 
to be aligned to constitutional entrenchments supporting proportionality in 
matters of a criminal law nature. From a purely labour law perspective, such 
enactments are lacking, and it may be questioned if it is possible that 
employees suspected of commission of criminal misconducts are protected 
from subjections to misapprehensions as to the specific acts or conducts 
being investigated as crimes against them. 
The current position under the LRA, is that precision in drafting charges is 
not  strictly demanded from employers as it is a standard in matters of 
criminal law nature.1018 In determining whether to charge the employee for 
external criminal conduct, the employer considers factors such as the 
nature of the conduct of the employee;1019 the work that the employee 
performs;1020 the status of the employee with regards to the employee’s 
 
1015 Mkolo and Others v Jacobs and Another (1831/2015) [2017] ZAECGHC 46 (11 April 
2017) para [8]. 
1016 (3) Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right –  
(a) To be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer it. 
1017 Mkolo and Others v Jacobs and Another (1831/2015) [2017] ZAECGHC 46 (11 April 
2017) para [8] CPA. 
1018 POPCRU v Minister of Correctional Services & Others 1999 20 ILJ 2416(LC); NUM 
obo Matela v New Vaal Colliery 1999 3 BLLR 332 (IMMSA); NUM &Others v CCMA & 
Others 2011 32 ILJ 956(LC). As well read Schedule 8 Item 4 (1) - (4). 
1019 See Schedule 8 Item 4(1) – (4). 
1020 See Schedule 8 Item 4(1) – (4). 
247 
 
position;1021 the nature of the employee and employer relationship;1022 the 
employer would also consider the extent of its establishment;1023 the extent 
to which the employer affected other employees as well as the person or 
institution affected by the employee’s actions.1024 
In addition to these considerations, the Director of Public Prosecutions, 
unlike the employer, uses a particular format in drafting charges and is 
aware of the principle of proportionality under the CPA. .1025 This accords 
with the formal nature of criminal proceedings aimed at meeting 
proportionality. 
The CPA dedicates a whole Chapter1026 to the specifications for charges 
against accused persons. An accused person is statutorily allowed to object 
to the charge that does not comply with the Act.1027 The gist of these 
stipulated individual interests is not catered for under the LRA flexible 
employer discretions. 
 
4 2 4  Adequate notice of factual criminal misconduct 
allegations 
In accordance with the LRA and the ILO provisions,1028 failure by the 
employer to instigate disciplinary processes against an employee offender 
within a reasonable time, is potentially prejudicial to an employee. Within 
the prescripts of the national and international provisions that South Africa 
prescribes to, it is required that employers sufficiently notify employees of 
the facts underlying the charges against the employee.1029 The employers 
 
1021 See Schedule 8 Item 4(1) – (4). 
1022 See Schedule 8 Item 4(1) – (4). 
1023 See Schedule 8 Item 4(1) – (4). 
1024 See Schedule 8 Item 4(1) – (4). 
1025Joubert JJ Criminal Procedure Handbook 172.  
1026 Chapter 14 of the CPA entailing sections 80-104.  
1027 Section 85 of the CPA. 
1028Schedule 8 item 4 of the LRA read with Article 11(5) of the International Labour 
Organization’s (“ILO”) Termination of Employment Recommendation 119 of 1963 and 
Article 10 of the ILO Convention 158 of 1982 as well as ILO Recommendation 166 of 
1982.   
1029 Schedule 8 Item 4 (1) - (4). 
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must afford the employees sufficient detail to the charges, in order to enable 
the employee to understand the charges and therefore reserve time to 
prepare a response.1030 The time allowed to an employee who understood 
the allegations to respond to them, should be reasonable. The employer 
must afford the employee enough time to consider the levelled 
accusations.1031  
The employer must apprehend that the employee may need time to 
obtain assistance where the employee requires such and, in turn, prepare 
defence against the allegations. If the employer fails to observe these 
requirements, the employee would be considered to have denied the 
employee the right to a fair procedure. In Nkomo & others v Adminstrator, 
Natal & others 1032 the employer who only gave 48 hours, within a weekend, 
to accused hospital workers, to prepare their written responses to their 
proposed dismissal, was regarded by the court to have afforded inadequate 
time in the circumstances. The court held that while the employer sought to 
afford the employees opportunity to reply, such opportunity was an illusory 
because it was “inadequate and did not constitute proper compliance with 
the requirements of the audi alteram partem rule.”1033 
In another matter, Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and 75 Others v 
Minister of Correctional Services and Others, a case decided in terms of 
sections 3(2) and 4 of the PAJA, the Western Cape High Court found that 
48 hours’ notice for a disciplinary hearing was tantamount to inadequate 
notice. It was labelled inadequate “by any stretch of the imagination.”1034 
The significance of timing associated with the holding of a disciplinary 
hearing is that, the principle that an employer must not only give an 
employee adequate notice of the hearing, but it is also aligned with ensuring 
 
1030 Schedule 8 Item 4 (1) - (4). 
1031 Schedule 8 Item 4 (1) - (4). 
1032 199112 ILJ 521 (N) Per Page J at page 528. 
1033Nkomo & others v Adminstrator, Natal & others 199112 ILJ 521 (N) Per Page J at 
page 528. 
1034 Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and 75 Others v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others (603/05) [2006] ZAECHC 4; 2008 3 SA 91 (E); 2006 2 All SA 175 
(E); 2006 8 BCLR 971 (E); 2006 4 BLLR 385 (E) (12 January 2006) at para 73. 
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that the disciplinary hearing is held within a reasonable time to avoid delays. 
It is therefore reasonable that the employer hears the matter within a short 
while, after the employer became aware of the commission of the 
misconduct.  
Concomitant to this requirement, is the assumption that, “the 
employer waived the right to terminate the employment of a worker for 
misconduct if the employer failed to do so within a reasonable time after 
acknowledging the employee’s misconduct.”1035 This however depends on 
the circumstances of the case. Within the labour law context of fairness, it 
would be determined, whether there was no possible indicator that a fair 
reason to terminate the employee’s employment existed. 1036 Disciplinary 
processes are, by their nature speedy processes. Therefore, they do not 
conform to the detailed requirements of section 35 fairness. 
Based on the labour law objective of speedy hearings, allegedly the 
employer executes haste justice, which overlooks employee criminal 
suspects’ rights. These rights are enforced if fair trial principles entrenched 
in section 35 of the Constitution are observed. Criminal justice does not 
accommodate haste criminal investigations and hearing processes. It 
demands a higher standard of proof in declaring a suspect’s criminality. It 
uses a beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof and not on a balance of 
probabilities standard of proof used in labour law. In chapters two and three, 
it was argued that the standard of beyond reasonable doubt, is met through 
the observance of proportionality negated in labour law within the 
parameters of flexibility. 
 
 
1035 Article 10 of the ILO Convention 158 of 1982 and ILO Recommendation 166 of 
1982.  
1036 Ceartain contracts are terminated without notice for cause recognised by law. For 
example, within section 37(6)(b) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 0f 1997, 
as amended ( BCEA). 
250 
 
4 2 5 The right of the employee criminal suspect to legal 
representation 
Section 35 of the Constitution entrenches the right of a criminal suspect to 
legal representation. In chapter three, it was argued that this right is of 
essence in order to avoid possible flaws in the persecution of a criminal 
suspect. 1037 At the centre is the eminent possibility of self-incrimination. 
Since labour law does not put much value to this possibility, the need for an 
employee criminal suspect to have legal representation immediately when 
the time of investigation is underrated. 1038 
The right of an employee criminal suspect to legal representation is not 
perceived as a direct constitutional right like in other criminal cases but is 
subjected to exceptions within the discretion of a commissioner and when 
the matter is already before the CCMA at the review stage.1039 
In accordance with the CCMA rule, Rule 25(1)(C) can only be afforded in 
certain circumstances namely, “where parties agree; based on the nature 
of the questions of law raised by the dispute; the complexity of the dispute; 
the public interest and the comparative ability of the opposing parties or 
their representatives to deal with the dispute.”1040 
The application of Rule 25 excludes the inception of the employee criminal 
suspect’s investigation and hearing for dismissal based on a criminal 
misconduct. In accordance with the LRA,1041 the employee is entitled to a 
reasonable period to prepare a response and to be assisted by a trade 
union representative or fellow employee of his choice.1042 
 
1037Read about the importance of this right and other related in 3 2 6 Constitutional 
principles underlying investigations of suspects of criminal acts. 
1038 In labour law the need to satisfy the reasons for dismissal requires employers to do 
criminal investigations and hold hearings against the ensued prejudices such as the 
potential that the employee may end up incriminating itself in the course of the 
processes. The employee can either claim or not claim the right against self-
incrimination at their own peril. See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420. 
1039 CCMA v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2013 11 BLLR 1057 SCA at para 21. 
1040 du Toit D etal Labour Relations Law  457 
1041 Schedule 8, Item 4(1).  
1042 Schedule 8, Item 4(1). But not a legal representative. 
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This requirement applies to both stages of preparation for the hearing and 
representation within such a hearing.1043  In accordance with the Industrial 
Court decision in Mahlangu, 1044  where the court insisted on a proper 
enquiry and not an interview by the employer to the employees, it can be 
argued that the rationale for requiring the assistance for the hearing of the 
employee’s matter, is that the employee may be assisted to prepare for the 
case and that there ought to be a spectator . to discern the fairness of the 
disciplinary proceedings. This is of essence because of the involved rights 
of the employee.  
As Mahlangu1045 held, the employee subjected to persecution by the 
employer has multifarious rights to protect;  
a right to challenge any statements which are detrimental to his 
credibility and integrity; the right to be told the nature of the offence or 
misconduct with relevant particulars of the charge; the right of the 
hearing to take place timeously; the right to be given adequate notice 
prior to the enquiry; the right to some form of representation (the 
representative could be anyone from the work-place; either a shop 
steward, works council representative, a colleague or even a 
supervisor, so as to assist the employee and ensure that the discipline 
procedure is fair and equitable); the right to call witnesses; the right to 
an interpreter; the right to a finding (if found guilty, he should have the 
right to be told the full reasons why); the right to have previous service 
considered; the right to be advised of the penalty imposed (verbal 
warnings, written warnings, termination of employment); and the right 
of appeal, i.e. usually to a higher level of management.1046 
 
The ensued rights cannot be observed if the employee is deprived of a fair 
hearing but instead, subjected to a process tantamount to an interview. In 
addition, it can be argued that a spectator who is not knowledgeable in law 
 
1043 Schedule 8, Item 4(1). 
1044 Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
1045 Mahlangu v Cim Deltak, Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 IC at 357–358. 
1046per Bulbulia AM, J in Mahlangu v Cim Deltak,Gallant v Cim Deltak 1986 7 ILJ 346 
IC at 357-358.  
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may not effectively assist the employee facing criminal charges for a 
dismissal. Without the assistance of a legal professional who is 
knowledgeable in law and, in particular, one who is able to articulate the 
depth of a criminal accusation, the employer would easily overlook the 
essence of a criminal accusation which the employer is levelling against the 
employee.  
Dealing with the question of a criminal misconduct as  grounds for dismissal, 
it is confronted with many challenges, because even if this is executed 
within labour law prescripts, “dishonesty must not be merely suspected but 
it must be proved, although this proof may be based on a balance of 
probabilities.” 1047 
Accordingly, arguing from a labour law perspective, Levy observed that,  
[t]heft is without doubt the most difficult situation that an employer has 
to deal with. I have said that it is unwise and probably unfair to dismiss 
an employee without notifying him of the reason. [However,] proof that 
a man has committed theft is a matter for the criminal courts and not 
for a unilateral decision by an employer. Inevitably, the employer's 
decision to fire for theft is based on evidence that would not obtain a 
conviction in a criminal court.... If the employer has based his evidence 
on suspicion, hearsay or security reports and there is no hard evidence, 
he is not entitled to say that a theft has occurred. He therefore has no 
justification to dismiss for theft.1048 
Levy’s argument raises another concern regarding the complexity of 
hearings on matters of a criminal law nature, which even exclude the use of 
legal professionals. A non-legal professional watchdog would not be able to 
decipher whether, the employer’s decision to dismiss was based on proven 
facts and acceptable evidence and not on mere suspicion. 
 
1047 See Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co 
v Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351. 
1048 Levy A Unfair Dismissals  81-82. 
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In NUM v Blinkpan Collieries,1049 the Industrial Court held for the importance 
of proper representation. Shunning away implied passive representations, 
it emphasised on the acute need for a sufficient and effective representation 
of employees who are “illiterate or uneducated.”1050  It can be argued that 
the court forces the employers, in ensuring that employees who are 
suspected of committing criminal misconduct, not only understand the 
nature of the charges and the allegations against them, but also that they 
understand the nature of the processes that they are subjected to. Such 
employees ought to be assisted in exercising the entitled rights, especially 
the right to be legally represented. 
It has been noted earlier that unlike from the demands of section 35 of the 
Constitution entrenching fair trial rights for matters of a criminal law nature, 
the entitlement to representation in labour matters does not mean a 
representation by a lawyer or legal practitioner. The parties in labour 
matters agree to representation on a case-by-case basis or even in a 
collective agreement. This flexibility has led to multifarious procedural 
differences. According to the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in MEC: 
Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province 
v Mahumani,1051 the right to legal representation in tribunals other than 
courts of law with regards to labour matters was non-existent under 
common law.1052 
In the current dispensation, and especially through section 33 of the 
Constitution and the PAJA provisions, it is recognised that certain cases 
and circumstances mandate the need for legal representation. It is an 
argument in this thesis that disciplinary hearings on misconducts of criminal 
law nature fall within the category of cases that need legal representation. 
More so because of the complexity of matters of a criminal law nature. In 
 
1049 NUM & another v Blinkpan Collieries 1986 7 ILJ 579 (IC) at 583 per van Schalkwyk 
AM. 
1050 NUM & another v Blinkpan Collieries 1986 7 ILJ 579 (IC) at 583 per van Schalkwyk 
AM. 
1051 2004 25 ILJ 2311 (SCA) para [11]. 
1052 2004 25 ILJ 2311 (SCA) para [11]. 
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the attempt to bring these categories of matters closer to the observance of 
section 35 constitutional fairness principles, regarding matters of a criminal 
law nature, the need for representatives who are legal professionals is 
eminent. 
Sections 35 (f) and (g) mandate that a person suspected of committing a 
criminal offence has to be afforded legal representation if not able to be 
represented by a legal practitioner of its choice. If the suspect does not 
know of this right, the suspect must be so informed of it.  Within labour law 
jurisprudence there are other cases supporting the need for legal 
representation.  
In the case of Dladla v Administrator Natal,1053 the court found that the 
circumstances of the case warranted legal representation in that the 
employees’ jobs and livelihood were at stake, the facts which involved 
issues of race, culture, language were complex, and the tribunal itself 
lacked independence. In another matter, the Supreme Court of Appeal 1054 
held in favour of employing a legal representative due to the circumstances 
of the case, notwithstanding the employer’s internal rule that excluded legal 
representation at disciplinary hearing proceedings.1055  
The Constitutional Court reiterated the need to have a legal representative 
even at the investigation stage, preparation stage and the hearing stage. It 
held that the legal representation must participate fully in the proceedings 
except in giving evidence on behalf of the witness.1056 The extent to which 
this is practicalised is minimal. 
 
 
1053Dladla & (and) Others v Administrator, Natal & (and) Others;1995 16 6 ILJ 1418 (N) 
pp. 1418-1426. 
1054 Hamata & Another v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary 
Committee & (and) Others 2002 23 9 ILJ 1531 (SCA) pp. 1531-1543. 
1055 Hamata & Another v Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary 
Committee & (and) Others 2002 23 9 ILJ 1531 (SCA) pp. 1531-1543. 
1056 CMA v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2013 11 BLLR 1057 SCA at para 21. 
255 
 
4 2 6 Opportunity to state a case and to challenge the employer’s 
evidence and arguments 
The LRA code1057 requires that in order to meet the required standard of 
fairness, employees be allowed the opportunity to be heard as early as 
possible. They are supposed to listen to employer’s evidence in order to 
challenge it before they can state their case.   
As argued earlier,1058 in this process, it is not clear whether the employee 
has a right to cross-examine the employer’s evidence.1059 Bearing the fact 
that the right to legal representation in employer disciplinary processes is 
compromised, the employee as a non-legal professional may not master 
the skills of cross-examination.1060 However, the ultimate dictates that the 
employee will have to reply to the employer allegations without guidelines 
from the legal professionals. In trying to challenge the reliability of the 
employer’s allegations to shed light as to the truthfulness or untruthfulness 
of them, the employee may benefit the employer more than vindicating the 
case.1061  
The employer, who is eager to reach managerial objectives, can take 
advantage of employee’s vulnerability.1062 It is possible,  undoubtedly in 
many cases that the employees submit to coerced interrogations as well as 
unfounded allegations and then divulge self-incriminating evidence at the 
expense of their individual rights expressed in section 35 of the Constitution. 
As held in Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick,1063 it may be possible that at the 
dilemma of establishing the employee’s blame regarding the criminal 
 
1057 Schedule 8 Item 4(1). 
1058 Para 4 2 5. 
1059 See Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co 
v Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351 
1060 See Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co 
v Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351. 
1061 Through self-incrimination. See Grogan J Dismissal (2018) 419-420 who explains 
the extent to which self-incrimination is considered in labour law cases. 
1062 Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co v 
Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351. 
1063 Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co v 
Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351. 
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misconduct the employer acts unreasonably. When all else failed, within the 
best information available to it in the circumstances, the employer may on 
its enthusiasm or anxiety to solve the ensued dishonesty problem, brush 
aside the rights of the employee and act on information that is founded on 
suspicion and hearsay.1064  
This possibility is not overrated because unlike in the processes prescribed 
in the CPA, employee criminal suspects are never informed of their right to 
silence.1065 The extent and limits of section 35 rights applicable to employee 
criminal suspects is not clarified nor observed in disciplinary processes. 
This is easily done because the law empowering the employer 
investigations is open-ended. The employer-wide discretion allows the use 
of every possible opportunity available. 
In light of the fact that employer exercises wide discretion in investigating 
employee’s criminality, there is a possibility of uncontrolled cooperation 
between the internal investigations and the police investigations.1066 
Consequently, the interlinked investigation could easily invade 
constitutional rights. 
The case of Coetzer, 1067 evidenced the possibility of cooperation in 
interlinked investigations. This was a case that was held before the 
Financial Services Appeal Board of South Africa. The appeal was based on 
a decision by the Registrar to debar the appellant from rendering financial 
services to clients on behalf of authorised financial service providers. The 
Registrar’s power to debar the appellant was based on section 14A of the 
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, the “FAIS 
Act”. The Registrar believed the appellant was no longer fit and proper to 
render a service to clients of financial service providers. This decision came 
 
1064Mine Workers' Union v Brodrick 1948 (4) SA 959 and Federal Cold Storage Co v 
Angehern & Piel 1910 TPD 1351. 
1065 Read para 4 2 5 above on the right of the employee criminal suspect to legal 
representation. 
1066 Refer to the case of Minister of Police v RM M & Safety and Security Sectoral 
Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/14 referred to below in para 4 3. 
1067 Unreported case of FSCA decided on the 12 August 2015. 
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after her employer, Old Mutual, had investigated a client complaint against 
the appellant and found a fraud allegation.   
Based on this allegation, the appellant was summoned to explain why she 
should not be debarred. In her explanation, the appellant gave self-
incriminating evidence which amounted to admitting guilt while pleading 
duress. Based on the self-incriminating evidence, her employer initiated a 
criminal case against her. During the investigation, the employer had 
secured evidence without a search warrant to found allegations against the 
appellant. Witnesses were utilised to give evidence against the appellant. 
Even though Old Mutual investigated a crime of fraud, it never informed the 
appellant in terms of section 35 of the Constitution about her right against 
self-incrimination and her right to remain silent, instead she was called to 
respond where upon she incriminated herself.1068 The obvious reason is 
that informing the appellant with her right against self-incrimination was not 
sanctioned by the law that facilitated the criminal investigation against the 
employee by Old Mutual. In turn the employer opened a criminal case 
against the employee. The secured evidence was handed over to the 
police.1069 
The Coetzer matter forms part of a myriad of cases meant at enforcing the 
“right to fair dismissal,” entrenched in section 23(1) of the Constitution. All 
these cases imply that the employers do not observe sections 8, 33, 35, 39 
and 195 of the Constitution in the execution of fair dismissals. They do not 
follow the constitutional demands that the interpretation of legislation and 
development of the common law or customary law by courts, tribunals or 
forums must promote the spirit, purpose, and objectives of the Bill of Rights. 
These constitutional objectives and values are entrenched in the Preamble, 
section 1 and section 195 of the Constitution.  Their rationale is to transform 
 
1068 para [3]. 




our legal perspective from authoritarian to the realisation of constitutional 
transformative objectives which aim at a rights-based decision making.  
Contrary to the constitutional call, when employers investigate, and 
discipline employees suspected of criminal misconduct, they do not observe 
the rights of the suspects. First, they overlook the right to privacy without 
applying necessary limitations and precautions applicable when such a right 
is compromised. Further, they disregard the constitutional rationale of 
fairness. They encourage self-persecution. When the hearings for 
dismissals are carried out, suspects are asked to provide answers against 
employers’ accusations at the risk of self-incrimination. On the one hand, 
this sacrifices the principle of fairness that no man shall be persecuted at 
his own cause. Where such compromises are made in law, in the guise to 
fair process, they let suspects incriminate themselves. On the other hand, 
employers can exercise authority without observing necessary guidelines.  
In the absence of a clear legal framework, providing individual suspects the 
opportunity to challenge the impinging parallel investigations, as it 
happened in this case, without the need to actually provide evidence that 
there was interference, the process as it stands is prejudicial and 
unconstitutional.1070  
 
4 2 7 The possibility to dispense with the hearing of an employee 
suspected of a criminal misconduct 
Item 4(1) and (3) of schedule 8, mandates employers to confine to pre-
dismissal procedures, except where exceptional circumstances exist.1071 
The decision as to whether a situation constitutes exceptional circumstance 
is within the employer’s discretion because the interpretation of this concept 
within labour law has received minimal attention. It can be argued that in 
 
1070 A similar observation was made in United States v. Scrushy, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 
1140 (N.D. Ala. 2005). Also see Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. 
Comm’n, 505 F.2d 869, 87273 (10th Cir. 1974). 
1071 Item 4(4) of schedule 8. Refer to the case of Metal & Allied Workers Union & Others 
v Siemens Ltd (1987) 8 ILJ 117 (IC). 
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these circumstances there is a possibility that employers dispense with 
these procedures, even where exceptional circumstances do not 
necessarily exist.  In accordance with article 7 of the ILO Convention 158 of 
1982, such instances entail occasions where the employer cannot 
reasonably be expected to observe the guidelines.1072 It is argued that such 
occasions are in effect rare and complex because in the same stance, the 
employer facilitating an employee the opportunity to respond to the 
allegations actualises the right to fair dismissal. Within this right is the need 
for the employee to be heard. 
It is therefore trite to view the provision that employees dispense with the 
right to be heard an elusive provision, especially in the light of the South 
African rights based on the Constitution. Perhaps this provision may be 
understood as sustaining the employee flexibility to judge individual cases 
where the employer may exercise its discretion not to afford an employee a 
hearing.  The case of Librapac CC v Moletsane NO and Others,1073 
explained exceptional circumstances as cases of “overriding extremity.” 
Courts have also referred to other examples including occasions where 
firstly, the employer sensed danger against life or property as exceptional 
circumstances.1074 Secondly, scenarios where a crisis can be 
determined.1075 Thirdly, occasions where the employee decides not to 
attend a hearing.1076 
According to Grogan, 1077 such scenarios entail circumstances where, 
“employees… by… conduct [abandon] or waive their right to hearings by 
refusing to attend the enquiry or by abusing the employer at the disciplinary 
hearing.”1078 It is argued that a scenario where employees may argue that 
the hearing will affect their privilege against self-incrimination may be 
 
1072 Article 7 of ILO Convention 158 of 1982. 
1073 1998 19 ILJ 1159 (LC). 
1074 Lefu v Western Areas Gold Mining Co 1985 6 ILJ 307 (IC). 
1075 Lefu v Western Areas Gold Mining Co 1985 6 ILJ 307 (IC). 
1076 Mfazwe v SA Metal & Machinery Company 1987 8 ILJ 492 (IC); Food & Bevarages 
Workers Union & Others v Hercules Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd 1990 11 ILJ 47 (LAC). 
1077Grogan J Workplace Law (2007) 271. 
1078Grogan J Workplace Law (2007) 271. 
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treated along the lines of this scenario. It is submitted that this provision is 
against the proportionality principles applied in matters of criminal law 
nature and is therefore classified as draconian. The reason meted to this 
classification is the possibility that the employer may misapprehend the 
situation and deprive the employee criminal suspect of the employee’s right 
to be heard only to discover later that the decision was not appropriate, it 
may be hard for the employer to reverse the situation without jeopardising 
employee’s interests.  
This can happen especially with employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts and it is not so possible for this category to evoke remedies 
available to other employees who may be subjected to a similar situation. 
Even if this could be possible, the practical scenario is that the very same 
employer who flaunted the process would be expected to rectify it by holding 
a second hearing. It will obviously be hard for the employee to trust in the 
second attempt without an assurance that it will be a hearing by an 
independent and impartial person. This situation will indeed frustrate 
employee genuine efforts and become financially taxing to both the 
employer and the employee. 
 
4 2 8 Jurisdictive resolutions on the charges of a criminal 
misconduct 
An employee suspected of criminal misconduct is entitled to be informed of 
the employer’s allegations. The information is given through reading 
charges to the employee criminal suspect. Once the charges of criminal 
misconduct have been read, then the employee criminal suspect will answer 
the charges and thus enter the plea. Once the plea has been entered then 
evidence is led, and the cross examination on witnesses from both parties, 
meaning the employer and the employee would take place. After the 
evidence of both parties has been presented, the chairperson would then 
determine the guilt or otherwise of the employee.  If the chairperson finds 
the employee criminal suspect guilty, the chairperson having considered the 
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nature of the charges and evidence in mitigation or aggravation would 
determine the appropriate sanction.  
The first is a factual issue in which the chairperson determines based on 
the evidence presented, whether the employee is guilty of the misconduct 
with which the employee has been charged. As explained above, in this 
process the chairperson will consider the evidence gathered by the 
employer in support of the allegations before deciding. As explained in the 
preceding chapters, in terms of Item 7(a) of the code, the chairperson 
enquires whether there was a workplace rule in existence that the employee 
flouted and enquires whether the employee breached that rule. 
Depending on the circumstances, an employee may be entitled to question 
the validity or the reasonableness of the rule.  This involves an assessment 
of the operational necessity for the rule.  Within the prescripts of the LRA 
and in satisfying employer flexibility measures, the chairperson can only 
look at the nature of the matter before the hearing. In addition, the 
chairperson will militate on the grounds that form the basis of the rule under 
enquiry while paying regard to the general industrial relations practice.1079 
The case of Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU,1080  held that disciplinary code-
inscripted standards, sometimes referred to as rules of employee 
behaviour, are conventional by nature. According to this case, the employer 
determines the disciplinary code and standards as part of their agreement 
with the employee who has to comply with them.1081 In addition, the 
employer is tasked to set rules pertaining to the determination of 
sanctions.1082 Such sanctions are eminent when employees contravene the 
ensued standards and rules.1083 
It is submitted that the employer-set sanctions are different from legislature-
set sanctions prescribed by the CPA and, as such, they are in effect worse 
 
1079 Item 7(b)(i) of Schedule 8.  See Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) 
at 1459. 
10801993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 1459.  
1081 Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 1457. 
1082 Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 1459. 
1083 Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 1459. 
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than the CPA proportional sanctions. In addition to the employer-made rules 
and sanctions are the common law-based rules embodying employee 
custom and practices. The common law-based rules are normally not spelt 
out in disciplinary codes. The rule that employees may not act in conflict 
with the interests of their employers is an example of such rules. The rest 
of the rules are inferred in the circumstances surrounding the misconduct 
that the employee is alleged to have committed.1084 
It is submitted that this scenario exposes the flexible nature of employer 
rules and standards to the extent that different employers may punish 
similar offences differently, contrary to the objectives of punishment 
emphasised within the proportionality-based types of punishment. 
The employer is flexible in setting the rules and standards and is only limited 
by the principle of reasonableness within the rationale of the LRA.1085  As 
shown in the previous chapters, employer reasonableness is measured 
within the labour law jurisprudential perspective bounds, as opposed to 
reasonableness within section 33 administrative law perspective. As 
Brassey succinctly states:  
...the employee can only be judged by reference to the standards that 
prevailed when he perpetrated the act complained of, since it is by 
reference to them that he is entitled to regulate his conduct.  The 
employer, in short, can set standards within the band of 
reasonableness, but has no such latitude when the prevailing 
standards…come to be applied.1086   
 
 In essence, employer reasonableness engages the consideration of 
employer-set standards and established rules of enterprise in the light of 
 
1084 Hoechst (Pty) Ltd v CWIU 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) at 1459. 
1085Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. As well see Sidumo above note 180 para 59 
. Also read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd 2013 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 
54-57. Myburg A & Bosch C Reviews in the Labour Courts South Africa 271-282. 
1086 Brassey M Employment and Labour Law A8-71. 
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the general industrial relations practice.1087 On the basis of this demand, it 
can be argued that the laxity engaged in varying flexibility determinations 
submits employer rules and standards to some major differences. Thus, the 
assessment of reasonableness on one employer may differ from the 
assessment of another employer. From this possibility emanate differing 
responses by different employers to the same misconducts. It was 
mentioned earlier in chapter three that even the same employer might come 
up with different responses for the same criminal misconduct committed by 
its employees, leading to different sanctions in comparable cases of 
misconducts. 
This fluid approach was observed in Donald Baphuthi v The CCMA and 
Others,1088 wherein employees accused of same dishonesty were offered 
different treatment. One employee was expelled while the other was given 
a written warning.  Normally, the one expelled would view the dismissal as 
unfair but would not gain favour in labour law because the employer 
reasonableness cannot be challenged beyond the set rules of labour law. It 
would not be possible to test the justiciability of the decision outside the 
scope of the LRA reasonableness. It is argued that the unbalanced decision 
could fit squarely within the constitutional inequality clause purview. 
In chapters one, two and three it is argued that the determination of 
employer reasonableness is comparable to the criticised common law high 
standard of unreasonableness, which rejected symptomatic 
unreasonableness rule.1089 The ensuing employer unreasonableness 
insinuates a higher degree of unreasonableness because it substantially 
presumes that a responsible employer carries out its duty properly and 
honestly. 
 
1087Avril above note 6 at 838 and at 1652. Sidumo above note 180 para 59. Also read 
Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers (Pty)Ltd (2013) 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 54-57. 
Myburg A & Bosch C Reviews in the Labour Courts South Africa 271-282. 
1088 Unreported case no J1901/99, Labour Court 1999. 
1089  Paras 1;221;2212 and 331. 
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In so doing, it limits possible challenge of the employer decision to dismiss 
as it places an exceedingly heavy onus on an aggrieved party who would 
have to traverse the constitutional human rights approach supportive 
principles, before making sense of the injustices encapsulated within the 
employer decision. To do that, the employee is not necessarily expected to 
engage legal expertise. Unlike in criminal matters, the poor employee 
cannot willy-nilly, be afforded a legal practitioner at the expense of the state.  
 It is further argued that even if the employee would be afforded all the 
necessary information at the stage, when the employee engages the 
employer before the CCMA, chances of convincing the court would be 
slimmer because of the limited avenues that the CCMA would utilise. 
The commissioners would not go beyond the labour law fora and start 
questioning the constitutionality of the employer decision within the equality 
clause provisions but would only be limited to considering whether the 
individual employee did not breach the employer’s trust to the extent that it 
could not be mended. It is argued that these circumstances reduce 
individual ability to seek review before the CCMA. Any move to challenge it 
based on other determinations such as the employee’s entrenched 
individual rights, like the rights entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution, 
is usually met with restraint and rejection.1090  
From labour law jurisprudence, there emerged reasonableness indicators 
and these include the scenarios in disputes where it could be argued that a 
rule or practice subject to dispute was not new because of its long 
application in similar circumstances. 1091  
In other scenarios, an employer would argue that the rule or practice subject 
to dispute emanated from their agreement with the employees or trade 
 
1090 This is marked by the different decisions, which lacked consistency regarding the 
extent of administrative discretion. See Shidiak v Union Government 1912 (AD) 651; 
Union Government v Union Steel Corporation 1928 (AD) 222; Johannesburg 
Consolidated Investment v Johannesburg Municipality 1903 TS 111; South African 
Defence and Aid Fund v Minister of Justice 1967 1 SA 263 (A); Cassim v Oos-Kaapse 
Komitee van die Groepsgebied 1959 3 SA 651 (A). 
1091 Sidumo above note 180 para 59;78-79. 
265 
 
unions.1092 Within this reasoning would fall sanctions as within agreed terms 
and standards. In these instances, the CCMA’s task is just to confirm the 
knowledge of the employee regarding the rule and whether indeed it is a 
standard rule or sanction without venturing into the justiciability of the rule 
or standard; whether the employee was aware of the rule and whether it 
has been consistently applied and nothing more.1093 Knowledge by the 
employee of well-established rules and standards such as unwritten and 
common-law1094 implied rules are assumed to be known by the employee. 
Within these categories are well-known customs and practices. 1095  
It would seem the employer is not as bound as the employee to observe 
customs and practices as well as common law in determining matters of 
criminal law nature. This argument is trite in the circumstances where well-
known principles of natural justice, especially the judex in propria sua causa 
rule engaging the principles against self-incrimination have been part of the 
South African common law since its inception. However, such principles are 
not observed by the employer criminal investigations and hearings based 
on employee criminal misconduct. 
To affirm the labour law supported ignorance by the employer of well-known 
rules, in Hoechst v Chemical Workers Industrial Union,1096 it was decided in 
the affirmative that employers need to strictly comply with these categories 
of laws as the basis of fair dismissal. In this case, the court judgment, 
amongst others, indicates that employers might dismiss employees for acts 
outside the scope of employment contract. 
The case further held that dismissals may occur based on acts not covered 
by labour law disciplinary codes. If the alleged criminal conduct of the 
 
1092 Highveld District Council v CCMA & Others 2003 23 ILJ 517 (LAC.) 
1093 Items 7(b)(ii) and (iii) of the Code.    
1094 the just cause principles. 
1095 the just cause principles. 
1096 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC). 
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employee impact materially on the relationship between the employer and 
the employee, the employer may dismiss the employee.1097 
The employers in most cases are concerned that codes of conduct are 
defaulted and yet they are also considered as guidelines. The codes of 
conduct cannot be willy-nilly departed from unless if not incorporated into 
the contract of employment. What matters is to afford the employee the right 
to be heard.1098 This reasoning is in accordance with the discovered criminal 
misconducts. 
 As seen in chapter two, criminal misconducts are composed of categories 
of criminal acts committed within the hiring of the employee or such criminal 
acts which happened while the employee was not on duty. As long as 
employee’s criminal acts impact negatively on the relationship that the 
employee has with the employer, such are criminal misconducts.1099 It can 
be argued that within labour law, the categorisation of criminal misconducts 
may be associated to several concerns other than the employer and 
employee relationship. These may include the link that a crime which the 
employee perpetrated outside the employment premises has on the 
employer and employee relationship. For example, a police officer who 
commits rape outside the workplace tarnishes police integrity.  
Consequently, three scenarios concerning employee criminal misconduct 
are at stake. Firstly, it would be of concern that the employee has 
perpetrated criminal acts at the workplace. Secondly, that the employee 
status of being a perpetrator may be associated with the integrity of the 
place of employment. Thirdly, that the employee status of being a criminal 
offender may negatively affect the employment relationship.1100  
 
 
1097 Hoechst v Chemical Workers Industrial Union 1993 14 ILJ 1449 (LAC) at pages 
1459-1460 paras G-I. 
1098 Highveld District Council v CCMA & others 2002 12 BLLR 1158 (LAC). 
1099 See part 4 3 dealing with the Case of Minister of Police v RM M & Safety and 
Security Sectoral Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/14. 
1100 Malan v Bulbring NO & others 2004 10 BLLR 1010 at 1017. 
267 
 
4 2 9  The decision and reasons for the dismissal 
 
The failure to give reasons for the dismissal is the basis for unfair dismissal. 
It interferes with the fair procedure in disciplinary proceedings.1101 At the 
finalisation of the hearing, the code demands that employees be informed 
of the outcome.1102 This must be in writing.1103  It does not matter whether 
the outcome is negative or positive. The employee needs to understand the 
consequences following the finding.  If the employer has decided to dismiss 
the employee, the employer must furnish the employee with reasons for 
dismissal. It would seem labour law differentiates between reasons and 
decisions. 
The determination on the employee’s guilt is the decision, while reasons are 
analogous to the rationale behind the finding. When the employer has 
decided to dismiss the employee, the employer is required to provide the 
employee with the reasons for his decision.  The employer must tell the 
employee why in the circumstances of the case dismissal, it was 
appropriate and fair, as opposed to any other sanction. In order to do that, 
the employer is expected to observe the Sidumo1104 matter factors, mainly 
confining employers within the four corners of the LRA. That is to say, the 
employer would consider what is appropriate in the circumstances of the 
employee criminal suspect’s case, even so within the Sidumo1105 matter 
perspective. It is argued that in these circumstances, employee criminal 
suspects would suffer prejudice in light of the possibility that the extent to 
which the finding that an employee is guilty of a criminal misconduct, would 
 
1101 Jeffery v President, South African Medical and Dental Council 1987 1 SA 387 (C). 
1102Schedule 8 Item 2 read with Item 4 (3). 
1103 Schedule 8 Item 2 read with item 5. 
1104 Sidumo above note 180 para 59;78-79. Also read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty)Ltd 2013 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 54-57. Mohammed v Chicken Licken 2010 31 
ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 5.3.1. 
1105Sidumo above note 180 para 59;78-79. Also read Matsekoleng v Shoprite Checkers 
(Pty) Ltd 2013 2 BLLR 130 (LAC) paras 54-57. Mohammed v Chicken Licken 2010 31 
ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 5.3.1  
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be based on the constitutional fairness (pertaining to matters of a criminal 
law nature) would still be minimal.  
The employer is expected to furnish sufficient reasons, which will enable 
the employee the ability to appeal the decision internally or for review and 
adjudication before the CCMA and Labour Court respectively. Before these 
jurisdictions, what is going to be determined are not only the facts but also 
the reason for the employee’s dissatisfaction, based on analysing whether 
the employer’s reasoning to have the employee dismissed was incorrect 
within the prescripts of the LRA.  
 
4 2 9 1 Referral of employer’s decision to dismiss the employee 
suspected of a criminal misconduct to arbitration or adjudication by 
the employee 
Upon the decision of the employer to dismiss the employee, the employer 
must inform the employee of subsequent rights, namely, the right to refer 
the matter to arbitration or adjudication. This partly may be interpreted to be 
an indication that a dismissed employee has the automatic right to these 
processes by virtue of the law.  
The consequent procedure after dismissal as seen in chapter three is the 
process of arbitration before the CCMA. In chapter three, it was explained 
that the CCMA determines fairness issues both for procedural fairness and 
for substantive fairness. As seen in Chapter three the employee can apply 
to the CCMA when the employee feels that the dismissal was unfair. In the 
event that the employee is still unsatisfied after the CCMA award, the 
employee would then proceed to the Labour Court for adjudication and not 
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vice versa.1106 This is what happens after the CCMA has referred the matter 
to the Labour Court.1107 
 
4 3 The repercussions of decisions based on employer interests 
against employees’ rights 
Through illustrations derived from recent case law 1108 which deals with 
some aspects of decided criminal misconduct dismissal cases, it is 
discovered that procedural dilemmas are caused. Central to these 
dilemmas is the contradiction between the two engaged criminal and civil 
labour laws with different underlying rationales of flexibility and 
proportionality.1109  
The difference in procedure seeking to punish employee criminal suspects, 
leads to objectionable outcomes considering constitutional proportionality 
principles. Few of these objectionable outcomes include questions of 
double punishment; unreasonable and onerous punishments, 
disproportionate outcomes and inequalities in the application of 
punishments on similar types of perpetrators. The cases cited below 
illustrate a glimpse of surmountable legal predicaments ensued by the 
distinction of labour law and criminal law processes dealing with employee 
dismissals on misconducts of a criminal nature. 
 
1106 See the case of Pillay v Automa Multi Styrene (Pty) Ltd (LC) (unreported case 
number JS 1658/14, 9-6-2015) where an opponent argued against applicant’s leap to 
the Labour Court before the CCMA’s certification of the matter. The arguments were 
based on section 191 of the LRA t and on section 157(4)(a) and (b) of the LRA setting 
the procedure that, “the labour court may refuse to determine any dispute, other than 
an appeal or review, if the court is not satisfied that an attempt has been made to resolve 
the dispute through conciliation.” Section 191 (5) of the LRA in particular requires that 
the applicant refer the matter to the CCMA and attempt to resolve the dispute through 
conciliation, or to allow a 30-day period to elapse, before the Labour Court can be 
approached to entertain the applicant’s matter. 
1107 Read Intervalve (Pty) Ltd and Another v National Union of Metalworkers of South 
Africa obo Members 2014 35 ILJ 3048 (LAC) at 160A. Per Zondo AJ & Mogoeng AJA, 
which amongst others held that “…. [T]he wording of section 191(5) imposes the referral 
of a dismissal dispute to conciliation as a precondition before such a dispute can either 
be arbitrated or referred to the Labour Court for adjudication…” 
1108For example cases discussed below; namely S v Mateke and Mabaso Case no:  A 
120/2015 heard on the 7/6/2016 (Unreported)  and  Minister of Police v RM M & Safety 
and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/1(unreported) 




4 3 1   The parallel nature of criminal misconduct dismissal 
processes 
The decided cases on employee criminal misconduct are of essence in this 
chapter. They are discussed in order to expose that the disjoined nature of 
South African civil and criminal laws creates an opportunity for employers 
to exploit formal legal processes. It was revealed previously that labour law 
allows the employer to design flexible ways of investigations and enquiries. 
To accomplish this, the employer, for example, may invoke the use of both 
criminal and civil processes of investigations and discoveries. These may 
extend to parallel proceedings.1110 Parallel proceedings are problematic by 
nature because they compromise due process and encourage 
simultaneous enforcement actions.    
Across these cases, the weaknesses in labour law dealing with cases of 
dismissal based on criminal misconduct are exposed. Furthermore, these 
cases show that the disjunction between the criminal and civil law 
processes engaged in labour law disciplinary processes for criminal 
misconduct, prejudices the ultimate justice.1111  Through arguments based 
on cases referred to in this chapter, lack of effective processes countering 
harsh effects in due course are found to compromise rationale for fair labour 
practices.   
 
 
1110 Regarding the nature of parallel proceedings, see Coffee J C 1991   Boston 
University Law Review 193 at 194 where he acknowledges the nature of criminal law. 
Regarding the possibility of prejudicial processes read Cheh M M 1991The Hastings 
Law Journal 1325. Also read Basdeo V 2013 African Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 303-326; McCastlain C J  and Schooner L S 1986 Public Contract 
Law Journal 418-445; Gonzalez L G Connelly B G and Eliopoulos E  1993 American 
Criminal Law Review 1179-1220 at 1179; Hasset M J 1979 Washington and Lee Law 
Review 1049; Eckers S R 1998 Hofstra Law Review 109 . 




4 3 1 1 The South Gauteng Case of S v Mateke and Mabaso Case no:  
A 120/2015 heard on the 7/6/2016 (Unreported) 
On this matter, two employees were internally investigated by the employer 
for theft of company funds. They then attended disciplinary hearings 
whereafter they were dismissed. When they appealed the employer’s 
decision, their appeal was not successful. The employer then proceeded 
and instituted criminal proceedings against them. In the criminal trial, the 
issues were based on the very same facts as those set before the 
disciplinary hearing.  The two employees were then charged with theft. 
 
4 3 1 1 1 Background to the matter 
On the 1st of October 2014, the employees received letters of suspension.  
On the 27th February 2015 the employees were informed about the 
disciplinary hearing. On the 30th of June 2015 the hearing for dismissal was 
finalised. On the 17th September 2015 they received letters of dismissal. 
Five days later they appealed their dismissal but failed. Second letters of 
dismissal were issued to them.  
After the labour law sanction of dismissal 1112was finalised, the State went 
back to the appellants with criminal law processes based on the same 
subject matter of dismissal.1113 Almost one month later, on the 21st 
November 2014, they were arrested. On the 24th of November 2014, they 
appeared before court and lodged bail which was granted. Each one paid 
bail of R5000.00. On 11th December 2014, they appeared for trial, the 
matter was then postponed to January 2015, and further postponed to 10 
February 2015. On 10 February 2015, they pleaded guilty and the matter 




1112 They were dismissed from work for stealing money. 
1113 That they stole money from work. 
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4 3 1 1 2 Sentence background 
At the trial, the respondents pleaded guilty to all 265 counts of fraud. They 
had formally confessed amidst the arrest that they had indeed defrauded 
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. They 
nevertheless went before a magistrate where their confession was formally 
recorded. They further tendered formal admissions in terms of section 112 
of the Criminal and Procedural Act and the State accepted the plea from the 
respondents. Based on the appellant’s acceptance of the formal pleas and 
the evidence tendered on aggravating circumstances, the court proceeded 
to pass sentence. 
 
4 3 1 1 3 The sentence 
Respondents were sentenced to 8 years direct imprisonment, of which five 
years were suspended on conditions that: - 
1. Respondents are not convicted of fraud and /or any competent verdict 
to fraud to which the respondents are sentenced to imprisonment 
without an option of a fine committed during the period of suspension. 
2. That the respondents are separately and jointly responsible to pay the 
amount of R1 442 740 to the complainant, Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development as follows: - 
3. Both forfeit their entire pension benefit to the State 
4. Separately and jointly responsible to pay the outstanding balance not 
covered by the pension benefits in monthly instalments of R11 330 
per month, until the amount is fully paid.  
The court made the following considerations: -1114 
1. That respondents confessed 
2. That they pleaded guilty 
3. That they resigned to forfeit pension money so that they repay the 
stolen monies 
 
1114 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
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4. That they have undertaken to pay the balance difference in 
monthly cash 
5. The court also considered the hardship, that the respondents 
would have a criminal record, which will remain a stigma and make 
it a challenge that they get jobs afterwards 
6. That they have lost jobs and pension money 
7. The court held that respondents showed remorse 
8. That they were first time offenders 
9. And considered that they had dependants; - 
10. First respondent, Mr Mateke, was married, had four children, two 
of them were minor children, he is 47 years old. 
11. He took care of his mother which is 71 years and his unemployed 
younger brother. 
12. Second respondent had two children, one 22 and another 2 years 
old, she is a single mother. 
13. The court considered the Zinn factors1115 and the main purposes 
of punishment-deterrence, prevention, retribution and 
rehabilitation. 
14. The court weighs the possibility of a suspended sentence against 
a suggestion by the State that the court should consider a 
sentence that will deter the respondents. 
15. The court went on to consider the status of the respondents 
against the public and the impact of their acts on the employer. 
The court held that the concerns by Mr Pierce, attract no criticism and took 
them into account; these related to the impact of the respondents’ actions 
to their career and the effects of these actions to the employer. Then the 
court concluded that the respondents deserved direct imprisonment 
because their offence is serious; the sentence of direct imprisonment was 
 
1115 S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A). the factors referred to in this case are the interests of 
society, the personal circumstances of the accused and the nature of the offences that 
have been committed. 
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appropriate. The court did consider the reaction of the respondents during 
their illegal actions; that they were willing to repay the lost money and the 
court held that they ought to be given an opportunity to do so.1116 
 
The State then appealed the sentence of the Magistrate Court. To sum up 
the following were the state’s appeal arguments: - 
• The sentence has no deterrent effect 
• The court failed to consider that the respondents held senior positions 
• That their positions were that of trust 
• That the respondents defrauded their employer  
• That the sentence is imbalanced, it overemphasises the element of 
remorse against the seriousness of the offence 
• Court made a compensation order without an application from State or 
request from complainant 
• That the court did not ascertain the tax implications on the respondent’s 
pension funds and other fees which may be due to the department 
• That the respondents did not give evidence in mitigation of sentence 
but conveyed their wish to pay back the money through counsel 
• The Court erred in calling for evidence from the respondents as to how 
they were going to pay back the outstanding balance from the pension 
funds as they would no longer be employed. 
 
Counsel for respondents (currently appellants) argued against the 
appellant’s argument. She regarded the gist of the appeal by the State 
before the court to be based on the following: - 
• Appellant emphasised that sentencing respondents to a suspended 
sentence instead of direct imprisonment was not legally acceptable.    
 
1116 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
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• He argued that the case does not follow or deviate from sentences that 
courts normally give, in circumstances where offenders, in positions of 
trust had broken the trust and stolen from the employer.  
• He argued that imprisonment would be appropriate as a deterrent to 
would-be offenders, holding positions of trust like the respondents in 
this case. 
Counsel for respondents categorised appellant’s concerns into two: - 
First, strictly sentencing-related concerns and, second, procedure-related 
concerns. She then considered these concerns to be raising two questions 
to ask. Basically, to determine if the court aquo erred in any way in the 
passing of a suspended sentence, taking into respect the above indicated 
considerations? Then again, whether the appeal court can entertain the 
appellant’s procedural concerns at the appeal stage? Counsel for the 
employee respondents, then submitted that in South African law, 
suspended sentences are considered appropriate under any circumstances 
the court deems fit, this is particularly inferred in section 297 of the CPA. 
She argued that the most important part of section 297 is paragraph (1)(b), 
which essentially reads as follows: 
 
 [w]here a court convicts a person of any offence, other than an offence 
in respect of which any law prescribes a minimum punishment, the 
court may in its discretion pass sentence but order the operation of the 
whole or any part thereof to be suspended for a period not exceeding 
five years on any condition referred to in paragraph (a)(i) which the 
court may specify in the order. 
 
Section 297(1)(b) of the CPA simply states that the court may pass 
“sentence” and then suspend it. It does not specify or limit these sentences. 
Counsel for the employees, argued that it is fair to assume, that all 
sentences a court may impose are included. There is no doubt that 
sentences consisting of ordinary imprisonment and fines can be 
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suspended. This is also accepted of section 276(1)(i) imprisonment.1117 In 
this respect counsel for respondents submitted that the court did not err in 
passing a suspended sentence, it had discretion to pass sentence guided 
by circumstances of the case in hand. She argued that in every sentence 
there is a requisite for a fair balance of mitigating circumstances and 
aggravating circumstances including an aspect of deterrence to both 
respondents and potential culprits. 
She further argued that there is an overwhelming account of 
mitigating circumstances in this case, which the court would not reasonably 
overlook to give way to aggravating circumstances relating to the 
seriousness of the offence.1118 South African law allows that in meting out 
a punishment, the court considers a punishment that suits the offender as 
well as the offence. Furthermore, counsel for respondents insisted that the 
sentence passed by the court aquo was appropriate due to the 
considerations that the court made.1119  
In particular, she argued that the court aquo did not err in considering that 
loss of employment had a detrimental effect on the respondents. In effect, 
she argued that by considering this factor, the court was able to mete out a 
proportionate1120 sentence. She supported her arguments with what 
happens in other jurisdictions.1121 In short, she based herself on the 
constitutional provisions of section 39. 1122  
 
1117 See S v Stanley 1996 (2) SACR 570 (A) at 575f-g. As well see Terblanche S The 
Guide to Sentencing in South Africa. 2007, 348-349. 
1118 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
1119Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court.  
1120 Consider Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (1995) page 1. 
80. As well see concerns raised on the disproportionate punishment caused by the lack 
of integration between criminal sanctions and employment deprivations, in Bagaric M 
2004 Journal of Criminal Law 329-355. 
1121 Amongst others, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as well as 
Australia. 
1122This section recommends interpretation that considers international and foreign law 
developments of similar concepts encapsulated in South African Law. 
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Quoting the decision in Johnson v Unisys Ltd,1123 she argued that loss of 
employment is a punishment as employment is valuable.1124 The court 
rejected this reasoning on the basis that the employee, by stealing from its 
employer, called that upon itself and therefore it is of no essence in 
considering loss of employment upon punishment.1125   
Counsel for the respondents also argued that after the loss of employment 
due to dismissal, the employees have no prospects of employment.1126 It 
further considered that the attainment of a criminal record owing to 
conviction of the employees would be another further punishment.1127 In the 
midst of a different perspective of sentencing employees who had also been 
dismissed from their employments, counsel based her arguments on the 
two Australian decisions, namely, R v Talia1128read with R v Nuttall; Exparte 
Attorney-General.1129  
She maintained that Australian decisions like American perspectives, give 
a balanced discussion of opposing hypothesis regarding the need to 
consider employment deprivations. Consequently, they appreciate the need 
to consider employment deprivations in sentencing.1130  
The court, while rejecting counsel’s arguments as “strange,” insisted on the 
current consistent way of sentencing perpetrators of fraud regardless of 
whether they lost jobs or not. The court inferred that South Africa is a highly 
corrupt country as compared to Australia and therefore the South African 
 
1123  [2003] 1 AC 518,539[35] per Lord Hoffmann. 
1124 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
1125 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
1126 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
1127 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
1128 [2009] VSCA 260,[28]. 
1129(QLD),[59] PER Muir JA (with whom Fraser and Chesterman JJA agreed). As well 
see legal Professional discourses in argument for the considerations, taken by the court 
aquo. For example, the discussion in Bagaric M, Xynas L and Lambropoulos V   2016 
UNSW Law Journal Vol 39(1). 
1130 Bagaric M, Xynas L and Lambropoulos V   2016 UNSW Law Journal Vol 39(1) 47 
at pages 81-82 (C Employment Deprivations Should Reduce Penalty) consider page 
59 regarding ensuing arguments. 
278 
 
law must indicate zero tolerance to employee theft.1131 In particular, the 
court considered Nicole Romey De Villiers v The State.1132  
Addressing the argument on whether the sentence should stand in the light 
of the decision in Nicole Romey De Villiers v The State,1133 Counsel for 
respondents argued that each case must be considered within its own 
circumstances. In particular, the court in Nicole’s case did not consider the 
impact of the loss of employment on the appellant. It mainly focused on 
appellant’s prospects of rehabilitation and the fact that appellant was 
gainfully employed. The Nicole’ case could be relevant in this particular 
case to the extent that it contributes mitigation for single parents who are 
also care givers to minors. However, counsel for respondents still argued 
that even though the court aquo did consider that the  second respondent 
had two children, of which one is 22 and another 2 years old and that she 
is a single mother, it failed to consider the issue of loss of employment as 
enough mitigation to allow the court to budge from imposing direct 
imprisonment.  
This factor was not fully thrashed out because the best interest of the minor 
child was never fully dealt with. Counsel therefore submitted that the 
circumstances of the second respondent as a caregiver to a minor child 
should appeal to the court never to consider direct imprisonment for the 
second respondent. This aspect puts the court aquo suspended sentence 
at stake as far as it would ultimately amount to direct imprisonment at the 
lapse of one or the other condition.   
In conclusion, counsel for respondents argued that, the arguments raised 
on behalf of the state, that the court aquo exercised its penal discretion 
irregularly, unreasonably, improperly and in an unbalanced way is 
 
1131 This perspective is without the realisation of the unreasonableness in punishing the 
same parson more than once on the basis of same issues. This is forbidden in the 
common law principle Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa, which means 
nobody, may be harassed with the same offence / case twice.  
1132  (20367/2014) [2015] ZASCA 119; 2016 (1) SACR 148 (SCA); [2015] 4 All SA 268 
(SCA) (11 September 2015). 
1133  (20367/2014) [2015] ZASCA 119; 2016 (1) SACR 148 (SCA); [2015] 4 All SA 268 
(SCA) (11 September 2015). 
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unfounded. She pleaded that the appeal should be dismissed. Further, she 
pleaded that the court varies the sentence of the court aquo. What the 
appeal court ought to do was to vary the sentence of the court aquo by 
removing the suspended sentence, counsel argued. Furthermore, the 
appeal went a step further to argue that court ought to vary the court aquo 
sentence by removing the order that respondents pay the remaining 
balance.  
It was further argued by the appellant-employer that the appeal court would 
again remit the matter back to the Regional Court for that court to make a 
proper consideration regarding the proper calculation of monies which 
respondents lost to State, as compensation for the loss that the State 
incurred. 1134 
It was further argued on behalf of the employees accused, that the court 
ought to consider the substance of court aquo’s net sentence, and that even 
though it is a trend that South African Jurisprudence in matters of this 
nature1135 leans towards direct imprisonment, the consideration of the effect 
of employment law sanctions, which are tantamount to punishment, bears 
a similar net effect with criminal punishment.1136 
At the instance of State, the court required not to bother about the 
calculation of monies still owed to the State by the respondents after the 
pensions were paid in. The State vouched to use its administrative ways.1137 
Consequently, the court never delved into this issue. The court upheld the 
appeal and set aside the Magistrate Court’s decision. That decision was 
substituted with the following sentence: - 
 
1134 Judgement unreported, court record not transcribed. Court Audio record available. 
Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. 
1135 Where employees stole from their employers. 
1136 Argument extracted from audio recordings of the court. No reported judgment nor 
transcribed court proceedings. 
1137 Here the state was referring to the invocation of the Asset Forfeiture laws. This law 
however is highly criticised by its double jeopardy effects.   
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• One-year direct imprisonment in terms of section 276 1 (i) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act to operate within 7 days from the date of 
judgment 
• The court threw out respondents’ counsel arguments and 
commented: - 
It considered the cited Australian jurisprudence as “strange.” 1138 
Not much was said in the reasoning of the court as to why the cited 
authorities were thrown out. 
 
4 3 1 1 3 1  Critical Analysis 
The Mateke matter is just the tip of the iceberg to unreported matters of 
criminal law nature which first began as an employee dismissal matter 
before employer hearings and ended up as a criminal trial matter before 
criminal courts. The two employees, criminally accused, initially began as 
employee criminal misconduct suspects. They were investigated for 
dismissal purposes and later the investigation for their criminal trial had 
taken over. They were investigated twice for one crime. They were 
arraigned and charged before the employer hearing for dismissal and found 
guilty of theft and a punishment of dismissal meted against them. 
Consequently, before the criminal court, they were punished again. The 
Magistrate Court had granted a suspended sentence in consideration that 
they were already punished through loss of employment. The magistrate 
considered the loss of employment as a mitigating factor hence the reason 
that the Director of Public prosecutions had appealed requesting that the 
High Court throw out the Lower Court judgment and impose direct 
imprisonment. 
The first criminal investigation by the employer did not follow the fair trial 
processes entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution read with the CPA. 
The second investigation, even though purported to follow fair trial 
 




processes, was already tainted by unfair investigation procedures carried 
out previously by the employer. This case exposes a clash between 
employer flexibility-based processes of investigation and criminal justice 
proportionality-based procedures. Where these take place simultaneously 
they breed unfairness and therefore injustices. 
In this case, the court missed an opportunity to develop the law from 
unjusticiable to a justiciable perspective. If the court could have taken an 
approach that unites criminal law punishment and civil employment law 
sanctions as it was suggested by respondents’ counsel, the problems of 
double punishment could have been eradicated. Compared to ordinary 
cases of fraud, the respondents’ punishment comes out onerous and 
disproportionate to criminal justice. This scenario amounts to inequality of 
sanctions, when compared to other fraudster employees who are punished 
twice as much.1139 The court ought to have considered that  ahead of the 
ensued injustices in the sentencing of the respondents, the worst thing is 
that discord between criminal sanctions and employment deprivations 
reduces the rehabilitation prospects of offenders. 
 
4 4 The Case of Minister of Police v RM M & Safety and Security 
Sectoral Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/14(Unreported) 
In this matter, an employee who was alleged to have raped his minor 
daughter several times,1140 a few years ago, was dismissed by his employer 
based on committing a criminal misconduct.  
This matter is understood to expose employer’s basis for substantive 
fairness of the employee’s dismissal to have been evidence submitted at an 
enquiry which was aimed at proving the guilt of the employee in that he 
perpetrated the acts. 
 
1139 Consider the argument against ohnerous punishment of employee criminal 
suspects in Bagaric M 2004 Journal of Criminal Justice August  Vol 68(4) 329-355 at 
page 332. 
1140 The alleged facts of the incidences were heart-breaking and damaging to the 
alleged victim-hid daughter. 
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The employer understood that, if the allegation is proven to have been true, 
the employee could no longer be an employee of the South African Police 
Service (SAPS). The continuance of the employee criminal perpetrator as 
the employee of SAPS would damage the dignity of the police service.1141 
The enquiry was held under a flexible procedure even though it 
sought to prove that the employee indeed committed the alleged criminal 
acts of sexual assault against his daughter. Constitutional observations 
enquired for fair criminal persecutions were never followed. The witnesses 
before this enquiry, for example, were never sworn. It was the prevailing 
understanding that these witnesses knew that they were supposed to tell 
the truth.1142 
The internal proceedings ran simultaneously with criminal trial of the 
employee. Before the criminal trial could come to completion, the employee 
had taken the decision to take on the employer for arbitration. 
It transpired that the complainant as the key witness refused give evidence 
at the arbitration. It was alleged that she was traumatized by the experience 
of giving evidence before the internal employer enquiries.1143 At this demise, 
the employer gave transcripts of the internal enquiry evidence. These were 
therefore classified hearsay evidence governed by the South African Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 (LEAA). It is this law that introduced 
and defined a specialized field of law of hearsay evidence as a development 
of common law aspects of hearsay evidence. 
From the employer’s side it was argued that the records were admissible in 
the best interest of justice in terms of section 3(1)(c) of the LEAA.1144 The 
arbitrator was not convinced given that the determination could be based 
on this evidence alone.  
 
1141 See para 2 of the judgment. 
1142 See the comment of the Labour Court in para 26 of the judgment. 
1143 Para 48 and 50 of the judgment. 
1144 See para 6 of the judgment, the employer applied that the record be admitted in 
terms of the LEAA. 
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The arbitrator then decided against the handed evidence. In light that there 
was no other independent evidence that the hearsay evidence seeks to 
pass through, the commissioner found it difficult to determine substantive 
fairness alleged by the employer. As far as the commissioner was 
concerned, there was no evidence to weigh. Prior to the commissioner, 
there was no corroborating evidence except the transcripts.1145 
At the review of the arbitrator’s award, the Labour Court, held against the 
arbitrator. The disagreement used for its decision, was that the transcripts 
were handed in as hearsay evidence.  Integrally, despite the employer’s 
annunciation on the guilt of the employee based on the led evidence, the 
Labour Court considered the contents of the transcripts of the evidence led 
in determining the criminal guilt of the employee substantive evidence. 
Thus, the court inferred that the content of evidence matters and not the 
purpose for which it was sought. 1146  
At the second turn, the Labour Court found that the employee ought to have 
taken a stand and rebut the prime facie evidence against him. It is 
understood that the court referred to the transcripts to have established 
prime facie1147evidence of the employee’s perpetration of criminal acts 
inferred against him. 
Against the decision by the arbitrator that the evidence tendered was of 
minimal weight, the Labour Court held that it was correct that the untested 
hearsay evidence was admitted by the arbitrator.1148 
Whilst ignoring the law regarding that the process of arbitration must be a 
de novo hearing of the parties’ case, the Labour Court considered that it 
was an irregularity that the commissioner decided that the transcript had a 
minimal evidential weight. 
 
1145 See para 33 of the judgment. 
1146 See para 38 of the judgment.  
1147 The court was actually calling for the alleged criminal perpetrator to incriminate 
himself. 
1148 Para 35 of the judgment. I do not agree with this perspective because it is turns 
against justice it seeks to met. Law of evidence have defined principles regarding 
admissibility of hearsay evidence. 
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The court went on to say that the commissioner “did not seem to realize that 
the transcripts were of no ordinary hearsay.”1149  The court held that the 
transcript was hearsay evidence of a special type. 1150 
The court’s understanding inscribes that the commissioner ought to have 
traversed the transcript and investigated what transpired in the enquiry. 
While condoning the informalities that happened at the enquiry and 
understanding that the enquiry determinations are based on informal 
procedure even when dealing with matters of a criminal law nature, the 
commissioner ought to have read the transcript and evaluated it to be of 
weight and can base a decision that the employee was fairly dismissed. 
 
• The court considered that the transcripts were of bi-lateral value. 
• That they were a comprehensive record of earlier proceedings in 
which the complainant’s evidence against the employee was indeed 
corroborated by independent witnesses. 
• That the substantiation was tested through cross examination. 
• That the employee’s defense was ventilated and exposed as being 
plausible. 
 
What the court suggested ought to have been done, was basically to 
overlook established principles of evidence, regarding the admissibility of 
hearsay evidence, regarding fewer that the transcripts were submitted as 
hearsay evidence in light of the interest of justice. 
Even though the Labour Court did not ultimately decide on the matter but 
remitted it to the commissioner for a fresh arbitration, it left an instruction1151 
and understood that its instruction introduces a departure from the normal 
guidelines of the law on how hearsay is weighed. It held that,  
Since this may be a departure from the norm in how hearsay is 
weighed, I take this opportunity to set out a few guidelines on when, in 
 
1149At Para 37. 
1150 At Para 37. 
1151 It reffered to this instruction as the new guideline. At para 45. 
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arbitration proceedings conducted in terms of the LRA, a single piece 
of hearsay, such as a transcript, might constitute prima facie proof of 
an allegation.  The hearsay should: 
be contained in a record which is reliably accurate and complete; 
be tendered on the same factual dispute; 
be bilateral in nature.  In other words, the hearsay should constitute a 
record of all evidence directly tendered by all contending parties; 
in respect of the allegations, demonstrate internal consistency and 
some corroboration at the time the hearsay record was created. For 
example, the transcripts read as a whole provide corroboration via D 
and RM, for K’s evidence that she became pregnant at age 14 while 
living under her father’s roof.  RM’s letter to K about expecting favours 
in exchange for sex was further corroborated by S; 
show that the various allegations were adequately tested in cross-
examination. For example, the transcripts record not only K’s 
allegations but also RM’s attempts to discredit them; 
have been generated in procedurally proper and fair circumstances. 
For example, the internal hearing that generated the hearsay records 
was run in a scrupulously fair manner by Snr Supt Matabane, with RM 
free to conduct his defence as he wished.1152 
Through this new guideline, South Africa will be adopting a unique way on 
how to weigh hearsay evidence. This approach is unique to South Africa 
and has never been practiced elsewhere in the world.  
 
4 4 1  Critical Analysis  
The newly decided guidelines, single out labour matters and define a unique 
and new way of admitting hearsay evidence. This newly created approach 
to admitting hearsay symbolises that the Labour Court did not appreciate 
the negative impact that this new principle has on the well-established law 
of evidence principles.1153  
Clearly from these instructions the arbitration need not follow legislated 
principles of evidence. Similarly, even in the light of principles underlying 
criminal condemnation, it can be argued that it is impossible, if not very 
difficult, to exclude the purpose of evidence from its content as the court 
 
1152  At para 45. 
1153 On the rationale of law of evidence, read Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles 
of Evidence 4; about the risks engaged in the ignorance of evidentiary precautions, read 
Monyakane MMM  2015 Obiter 136-149. 
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suggests. In pursuit of what the court suggested that the purpose of 
evidence be excluded from its content, it is possible that the guilt of an 
alleged criminal perpetrator be proved using informal ways which are full of 
irregularities in pursuit of employer’s grounds for fair dismissal.  
These irregularities would be ignored regardless of their prejudicial nature 
on the employee suspected of criminal misconduct. It is argued that the 
Labour Court indirectly acknowledges that the objective of the inquiry was 
to establish the guilt of the employee without which determination, it could 
not found substantive fairness. 
In the long run, this decision acknowledges disproportionate justice against 
the employee. If the rationale for criminalisation was considered in this 
matter, the court could have appreciated every ensuing injustice and thus 
applied mitigating precautions. This can only be attained by breaking the 
walls between civil and criminal justice.  
  
4 5 Conclusion 
Using chapter three as background, this chapter explained that the adoption 
of the principle of implied breach of trust between employer and employee 
emanating from common law1154 and now encapsulated in jurisprudential 
underpinnings of dismissal hearing processes, promotes the idea that the 
employer has flexibility in determining disciplinary hearing processes.  It has 
shown that this understanding was practicalised in the LRA disciplinary 
hearing processes for the dismissal of employees, who committed criminal 
misconducts. It was found out that the practice did not exclude criminal 
misconducts as matters of criminal law nature in light that such matters 
ought to observe criminal procedure-based fairness entrenched in section 
35 of the Constitution. This chapter analysed that in pursuit of flexibility, 
employers feel not bound by the prescripts of criminal justice and 
 
1154 Discussed in chapter two at part 2 2 4 2 dealing with the theory of flexibility and its 
extent in criminal misconducts discipline. 
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consequently lose sight of the holistic application of constitutional 
justification demands.1155   
The disregard of constitutional human rights-based justification was 
observed to lead to absurd results. The extent of employer criminal 
investigations and subsequent disciplinary hearing processes were deemed 
informal and against formal processes proscribed in the CPA. This chapter 
ultimately exposed that the informal employer disciplinary hearing flaunts 
the essentialities of proportionality mandated in matters of criminal law 
nature.1156 This circumstance was analysed to have culminated in multiple 
injustices for employees subjected to employer criminal investigations and 
their subsequent disciplinary hearings. 
In this chapter, the intrinsic nature of employer flexibility in dismissals of 
employees who have committed criminal misconduct was dissected. The 
systematic processes of hearing for dismissal were explained. It was 
discovered that these processes do not observe principles of proportionality 
embedded in criminal law formalities. In so doing, employee’s rights as 
criminal suspects are greatly, if negatively, affected. It was also discovered 
that there are uncertainties in disciplinary hearing processes.  It was as well 
discerned, that these processes pursue progressive discipline perspective 
without differentiation of the nature of matters in dispute. As shown in 
chapter two, progressive discipline has its foundation on the theory of 
flexibility.  
This chapter opines that, to a larger extent, flexibility gives leeway to 
maintaining the status quo of the imbalanced master and servant principle. 
While maintaining its upper hand in the relationship, since the employer 
cannot simply dismiss the employee, the employer would  hold onto to 
satisfying audi alterum partem without extending to the need to satisfy the 
second leg of natural justice—nemo judex in propria sua causa.1157  
 
1155 Entrenched in section 35 of the constitution.  
1156 Explained in chapter two at part 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality 
and its extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline. 
1157 No man shall be judged in his own cause, the rule against bias. 
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As indicated in chapters one, two and three, the employer cannot proceed 
to such an extent because of the informal nature of the disciplinary 
proceedings, short of formal processes needed in complying with the 
second leg of natural justice. It is mandatory that in the attempt to satisfy 
the audi alterum principle requirement, the employer must have interacted 
with the employee criminal suspect even at the peril of sacrificing individual 
employee rights as a criminal suspect.  
It was observed in this chapter that in most cases, where a misconduct is 
of a criminal law nature, the employee ends up in self-incrimination ventures 
to putting out their version of the issues. After the employee has been found 
guilty of perpetrating misconduct by the employer, the last element of 
substantive fairness subsequently determines an appropriate and fitting 
disciplinary sanction from a range of warnings to dismissal.  
In the attempt to establishing substantive fairness, the employer ought to 
have engaged in fair evaluation of the available facts. It transpired in this 
chapter that the processes used to determine whether the employee 
suspect actually committed the criminal misconduct are not close to 
observing fairness principles entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution 
because they are based on the flexibility of the employer’s decision. 
Concisely, they invoke specialised procedures interlocked between civil and 
criminal procedure.  
At the centre is the pursuit to establish as to whether there is a breakdown 
of trust between the employer and employee while trampling on entrenched 
section 35 fairness rights for employee suspects of crime.1158 Goddard, 
writing from the New Zealand perspective, observed a similar interaction of 
legal processes to ensure a “tension.”1159  
In line with this observation, this chapter has discovered that the nature of 
employer disciplinary hearing proceedings causes a clash in procedure. 
They bear some nature of civil procedural steps in some respects; in 
 
1158 Per section 35 of the Constitution.  
1159 Goddard J 2011 Canterbury Law Review 251-282, at 251.   
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another respect they purport to be following criminal procedural steps and 
yet not concomitantly so. The employer investigates the criminal 
misconduct and therefore assumes the position of trained police 
investigators. 
The employer devises their own investigation processes and not CPA-
mandated investigation principles. These are normally informal; laissez 
faire and hardly take constant civil procedure into account nor formal 
constitutional section 351160 oriented processes in the CPA. It was found 
that employer processes are hence complex proceedings, showing 
intertwined characteristics mixing civil trial processes with civil application 
processes and some observance of criminal procedure. The employer is at 
liberty to pick and choose what abides with the protection of flexibility-based 
fairness which is in effect not easily determinable. It is not a constant 
procedure. 
It was found that employer flexible processes are not as definite and straight 
forward as criminal procedure, hence difficulty to abide with constitutional 
justification. They may follow civil procedure processes of discovery as 
opposed to criminal investigation processes. They do not involve legal 
expertise; it is the discretion of the employer as to whether the employee 
would need a legal representative. Their standard of proof is on a balance 
of probability and not beyond a reasonable doubt just as much as it happens 
in criminal procedure.  Unlike under criminal procedure, employer 
processes do not observe the rights of criminal suspects. 
Both civil and criminal procedure processes will ultimately condemn the 
perpetrator. Dismissed employees like convicted persons do not find jobs 
easily. They both have slim prospects of employment. Dismissed 
employees may still be prosecuted1161and the possibility that the 
unprocedural collection of evidence may be used in the criminal trial is very 
high as there are no laws restricting the exchange of information between 
 
1160 Of the Constitution. 
1161  Consider the case of Hollington v F Hewthorne & Co Ltd [1943] 2 ALL ER 35 
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the employer and the police. The criminal trial and dismissal hearings are 
attached in some respects, especially for the benefit of the employer.  
They are however detached when it comes to the employee benefit. Even 
if the employee is acquitted in the criminal trial that does not guarantee 
employee’s reinstatement. However, the employee conviction in a criminal 
trial can lead to automatic dismissal without a disciplinary hearing. 
Underlying these clashes is the ensuing conflict between establishing 
employee’s breach of trust and respect of entrenched rights of employee 
criminal suspect in section 35 of the Constitution. This conflict in legal 
principles poses the need to venture through the possible solutions.  
The next chapter explores international jurisprudential perspectives on the 
tension between the pursuit of employee breach of trust and the need to 
observe employee criminal suspects rights. Within the extent and limits of 
this thesis, namely how constitutionally justifiable is the employer’s 
investigations and disciplinary hearings on employee criminal misconducts, 
the examination in the next chapter is limited to available examples 
pertaining to the interconnections between criminal law fairness and 






The adoption of selected commonwealth countries’ application of 
employee criminal suspect’s right against self-incrimination in terms 
of section 39(1) of the South African Constitution  
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In terms of section 39 (1) of the Constitution, the interpretation and 
application of the law in South Africa must consider international and foreign 
law. It is mandatory that international law is considered while it can be in 
accordance with choice that foreign law is considered for the justification of 
judicial interpretation of any South African law. In light of benefits that South 
Africa would attain, if it emulates other commonwealth states, in respecting 
employee criminal suspect’s rights’ against self- incrimination, it is 
submitted that it is mandatory that South Africa reinterprets labour law 
employer investigative and dismissal processes for employee criminal 
suspects along the lines of other commonwealth states’ jurisprudence.  
The international literature to refer to, has not yet developed into an 
established area of research. There is, however, an example of a 
development addressing the area of concern in this thesis. This 
development concerns the application of the right against self- incrimination 
in employment related justice. The fact that it is taking place in the 
commonwealth states, which were identified in chapter one and three as 
having similar common law principles of justification to South African 
constitutional demands for justification raises hope for development of 
labour law in South Africa.  
Since the right against self-incrimination  intersects principles of fairness 
entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution, discussed in chapters one, two, 
three and four, the concerned literature from the identified common law 
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jurisdictions is found important to form a ground and therefore a starting 
point for a practical eradication of the identified problem for the current 
study. It was found that South Africa needs to develop a law interacting 
labour law and criminal law so that it does away with the divide between 
section 23 and section 35 constitutional fairness.  
The application of the section 35 right against self-incrimination, in labour 
law related matters of a criminal law nature, which traditionally only applies 
in criminal law matters and is identified as a huge step of related labour law 
development. 
The problems experienced in South African labour law regarding the 
clashes between the pursuit of employee breach of trust and the need to 
observe employee criminal suspects’ rights were apparent in the United 
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and United States of America before the 
right against self-incrimination was introduced in employment law. The 
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and United States of America 
jurisprudence expose that these states went through the same experiences 
as South Africa. However, these jurisdictions have remedied the situation 
through various measures and strategies by introducing the application of 
the right against self-incrimination in employment law.  
This chapter will show how the United Kingdom, New Zealand and United 
States of America jurisdictions developed jurisprudence dealing with 
criminal misconduct  dismissals to the benefit of employees criminal 
misconducts.1162 It will show that in these jurisdictions, negation of the 
principle against self-incrimination is opposed and employer investigations 
and disciplinary hearings respect the fairness principles engaged in matters 
of criminal law nature.1163 These jurisdictions operate in a perspective that 
is different from the current South African labour law perspective discussed 
in the previous chapters and yet they have a similar common law which 
 
1162 The United Kingdom; New Zealand and United States of America. 
1163 All proportionality-based principles come into play once the employee invokes the 
right against self-incriminationmination. Consequently, the challenges explained in 
chapter four to be aligned with flexibility-based processes are remedied. 
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embraced principles of natural justice including the right against self-
incrimination. 
It was earlier explained that respect to the twin principles of natural justice 
facilitates the enforcement of the principles underlying the major principle 
of proportionality. The principle of proportionality was found1164 to be the 
backbone principle in dealing with criminal misdemeanours such as acts 
categorised as criminal misconduct in labour law.1165 It will be exposed in 
this chapter, that within their employment laws for dismissals of employee 
suspects of criminal misconducts, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and 
United States of America perspectives have adopted the principle of 
fairness embraced in criminal trials. They observe principles underlying 
section 35 of the South African Constitution.  
It will be recognised from this exposure that employee dismissals in these 
jurisdictions make the nature of issues the focus when choosing applicable 
law.1166 In the end, it will be realised that the approaches of these 
jurisdictions defy the practice followed in South African employee dismissal 
jurisprudence and mirror the arguments raised in this thesis against the 
current South African dismissal practice in this thesis. Further, that they 
exemplify the constitutional objective anticipated in section 23(1) and 
section 8 read with sections 33, 35 and 39 of the South African Constitution. 
At the centre of the uncovered developments was the observance of the 
principle that no man shall be judged in his own cause. It is this principle 
that enshrines the right against self-incrimination in South Africa discussed 
in chapters two and three.1167 
The evolution of the right against self-incrimination principle in the 
New Zealand, United States of America and United Kingdom jurisdictions 
 
1164 Refer to chapters two, three and four of this thesis. 
1165 Refer to chapter two para 2 1 1 1 dealing with the definition of criminal misconducts 
in labour law. 
1166 An exposure initially proposed to be practiced in South African Law by the 
Constitutional Court, per Moseneke J in Thebus v S 2003 (10) BCLR 1100 at 1121 para 
54. 




was remarkable. It first came as a common law privilege before it was a 
statutorily recognised law principle. It ultimately became a protected right 
against self-incrimination.1168 It was earlier applied cumbersomely before it 
could be elevated to a recognised individual right. In the matter of Palko v 
State of Connecticut1169 for example, the application of this principle was 
undermined by the philosophy of the day. The court expressed the 
skepticism within which this principle was regarded when it held that self-
incrimination immunities are capable of being lost without affecting the fiber 
of justice. The court also expressed doubt regarding justice amid torturing 
perpetrators. 
 
5 2 The development of the right against self-incrimination in the 
United States of America.  
The United States’ interpretation of the right against self-incrimination is up 
to the current times undergoing “expansion of scope and practical 
effect.”1170 Even though the wording of the Fifth Amendment clause is direct 
and simple, it transpires to be overwhelming by nature.  Its “profound 
effect”1171 is exposed by the United States of America judiciary. The courts 
warned that this clause ought not to be applied “narrowly or 
begrudgingly.”1172 These courts remarks indicated that a narrow treatment 
was tantamount to undermining the importance of this principle in law in 
conflict to treating it as a historic relic and therefore “ignoring its 
purpose.”1173 
The United States of America vouches for a wide interpretation. It 
interprets privilege against self-incrimination as a constitutional right 
capable of “sustaining growth and encompassing new circumstances as 
 
1168 Pittman C R The Colonial and Constitutional History of Privilege 71; Trainor A S 
1994 FILJ 2139-2186; Langbein J H 1993-1994 Mich L Rev 1047-1085; MacCulloch A 
2006 Legal Studies 211-257. 
1169 302 US 319 (1937) at 325–6 per Cardozo J. 
1170Theophilopoulos above note 869. 
1171Theophilopoulos above note 869. 
1172Theophilopoulos above note 869. 
1173Theophilopoulos above note 869.  
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they arise.”1174 A couple of principles accommodating wide application of 
the right against self-incrimination in the United States of America entail 
that;  
[f]irst, all invocations of the privilege must be liberally interpreted, 
always in favor rather than against the claimant.1175 
Secondly, an invocation of the privilege is not dependent on a particular 
choice of words and no specific ritual formula is required.1176 
Third, the privilege may be asserted in all proceedings, civil or criminal, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory.1177  
Fourth, waiver of the privilege must be made voluntarily, knowingly and 
intelligently.1178 
Fifth, the accused’s privilege in the courtroom (i e the trial right to 
silence) is an absolute privilege, whereas the witness privilege against 
self- incrimination is a relative one which may be invoked on a 
question-to- question basis.  
Sixth, once the privilege has been claimed, no evidentiary use may be 
made of the suspect’s pre-trial silence during custodial interrogation or 
of the accused’s silence or failure to testify during the trial.1179 
The application of these principles facilitates effective protective 
mechanisms in matters of criminal law nature. Their application is especially 
useful at the demise of flexibilities entailed in employment law which is semi 
contractual in nature. 
 
1174 Gompers v United States 233 US 604 (1914) at 610, the interpretation of 
constitutional provisions is to be gathered ‘not simply by taking the words and a 
dictionary but by considering their origin and the line of their growth. 
1175 Hoffman v United States 341 U.S. 479 (1951) at 486 and Counselman v Hitchcock 
142 U.S. 547 (1892) at 562 hold that ‘the privilege is as broad as the mischief against 
which it seeks to guard’. Counselman was partly overruled by Kastigar v United States 
406 US 441 (1972) at 455. 
1176 Quinn v United States 349 US 155 (1955) at 162 notes that no magic language is 
required to assert the privilege which is effectively invoked by any language which the 
court should reasonably be expected to understand as an attempt to claim the privilege. 
1177 Kastigar v United States supra note 30 at 444. 
1178 Miranda v Arizona supra note 11 at 444 citing Escobedo v State of Illinois 378 US 
478 (1964) at 490n14. 




5 2 1 The United States of America extension of the principle against 
self-incrimination to civil law  
In McCarthy v Arnstein,1180 privilege against self-incrimination was 
extended to all cases, both criminal and civil. All civil matters that solicited 
an investigated individual to be subjected to criminal liability called for the 
invocation of individual privilege against self-incrimination. The case of 
Andresen v Maryland1181 in pursuit of the McCarthy principle, unleashed a 
new perspective in the United States of America and the need for the 
protection of subjects of investigations. The Star Chamber perspectives 
compelled subjects of investigations to confess their guilt and incur 
compulsory incrimination.1182 Historically, privilege against self-
incrimination was concerned with the protection of incriminating documents 
or coerced incrimination.1183 
Following McCarthy and Andresen, it was decided in Butterfield v State 1184 
that, the application of the Fifth Amendment that no person can be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is extended 
to any civil proceeding—be it administrative, judicial, investigatory or 
adjudicatory. In order to assert this privilege, it was held, what is of concern 
is the questions asked and not the type of proceeding. 
 
5 2 2 The application of the Fifth Amendment clause in employer 
criminal investigation and disciplinary hearings  
The system marshalled in the United States of America distinguishes 
between classes of investigations not done by law enforcement agencies. 
These include investigations where the incident under investigation may be 
 
1180 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
118149 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976).  
1182 Andresen v Maryland 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976) 
1183 Andresen v Maryland 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976) 
1184 Butterfield v State, 992 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). 
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criminal in nature and those where the incident is a purely civil matter. More 
caution is taken when dealing with potentially criminal matters. 
The United States of America precedent is based on the application 
of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution which states that: 
‘No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.’ In Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,1185 it was 
held that the application of this principle was extended to all States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As Andresen v 
Maryland1186 reveals, this principle does away with the procedure that 
compels subjects of investigation to admit their guilt leading to compulsory 
incrimination from the suspect’s own testimony and personal records. The 
application of this principle does not discriminate between criminal and civil 
proceedings if the suspect or the witness precludes self-incrimination.1187  
The assertion of this principle does not depend on the nature of the 
proceedings. It can be invoked in civil, criminal, administrative or judicial, 
investigatory or adjudicatory proceedings. The nature of the protection is 
not discriminatory on the process; it all depends on the question.1188  
The Supreme Court cases of Garrity v. New Jersey,1189 and Gardner v. 
Broderick,1190 decided against the involuntary waiver of the constitutional 
right to silence by virtue of employment. The court held that the objective of 
this constitutional right is the protection of individuals from coerced self-
incriminating testimony. With particular reference to administrative criminal 
investigations, the court held that even though it is not compulsory to 
caution an employee of this right before testifying, the employee must be 
given immunity against self-incriminating testimony in future criminal trials, 
 
1185 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Followed in M alloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Spevack v. 
Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
1186 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976). 
1187 McCarthy v Arndstein 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
1188 Butterfield v State, 992 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). 
1189 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
1190 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
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if the employee happens to give any testimony during the internal 
investigation.1191 
 
5 2 3 South African fair dismissal perspective for employee criminal 
suspects compared to the United States perspective 
Compared to the United States, which shares similar foundational 
constitutional perspectives on fairness, South African labour law is still 
lagging. Unlike the United States of America, South Africa does not offer or 
enforce constitutional protective measures for suspects of crime, where 
such suspects are employees appearing before a disciplinary hearing. The 
law leaves employers with wide and uncontrolled discretion. As seen earlier 
in South Africa, the epitome of dismissal based on criminal misconduct is 
employer discretion regarding the extent to which the employee has 
breached the trust the employer had on the employee.  
The employer needs not rely on statutorily specified legal rules in 
establishing reasons as to why the employee could be said to have 
breached employer trust. Mere allegations of criminality suffice; they need 
not be tested as constitutional criminal justice vouches. Unlike in the United 
States of America, South African labour law dismissals, disregard the 
application of the rights to remain silent and against self-incrimination even 
where criminal misconducts are an issue. It is seen from above that the 
United States of America has defined jurisprudence regarding the 
application of the right to silence even in employer criminal 
investigations.1192   
The relevance of the American jurisprudence cannot be denied as far as its 
persuasive application in South Africa. The South African fundamentals on 
 
1191 Garrity v. New Jersey  385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 
(1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 695; Bryson v. United States, 
396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87; Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308. The list is not exhaustive. 
1192 To name a few, see the reasoning in Garrity v. New Jersey  385 U.S. 493 (1967); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 
L.Ed.2d 695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308. 
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the rights to remain silent and the right against self- incrimination evolved 
from the same perspective as the American perspective. Theophilopoulos 
observes: 
Although the South African silence principle has been elevated to the 
status of a constitutional right, it is to all intents and purposes the 
evolutionary product of a utilitarian English common-law rule,1193and 
therefore likely to be influenced  by  English statutory developments.1194 
However, it should be noted that an essential element of the right to 
silence entrenched in s 25(3)(d) of the Republic of South African 
Constitution Act 200 of 1993 (interim Constitution) uses much the same 
language as  the American Fifth Amendment, as do several of the key 
terms incorporated into s 35(3)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the1996 Constitution).1195 1196 
 
It would, therefore, not be so far-fetched to borrow the nitty-gritty of the right-
to-silence application in employer dismissals from American jurisprudence.  
The difference in the application of this principle between South Africa and 
the United States of America is appreciated. According to the South African 
approach, the right to silence has two distinct rights, namely the right to 
silence which applies in pre-trial stages1197 and the right against self-
incrimination which applies as privilege during the criminal trial.1198 
American jurisprudence combines the right to silence and the right against 
 
1193See Theophilopoulos C 2003 SLR 161.  
1194 South African Law Commission Simplification of Criminal   Procedure — A More 
Inquisitorial Approach South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 89 Project 73 
(April 2001) suggests amending the right to silence along the lines set out by the English 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. See Theophilopoulos C (2002) 15 SACJ 
321. 
1195Section 25 of the interim Constitution, particularly s 25(3)(d): ‘. . . and not to be a 
compellable witness against himself or herself’. See also s 35 of the 1996 Constitution, 
particularly s 35(3)(j):‘.not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence’.  
1196 Theophilopoulos above note 869 at 516–517. Footnotes included. 
1197 See Theophilopoulos C 2003 2 SLR at 161, who explains that this becomes obvious 
not so much from a theoretical perspective, but when these rights are invoked in 
practice.  
1198See Theophilopoulos C 2003 2 SLR 161, who explains that this becomes obvious 




self-incrimination as one silence principle. It applies this principle in State 
and private office related investigations.1199 
In the light of the South African right to administrative justice which 
insists that similar principles of fairness, justiciability and reasonableness 
apply in justifying administrative action, regardless of whether 
administrative action emanates directly from the State or from private 
entities, it is reasonable to argue that the American jurisprudence’s1200 
explanation of the application of the right to silence as far as the exercise of 
State power is concerned, can well be used to explain the scope of  the 
application of rights against self-incrimination and silence on private power 
upon which employer criminal investigations are based in South Africa.  
In the light of the cautious approach that the United States of America 
adopted and bearing the fact that the Fifth Amendment emulates South 
African constitutional concerns expressed in section 35 of the Constitution, 
it is important to ponder and adopt a new perspective for South Africa. If 
you look at the positive consequences that brought the extension of the 
privilege against self-incrimination in the United States of America, it 
remains reasonable that South Africa extends the application of this right to 
cases of civil nature, including labour law criminal misconduct matters.  
 
5 3 The development of the right against self-incrimination in New 
Zealand 
In New Zealand, the right against self-incrimination has a status of a 
common law right. The case of Murphy v Waterfront Commission 1201 made 
 
1199 See, for example, principles in  Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gardner 
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 
695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 and Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 
308. 
1200 See, for example, principles in  Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967);Gardner 
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 
695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 and Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 
308. 
1201 378 US 52(SC) at 55. 
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it evident that the importance of the privilege against self-incrimination is, 
as stated, “a landmark in man’s struggle to make himself civilised.” 1202 
Armed with this privilege, a suspect was protected from an array of possible 
prejudices, for example, cruel dilemma of self-accusation; perjury or 
contempt; exposure to intrusive accusatorial system manipulations; 
inhumane treatment and human rights violations; unfair inequalities and 
unbalanced exercise of power; and unfair intrusions of privacy and 
exposures to illegal persecutions.1203 It is because of these qualities that 
privilege against self-incrimination withstood the test of reforms.  
In the same vein, the New Zealand Law Reform Commission made several 
observations regarding this privilege to leave it as it applied under common 
law.1204 In common law, privilege against self-incrimination prevented a 
litigant’s exposure to criminal prosecution, civil penalty and civil 
forfeitures.1205 This background excluded employment investigations in 
private sector from requiring employees to disclose information in the 
course of proceedings.1206 It was found that it would be dangerous to 
expose employees to self-incrimination because the prosecution has a 
potential to rely evidentially on the findings contained in an employer’s 
investigation without obtaining evidence through prescribed fair 
measures.1207 Additionally, the prosecution could successfully reject the 
argument that answers to questions obtained in an employer’s investigation 
are inadmissible because they were involuntarily secured. 1208 
They would base their argument to reject the opposition, on the very fact 
that an employee was under no obligation to make statements contrary to 
 
1202 378 US 52(SC) at 55. 
1203Murphy v Waterfront Commission 378 US 52(SC) at 55. 
1204 Law Commission The Privilege against self-Incrimination (NZLC PP 25,1996) AT 
29-30. 
1205 Blunt v Park Lane Hotel Ltd 1942 2 KB 253 at 257; 1942 All ER 187 at189. 
1206 Goddard J 2011 Canterbury Law Review 251-282, at   258.  Also see Couch T “The 
Right to Silence” in Employment Law Conference Nov 2002 New Zealand Law Society 
Wellington 2002 91 at 97. 
1207 R v Dawson 2004 2 NZELR 126 CA. 
1208 R v Dawson 2004 2 NZELR 126 CA.  
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their interest while ignoring the fact that employees are non-professionals 
as far as legal understanding is concerned.1209  
The adoption of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act of 1990 (NZBORA) and 
the subsequent affirmation of the New Zealand’s commitment to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guaranteed privilege 
against self-incrimination as a human right.1210 
 
5 3 1  The effects of the Employment Relations Act of 2000 (The ERA) 
on Common Law Right Against Self-incrimination 
The guaranteed privilege against self-incrimination as a human right 
transpired into direct amendments to the employment relations. Through 
the enactment of the ERA New Zealand introduced privilege against self-
incrimination into dismissal proceedings. 
Among its provisions, the ERA requires that employees and employers be 
responsive and communicative in establishing and maintaining constructive 
relationships.1211 It thus prescribes the duty of good-faith principle.  
In New Zealand, the duty of good-faith principle is understood to be a 
broader expression of employee and employer trust relationship. It thus 
embeds the duty of good-faith in a wider scope than the common law 
implied duty of trust and confidence.1212 Although they both relate to the 
same objective, New Zealand statutory good-faith principle ensures that 
there is no possibility that the parties may contractually expel it as they can 
do with implied obligation of mutual trust and confidence.  
As mentioned earlier, 1213  the implied obligation of mutual trust and 
confidence is formulated as a result on matters of fact and not on matters 
 
1209 R v Lane 2005 2 NZERLR 172 CA. 
1210 Goddard J 2011 Canterbury Law Review 251-282, at 255.  
1211 Section 4(1A) (b). 
1212 See Goddard J 2011 Canterbury Law Review 251-282, at 261.    




of law.1214 The same principle was later accepted in law as an implied term 
in every employer and employee contract.1215 It seems its volatile nature led 
New Zealand to the enactment of its progeny-duty of good-faith principle.  
The enactment of duty of good-faith principle has influenced the common 
law privilege against self-incrimination. It posed a question as to whether it 
has abrogated this right to the extent that employees cannot refuse to 
divulge self-incriminating information before disciplinary hearings or during 
employer investigations for dismissals based on criminal misconducts.1216 
 In light of section 60 (3) of the Evidence Act of 2006, there is no blanket 
answer to this question. According to this section, privilege against self-
incrimination may be abrogated by necessary implication. It provides no 
explicit implication for the abrogation of privilege against self-
incrimination.1217 This poses a nebulous approach prone to many 
interpretations.1218 Among the possibility, is that it could be argued that on 
the basis of duty of good-faith the employer may be tasked to not force the 
employee to provide incriminating information and the likelihood of which 
may end up in police custody. 
The provisions of the ERA therefore do not remove the common law 
protection against self-incrimination. The employee criminal suspect still 
has the protection to refuse answering any incriminating question. In Sharpe 
v Chief of the New Zealand Defence Force,1219 the court held against the 
submission that an employee cannot refuse to participate in an employment 
 
1214 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84. As well, read Reynolds F 
2015 ILJ 262. 
1215 See cases of Woods v W.M Car Services (Peterborough) Ltd [1981] ICR 666 and 
Courtaulds Northern Textiles Ltd v Andrew [1979] IRLR 84. As well, read Reynolds F 
2015 ILJ 262. 
1216 Goddard J 2011 Canterbury Law Review 251-282. 
1217 Regarding the need for explicit provisions for abrogation of human rights in The New 
Zealand read R v Pora 2001 2 NZLR 37 CA at 50. In this case, Justices Tipping and Elias 
held against implied abrogations. They held that “it was improbable that where human rights 
are affected Parliament would by a side wind do what it has not done explicitly.”  
1218 See Regal Castings v Light body 2008 NZSC 87; 2009 2 NZLR 433 per Tipping J 
and McGrath J and read Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board 1984 1 NZLR 394 CA per 
McMullin J.  
1219 Auckland AA 101/10,4 March 2010. 
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investigation due to the duty of good faith. It was clarified that Parliament 
could not have intended that the duty of good-faith overrides section 23(4) 
of New Zealand Bill of Rights (NZBORA) or the common law right to 
silence.1220 
 
5 3 1 2 The South African fair dismissal perspective for 
employees’ criminal suspects compared to the New Zealand 
perspective 
South Africa like New Zealand has common law privilege against self-
incrimination. It also elevated this privilege to a constitutional right and 
entrenched it in the Bill of Rights.1221 In the same note South African labour 
law observes the employee and employer trust relationship. In fact, the 
basis of the contract of employment is interpreted to be one of trust. If the 
employee becomes dishonest, that activates the employer’s concern and 
therefore investigatory processes leading to dismissal.1222 South African 
jurisprudence expresses that the breach of trust principle is at the higher 
pedestal than the right against self-incrimination. In effect, the employer 
bears no duty to observe involved employee’s rights as mandated in New 
Zealand.  
The employer in South African labour law is legally clothed with wide 
discretion including the choice not to observe both of natural justice 
principles. The employer simply needs to give the employee an opportunity 
to answer to the allegations and would not be deterred by employee raising 
a concern regarding employee’s right against self-incrimination. Since the 
employer only needs to afford the employee an opportunity to be heard, 
nothing else is required from the employer, if the employee insists on the 
 
1220Sharpe v Chief of the New Zealand Defence Force ERA Auckland AA 101/10,4 March 
2010. 
1221 Inferred in section 35(1)(a);( b);(c) and section 35(3)(h);(j) of the South African 
Constitution. In effect, the right against self-incrimination is maintained by observing all 
other rights referred to in these subsections. 
1222 Refer to chapter two para 2 2 1 1, on the definition of criminal misconducts in labour 
law. As well see chapter three para 3 2, on the theoretical implications of LRA disciplinary 
processes for criminal misconduct. 
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right against self-incrimination and does not answer to the allegations, the 
employer can proceed with the process of disciplinary hearing and the 
employee stands to lose. 
It is submitted that this total ignorance of individual interests in labour 
matters involving criminal misconducts is in effect an antithesis of what the 
South African Constitution stands for.1223 The Constitution has introduced a 
human rights-based perspective of law. To the effect that the Parliament 
cannot enact legislation that is contrary to this constitutional objective. Like 
New Zealand, it is argued in this thesis, that South Africa has to relook at 
its interpretation of fairness in labour matters based on matters of criminal 
misconducts. 
 
5 4 The development of the right against self-incrimination in the 
United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, the origins of the right against self-incrimination are 
associated with several schools of thought.1224 Although different in 
perspective as to what initially triggered the formulation of this principle, they 
have a common understanding regarding its rationale. They maintain it 
surfaced from deep historical contours—against oath ex officio that 
supported purely inquisitorial criminal processes but for accusatorial 
criminal processes that supported the principle, “nemo tenetur seipsum 
prodere, or no one is obliged to accuse himself.”1225 The rationale for this 
principle is the same as the second leg of the natural justice principles of 
fairness explained in the previous chapter—the  Nemo judex in propria sua 
causa rule. It was established earlier that the application of Nemo judex in 
 
1223  Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146; Burns Y 2002 SAPL  
283; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 12 BCLR 1593 (CC). 
1224 Some of these are the traditional view and the perspective on the ius commune. 
Read Helmholz R H 1990 Ius Commune 964; Moglen E1994   92 Mich. L. Rev 
1086,1087, as well as, Langbein J H 1993-1994 Mich L Rev 1047, 1047 together with 
Helmholz R H 1990 NYU l Rev 962 964. 
1225 See Trainor A S 1994 FILJ 2139-2186 at 2144. 
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propria sua causa in labour law criminal investigations is jurisprudentially 
shunned in South Africa.1226  
 
Like the current South African employer criminal investigations’ purely 
inquisitorial procedure supported the investigation of a suspect in secret and 
required that suspects swear under oath. In addition, the judges in 
inquisitorial systems had wide discretions; their powers were unlimited 
because they acted as accusers, prosecutors and presiding officers.1227 A 
similar circumstance is apparent in employer criminal investigations and 
hearings for dismissals for employees who committed criminal 
misconducts. Within the United Kingdom common law, the basic form of the 
privilege against self-incrimination gives individuals freedom from 
compulsory self-accusation.1228  
 
5 4 1 Privilege against self –incrimination as a human right in the 
United Kingdom and its application in employment matters 
At the hype of the adoption of a human rights-based approach to law in the 
European Union, the United Kingdom (UK) did not lag.  Among other 
provisions that influence the continued observation of the right against self-
incrimination in the UK, was Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). Article 6 reads as follows. 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the 
press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the 
interest of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private 
 
1226 See cases cited in chapter one para 1 2 Statement of the Problem. Avril above note 
6 at 838 and at 1652; Mohammed v Chicken Licken 2010 31 ILJ 1741 (CCMA) para 
5.3.1; Smit v Nashua East London 201031 ILJ 1751 (CCMA) at para [13]. 
1227 Read Charles H Randall Jr 8 SC LQ 417 420 421 1956.  
1228 See Trainor A S 1994 FILJ 2139-2186 at 2143-2144.  
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life of the parties so require, or the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would 
prejudice the interests of justice. 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent 
until proved guilty according to law. 
Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum 
rights: 
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and 
in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; 
(b) to have adequate time and the facilities for the preparation of his 
defence; 
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own 
choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, 
to be given it free when the interests of justice so require; 
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain 
the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the 
same conditions as witnesses against him; 
(e) to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand 
or speak the language used in court.1229 
 
The essence of Article 6 serves amongst others to protect individuals’ rights 
against self-accusation including the right against self-incrimination. In 
consonance to this understanding, MacCulloch 1230 writes:   
 the Article does not directly address the privilege against self-
incrimination but guarantees that in the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. The privilege is seen as being an 
integral part of that right.1231  
 
1229  Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
1230 MacCulloch A 2006 Legal Studies 211-257 at page 228. 
1231 MacCulloch A 2006 Legal Studies 211-257 at page 228. 
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MacCulloch’s exposure triggers a further explanation as to whom indeed 
Article 6 applies to. Does it indeed only refer to criminal charges as 
understood in the South African CPA? To answer this question the 
Jurisprudential opinions of the European Court of Human Rights are of 
assistance. 
Subject to the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence, the meaning 
of “criminal charge” is more than the eye perceives. This privilege applies 
to subjects of criminal persecution hence the decision in Serves v 
France1232 that,  
…[the] concept [criminal charge] is autonomous [and] has to be 
understood within the meaning of the Convention and not solely within 
its meaning in domestic law. It may thus be defined as “the official 
notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an 
allegation that he has committed a criminal offence,” a definition that 
also corresponds to the test whether “the situation of the suspect has 
been substantially affected…1233 
 
It is argued from the perspective adopted in this thesis that criminal 
misconduct allegations fall within criminal charges in the context of Serves 
v France1234holding. Very close to this reasoning is the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court unanimous ruling in R (on the application of G) 
(Respondent) v The Governors of X School (Appellant).1235  In order to 
decide the matter, the Supreme Appeal Court had to consider the 
applicability of Article 6 in employment dismissals. Consequently, it held 
that, “Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the right to a 
fair trial, is engaged in internal disciplinary proceedings if they will have a 
 
12321999 28 EHRR 265. 
1233 1999 28 EHRR 265. 
1234 1999 28 EHRR 265. 
1235 2011 UKSC 30. 
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“substantial influence” on future proceedings, which are likely to determine 
a civil right.”1236 
According to the European Court of Human Rights,1237 determination of a 
person’s civil rights means “proceedings the result of which is decisive for 
private rights and obligations.” 1238 These are proceedings which are 
“directly decisive” of the right in question to which Article 6 applies and not 
those which have a “tenuous” or “remote” consequence.1239 Such 
proceedings include circumstances in which initial proceedings do not in 
themselves determine a civil right1240 but are closely linked to subsequent 
proceedings, which do. Alive to this thesis is a circumstance created in the 
employer criminal investigations and subsequent disciplinary hearings to 
dismiss employees suspected of criminal misconducts. The employer 
processes will substantially affect the subsequent prosecution of the 
employee based on the same facts and evidence before the employer 
processes. To determine the link between the current and subsequent 
processes, the following factors are considered; 
 
…[W]hether the first proceedings are in fact dispositive of the later 
proceedings; how close the link is between the two proceedings; 
whether the object of the two proceedings is the same; and whether 
there are policy reasons for holding that article 6(1) should not apply in 
the first proceedings.1241 
 
 
1236 R (on the application of G) (Respondent) v The Governors of X School (Appellant) 
2011 UKSC 30. 
1237 (“ECtHR”) in Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455.  
1238 (“ECtHR”) in Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) (1971) 1 EHRR 455. 
1239 In Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 1, the ECtHR 
[36]-[59]. 
1240 A civil right is an enforceable right or privilege, which if interfered with by another 
gives rise to an action for injury. See Wex Legal Dictionary 
Http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/civil_rights.[accessed 28/06/2018]. 




In light of this reasoning, it ought to be tested whether the current 
proceedings could substantially influence any future proceedings. 
Implementing this concern to employer disciplinary processes, it would be 
inquired as to whether the employer criminal investigations and consequent 
disciplinary hearing processes for employees suspected of criminal 
misconducts, could have a substantial influence on the subsequent criminal 
proceedings. The answer to this would be in the affirmative. To give an 
example, as seen in cases cited in chapter four,1242 the criminal proceedings 
in one way or the other are based on the same evidence as the evidence 
collected through informal means by the employer. In most cases, the 
employer condemnation affects the employee’s right to being presumed 
innocent until proven guilty.1243 
 
5 5  The South African fair dismissal perspective compared to the 
United Kingdom perspective 
The South African procedural law is in fact the English common law 
procedure in most respects. In effect, South Africa and England have the 
same common law.1244 The common law privilege against self-incrimination 
has the same rationales for both South Africa and England. In contrast to 
the United Kingdom, the South African application of privilege against self-
incrimination, however, seems to be restricted to criminal matters following 
criminal procedure processes. Regardless of the Constitutional Court 
decision that the right against self-incrimination does not discriminate 
between civil and criminal matters,1245 matters of criminal law nature 
 
1242  Chapter four at par 4 3 1 on the parallel nature of criminal misconducts dismissal 
processes. 
1243 See S v Mateke and Mabaso CASE NO: A 120/2015 and the Case of Minister of              
Police v RM M & Safety and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council Case no: JR56/14. 
1244 Schreiner M C The Contribution of English Law 27. Monyakane above note 9 at 32 
reiterates that, the common law of South Africa is a “mixture of English and Roman Dutch 
law.” 
1245 At the inception of the South African Constitution in Ferreira v Levin N O & Others 
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at paragraph 96. In the case of S v Krejcir and Others 2016 2 SACR 




seeking remedies through civil procedural processes seem to be excluded 
from the application of this privilege. Evident to this perspective is employer 
criminal investigations processes and employer disciplinary hearings on 
employees who have committed criminal misconducts discussed in 
chapters three and four.1246 
 
5 6  Conclusion 
In the midst of slight developments and therefore limited research sources, 
this chapter has come up with possible approaches adopted in the three of 
common law jurisdictions when dealing with criminal misconduct 
dismissals.1247 It has shown that in these jurisdictions, negation of the 
principle against self-incrimination is opposed and employer investigations 
and disciplinary hearings are urged to respect the fairness principles 
engaged in matters of criminal law nature. These jurisdictions operate in a 
perspective that is different from the current South African labour law 
perspective discussed in the previous chapters and yet they have a similar 
common law which embraced principles of natural justice including the right 
against self-incrimination and recently developed the application of these 
principles to employment law. Considering the legal developments made on 
the European and other common law countries which share common law 
with South Africa, there is hope that it will not be difficult to develop the law 
in the same manner in South Africa and for such a transformative position 
to gain traction. The anticipated developments seem immutable because 
South Africa shares similar common law principles, therefore the basics 
upon which to develop are already in place as a bedrock of justiciability. In 
this adventure, South Africa will not be beginning on a clean slate but will 
 
171 (CPD), Obiter confirmed that amongst other rights, the application of the right 
against self-incrimination does not discriminate between criminal and civil matters. He 
held that, “The privilege which the witness has is not limited to criminal or civil trial 
proceedings.”  
1246 See jurisprudence on fairness in employer criminal investigations and hearings for 
employees’ criminal suspects’ dismissals. Refer to chapter three and chapter four.  
1247 The United Kingdom; New Zealand and United States of America. 
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observe and confirm the advantages and solutions brought by the 
extensions on the application of the right against self-incrimination in civil 
law.   
Observation of the right against self-incrimination in employer criminal 
investigations and dismissal hearings as an embodiment of the principle 
against self-condemnation will enable the recognition of many other 
constitutional rights entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution.1248 It is 
hoped that this development will help influence the regime of fairness in 
employer disciplinary processes for dismissal of employees suspected of 
criminal misconducts. It will also improve the processes engaged as well as 
the standard of proof from a simple balance of probabilities standard.1249  
Using chapters one, two, three and four as the basis, the following chapter 
is a conclusion and observes possible avenues to correcting the anomalies 
brought by the ignorance of proportionality when dealing with investigations 
and disciplinary hearings of employees who are suspected of criminal 
misconducts.  
 
1248  In Ferreira v Levin N O & Others 1996 1 SA 984 (CC) at para 79, it was held that 
for the principle against self-incrimination to hold the standard of proof observed is 
of importance. The balance of probabilities was not preferred but the proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The centre to this is observation of principles supporting 
proportionality in matters of criminal law nature.  
1249 Consider S v. Zuma and Others 1995 2 SA 642 (CC); 1995 4 BCLR 401 (CC) at 
para 10. Per Kentridge AJ where he acknowledges that proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is the standard of proof applicable in maintaining the right against self-




Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
6 1 Conclusion 
In line with the research questions and aims, the thesis has managed to 
expound on the right to fair labour practices, regarding the discipline of 
employees who have committed criminal misconducts. It has shown that it 
is through section 23 of the Constitution and the enactment of the LRA, that 
the application of the right to fair labour practices entailing the right to fair 
dismissal were entrenched. In line with the main research question and the 
main objective, this thesis illustrated how the right to fair dismissal was 
practicalised in employer criminal investigations and hearings for dismissals 
of employees suspected of criminal misconducts.  
Through reference to Industrial Court jurisprudence, the thesis expounded 
on how common law founded the right to fair labour practices. It went further 
to show how the Industrial Courts’ expression of just cause became adopted 
through the entrenchment of the right to fair labour practice in sections 23 
and 33 of the Bill of rights. In addition, the thesis has shown how the 
enactment and subsequent implementation of the LRA Act regarding 
dismissals based on criminal misconducts negatively affected the fair 
dismissal of employee criminal suspects which was prior to that practiced 
by the Industrial Court.  
The Industrial Court based its decisions on both principles of natural justice. 
The extent to which the LRA as an outflow to the South African 
transformative constitutionalism succeeded in facilitating the transformation 
of fair labour practices in South Africa was explicated. It was discovered that 
within the right to fair labour practices, the right to fair dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts was misinterpreted. Also 
observed in this thesis, is that current interpretations of fair dismissal need 
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improvements to accommodate section 35 of the Constitution provisions of 
fairness in the investigation and dismissal of employee criminal suspects.  
The thesis established that there is interrelationship between section 23(1) 
of fair labour practice rights and the Bill of Rights in South African 
Constitution, especially the rights in sections 33 and 35 of the Constitution 
encompassing the rights of employees suspected with criminal 
misconducts. The thesis located the right to fair labour practices within 
constitutional transformative objectives in the Preamble, section 1, 8, 9, 33, 
35, 39 and 195.  
The thesis assessed that the constitutional principle of justification for 
employer investigation procedures and hearings processes for dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts bears its foundations in the 
principles of natural justice. It was found that common law courts including 
the Industrial Courts battled to develop jurisprudence that observed both 
natural justice principles of fairness. 
This thesis observed further that this struggle amongst others, influenced 
the entrenchment of the wide constitutional principle of fairness. Such 
influence is also extended to the historical foundations of section 23 (1) of 
the South African Constitution.  
The application of section 23(1) rights was found to be ignoring common 
law natural justice principles of fairness ensconced in section 35 of the 
Constitution read with that of just cause ensconced in section 33 of the 
Constitution and operationalised through the PAJA. The ensued 
jurisprudence negatively affects the interpretation of what constitutional 
fairness in cases of dismissals based on employees’ criminal misconducts 
ought to be. The thesis found out that theoretical underpinnings of employer 
criminal investigative powers and adjudicative powers for disciplining 
employee criminal suspects was mainly to satisfy the employer rights to 
flexibility, which was identified as a progeny of the common law principle of 
implied breach of trust between the employer and the employee as opposed 
to employee criminal suspects rights entrenched in section 35 of the 
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Constitution and principles of fairness entrenched in section 33. It was found 
out that the common law principle of implied breach of trust between the 
employer and the employee is a simulated principle which is not a legal 
principle as such. 
 It was also argued that section 35 of the Constitution expresses the 
constitutional mandate for the fair treatment of criminal suspects and 
therefore fairness with respect to employees who committed criminal 
misconducts. As a matter of law implied, breach of law cannot supersede 
the principle of fair treatment of criminal suspects ensconced in section 35 
of the Constitution. 
 The thesis observed that there is an interlink between the investigation and 
disciplinary processes against the employee, who has committed a criminal 
act and the ultimate determination of criminal liability in the subsequent 
criminal trial proceedings. It then argued that the impact of ignoring the 
observance of section 35 rights, especially the rights against self-
incrimination in employer criminal investigations and subsequent criminal 
disciplinary hearings, on the subsequent criminal trial is unconstitutional. It 
was argued that the unconstitutionality is even more evident in the light of 
an interlink that exists between fairness in section 23(1) and section 33 of 
the Constitution. It was found that the labour law jurisprudential 
interpretation of the LRA supports the view that section 145 of the LRA 
categorises legislation in consonance with the PAJA review standards 
umbrella. It was argued that the operationalisation of section 23(1) through 
the employer criminal investigation and subsequent criminal disciplinary 
hearing would observe section 33 fairness demands as mandated by the 
Constitution and could not ignore the expression of wide constitutional 
fairness entailing the observation of both natural justice principles.  
The thesis argued that the principle of justiciability entrenched in section 33 
of the Constitution ensures that power is exercised within constitutional 
justification. It was found out that fairness measures encapsulated in labour 
law jurisprudence on employee criminal misconducts does not currently 
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derive measures from sections 33 and 35 constitutional fairness principles 
intended for justification. For example, the ignorance of principles 
underlying section 35 in matters of criminal law nature also ignore 
constitutional justiciability principle. 
The thesis found out that there are exigencies related to the ignorance of 
measures from section 35 constitutional fairness principles intended for a 
matter of criminal law nature when dealing with criminal misconducts. It 
argued that South African labour law jurisprudence on dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts reflect these flaws. The 
thesis suggested possible resolutions to the identified possible flaws. It 
recommended that international jurisprudence on the dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts be utilised in order that South 
Africa develops the law to remedy the identified fairness.  
The explained attempts satisfied the thesis objective of investigating how 
employers' criminal investigation procedures and disciplinary hearing 
processes in cases where the investigated misconducts are criminal acts 
and are dealt within section 23(1) fairness. 
The thesis therefore argued for constitutional redefinition of the involved 
procedures and processes with the aim of culminating a clear and well-
defined constitutional equity measure of justice which emulates the 
previously envisaged Industrial Court equity perspective on labour 
disciplinary processes based on common law fairness principles of natural 
justice. 
The international jurisprudence of the United States of America, New 
Zealand, and United Kingdom on the application of the employee criminal 
suspect’s right against self-incrimination has been argued for as a hopeful 
idea for development of the current employer investigation processes and 
hearing procedures for dismissal of employees who have committed 
criminal misconducts.   
The South African law of dismissal regarding criminal misconducts has 
been shown to be not adopting defined legal principles for matters of 
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criminal law nature. As such, the law has been proven volatile to procedural 
manipulations. It was shown that this state of law leans more on procedural 
prejudices than being mechanism towards expected constitutional labour 
practices explained in chapters one, two, three, four and five. In the middle 
of this problem is the State of South African law in general, namely that 
South Africa has a compartmentalised justice system as shown in cases 
discussed in chapter four. 
It was argued in chapter four that the South African justice system is 
demarcated into civil and criminal justice systems. In some instances, as 
shown in chapter three, these demarcations prove disadvantageous. As 
shown in chapter three, in situations where matters of criminal law nature 
are decided in terms of civil prescripts constitutional objectives are 
sacrificed to the extent that such decisions could be expressing a 
constitutional taboo. 
 It was explained in chapters one, two, three and four and five that South 
African justice system pertaining to matters of criminal law nature vouches 
constitutional compliance because the Constitution is the epitome of all 
jurisdictive decisions. All jurisdictive decisions in matters of a criminal law 
nature ought to comply with the principle of proportionality emphasised in 
section 35 of the Constitution. As shown in chapter three, the measure of 
reasonableness in labour law fairness matters ought to be within the 
prescripts of section 33 of the Constitution read with the Constitutional 
transformative principles in the Preamble, sections 1,8,9,23,33,35 and 
section 195 of the Constitution. Obvious to the South African constitutional 
objectives is the implied sections 8 and 39 cumulative interpretation of 
constitutional clauses as opposed to piecemeal expression of constitutional 
clauses illustrated in chapter three jurisprudential expression of section 
23(1) of the Constitution.  
In chapter three, it was argued that clause 23(1) cannot be interpreted 
without observing sections1,8,9,33,35,39 and 195 of the Constitution. It was 
argued in chapter five that the solution for the current problematic 
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jurisprudential interpretation of section 23(1) objectives could be found in a 
system that has shifted away from a mode of justice strictly 
compartmentalising civil and criminal processes.1250 Through illustrations 
derived from recent case law dealing with criminal misconduct dismissals, 
chapter four has exposed the dilemmas ensued in the South African narrow 
approach. 
An example of a reformed model used in the United States of America; New 
Zealand and United Kingdom was shown in chapter five. This model 
opposes a strictly compartmentalised system and vouches an all-inclusive 
system. It differentiates employer investigations and exercises more caution 
where the formal bodies for investigations are not tasked with the 
investigations, but instead different authorities and employers are engaged. 
These include investigations where the incident under investigation may be 
criminal in nature as well as those where the incident is a purely civil matter. 
Even greater caution is taken when dealing with potentially criminal matters.   
It was seen in chapter five that for purposes of finding justice for employees 
suspected of criminal misconducts, the section 35 constitutional rights 
afforded to criminal suspects are ought to be taken seriously. The American 
precedent, for example, has been exposed to firstly place at the centre, the 
application of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The 
Fifth Amendment put emphasis on the application of natural justice 
principles discussed in chapter one and chapter two.1251 Secondly, as 
shown in chapter five, the application of these principles in the United States 
of America; New Zealand and United Kingdom does not discriminate 
between criminal and civil proceedings. If the dismissal proceedings are in 
fact dispositive of the later criminal proceedings, the employee suspected 
 
1250 The discussed jurisprudence in The United States of America; The United Kingdom; 
and The New Zealand which are commonwealth states bearing similar basics on labour 
law principles with South Africa. 
1251Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). Followed 
in M alloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967) and 
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Also see Andresen v. Maryland 49 L.Ed.2d 
627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976). 
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of a criminal misconduct apprehends self-incrimination as soon as the 
employee is called to answer to the employer charges.1252  
Thirdly, the assertion of this principle does not depend on the form of the 
proceedings but the nature of the subject matter of the proceedings 
because the right against self-incrimination is invoked in civil, criminal, 
administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory proceedings dealing 
with matters of criminal law nature. 
Fourthly, the nature of protection is not discriminatory on the process 
followed because its application depends on the question posed.1253 As 
argued earlier, the relevance of the United States of America; New Zealand 
and United Kingdom jurisprudence on dismissal of employees suspected of 
criminal misconducts cannot be denied. It is persuasive in South African law 
bearing section 39 of the Constitution provisions. Marked by their similar 
human rights constitutional concerns, the South African, United States of 
America; New Zealand and United Kingdom fundamentals on the rights to 
remain silent and the right against self- incrimination evolved from the same 
perspectives.  1254  
Even Theophilopoulos1255 recognizes the evolutionary similarities of the 
South African constitutional rights against self-incrimination in section 35 of 
the Constitution with the United States of America; New Zealand and United 
Kingdom as common law-based states. He identifies the historical origins 
of the right of protection against self-incrimination as emanating from the 
utilitarian English common-law rule and having cascaded into the United 
States hence and reflected in The Fifth Amendment of the constitution of 
the United States in a similar language as that in section 35. He therefore 
 
1252 McCarthy v Arndstein 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
1253 Butterfield v State, 992 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). 
1254Theophilopoulos above note 869 at 516–517. 
1255 Theophilopoulos above note 869 at 516–517. As well read Theophilopoulos C 2003 
SLR  161. Read with Theophilopoulos C 2003 SLR 161 and  South African Law 
Commission  In Simplification of Criminal   Procedure — A More Inquisitorial Approach  
South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 89 Project 73 (April 2001) suggesting 
an amendmend of the right to silence along the lines set out by the English Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. As well See Theophilopoulos C 2002 SACJ 321. 
320 
 
acknowledges that this right, regardless of its inclusion in the South African 
constitution, is susceptible to the influence of United Kingdom statutory 
developments. 
The thesis suggests that it would therefore not be so far-fetched to borrow 
the nitty-gritty of the right-to-silence application in employer dismissals from 
the international jurisprudence for purposes of developing a working 
employer–employee investigatory and disciplinary processes for dismissal 
in South Africa.   
It suggests further that even though the difference in the application of the 
natural justice principles relating to the right-to-silence between South 
Africa and these jurisdictions can be ignored as such, bears no major 
negative impacts.1256American perspective illustrates these differences. 
 
6 1 1  The United States of America’s perspective of the right to 
remain silent compared to the South African perspective  
As shown in chapter two, according to the South African approach, the right 
to silence has two distinct rights, namely the right to silence which applies 
in pre-trial stages1257 and the right against self-incrimination which applies 
as privilege during the criminal trial.1258 American jurisprudence combines 
the right to silence and the right against self-incrimination in one silence 
principle. It applies this principle in both State and public office related 
investigations as well as private law investigations as explained above. 1259  
The American idea cannot be much divorced from the South African 
understanding about the protection of individual rights from counterpart 
parties wielding extensive powers. If the exercise of powers within the South 
 
1256 See Theophilopoulos C 2003 SLR 2 at 161, who explains that this becomes obvious 
not so much from a theoretical perspective, but when these rights are invoked in 
practice. 
1257See Theophilopoulos above note 1296.  
1258See Theophilopoulos above note 1296.  
1259 See, for example, principles in  Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Gardner 
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 
695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 




African law could be explored, it will be seen that there is a possibility for a 
new perspective in labour law investigations where employers are waging 
massive powers against employees as seen in chapter three.  
In this respect, the Constitution can rightly be considered a major instrument 
for transformation in labour decision making. The exercise of every power 
whether private or public power in South African law is ought to be highly 
scrutinised and measured within constitutional prescripts of 
reasonableness, fairness, justification and lawfulness which are the centre 
principles explaining the rationale for natural justice.1260  
The operation of every power including employer powers exercised in terms 
of the South African law must be constitutionally monitored. This is with the 
aim of maintaining constitutional values of human dignity and equality. The 
constitutional monitoring of lawful powers aligns with the constitutionally 
elected wide interpretation of the Constitution1261 as opposed to the 
common law narrow interpretation of statutory powers1262 which could not 
cater for the growing sophistication of governance in the current times. The 
constitutional era vouches the importance of a more progressive 
interpretation of discretionary powers. At the centre, the Constitution 
protects the rule of law by ensuring that the Constitution should be supreme 
to the interpretation of discretionary powers so that individuals are protected 
from arbitrary decisions.  
Through the right to administrative justice as a human right, for example, 
individuals are constitutionally protected from the exercise of arbitrary 
powers.1263 To realise administrative justice within which the employer 
discretion falls, the Constitution demands that it should be essential to 
 
1260 Read sections 33 and 23 of the Constitution and section 145 of the LRA which in 
effect subject employer powers and discresions within constitutional values of fairness, 
reasonableness and justifiability. 
1261 Within sections 1,8,9,23,33,35 and 195 of the Constitution. 
1262 In accordance with positivists approach of law, that regarded law as what is covered 
within the four corners of the statute. No rationality whatsover of the law was referred 
to. 




confine administrative bodies exercising delegated powers to the 
observance of principles of natural justice, fairness, reasonableness and 
lawfulness so as to limit opportunities for the abuse of power.1264 In addition, 
the due process of law must be maintained through reasonable opportunity 
to challenge administrative action.1265 
The section 33 right to administrative justice demands lawful, fair and 
reasonable treatment of individuals by the administrative bodies. This offers 
flexible procedures for individuals to test administrative decisions before 
courts of law in terms of these principles. In order to give effect to the right 
to administrative justice as a human right, the PAJA1266 was enacted. In 
redefining administrative justice to transform discretionary powers from a 
prejudicial form of justice similar to the pre democratic system of 
discretion1267 under the parliamentary sovereignty – to one based on a 
culture of human rights within the constitutional demands. 
The objective of the Constitution in embracing sections that deal with the 
rules of administrative law (including the traditional principles of natural 
justice) was to remedy the anomalies of the pre-democratic era that 
 
1264  Section 33 of the Constitution. 
1265 Gellhorn Administrative Law and Process in a Nutshell 22. 
1266 Act 3 of 2000 [the PAJA]. This is in accordance with section 33(3) of the 
Constitution, which requires that national legislation be enacted to give effect to the right 
to administrative justice as a human right by providing for the review of administrative 
action by a court or, where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; by 
imposing a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsection (1) and (2); and by 
promoting an efficient administration. 
1267 According to Schreiner M C The Contribution of English Law 87, 
apartheid means separation or segregation-the keeping apart of the 
several races of South Africa. Sometimes the euphemism “separate 
development” is used instead, but the meaning is the same. Apartheid 
has a history going back to the earliest days of white settlement in 
South Africa. It has become more and more important in the life of the 
country during recent decades as all races have rapidly become more 
and more urban and industrialized, and as what used to be a natural 
and elastic practice for like to seek like has become a compulsory, hard 




prevailed in exercising potentially prejudicial powers like the LRA employer 
criminal investigatory powers.1268  
In urging justiciable discretion in exercising power and an awareness of 
proper administrative procedures, the Constitution aims at reducing the 
rigidity of administrative law by providing a proactive measure to monitor 
administrative power in all respects as soon as it is used.1269  
The Constitution further empowers individuals to participate in the 
enforcement of their rights without fear. Furthermore, the Constitution 
improves the position of the common law review of administrative decisions. 
Instead of being an inherent power of the Supreme Court, judicial review is 
now embedded in the Constitution. These improvements ensure individual 
protection and therefore liberty in civil governance.1270 
The Constitution appreciates the massive power of the office bearers 
against the individual who has no power and mitigates the disadvantages 
ensued in the inequity. In the light of the South African right to administrative 
justice which insists that similar natural justice principles apply in justifying 
administrative action against an individual who bears no power, regardless 
of whether it emanates directly from the State or from private entities, it is 
reasonable to argue that the international jurisprudence’s1271 explanation of 
the application of the right to silence as far as the exercise of employer 
power is concerned, can well be used to explain the scope of  the application 
of rights against self-incrimination and silence on private powers upon which 
employer criminal investigations are based in South Africa.  
 
1268 Section 33 read with section 195 of the Constitution; Beukes above note 98 at 12. 
1269 Sections 33 and 195 of the Constitution read with the Preamble and section 1. The 
Preamble sets the objectives of the Constitution while section 1 relates the 
constitutional values. The Preamble and section 1 are basic provisions to the 
interpretation of transformation provisions such as section 33 and section 195. Also see 
Beukes above note 98 at 12. 
1270  Akokpari J Governance and Politics in Africa 5.  Also see Chabal P in Political 
Domination in Africa  8. 
1271 See, for example, principles in  Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967);Gardner 
v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 L.Ed.2d 
695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 




The above explanation exposes that even in the current times under the 
Constitution, the twin principles of natural justice are of essence. A close 
examination of the basic elements of the right to administrative justice 
entrenched in section 33 of the Constitution reveals that the practicalising 
of constitutional principles aims at promoting fairness. Fairness1272 has 
therefore become the basis of constitutional objectives namely, respecting, 
protecting, promoting and fulfilling individual rights and freedoms. The same 
objectives are inferred in constitutional provisions of section 23(1), read with 
the Preamble, section1, section 8, section 9, section 33, section 35, section 
39 and section 195 of the Constitution. 
 
6 1 2  The application of section 23(1), read with sections 8 and 39 
respecting employees suspected of criminal misconducts 
It was discovered that the application of section 23(1) of the Constitution 
without the demands in sections 8 and 39 has led to devastating 
circumstances. First the secluded application of section 23(1) misinterprets 
constitutional objectives as far as employment law is concerned. As 
observed earlier, in terms of section 8 of the Constitution, private power 
relations must recognise and apply the rights in the Bill of Rights in day to 
day dealings. The observance of these rights need not discriminate 
between the legal classes of persons. It should apply to all relations, be it 
among natural or juristic persons or between both. Section 39 provisions 
also subject the courts; tribunals; the legislature and the executive to the 
same constitutional demand of observing entrenched human rights. When 
exercising disciplinary powers, the employer ought to act reasonably, fairly 
and justiciable. Secondly, that jurisprudence relating to dismissals based on 
criminal misconducts inclines to informal criminal procedure is against the 
employer’s duty to observe sections 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution in the 
 
1272  Baxter Administrative Law L B 482. Also see MacLean v The Workers Union 1929 
(1) Ch. 602, 624. 
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execution of fair dismissals. Thus, employers are acting against 
constitutional demands. 
Contrary to the above expectation, as explained earlier in chapter three, the 
current jurisprudence misinterprets constitutional demands. This 
interpretation is against the demand that the interpretation of legislation and 
development of the common law or customary law by courts, tribunals or 
forums must promote the spirit, purpose and objectives of the Bill of 
Rights.1273 Such interpretation as observed earlier, is against constitutional 
objectives and values entrenched in the Preamble and section 1 of the 
Constitution.1274 It is against the constitutional rationale of change of South 
African legal perspective from authoritarian to the realisation of 
constitutional transformative objectives which aim at a rights based decision 
making.1275 It therefore negates the rationales for the foundational principles 
of natural justice, later entrenched in the Bill of Rights and in particular 
section 35 of the Constitution. As it was pointed out earlier, section 35 
supports the nitty- gritties of fairness principles regarding criminal suspects. 
To attain the necessary change in labour law fair dismissal, it is 
therefore important that employers exercise criminal investigatory powers 
and powers to hold disciplinary hearings of criminal suspects in accordance 
with the constitutional call. When employers investigate, and discipline 
employees suspected of criminal misconduct, they must observe the 
constitutional rights of criminal suspects.  
The odds would be stacked against employee criminal suspects if the 
employers failed to observe their constitutional rights as criminal suspects. 
This assessment reveals that observing the constitutional expression in 
sections 8 and 39 during employer disciplinary proceedings would also call 
 
1273 See section 39 and also read Pharmaceutical Manufacture Association of South 
Africa In Re: The Exparte Application of the Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 674 
(CC) 49. 
1274 Chapter 1 of the Constitution entrenches the founding provisions that include 
supremacy of the Constitution.  
1275  Mureinik E 1994 SAJHR 31, 32; Klare K 1998 SAJHR 146, who extensively discuss             
the constitutional perspective in relation to the exercise of authority. 
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for the observance of section 35 of the Constitution. This in turn postulates 
that an employer with the power to investigate criminal misconducts and 
hold subsequent disciplinary hearings must observe the rights regarding 
criminal suspects entrenched in section 35 of the Constitution. As illustrated 
in chapter two, section 35 embodies wide constitutional principles of 
fairness entailing the twin principles of natural justice.1276 
 
6 2  Recommendations 
There is a major need for a radical reinterpretation of the right to fair labour 
practices especially the right to fair dismissal of employees suspected of 
criminal misconducts. The first step towards eradicating the 
misinterpretation of the right to fair dismissal for employees suspected of 
criminal misconduct is to reform the law that incorporates and facilitates 
such dismissal. The second step is to address the unjusticiable procedures 
adopted in the current processes of investigations and hearings of criminal 
misconducts. 
 
6 2 1 Enact legislation to control employer massive discretion 
Thus far, the law pertaining to dismissals, is found in the legislation annexed 
code. Codes are normally just guidelines aimed at enforcing the provisions 
of the main Acts of Parliament. Codes can be compared to soft law that can 
be changed in accordance with standards willingly adopted by the 
implementer of the provisions of the code. Codes are an expression of what 
the implementer finds suitable in the circumstances within which the 
implementation of the law itself takes place.  
The labour code, like other codes are just guides to the employer who must 
take steps and implement the constitutional right to fair labour practices 
including right to fair dismissal.  
The employer therefore chooses how to exercise discretion to dismiss 
based on criminal misconducts. The employer’s subjective decision is 
 
1276 At various paras in chapter two. 
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influenced by the circumstances of the case and the understanding of what 
the misconduct at hand means to the employment circumstances. The 
employer regards less than what another employer may take the 
misconduct to mean at its own institution.     
It was explained earlier that the right to fair dismissal with respect to 
employees who committed criminal misconducts is explicitly provided for in 
Chapter VIII sections 185, 186, 188 of the LRA read with Schedule 8 of code 
of good practice: dismissal, items 2,3,4 and 7. It was also explained that the 
major law is section 23 of the Constitution founded on the common law 
equity perspectives of the Industrial Court.  
The practical effect of these provisions is in the code of good practice given 
practical effect to employers. Employers are expected to administer 
compliance within the code of good labour practice but without statutory 
guidelines. Employers provide guidelines to employees regarding their 
relationship with the legislature.   
It is however wrong that the labour code does not provide a detailed 
standard of conduct for employers. Such excessive types of discretion 
coupled with the fact that employer discretion is based on flexibility 
principles emanating from simulated common law principle of implied 
breach of trust between the employer and the employee which can be 
applied,  however calls for stringent measures if employee criminal 
suspects’ rights are to be taken seriously. 
According to the Code, employers are responsible for the efficient 
management and administration of their institutions and the upkeep of 
discipline but within their discretionary powers. They may therefore, willi-
nilly supplement the code of good practice to provide for their unique 
circumstances and institutional objectives, in the circumstance if they wish 
to exclude employee rights, they may do so without any limitation. 
The purpose of the code is therefore the promotion of exemplary conduct in 
accordance with the employer’s discretion. While employers are guided 
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through soft law, employees can be declared guilty of misconduct without 
legislative means and be accordingly punished. 
This scenario as mentioned in previous chapters, escapes the bounds of 
constitutional reasonableness and justification expected from labour law fair 
dismissal for employee based on criminal misconducts 1277 A proper 
legislation that addresses a justified discretion in terms of the constitutional 
principles of justification against flexibility oriented employer discretion in 
matters of a criminal law nature should be enacted. That law will take regard 
of principles incorporated in section 35 of the Constitution including the right 
against self-incrimination. 
 
6 2 2 Invoke section 35 of the Constitution Rights in employee 
criminal misconduct matters 
It is without doubt that in order to avoid inequalities in treating criminal 
suspects, the investigatory and disciplinary hearings for criminal 
misconducts must observe individual rights. Employees suspected of 
criminal misconducts like other vulnerable categories of individuals must be 
clothed with section 35 protection against the massive hands of the 
employer.  
The investigatory and disciplinary hearings for criminal misconducts must 
observe individual rights. Employee criminal suspects must have the right 
to question the reasonableness, fairness and justiciability of powers 
exercised to their detriment before the courts of law. They must as well 
exercise their rights against self-incrimination. They must not be made to 
make criminal cases against themselves. They must be protected like other 
criminal suspects. They ought not to have to subject themselves to the 
arbitrary decisions of the employer. The extent of employer’s discretion to 
investigate criminal misconduct and hold disciplinary hearings must be 
legally monitored. 
 
1277  Section 33 reasonableness that takes regard of both principles of natural justice.  
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In any action that affects the employee criminal suspects, a clearly defined 
law embedded within constitutional objectives should guide the 
investigations and hearings.  
In order to attain equal treatment of employee criminal suspects with 
ordinary criminal suspects, both the employer and employee should 
observe the ethical values of fairness, reasonableness and lawfulness 
inferred in the CPA as well as in the PAJA.1278 Labour law should be 
reformed and be read to consist of a group of vital principles, which provide 
for what should be done and what should not be done to attain justice in the 
employer criminal investigatory and disciplinary hearings for suspects of 
criminal misconducts.  
The progressive discipline; and the wide employer discretion-oriented 
perspective, should be restricted. This approach as indicated in chapters 
two; three; four and five denotes a process that provides no control of 
employer power to ward off the possible dangers of abuse of power. It lacks 
respect for the protection of human rights under constitutionalism. This 
shows that, while the concept of fair dismissal has developed over time, its 
development and role have never been substantial even under 
constitutional dispensation. 
The current interpretation of the right to fair dismissal does not promote 
mechanisms that could control employer powers in protection of individual 
rights. It does not limit excessive power that could be exercised to the 
detriment of individual rights. In this way, employer criminal investigatory 
processes and disciplinary processes cannot be equated to the restoration 
of the basic principles of humanity associated with natural justice like it can 
be inferred in criminal justice processes under the CPA and PAJA.1279  The 
CPA and PAJA processes mark the protection of individual rights as the 
 
1278 These principles are basic to the principle of natural justice. 
1279 Locke J Two Treatises on Civil Government 10. Locke’s theory of law, (i) stipulates 
that the purpose of natural law theory is to explain the foundations and maintenance of 
legal order. (ii) emphasises the inalienable right of the people to establish the legal order 
to suit the protection of their general rights. 
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central aspect of justice. This in turn implies that the failure of labour law in 
promoting natural justice based criminal justice affects not only the 
maintenance of law and order, but its basic existence. 
With all these negative aspects regarding the current perspective of the right 
to fair dismissal, it is advisable to explore the approaches used in the United 
States of America, New Zealand and United Kingdom exposed in chapter 
five to reform the South African position. 
This is the responsibility of the legal fraternity in general, including the 
courts. First, employees facing criminal charges before their internal 
employers who are also investigating crimes must be knowledgeable that 
there are other constitutional rights at stake. The employees must be aware 
of their constitutional rights so that they are aware of what rights are at 
stake.  
Furthermore, investigators must be proactive and point out the gap 
concerning the lack of observation of involved rights when they are involved 
in employer investigations. The legislature must enact clear and precise 
laws to guide employers in their investigations and hearings. The law reform 
bodies must recommend the enactment of laws that are Constitution 
conscious. Where such laws were enacted before the coming into effect of 
the Constitution, the necessary amendments must be made as a matter of 
urgency. Disciplinary committees must always take the proper steps in the 
pursuit of constitutional justice objectives. They must pay regard to 
constitutional objectives while pursuing their own objectives to avoid 
unnecessary clashes between their internal investigations and 
constitutional rights. Commissions which deal with the litigation of cases 
based on criminal investigations, in which the due process of law was not 
followed, must be aware of this. 
 Justice by ambush must be discouraged at all costs, especially in the 
current era of the Constitution. All the stakeholders involved in the 
processes of employer criminal investigation and hearings for dismissal of 
employees suspected of criminal misconducts must be constitutionally 
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compliant. Exclusion of the second leg of natural justice principles that no 
one must be judged at his own cause, if not tailored within section 36 
exclusionary clause, remains illegal and therefore unconstitutional.1280 
 
6 2 3 Highlight the importance of considering the second leg of 
natural justice principles  
If the applicability of the second leg of natural justice principles is 
encouraged, South African labour law would become as progressive as its 
counterpart common law countries jurisprudence demonstrated in chapter 
five. In chapter five, it was observed that the United States of America; New 
Zealand and United Kingdom labour law position at the centre, the 
observance of human rights. As seen in chapter five, the United States of 
America as an example, considers the application of the Fifth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. The Fifth Amendment emphasises on the 
application of natural justice principles discussed in the previous 
chapters.1281 It is this perspective that promotes observance of 
proportionality in dealing with matters of criminal law nature. It was 
observed in chapter two that proportionality underscores all aspects of 
criminal justice.  
 
6 2 4 Remedy parallel criminal investigations 
As shown in chapter five, the application of the second leg of natural justice 
principles in labour law eliminates discrimination between criminal and civil 
proceedings as long as the suspect or the witness apprehends self-
incrimination.1282 By doing so the disunity between criminal and civil 
employment law that causes massive problems as seen in chapter four is 
 
1280 Exclusion of self- incrimination privilege Harold Bernstein and Others v L. Von Wielligh 
Bester NO and Others 1996 4 BCLR 449; 1996 (2) SA 751 para [3].  
1281See the American cases of Murphy v Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 
378 U.S. 52 (1964). Followed in M alloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Spevack v. Klein, 
385 U.S. 511 (1967) and Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). Also see Andresen 
v. Maryland 49 L.Ed.2d 627, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976). 
1282 McCarthy v Arndstein 266 U.S. 34 (1924). 
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eliminated.1283 When an employee is not expected to make a case against 
itself, the principles underlying the rationale of criminal investigations will be 
followed. In doing this, the gathering of evidence will be made in accordance 
with the rationale of principle of proportionality explained in chapter two. As 
explained earlier, the principle of proportionality is fundamental to all 
aspects of criminalisation.   
 
6 2 5  Make a mandatory Use of natural justice principles across 
board proceedings 
The South African law in general must move away from a 
compartmentalised system to an all-inclusive system. In chapter five, it was 
shown that America has progressed by removing demarcations between 
civil and criminal law systems. America is, therefore, able to identify issues 
in dispute and align them to the law that provides justiciable remedies. 
American system distinguishes investigations and exercises more caution 
where the formal bodies for investigations are not tasked with the 
investigations. This is where a criminal matter is classified under civil law 
like in labour law matters. Instead of focussing on classification, they make 
the nature of issues the focus of dismissal disputes. Thus, enable the 
determination of the civil matter through the recognition of both natural 
justice fairness principles. 
 
 6 2 6  Eradicate discriminatory protection between employee 
criminal suspects and other criminal suspects 
For the legal protections not to be discriminatory against criminal suspects, 
the application of protective natural justice principles must depend on the 
question posed and not on whether the matter belongs to the civil or criminal 
justice system.1284 The major question in determining the existence of a 
 
1283 See chapter four para 4 3 and para 4 3 1 on the parallel nature of criminal 
misconducts dismissal processes. 
1284 Butterfield v State, 992 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Crim.App.1999). 
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criminal misconduct is to establish whether a criminal act was perpetrated 
by the suspected employee. The criminal liability concern should 
immediately prompt the need to investigate the employee criminal suspect 
and thus the application of natural justice principles.1285 
  
6 2 7 Explore the possibility for a statutory direct exclusion of 
privilege against self-incrimination  
Some South African courts decisions may suggest a possibility for a law 
that directly excludes privilege against self-incrimination.1286 However, there 
is no law that directly excludes the right against self-incrimination. 
It is possible to argue that in light of the current position of law, where there 
are no direct laws that exclude the application of natural justice principles 
used in criminal investigation, when the employer engages in criminal 
investigations, the perspective followed in the United States of America; 
New Zealand and United Kingdom employment law jurisprudence seen in 
chapter five is a better perspective. In the same way as it happens in these 
common law jurisdictions, South Africa must approach matters involving 
criminal misconduct from their nature of being matters of criminal law 
nature. The application of section 35 of the Constitution principles is ought 
to be mandatory in criminal misconduct matters. 
We learned in the previous chapter that the American Supreme Court cases 
of Garrity v New Jersey,1287 and Gardner v. Broderick,1288 decided against 
the involuntary waiver of the constitutional right to silence by virtue of 
 
1285 Consider concerns raised in disregarding the potential for disproportionate punishment 
in Chong M D Fellows J and Richards F 2013 Sydney Law Review 379, 381-2. Read the 
rationales for considering the right against self-incrimination in employment law matters of 
criminal law nature in Serves v France 1999 28 EHRR 265; Ringeisen v Austria (No 1) 
(1971) 1 EHRR 455; In Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v Belgium (1981) 4 EHRR 
1, the ECTHR. Compare with Newaj K 2016 THRHR 429-442 at 433 on the impact of 
dishonesty constituting criminal misconduct. Read these together with chapter five of this 
thesis and chapter two at para 2 2 4 1 dealing with the theory of proportionality and its 
extent of application in criminal misconduct discipline.  
1286 Harold Bernstein and Others v Von Wielligh Bester NO and Others 1996 4 BCLR 
449; 1996 2 SA 751 para [3]. 
1287 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
1288 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
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employment. The court held that the objective of this constitutional right is 
the protection of individuals from coerced self-incriminating testimony. With 
particular reference to administrative criminal investigations, the court held 
that even though it is not compulsory to caution an employee of this right 
before testifying, the employee must be given immunity against the self-
incriminating testimony in future criminal trials if the employee happens to 
give any during the internal investigation. 
It was seen in chapter five that the United States of America, which 
shares similar foundational perspectives with South Africa, has advanced 
as far as the application of rights to remain silent and against self-
incrimination are concerned. While South Africa is still lagging, the United 
States of America; New Zealand and United Kingdom have advanced in the 
sense that employers investigating employee criminal misconducts operate 
under a defined jurisprudence entailing the right to silence and against self-
incrimination. As far as South Africa is concerned, the developments shown 
in the United States of America; New Zealand and United Kingdom 
jurisprudence calls South Africa to align with these developments.1289 
 
6 3 Questions for further research and the need for way forward 
research 
The major concern relates to questions regarding the parallel nature of our 
legal system. There are current international transformational steps towards 
deciding cases by first looking at the nature of the cause of action as 
opposed to classification into criminal and civil.  South Africa must follow 
suit and engage in research that breaks the criminal and civil systems 
dichotomy as a long-term objective. For short term purposes, South Africa 
must review the labour law fair dismissal principle in light of dismissals 
 
1289 To name a few, see the reasoning in Garrity v. New Jersey  385 U.S. 493 (1967); 
Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968); Lachance v. Erickson, 118 S.Ct. 753, 139 
L.Ed.2d 695; Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64; U.S. v. Wong, 431 U.S. 174; U.S. v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43; Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308. 
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based on criminal misconducts and come up with a new law that 
accommodates the right against self-incrimination. 
There is also a need to research on dismissal and misconduct in order to 
establish theories that underly these two interrelated concepts. It has been 
established in this research that misconducts are of a different species. 
Without much research to interpret misconducts, it becomes difficult to 
easily identify different types of misconducts and differentiate them. Due to 
this lacuna in research, it is challenging to come up with justiciable 
approaches in dealing with dismissals based on different species of 
misconducts. 
There is a need for more research entailing a comparative study on the 
legality of employers' investigative procedures and disciplinary hearing 
processes with specific reference to dismissal of employees based on 
criminal misconducts in South Africa. South Africa must be compared with 
other African states as well as European states. African states and 
European states comparative study may serve as pioneer to this study 
because these states share basic human rights principles. Both African and 
European states whose common law employment law foundations are 
similar may avail research areas that could give answers to lacunas in their 
respective employment laws. It is as well important to do such a study on 
African states, especially commonwealth states whose common law is of 
the same foundations as the identified European states. This research can 
be possible especially because South Africa and other African states 
respect human rights that are also respected in other European states. It is 
such availability of human rights in European states that helped with further 
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